

THE
DESPATCHES,

MINUTES, AND CORRESPONDENCE,

OF THE

MARQUESS WELLESSEY, K. G.

DURING HIS ADMINISTRATION IN

INDIA;

EDITED BY

MONTGOMERY MARSH

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I N T R O D U C T I O N.

The first volume of the Marquess Wellesley's despatches, &c., contained the documents relating to the origin of the war in Mysore, and to the series of measures and events which terminated in the death of Tippoo Sultaun, and in the occupation of his capital and kingdom by the British forces. This volume contains, in a similar form, the proceedings of the Marquess Wellesley, which followed the reduction of Mysore down to the commencement of the Mahratta war. The contents of this volume may be enumerated in the following order.

The settlement of Mysore, as explained in the documents noted beneath.*

The treaties of Hyderabad arose out of the settlement of Mysore.†

The discoveries made in the palace of Seringapatam, disclosing the treachery of the Nabobs of the Carnatic, led to the final settlement of that part of India, on the principles detailed in the treaty of 31st July, 1801,‡ which, together with a similar arrangement in Tanjore,§ placed our territories in the south of India on a footing of permanent tranquillity, prosperity, and security.

* Letters, &c. numbered 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 15, 16, 23, 24, 26, 45, 107; the treaties of Mysore, page 26, of Seringapatam, p. 43, and in the Appendix, p. 736.

† See letters No. 41, 73, 79, 102, and Appendix, p. 709 and 726.

‡ Nos. 1, 69, 70, 72, 133, 134, 136, and Appendix, p. 720 and 740.

§ No. 69, and Appendix, p. 705.

The settlement of Oude, so essential to the security of our north-west frontier, after a protracted negotiation with the Vizier Saadut Ali Khan, terminated in the conclusion of the treaty of cession under date 10th of November, 1801.*

The settlement of Surat was effected on a principle corresponding with that of the Carnatic and Mysore, by a treaty concluded with the Nabob of Surat, under date 13th of May, 1800,† and with the Guicowar, by articles of agreement dated 6th of June, 1802.‡

A treaty with the Rajah of Nepaul, under date 30th of October, 1801,§ placed our alliance with this frontier state on an amicable basis.

The political and commercial treaties with Persia afforded a check to Zemaun Shah.||

The policy pursued towards the Peishwa and Mahrattas is detailed in the documents specified.¶

The Egyptian expedition, by which the combined troops of England and of India co-operated in the delta of the Nile for the expulsion of the French army from the East, was a useful sequel to the destruction of the French influence at Hyderabad and in Mysore.**

The foundation of a collegiate establishment at Fort William for the instruction of the civil servants of the East India Company is explained in the following documents.††

* See letters, No. 20, 40, 44, (p. 145,) 47, 48, 64, 69, 109, 110, 124, 126, 135, 137, 139.

† No. 57, and Appendix, p. 708.

‡ See Appendix, p. 728, 729, 730, 731. § p. 726.

|| No. 29, and Appendix, p. 715 and 717.

¶ See letters, No. 6, 10, 18, 26, 32, 36, 54, 69, 78, and 90.

** No. 30, 42, 43, 62, 63, 69, 71, 80, 81, 83, 84, 98, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 111, 113, 114, 117, 118, 120, 122, 123, 125, 127, 135, 136, 137, and Appendix, 753, 755, 758, and 759.

†† Letters, &c. No. 39, 85, 86, 87; Appendix, p. 732 and 738.

The measures adopted for the regulation of the private trade of India appears in the several papers noted below.*

The rebellion of Doondiah Waugh,† in which the Duke of Wellington (then Colonel Wellesley) distinguished himself by his able conduct and brilliant successes, is so fully explained in his Grace's despatches‡ as to render a repetition in this work unnecessary.

The Poligar insurrection§ which resulted from the fall of Mysore was temporary in its duration and circumscribed in its operation.

The finances,|| taxation,¶ and police** of India required and received the minute attention of the Governor-General. The naval and military armaments assembled at Trincomalee for the conquest of Java, Mauritius and Bourbon, were subsequently employed in the expedition to Egypt, but the policy of the measure was fully recognized by the Marquess Wellesley's plans being carried into execution before the close of the war.††

The power vested (for the first time) in the Governor-General,‡‡ as Captain-General of the Forces, gave his Lordship full authority over all military operations. The reduction of the military charges on the ratification of the peace of Amiens,

* No. 60, 69, 94, and Appendix, p. 736.

† See Nos. 31 and 78.

‡ See Vol. I. of the Duke of Wellington's despatches, p. 52, 56, 60, 66 and 79. § No. 45 and 183.

|| No. 56 and 59. ¶ No. 69. ** No. 69.

†† Admiral Rainier doubted the power of the Governor-General to send an expedition against the French islands without special orders from home, and refused to proceed thither with the ships under his command. The authority assumed by his Lordship on this occasion was afterwards approved by the King's Government at home. See Lord Hobart's letter, No. 185, and the Marquess Wellesley's Letters to Admiral Rainier in the Appendix, p. 753.

‡‡ Letter, No. 121.

is shewn in the Governor-General's letter to General Lake,* and the intended resignation of the Marquess Wellesley of the Indian Government, is announced in his Lordship's letter to the Court of Directors, dated 1st of January, 1802.†

Goa, to prevent its intended occupation by the French, was garrisoned by British troops.‡

The murder of the Persian ambassador at Bombay (20th of July, 1802), and the Governor-General's declaration to the surviving relations and attendants of that nobleman§ is detailed as below.

The papers relating to Ceylon,|| and several other matters referring to the Governor-General in his public capacity, required insertion in the present work.

The army engaged in the war in Mysore presented to the Marquess Wellesley a star formed of the diamonds captured at Seringapatam; it was declined by his Lordship on public grounds; the army presented it to the Court of Directors, under whose authority the Governor-General accepted it.¶

The prize taken at Seringapatam was very considerable: the Governor-General ordered the immediate distribution of a large part of it among the troops employed in the war, reserving however the ordnance, ammunition, and military stores until the pleasure of his Majesty and the Court of Directors could be received.**

It was proposed by Mr. Dundas and the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the East India Company to grant £100,000 out of the sum thus reserved to the Marquess Wellesley. His Lordship declined this proposition as injurious to the interests of the army.†† A pension of £5,000

* No. 168.

† See 166 and 172.

‡ Letters, Nos. 38, 39 and 167.

§ Letter, No. 130, and p. 668.

|| No. 130, and 185.

¶ Nos. 52, 170 and 171.

** No. 14 and 15.

†† Nos. 75, 76, and 93.

INTRODUCTION.

per annum for twenty years was afterwards granted to his Lordship.*

The King was graciously pleased to express his Majesty's royal pleasure at the co-operation of the Indian army with his Majesty's forces, and those of the Ottoman Porte in Egypt,† and the Grand Seignior conferred the order of the Crescent on the Governor-General and on Major-General Baird.‡

The third volume will contain the account of the Mah-ratta war, down to the peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.§

* No. 108.

† Nos. 185 and 186.

‡ No. 187

§ The Editor has much pleasure in renewing his thanks to N. B. Edmonstone, Esq. for his continued kind and most valuable assistance in the preparation of the present work. Mr. Edmonstone's aid has been more particularly useful on account of his having filled the important offices of Persian Translator, and Secretary to the Government in the Secret Political and Foreign Departments with so much credit during the greater part of the period of these memorable transactions.

London, August, 1836.

ERRATA.

- p. 12, fourth from bottom—for *of* read *to*.
- 24, letter, No XIII.—for *Lord*, read *Earl of*.
- 52, letter XIX. fourth line from end of letter—adventures may *be*, read adventurers may *become*.
- 56, letter XXI. line 8—for *gave*, read *give*.
- 80, last line—for *or* union, read *nor* union.
- 83, line 10—for *has*, read *had*.
- 86, line 9 from bottom—for *most*, read *more*.
- 91, line 5 from top, for *into*, read *to*.
- 129, line 10 from bottom—for *of forward*, read *of the forward*.
- 162, end of 3rd paragraph—for . put ?
- 184, last line but one from bottom—for *Most Noble*, read *Right Honourable*.
- 231, paragraph 4, line 17—for *those*, read *they*.
- 244, line 6, reverse bracket.
- 452, letter CXV line 10, after India, omit semicolon.
- 640, line 19 from top, for *Governor*, read *Government*.

CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

No.	From	To	Date.	Page.
21	Anstruther, Sir John, Chief Justice .	Earl of Mornington do.	. 25 June 1799 . . 24 Jan. 1800 .	56 194
57	Do.	The Marq. Wellesley do	. 31 Aug. — . . 17 Nov. 1801 .	370 610
91	Do.	do	. 22 Feb. — .	455
164	Do.	do	. 28 May 1799 . . 25 Feb. 1801 .	16 456
118	Baird, Major-General	Earl of Mornington	. 5 July — .	546
9	Clarke, Lt.-Gen Sir A.	The Marq. Wellesley	. 15 July — . . 2 Aug. — .	547 550
119	Clive, Lord .	Do.	. 14 Aug. — . . 14 Nov. — .	551 594
140	Do.	Do.	. 14 Sept. 1802 .	700
141	Do.	Do.		
142	Do.	Do.		
143	Do.	Do.		
157	Do.	Do.		
183	Do.	Do.		
Note	Commission appointing the Marquess Wellesley Capt.-General and Commander-in-Chief			. 6 Oct. 1797 .
51	Cowper, Hon. William	Earl of Mornington	. 1 Jan. 1800 .	466 169
35	Craig, Maj.-Gen. Sir J. H.	Do.	. 25 Sept. 1799 .	122
174	Dartmouth, Earl of	The Marq. Wellesley	. 9 April 1802 .	634
27	Dundas, Rt. Hon. Henry	Earl of Mornington	. 5 Aug. 1799 . Do.	101 107
28	Do.	The Marq. Wellesley	. 26 Sept. 1800 .	376
93	Do.	Sir Ralph Abercromby	. 26 Oct. — .	416
Note	Do.	The Marq. Wellesley	. 6 Feb. 1801 .	436
111	Do.	Do.	. 24 Sept. — .	571
148	Do.	Lords Com. of the Ad.	. 6 Oct. 1800 .	438
Note	Do.	Earl of Mornington	. 4 Nov. 1799 .	262
Note	Do.	Resident at Bagdad	. 11 May 1801 .	514
132	Edmonstone, N. B Esq	Earl of Mornington	. 16 Nov. 1799 . Do.	142 205
43	Elgin, Earl of .	Do.	. 20 Feb. — .	224
62	Do.	The Marq. Wellesley	. 11 Nov. — .	415
68	Do.	Do.	. 10 Mar. 1801 .	469
104	Do.	Do.	. 23 April — .	492
122	Do.	Do.	. 1 July — .	539
125	Do.	Do.	. 2 Sept. — .	565
138	Do.	Do.	. 18 Feb. 1802 .	633
145	Do.	Do.	. 1 May — .	638
173	Do.	Do.		
177	Do.	Lieut-General Harris	. 9 Nov. 1799 .	171
Note	Floyd, Major-General	General Order of the	. 17 Sept. — .	119
33	Governor-General	The H. Ct. of Directors.	. 18 Jan. 1800 .	174
54	Gov.-General in Council	Minute by the	. 19 Jan. — .	184
55	Do.	The H. Ct. of Directors.	. 23 Jan. — .	185
56	Do.	General Orders	. 2 June 1799 .	34
Note	Do.	Do.	. 26 Feb. 1801 .	468
Note	Do.	The H. Ct. of Directors.	. 9 July 1800 .	312
85	Do.	Notes on the foundation		
86	Governor-General's, the	of the Col. at Ft. Wm.	. 10 July — .	325
97	Do.	Minute by the	. 20 Oct. — .	397
Note	Do.	Do.	. 16 Dec. 1799 .	159
115	Do.	Do.	. 12 Feb. 1801 .	452
116	Do.	Do.	. 12 Feb. — .	453
124	Do.	The Vizier of Oude	. 5 April — .	474

No.	From	To	Date.	Page.
135	Governor-General's, the	Remarks on the Vizier of Oude's propositions .	2 June 1801	527
Note	Articles submitted	.	.	527
Note	Governor in Council of Fort St. George	.	.	.
175	Governor-General	Declaration of Minute by the Do.	27 July — 21 April 1802	553 636
181	Do.	Do.	16 Aug. —	672
2	Harris, Lieut.-General	Earl of Mornington	13 May 1799	7
14	Do.	Do.	7 June —	34
17	Do.	General Order of	9 June —	50
19	Do.	Earl of Mornington	15 June —	53
52	Do.	Do.	11 Jan. 1800	170
185	Hobart, Right Hon. Lord	Marquess Wellesley	18 Sept. 1802	700
176	Kaymakan, the	Do.	30 April —	637
47	Kirkpatrick, Lt.-Col. W.	Lieut.-Col. W. Scott	16 Dec. 1799	157
83	Koehler, General	Marquess Wellesley	9 July 1800	309
112	Lake, Lieut.-General	Do.	10 Feb. 1801	440
156	Lewisham, Rt. Hon. Lord	Do.	10 Nov. —	593
182	Macartney, Earl of	Do.	5 Sept. 1802	698
81	Morier, J. P. Esq.	Do.	28 June 1800	304
3	Mornington, Earl of	Lieut.-General Harris	14 May 1799	9
4	Do.	Resident at Hyderabad	17 May —	10
5	Do.	Hon. Colonel Wellesley	20 May —	10
6	Do.	The Resident at Poonah	23 May —	12
7	Do.	The Res. at Hyderabad	23 May —	15
10	Do.	Lieut.-General Harris	28 May —	17
11	Do.	Lieut.-General Stuart	1 June —	18
12	Do.	Commiss. of the Affairs of Mysore	4 June —	18
Note	Do.	Lieut.-General Harris	7 Nov. 1800	172
Note	Do.	Hon. Court of Directors	6 Aug. 1799	172
13	Do.	Lt.-Col. Kirkpatrick	5 June —	25
15	Do.	Rt. Hon. H. Dundas	7 June —	35
16	Do.	Commiss. of the Affairs of Mysore	8 June —	43
18	Do.	Colonel Palmer	12 June —	51
20	Do.	Lieut.-Col. W. Scott	18 June —	53
23	Do.	Capt. J. A. Kirkpatrick	30 June —	60
24	Do.	Colonel Palmer	4 July —	68
26	Do.	Hon. Court of Directors	3 Aug. —	72
29	Do.	Hon. Jonathan Duncan	5 Aug. —	110
31	Do.	Hon. Court of Directors	3 Sept. —	113
32	Do.	Colonel Palmer	16 Sept. —	118
34	Do.	Right Hon. H. Dundas	22 Sept. —	119
36	Do.	Right Hon. Lord Clive	2 Oct. —	124
37	Do.	Maj. Gen. Sir J. H. Craig	9 Oct. —	125
38	Do.	The Secret Committee	25 Oct. —	127
39	Do.	Right Hon. H. Dundas	24 Oct. —	128
40	Do.	The Vizier of Oude	5 Nov. —	132
41	Do.	Capt. J. A. Kirkpatrick	6 Nov. —	135
45	Do.	The Secret Committee	28 Nov. —	154
46	Do.	Right Hon. Lord Clive	12 Dec. —	157
53	Do.	Lieut.-General Stuart	12 Jan. 1800	173
58	Do.	The Secret Committee	25 Jan. —	195
59	Do.	Hon. Court of Directors	27 Jan. —	200
60	Do.	Right Hon. H. Dundas	29 Jan. —	202
61	Do.	Do.	30 Jan. —	203
64	Do.	The Nabob of Oude	9 Feb. —	208
66	Do.	Hon. J. Duncan	16 Feb. —	221
67	Do.	Do.	18 Feb. —	222
69	Do.	Right Hon. H. Dundas	5 Mar. —	225

No.	From	To	Date.	Page.
70	Mornington, Earl of	Right Hon. Lord Clive	26 Mar.	1800 . 249
72	Do.	Do.	7 April	— . 254
73	Do.	Do.	10 April	— . 258
74	Do.	Hon. J. Duncan	16 April	— . 259
75	Do.	Rt. Hon. Henry Dundas	29 April	— . 262
76	Do.	Mr. Pitt	29 April	— . 264
77	Do.	Rt. Hon. Lord Clive	3 May	— . ib.
22	Munro, Captain	Earl of Mornington	29 June	1799 . 58
Note	Mysore Commission			23
Note	Do. Treaty			26
1	Omdut ul Omrah, H. H.	Do.	13 May	— . 1
48	Oude, the Vizier of	Do	21 Dec.	— . 168
Note	Do. Treaty with	Do.	10 Nov.	1801 . 598
Note	Do	The Governor-General	14 Mar.	— . 474
87	Regulations for the	College at Fort William	10 July	1800 . 356
108	Resolutions of	The Court of Proprietors	15 Jan.	1801 . 423
44	Scott, Lieut.-Colonel	Earl of Mornington	22 Nov.	1799 . 145
Note	Do	Do.	20 Sept.	— . 481
Note	Seringapatam, Treaty of	Subsidiary	13 July	1799 . 43
25	Smith, Sir Sidney	The Governor-General	9 July	— . 70
42	Do.	Earl of Mornington	9 Nov.	— . 139
63	Do.	Do.	6 Feb.	1800 . 207
71	Do.	Do	5 April	— . 252
80	Do.	The Marquess Wellesley	27 June	— . 299
30	Smith, Spencer, Esq.	The Earl of Mornington	24 Aug	1799 . 111
50	Speke, the Hon. P.	Do.	1 Jan.	1800 . 169
49	Stuart, Lieut. Gen.	Do.	21 Dec.	1799 . 168
Note	Do.	Do.	6 Feb.	1802 . 628
65	Do.	Do.	16 Feb.	1800 . 219
8	Wellesley, the Hon. Henry	Do.	25 May	1799 . 15
146	Do.	Marquess Wellesley	6 Sept.	1801 . 567
158	Do.	Do.	Nov.	— . 596
179	Do.	Do.	5 Aug.	1802 . 666
78	Wellesley, Marquess	The Secret Committee	9 June	1800 . 266
79	Do.	Resident at Hyderabad	15 June	— . 275
82	Do.	Jonathan Duncan, Esq.	2 July	— . 305
84	Do.	Vice-Admiral Rainier	9 July	— . 311
88	Do.	Rt. Hon. Henry Dundas	13 July	— . 361
89	Do.	Court of Directors	18 Aug.	— . 366
90	Do.	Rt. Hon. Lord Clive	23 Aug.	— . 367
92	Do.	Do.	6 Sept.	— . 372
94	Do.	Hon. Court of Directors	30 Sept.	— . 376
95	Do.	Chairman of Ditto.	6 Oct.	— . 394
96	Do.	Vice-Admiral Rainier	13 Oct.	— . 395
98	Do.	Do.	22 Oct.	— . 399
99	Do.	Rt. Hon. Sir Geo. Yonge	24 Oct.	— . 405
100	Do.	Vice-Adm. Sir R. Curtis	24 Oct.	— . 407
101	Do.	Rt. Hon. Henry Dundas	25 Oct.	— . 410
102	Do.	Do.	26 Oct.	— . 413
103	Do.	Do.	5 Nov.	— . ib.
105	Do.	Hon. F. North	28 Nov.	— . 417
106	Do.	Rt. Hon. Lord Clive	1 Dec.	— . 418
107	Do.	Lieut.-Col. Close	24 Dec.	— . 421
109	Do.	Lieut.-Col. W. Scott	22 Jan.	1801 . 425
110	Do.	The Vizier of Oude	22 Jan.	— . 433
113	Do.	Maj.-Gen. Baird	10 Feb.	— . 440
114	Do.	Do.	10 Feb.	— . 451
117	Do.	Hon. Jonathan Duncan	16 Feb.	— . 454
120	Do.	Sir Ralph Abercromby	28 Feb.	— . 457
121	Do.	Rt. Hon. H. Dundas	7 Mar.	— . 466
123	Do.	Hon. Jonathan Duncan	19 Mar.	— . 471

No	From	To	Date	Page.
Note	Wellesley, Marquess	. Shereef of Mecca	19 Mar	1801 471
126	Do	. Resident at Lucknow	28 April	— 493
127	Do.	Earl of Elgin	6 May	— 505
130	Do.	Rt Hon H Dundas	10 May	— 509
131	Do.	Do.	10 May	— 513
133	Do.	Lord Clive	28 May	— 515
Note	Do.	The Nabob of Arcot	28 May	— 524
131	Do.	Lord Clive	31 May	— 525
136	Do.	Do.	4 June	— 533
137	Do.	Lieut.-Colonel Scott	15 June	— 537
139	Do.	Hon. Henry Wellesley	5 July	— 541
144	Do.	Vizier of Oude	14 Aug.	— 561
147	Do.	Hon Henry Wellesley	17 Sept.	— 571
149	Do.	The Secret Committee	28 Sept.	— 573
150	Do.	Hon Court of Directors	28 Sept.	— 576
151	Do.	Hon. Secret Committee	28 Sept.	— 578
152	Do.	Maj -General Baird	15 Oct.	— 584
153	Do.	Earl of Elgin	17 Oct	— 587
154	Do.	Hartford Jones, Esq.	20 Oct	— 589
155	Do.	Hon. Secret Committee	21 Oct.	— 590
159	Do.	Hon. Court of Directors	13 Nov.	— 597
160	Do.	Hon. H. Wellesley, and Lieut -Col. Scott	14 Nov	— 598
161	Do.	Vizier of Oude	14 Nov.	— 602
162	Do.	Hon. H. Wellesley	14 Nov.	— 604
163	Do.	The Secret Committee	14 Nov.	— 605
165	Do.	James Drummond, Esq.	20 Nov.	— 611
166	Do.	Court of Directors	1 Jan.	1802 614
167	Do.	Viceroy of Goa	17 Jan.	— 617
168	Do.	Lieut.-General Lake	8 Feb.	— 619
169	Do.	Do.	8 Feb.	— 624
170	Do.	Court of Directors	8 Feb	— 626
171	Do.	Lieut.-General Stuart	8 Feb.	— 628
172	Do.	Court of Directors	13 Feb.	— 629
178	Do.	Chairman of Ditto	5 Aug.	— 639
180	Do.	Do.	12 Aug.	— 667
184	Do.	Lord Clive	14 Aug.	— 701
185	Do.	Lord Hobart	2 Oct	— 702
186	Do.	Do.	2 Oct.	— 703
Note	Wickham, Mr.	Rt. Hon. Lord Grenville	13 Nov.	1800 417
128	Do.	Marquess Wellesley	9 May	1801 507
Note	Do.	Rt Hon. Lord Grenville	25 Jan.	— 507
129	Do.	Marquess Wellesley	1 Feb.	— 508

APPENDIX.

A.—Treaty of Tanjore, Nov. 26, 1799, p. 705. B.—Treaty of Surat, May 13, 1800, p. 708. C.—Treaty of the Deccan (Political), Oct. 12, 1800, p. 709. D.—Persian Treaty (Political), January, 1801, p. 715, Commercial Do. p. 717. E.—Treaty of Arcot, July 31, 1801, p. 720. F.—Treaty with the Rajah of Nepaul, Oct. 30, 1801, p. 724. G.—Deccan Treaty, Commercial, April 12, 1802, p. 726. H.—Guicowar Articles of Agreement, June 6, 1802, p. 728. I.—Statutes of the College of Fort William, p. 732. K.—Officers and Professors of the College, p. 735. L.—Letter from the Mysore Commissioners to the Governor-General, the Earl of Mornington, June 30, 1799, p. 736. M.—Notice of the Board of Trade, of the 5th of October, 1798, p. 736. N.—Extract from a Public Letter from the Court of Directors, to Bengal, May 25, 1798. O.—Report of Mr. Edmonstone, Persian Translator to the Government on various documents found in the Palace at Seringapatam, &c., April 6, 1800, p. 740 P.—Extract of a Letter from the Mysore Commissioners, dated Seringapatam, June 8, 1799, p. 753. Q.—Vice-Admiral Rainier, &c. Fort William, Feb. 5, 1801, p. 753. Ditto (Most Secret B), Feb. 5, 1801, p. 755. Ditto (Most Secret A), Feb. 10, 1801, p. 758 R.—Benares Address to the Marquess Wellesley, p. 759.

DESPATCHES,

MINUTES, AND CORRESPONDENCE,

&c. &c. &c.

INDIA.

No. I.

From His Highness Omdut ul Omra, Nabob of the Carnatic, to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Written the 7 Zelhege, 1213 Hegery,
or 13 May, 1799.

Having read your Lordship's letter of the 24th ultimo,* with great and serious attention, suitable to the importance of the contents, I shall return to it a fair and explicit answer; the candour and sincerity of my character, without a request from your Lordship would have induced me on this, as on all other occasions, to speak without disguise. I have an additional inducement however, for plainness of language and sentiment, in the earnest desire and manly example of your Lordship.

I acknowledge my Lord, that under certain circumstances, explained by the third Article of the Treaty of 1792, the Company are vested with authority to assume the Carnatic, and amongst other things empowered to collect the revenue, which it yields; and I confess, without regard to the consequence of that confession, that the assumption of the control over the affairs and revenues of my country, under the provision of the Treaty, would occasion a severe and heartfelt affliction; yet, if the time should arrive, which should render it necessary, that the Company avail themselves of the objects which that Article secures, I hope that Divine

Providence will endue me with fortitude, adapted to the necessity of the season, and the adversity of fortune, that I may make the sacrifice required of me, if not with cheerfulness, at least with dignity and resignation. And in performing this extreme act which the treaty enjoins (if it ever be demanded of me) I shall have a constant consolation in reflecting on the letter of the treaty itself, which stipulates that as soon as the exigency of the times which required the temporary exercise shall have been satisfied, that I shall be reinstated in all my privileges and authorities; and I should wrong your Lordship's honor, and slur the reputation of those whom your Lordship represents, if I could suspect for an instant, that whilst I was fulfilling every relation to the Company with fidelity and exactness, that they should hesitate on their parts to discharge their relative connective duties.

Possessing these avowed sentiments within myself, and this declared sense of the honor and justice of my allies, I have no disinclination of that strong and rooted kind which your Lordship would seem to indulge, so as to induce me to enter into any new arrangement, rather than conform myself to the provisions of the existing engagements. No, my Lord,—the treaty of 1792, was concluded under such happy auspices, and is calculated from its precision and clearness, to promote and maintain so good understanding between all the parties to it; and is, moreover, so recommended to my affections, by the loved and revered personages who framed it, that I could not for any personal inconvenience, were it ten times greater, so it were created by the treaty, consent that it should be altered even in a letter.

But your Lordship has submitted reasons apparently more cogent, why a new arrangement would be desirable; and these arise out of the supposed defect of the treaty itself, to ensure the objects which it had in view, and the probable deficiency of my means to fulfil hereafter the duties which it imposes.

I cannot overlook a circumstance, which in an affair of this sort, must naturally present itself to the mind of your Lordship; that the treaty which is now suggested to be defective, has had a trial, my Lord, of more than seven years, and without a single exception, has been found for that period,

not only sufficient for all common purposes, but has secured the fulfilment of every engagement stipulated in it, with a harmony uninterrupted, and perhaps I might add, almost unprecedented in any country or age. And if experience be the true test of human institutions, there can be nothing, my Lord, to apprehend of the competency of the treaty of 1792, to continue to the contracting parties to an incalculable date, that happiness, that security, and that universal good-will which it has hitherto produced.

But, my Lord, you have directed my observation beyond the present hour, and have informed me that your Lordship, and the ministers of his Majesty the King of Great Britain, whom may the Almighty preserve, have looked, and do still look with a politic care, and wise prudence, to future probabilities and events as they regard our mutual conditions, and that the prospect is terrifying.

I do not presume to know the grounds on which your Lordship has formed your opinion of the instability and uncertainty of my affairs, nor is it necessary that I should be acquainted with them. It is sufficient for me to know, that they are abundant enough to enable me to keep with punctuality my plighted faith. Your Lordship, however, has supposed, that from a difficulty to raise the kists, periodically payable to the Company, that I have been reduced to so great pecuniary distresses, that to provide a remedy for them, I have had recourse to measures, which I cannot bring myself to name; and that these measures in their expected consequences, may affect the interests of the Company, as connected with the treaty.

Your Lordship has a right undoubted, to expect an explanation of me, as to any public matter, which may regard the affairs of the Company as interwoven with my own; and I shall be happy on all occasions, as I am at the present opportunity, of answering that part of your Lordship's letter, which respects the alleged assignment of certain districts, set apart by the treaty of 1792, as a security for the Company on the possible occurrence of a described event; but as to any thing foreign to this, that may relate either to the internal management of my countries, or the government of my people, I must, on principles as obvious as they are just, decline to enter into a discussion.

The supposed assignment of the districts, alluded to by your Lordship, is stated as having been productive of the greater part of the mischief, which is lamented and deplored in your Lordship's letter, and as having laid the seeds of a more deadly and extensive ruin: and your Lordship relying principally on this, and on reasoning applicable to it, has suggested the necessity of a new arrangement. I am happy, my Lord, to offer an unqualified explanation of this alleged transaction; and I have a double motive to rejoice at the opportunity afforded by your Lordship, since it will serve to free my character and honor from the imputations which at present rest upon it, and will convince you, my Lord, that there are no substantial reasons, which must give your Lordship infinite satisfaction, for any apprehensions on this, or any other ground related with it.

I do most unequivocally assure your Lordship, on the word and faith of a sovereign, that no one foot of the Districts, set apart by the treaty of 1792, have been, or are in any manner or way, directly or indirectly assigned by me, or *with my knowledge to any individual whatsoever*; and having made this solemn and unreserved declaration, I would hope that I need not urge more.

But I have suffered, my Lord, so much from reports founded on an erroneous conception of my conduct in this particular, that I am unavoidably led to be more explicit perhaps, than might be expected by your Lordship. I have been represented, my Lord, to the world, and it were impossible to calculate how far I may yet be injured by it, unless I put a limit to the representation, to have notoriously mortgaged and assigned the Districts, pledged to the Company, and the manner of my doing it has been publicly and confidently spoken of and proclaimed. That the ill-will of those, who are inimical to my interests, may have no further pretence for their assertions, and that it may be unable further to operate to my prejudice on the enlightened mind of your Lordship, I shall briefly state the manner in which payments are made into my treasury from those Districts by the officers of my revenue department, and which are ordinarily said to give rise to the assignments in question; and it is in this simple way—

As my monthly kists require to be paid with regularity, and

as the expence and danger of the remittance of money in specie, from a distant country to the Presidency are great, my aumils, or managers, for the amount of their respective payments, procure bills from soucars for the particular sums to be remitted ; and these bills are indifferently purchased of native bankers, who may have money unemployed at Madras ! They are taken without reference to me, or to any connected with my durbar. They are paid in specie, or grain, and never superinduce an agreement of any sort to which I am made a party, directly, or collaterally. The transaction ends as it originates, with the managers and the soucars.

Having convinced your Lordship, as I would believe, that the evil anticipated by your Lordship of the expected failure of my resources to answer the exigencies of the treaty, can never happen from any of the causes mentioned by your Lordship ; and that the treaty in its operation, is capable of insuring all those advantages which it was designed to secure, I shall not enter, my Lord, into a detail of the new proposals founded on supposed circumstances, which I have shewn to your Lordship to have been without existence.

The wisdom and justice which pervades many parts of the arrangement proposed, I cannot but admire, as I have hitherto admired, all the public acts and propositions of your Lordship. They are the certain and avowed offsprings of a great and comprehensive mind ; and although I cannot so far accede to the measure, as to give it, inasmuch as regards myself, all the weight and authority of a treaty ; yet I shall endeavour, as circumstances allow, to observe the genuine maxims which your Lordship has used to enforce your proposals, and the conduct which they would inculcate.

You need not be told, my Lord, of the unconquerable and insurmountable obstacle in the way of any new engagement, which could not be overstepped without outraging every principle that should make engagements binding ; for your Lordship is not unacquainted that my revered and honoured father, with his departing spirit, entreated and enjoined me that I should not consent to the alteration of a treaty, which he had painfully concluded ; and I assured him on the most sacred obligation that religion imposes that I would obey

his dying commands. Does it remain for me to conjure your Lordship, by the nobleness of your own nature—by your filial piety—by the reverence you owe to God—by each and all of these, not to renew an application which I cannot accede to, without a breach of all moral and religious duties, and cannot listen to without reproach.

My Lord, Praise be to the Almighty God, that in consequence of your Lordship's wise and resolute measures, the strong Fortress of Seringapatam, which is equal to the wall of Alexander, and which has for a great length of time withstood all the attempts of other princes, has been captured, and the extensive country of Mysore restored to tranquillity and safety, by the annihilation of the disturber of that country. This has conveyed to my mind unspeakable joy and gladness. It was right that such a glorious victory, and the acquisition of such honourable advantages, should be derived purely from your Lordship's good fortune; and it will remain for ever on the records of time. Verse—"It is a happy plan that has succeeded, this affair has been effected by you, and is such as is done by the brave." The victories which my friends have obtained by Divine favour, has given the greatest joy to me who am their ancient ally, I consider them as an auspicious omen of my own happiness, and am persuaded that your Lordship will manifest your kindness towards me, especially in support of my rights. The talooks of Carrore, the two Sealams, and as far as Tungarpeatty, have always been dependencies on Trichinopoly. The father of Tippoo arrogantly usurped these talooks, I hope they will now be restored to me by your Lordship's justice. Another request that I have to make, and with which I trust your Lordship will not only be not offended, but that you will grant my desire is this—when friends acquire an immensity of power, those who are their sincere and ancient friends, are inspired with certain hopes of obtaining their wishes. The troops, for which I pay nine lacks of pagodas yearly, in the service of the Company, were employed with those of my friends in the reduction of the Mysore country. I trust, therefore, that I shall be allowed to participate in the conquered countries, in proportion to the sum I contribute for those troops, and that thereby through your Lordship's justice and equity, I

who have always followed the fortunes of my friends, and prayed for their acquirement of such successes, may obtain my wishes.

May your days be happy.
What more?

No. II.

From Lieut.-General Harris, to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Seringapatam, May 13th, 1799.

This morning Purneah, who has so long been at the head of the principal departments of the Mysore Government, and enjoyed the confidence of the late Sultaun, paid me a visit, having arrived last night from the army, which remained under his command.

After the customary ceremonies of an Eastern visit, Purneah stated, in reply to my questions concerning Futteh Hyder, and the reason of his absence, that prudence required the presence of a person of rank with the troops; but the Prince was ready to attend my summons. This led to farther conversation on the subject of the troops of the *Sircars*, still remaining in arms near Seringapatam, and produced from *Purneah* a direct proposal for an arrangement, by the adoption of which alone, in his opinion, the immediate restoration of order and tranquillity could be obtained.

The following is the outline of the Plan proposed.
1st. That one of the family of the late Tippoo Sultaun, should be placed at the head of the Government, to be established in this Country.

2nd. That the Prince should pay to the English such tribute as shall be agreed upon.

3rd. That the English troops shall garrison such Forts, as they deem necessary for the security of the Country.

Purneah further suggested, that Futteh Hyder should be the Prince selected, and under this arrangement, which he very strongly pressed on my consideration, he declared he would be responsible for the immediate settlement of the Country; and he intimated, through the discussion that he expected, as *Dewan*, to be charged with the administration of the revenues under the Government, which it was proposed to establish. He stated, that the troops who, under any other plan would, he feared, become a lawless banditti,

pillaging the country, and only to be quelled by force, would under this remain quiet, on the hope of future employment in the Service. The family of Tippoo Sultaun would be preserved in a respectable rank, and the power of the English established by an arrangement, the moderation of which, would do honour to the national character.

I informed Purneah in reply to his proposal, that my powers did not authorise me even to give an opinion on his plan, that I would state it to your Lordship; but that he must clearly understand, I made no promise regarding the event. I insisted that Futteh Hyder should immediately repair to Seringapatam; and waving the consideration of permanent settlement, requested him to suggest measures for the temporary arrangements of the remains of the Sultaun's army, and the re-establishment of order in the Country.

This, he said, was difficult, unless a prospect of the adoption of such a plan, as he had suggested was held out. About 3000 of the cavalry were he informed me, mounted on horses the property of the State; the men would not serve us; and although he thought his influence would be sufficient to cause their horses to be delivered up, together with the elephants and camels of the Sircar, which were also with his army; arrears were due to the troopers, and the persons employed to attend the horses, which they had a right to expect. The rest of the cavalry were Sillahdars, whose horses were their own; and whom it might be difficult to disperse at once, by dismission from the service, without the risk of great inconvenience to Government, and distress to the country from their licentious conduct; Meer Cummer ud Deen's party he informed me, had joined that now with Futteh Hyder.

After much discussion, it was agreed, that the proposal of *Purneah*, should be submitted to your Lordship's consideration; and that he should immediately receive an order from me, to deliver up the elephants, camels, horses, &c. the property of the State. That I should cause a small advance of money for the supply of their immediate wants, to be paid to the troopers and horse-keepers of the *Bargeer*, or regular cavalry; and that all Jagheedars, Sillahdars, &c. should be directed to return to the lands assigned to them respectively for their support, under the late Government, of which they should remain possessed until further orders;

restricting *at present*, their collection of the revenues of these lands, to the arrears of the last year only. This, as a temporary arrangement seemed satisfactory, and Purneah returned to his camp to put it in force.

In the course of conversation, the possibility of an arrangement was hinted, for the establishment of a Hindoo Government, in favour of the ancient family of Mysore, but *Purneah* cautiously evaded entering into this idea, in the slightest degree. The Mahomedan interest is so intimately blended with every department of the State in this Country, that no plan by which it is set aside in favour of an Hindoo Prince, could produce the very desirable effect of restoring tranquillity, and reconciling the troops, and most powerful class of the inhabitants to the change of Government.

I have the honour to be, My Lord,
Your most obedient and faithful Servant,
G. HARRIS.

No. III.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Harris.

Fort St. George, 14 May, 1799.

Having judged it necessary to entrust the conduct of all political affairs in Mysore, until my arrival at Seringapatam, or until further orders, to the exclusive management of my private Secretary, the honourable Mr. Henry Wellesley, and of my military Secretary Lieut.-Colonel Kirkpatrick, the services of the Commissioners appointed under my instructions of 22nd February are no longer required. That Commission is, therefore, now superseded.* I request you to express to the members of the commission my entire satisfaction in the zeal, ability, and discretion with which they have discharged the trust reposed in them in every part of their proceedings, of which I have hitherto been apprized.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

* The instruction conveyed in this letter, was not to take effect until the arrival of Mr. Henry Wellesley at Seringapatam, which will account for the apparent discrepancy of the letter dated May 20th 1799, [see next page] addressed to the members of the Army Commission, for a specific purpose.

No. IV.

The Earl of Mornington to the Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 17th May, 1799.

Although his highness the Nizam has unreservedly committed the interests of his government in the final adjustment of the concerns of the triple alliance to my charge, yet being desirous of consulting him in the present important conjuncture of affairs, as far as is consistent with a prompt and efficacious arrangement, I desire that you will, without delay, intimate to his Highness and the Minister my wish to be informed of their sentiments, not only with respect to the general arrangement of affairs in Mysore as affecting the combined interests of the triple alliance, but also with regard to his Highness's particular views and pretensions. You may assure his Highness of my entire disposition to meet his wishes to the utmost extent compatible with the general objects and interests of the alliance; and that it is with a view to consult his wishes, as far as may be practicable, that I now solicit his sentiments and opinion. You will obtain his Highness's and the Minister's reply as early as possible, and forward it, in duplicate, to me to Fort St. George, and to Seringapatam.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. V.

The Earl of Mornington to the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, and the Members of the Army Commission.

GENTLEMEN,

Fort St. George, 20th May, 1799.

I have great pleasure in expressing my entire approbation of the manner in which you have hitherto executed the powers entrusted to you. Unexpected circumstances, for which I could not make a particular provision, not only justified your deviation from the letter of my instructions, but would have rendered an adherence to their letter inconsistent with their spirit. You very properly considered that my first objects must be (as I had expressed it,) in all cases, the safety of the army, and the success of the expedition; and that

these important considerations must always be paramount to the strict execution of any special instruction.

I am desirous of learning the nature of all the steps taken to conciliate the various Leaders of Troops dispersed in Mysore. Effectual measures of conciliation are absolutely necessary to the restoration of tranquillity in the country, and to the establishment of a final arrangement.

I desire that you will immediately ascertain and report to me the condition of the late Sultan's family, and the characters, dispositions and views of his sons respectively, and their connections with parties and politics, either foreign or domestic.—This enquiry will naturally lead to the question, how far any of the sons of the Sultan had either entered into his views of establishing an alliance with France, or had disapproved them. The state of the family of the ancient Rajas of Mysore, and the characters and description of the persons composing it must also form an immediate object of your investigation to be reported to me.

It is also my wish to receive the opinion of the Commission with respect to the most eligible settlement of the Country of Mysore, in every possible view of that extensive and intricate question. I request, therefore, that you will, immediately, take this important subject into deliberation; if unanimous in your opinion, you will report it collectively; and if you should differ, you will each of you report your opinions separately, in writing, on the question, and transmit them to me for my consideration. As you may be assured of the most liberal construction, on my part, I shall expect that you will be perfectly unreserved in your communications and sentiments upon this momentous subject. My judgment is perfectly without prejudice on any part of the question, and I am anxious to learn the result of your observations, with a view to assist me in forming a correct opinion.

I will, however, state a few general points which may serve to explain the considerations requiring immediate attention in the examination of this question:

1st. That mode of settlement is to be preferred which shall unite the most speedy restoration of peace and order, with the greatest practicable degree of security for the continuance of both.

2nd. For this purpose not only the interests of the Company, but those of the Nizam, of the Mahrattas, and of the leading Chieftains in Mysore must be conciliated.

3rd. The Military power of Mysore must be broken; or absolutely identified with that of the Company.

4. Seringapatam must be, in effect, a British Garrison under whatever nominal authority it may be placed.

5. The Company must retain the whole of the Sultan's territory in Malabar, and also in Coimbatore and Daraporam with the Heads of all the Passes on the Table Land.

The 4th and 5th of these points are properly matters of detail, but I consider them to be so essential to the stability of any new settlement, that I have stated them here as fundamental articles in every possible view and modification of the question.

I have, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. VI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 23d May, 1799.

Although the Peishwa's conduct, since my declaration was signified to him has been such as to forfeit every claim upon the faith or justice of the Company, I have determined to allow him a certain share in the division of the conquered territory, provided he shall conduct himself in a manner suitable to the nature of his own situation and of that of the Allies, and shall not attempt to disturb the Settlement which I shall deem most expedient for the affairs of Mysore.

The Peishwa's sudden determination to take the field, accompanied by the tacit acquiescence of Scindiah, and by the orders which you state to have been forwarded to Purseram Bhow appears to me very suspicious. It is possible that before the 10th of May, the Peishwa might have been apprised of the fall of Seringapatam; and his own preparations together with the orders of Purseram Bhow, may have been intended to favour the seige of Bednore, or of some other part of the late Tippoo Sultaun's dominions, with the view of securing the dominions seized in defiance of the consent of

the Company and of the Nizam. Such a proceeding could not be viewed with indifference by me, and ultimately must prove injurious to the interests of the Peishwa, by compelling the Company to renounce his alliance altogether, and to recover, by force of arms, the territory so unjustly invaded. I desire that you will take the most effectual measures in your power to discover the intentions of the Peishwa with respect to the treacherous design which I apprehend him to have formed; and that you will employ such representations or other means as may appear to you most likely to prevent the execution of this design, if really entertained. You will apprise Lieut.-General Harris at Seringapatam, and Lieut.-General Stuart (now occupying the late Sultan's dominions on the coast of Malabar,) of any movement which you may apprehend from the Mahrattas towards the dominions of Tippoo Sultaun. It is almost superfluous to state to you that the whole Kingdom of Mysore, having fallen to the arms of the Company and the Nizam, is at present to be considered as a part of their Dominions by right of conquest, and consequently any invasion of the Kingdom of Mysore must be deemed, on the part of the Mahrattas, an aggression against both the other Members of the Triple Alliance. The Peishwa can derive no right to the conquered territories under an alliance of which he has violated both the letter and spirit. Whatever benefit he may eventually be permitted to derive from our recent conquest, will flow from the mere generosity and liberal policy of the British councils.

Although I have not yet completely arranged in my mind the portion of territory which I mean to cede to the Peishwa; I can now state to you generally, that I expect it will consist of the Territory of Anagoondy, Harponelly, and a part of Rydroog, to this may possibly be added a part of Bednore; but the extent of that addition must depend upon circumstances on which I am not at present prepared to give a decision. It is evidently for the Peishwa's interest to await the quiet cession of the considerable territory which he will acquire under any possible modification of the settlement of Mysore, rather than incur the hazard of provoking that power which has so recently given a signal instance of its vigour and efficiency.

The Peishwa must be aware that the Nizam will not wil-

lingly consent to any partition of Territory tending to enlarge the Mahratta Dominion, and therefore the Peishwa should feel that he must rely on me exclusively for any such consideration and favour. Under such circumstances his wisest policy would be to be guided by your suggestions, and to make no attempt which can serve to confirm my late suspicions of his disaffection to the interests of the Company.

Previously to the cession of any portion of Territory to the Peishwa, I should wish to endeavour to accomplish the whole of the arrangement contained in my instructions to you of the 8th of July 1798.* And I desire to learn from you, without delay, whether a renewal of those propositions under the present circumstances of affairs would prove acceptable to the court of Poonah.

On some parts of these propositions I shall absolutely insist, as indispensable preliminaries to any cession of territory to the Peishwa.

The establishment of a Subsidiary British force at Poonah still appears to me to be a most desirable measure, although its importance has been much diminished by the reduction of Mysore; but a complete adjustment, under my arbitration, of every point now at issue between the courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, as well as an engagement to abide by the arbitration of the Company on all future points of difference which may arise between the two courts; the perpetual exclusion of the French from the territories and armies of the Peishwa, and a defensive alliance against any French invasion of India, must be made indispensable preliminaries of whatever cession of territory I may deem it expedient to make to the Peishwa. This general outline of my views will enable you to take such steps as may tend to favour their success; and I shall hope to receive from you, as early as possible, such reflections as shall occur to you upon the suggestions contained in this letter.

I enclose copies of two French papers found in the Palace of Tippoo Sultaun after the capture of Seringapatam. The originals are attested by the Sultan's Byze or usual form of abbreviated signature. You will communicate these papers to the Peishwa and to Nana; and you will not fail to enforce the arguments which arise from the evident design of the late

* See Vol. I. p. 94.

Sultan to employ the French arms for the purpose of recovering from the Mahrattas, and the Nizam, as well as from the Company the territories ceded to each of them under the treaty of Seringapatam.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. VII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 23rd May, 1799.

I am apprehensive that the extraordinary tide of success which attends us in Mysore may so elate Azim ul Omrah as to raise the pretensions of his court beyond all bounds of discretion. I rely on you to correct every appearance of such a disposition as well as every symptom of an inclination to hostilities against Scindiah, or the Peishwa. My wish is that the whole arrangement of our conquests should be left implicitly to the Company's government, but I should be glad to be furnished with a general outline of the views and pretensions of the Nizam, which his Highness may be assured will form an anxious object of my attention in framing any new distribution of territory or power.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. VIII.

The Honourable Henry Wellesley to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR MORNINGTON,

Camp near Anicul, 25th May, 1799.

No part of the Carnatic is in a more tranquil state than the country we passed through last night and this morning; and there can be little doubt that if the Commissioners of Malabar were to use proper exertions, that the same state of tranquillity and obedience to our Government might be produced in Canara. I am told that the inhabitants of all the villages between this place and Seringapatam express the greatest satisfaction at the fall of Tippoo, and at the prospect of living under the Company's Government.

Ever your's,

H. WELLESLEY.

No. IX.

Lieut.-General Sir Alured Clarke to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort William, May 28, 1799.

Thanks to the expeditious passage of the *Success* Galley, I have been honoured with your letter of the 22nd instant, by which I was happy to find you had been dissuaded from undertaking the journey to Seringapatam at this inclement season. The heat here has been intense, and I am told it is so much worse in the Amboor Valley and Baramahl at this time of the year, that you would have found it insupportable, and probably have suffered much ill health in consequence; and as I see a great deal still to be done, that must depend on your strength of mind and active exertions, I should have been sorry that the benefit we may expect from the full operation of both, should have been hazarded by an overzeal for the public good. The more I reflect on the events of the last twelve months the greater surprise and gratification I feel; and the wider view I take of their probable consequences, the more satisfied I am of the wisdom of those measures, and the merit of those persevering exertions that have ensured, so far, a prospect of long peace and general stability to the interests of the British Empire in India. I am aware this is something like a repetition of what I said before, but it presses so heavily on my mind, that I cannot restrain it. I shall wait with much impatience to know the outlines of the plan you may determine on with respect to the possessions of every description that have fallen under our controul, which is a matter of no easy arrangement; but will, I am persuaded, be brought to the most favourable issue that enlightened policy and sound judgment can devise.

No evidence was wanting to corroborate the justice of the war against Tippoo; but if there had, nothing could have proved more satisfactory and complete than the papers you have been good enough to send me copies of. They are such as one would be desirous of recording immediately and every where.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect and esteem, my dear Lord, your Lordship's obedient,

And most faithful humble Servant,

ALURED CLARKE.

No. X.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Harris.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 28th May, 1799.

I think it necessary to apprise you, without delay, that it is my most earnest desire to avoid hostilities with the Mahrattas, and, therefore, although their army should actually have entered the Mysore Country, I do not wish that measures of force should be taken to repel them. I approve the letter which you have written to Purseram Bhow for the purpose of preventing the advance of his army into Mysore, or of inducing him to withdraw it, if already advanced.

It will be advisable to lose no time in taking possession of the Forts of Simogu, Bednore, Chitteldroog, and any others on the northern Frontier of Mysore, which may appear important for the purpose of checking the advance of the Mahrattas. You will judge how far such detachments may be practicable consistently with the essential object of maintaining your main army in a formidable and efficient state. If the Mahrattas, however, should have occupied any forts in that quarter, I desire that no measures of force may be taken to dislodge them; representations may be made to the several Commanders and Killahdars, but no hostility must, on any account, be undertaken against the Mahratta army, unless in the case stated, "that the safety of your own army or their aggression should absolutely demand the use of force."

Whatever forts may actually be in our possession must be maintained, even at the hazard of hostility; but I do not suppose that the Mahrattas will venture to become the aggressors, although it would be conformable to their policy to pre-occupy the northern parts of the country with a view of reducing me to the alternative either of ceding them to the Peishwa, or of engaging in a war for the purpose of expelling his army.

I further think it necessary to apprise you that upon principles of policy too obvious to require explanation, it is my determination to allow the state of Poonah to participate in the division of the country now at the disposal of the Allies.

I have, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XI.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Steuart.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 1st June, 1799.

I learnt with much satisfaction the important intelligence of the safe arrival of the army of Bombay on the frontier of the Province of Canara.

From your several communications it appears that the season is too far advanced to admit of an attempt to reduce the Province of Canara in the event of any resistance being offered to the introduction of our government; but I flatter myself that the orders transmitted from Seringapatam to the Killahdars of the several forts in Canara may enable you to take possession of the country even during the monsoon. I rely on you to make the best distribution of your present force for that purpose.

I now proceed to add such general directions as occur to me with respect to the first settlement of the country if it should fall into our hands. With respect to the policy to be observed upon our entrance into the Government of Canara, our great object should be to reconcile the inhabitants to our authority by the utmost degree of indulgence to their prejudices and customs, and by refraining from any other changes of system than such as evidently tend to alleviate oppression, if oppression were felt by the people under the former government. With this view I empower you to establish such a temporary system of administration of revenue and justice as may appear best calculated to maintain order and tranquillity, and to conciliate the affections of the people.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XII.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Harris, Colonel Arthur Wellesley, Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieut.-Colonels William Kirkpatrick, and Barry Close—Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore.

GENTLEMEN,

Fort St. George, 4th June, 1799.

The Commission which accompanies this Letter* will apprise you of the nature and extent of the powers which I

* See page 23.

have deemed it advisable to entrust to you. These powers necessarily supersede those which I had delegated during the campaign to the Commission appointed to assist Lieut.-General Harris in all matters relating to political negotiation. The favourable situation of affairs in Mysore appearing to render my presence at Seringapatam quite unnecessary; I have again taken the resolution of remaining at Madras, and I, therefore, propose to confide to you such a portion of my authority as may enable you, under my orders, to effect a settlement of the country without my presence. Whatever three Members of the Commission shall be present at Seringapatam, on the arrival of this despatch, will proceed immediately to act under the Commission, and to execute the instructions contained in this letter.

The restoration of the representative of the ancient family of the Rajahs of Mysore, accompanied by a partition of territory between the Allies, in which the interests of the Mahrattas should be conciliated, appearing to me, under all the circumstances of the case, to be the most advisable basis on which any new settlement of the Country can be vested, I have resolved to frame, without delay, a plan founded on these principles; and I hope, in the course of to-morrow, to be able to forward to you the Articles of a Treaty, with proper instructions annexed, for the purpose of carrying the abovementioned plan into effect. In the meanwhile it is absolutely necessary that certain measures of precaution should be immediately adopted in order to facilitate the intended arrangement. These measures relate—

1st. To the satisfaction of the principal Musselman Sir-dars, and of the Killahdars of the several Forts.

2nd. To the mode of removing the family of Tippoo Sul-taun from Mysore with the least practicable injury to their feelings. With regard to the first object, I have already forwarded to the Honourable Mr. H. Wellesley a letter to Meer Allum, and a copy of a letter from the Nizam to me, which I trust will enable you to give a complete satisfaction to Kummer ud Deen; and unless you expect any considerable advantage from his influence at Seringapatam in conciliating others of his religion, I desire that you will take the earliest measures to induce him to repair to Gurrumcondah; with the other leading Musselmans you should immediately enter into

such specific engagements as may preclude the possibility of any alarm in their minds with respect to their situation and prospects under any new arrangements of the country. I rely on your discretion to conclude such an arrangement, with as little burthen to the finances of the Company as circumstances will admit. The whole body of Tippoo's Sirdars ought not to become an exclusive charge upon the Company, they must be employed and provided for by the Allies, and by the Rajah of Mysore collectively. The families of the Sirdars, slain during the campaign, must also be provided for in the same manner.

The Killahdars who have surrendered posts, and those who still hold forts in their possession, should be paid their arrears for the month of April, at least, with their pay for the month of May, and for as long a time as we may leave them in charge of their forts. On dismissing any of them, a liberal gratuity should be given them for the purpose of conciliation; all these charges may hereafter be adjusted between the Allies.

As soon as you shall judge that your arrangements with the remnant of the Musselman interest are in sufficient forwardness, you will proceed to take necessary measures for removing the family of the Sultaun. The details of this painful, but indispensable, measure cannot be entrusted to any person more likely to combine every office of humanity with the prudential precautions required by this occasion than Colonel Wellesley; and I, therefore, commit to his discretion, activity and humanity, the whole arrangement, subject always to such suggestions as may be offered by the other members of the Commission. I have appointed Lieut.-Colonel Doveton to take the command of the Fortress of Vellore, which is destined for the future residence of the Sultaun's family. Lieut.-Colonel Doveton is also appointed Paymaster of Stipends to the family; and he has been directed to make every possible preparation for their accommodation at Vellore. After their arrival, no reasonable expence will be spared to render their habitation suitable to their former rank and expectations; and it is my intention to give them a liberal pecuniary allowance. Colonel Wellesley will judge whether it may be necessary to give, either to the whole or to any branch of the family any specific assur-

ance of the exact amount of the sums to be allotted to them respectively, if any such particular explanation should appear necessary for their satisfaction, I authorize you to make the allotment of stipend to each of them, as well as for the establishment of the Zenana, provided that the total sum for the maintenance of the family be not stated at more than three, or at the utmost, four lacs of pagodas. The sons of the late Sultaun may be accompanied by such attendants as they may select, provided the number be not so great as to endanger the public tranquillity, or to form a point of union for the adherents of the late Sultaun. It might be desirable that Alli Reza should accompany the Princes, as he appears to be attached to the interests of the Company, and at the same time to entertain considerable affection for the Princes. The females and children of the several families must follow the Princes as speedily as possible. Colonel Wellesley, in my name, will give the most unequivocal assurances of protection and indulgence to every branch of the family. And at a proper time he will deliver the letters for the four eldest sons of Tippoo, forwarded by the Persian translator to Mr. Wellesley. If Lieut.-General Harris should be at Seringapatam, or within reach of it, I am persuaded that his humanity will induce him to exert every effort to mitigate all the rigorous part of this revolution in Mysore, which I feel myself bound, by every principle of duty towards the British interests in India, to accomplish without delay.

I have learned, with the utmost degree of surprise and concern, that the Zenana, in the Palace of the Sultaun, was searched for treasure some time after the capture of the place. I could have wished, for the honour of the British name, that the apartments of the women had not been disturbed.* In the heat and confusion of an assault, such excesses are frequently unavoidable; but I shall for ever lament that this scene should have been acted long after the contest had subsided, and when the whole place had submitted to the superiority of our victorious arms. If any personal ornaments or other articles of value were taken from the women in that unfortunate moment, I trust that the Commander-in-Chief will make it his business to vindicate the

* See Appendix p. 753, for a satisfactory explanation of this charge.

humanity of the British character by using the most zealous exertions to obtain a full restitution of the property in question.

After this observation, it is superfluous to add my most anxious expectation that the utmost degree of care will be taken to secure the personal property of the Princes, and of the women when the period of their removal shall arrive.

You will, of course, apply to the Commander-in-Chief for such an escort as may be necessary to convey the family of Tippoo to the place of their destination; and you will arrange the time and mode of their departure, so as to preclude the possibility of any commotion or escape. It is desirable that some officer, conversant in the language, manners, and customs of the natives, and of approved humanity, should accompany the Princes, until Lieut.-Colonel Doveton can meet them. His qualifications for the trust which I have reposed in him are too well known to require any illustration.

In exercising the general powers vested in you by the accompanying Commission, I desire that you will not interfere in the management of the Province of Canara, until you shall receive further instructions from me. I have directed General Steuart to make a temporary arrangement for the Government of that Province, and until I shall have received his Report I cannot decide the system of measures most eligible to be adopted in that quarter. You will apprise the Commissioners whose power is superseded by this new Commission of my entire approbation of their services, and you will return them my thanks accordingly.

These regulations are founded on an opinion that the Commander-in-Chief may not always be at liberty to act in a political capacity; and that he may not be able to spare more than one of his confidential staff from about his person; my selection of Lieut.-Colonel Close has been directed, not only by my knowledge of his extraordinary talents, proficiency in the native languages, and experience in the native manners and customs, but by my determination to establish him in the important office of Resident with the Rajah of Mysore, as soon as that Prince shall be placed upon the Musnud.

You will observe that the Commission enjoins all the Commissioners and persons employed under them to take an oath of secrecy previously to entering upon their functions. You will, therefore, communicate a copy of the Commission to any

Member who may happen to be absent from Seringapatam when the despatch shall arrive; but the contents of this despatch must not be communicated by the persons to whom it is addressed to any person who shall not have taken the oath of secrecy prescribed in the Commission, excepting Meer Allum.

It has occurred to me that the removal of your meetings to Bangalore might have an useful effect in drawing the multitude of Musselmans from Seringapatam. This would enable the Commandant of the Fort to commence the repair and improvement of the fortifications, and to proceed in clearing the place, and making it strictly a Military Station. I recommend the earliest possible attention to this measure as being of essential importance to our security in Mysore.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,

Your faithful Servant,

MORNINGTON.

[Commission.]

Richard, Earl of Mornington, &c., Governor-General for all the Forces and Affairs of the British Nation in India.

To all to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting :

Whereas, the glorious success of the British and Allied Arms in Mysore, under the favour of Providence, has reduced the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun to the joint power and authority of the Honourable the English East India Company, and of his Highness the Soubah of the Dekkan, their friend and ally: and whereas his said Highness has given full power and authority to the Right Honourable Richard, Earl of Mornington, Governor-General for all the Forces and Affairs of the British Nation in India, to conduct and order the interests of his Highness in the said possessions, and to conclude such an arrangement thereof as shall appear to his Lordship to be most expedient for the security and welfare of the Country, and for the common benefit of the Allies.

Now know ye, that for the more speedy conclusion of such salutary arrangement, and for the restoration of order and tranquillity by the settlement of the said conquered territories, I, the said Richard Earl of Mornington, Governor-General as aforesaid, do hereby constitute, nominate and appoint , or any three or more of them to be Commissioners during my pleasure for the settlement of the territories recently conquered from the said Tippoo Sultaun, and to be and be styled Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore, with full powers to negotiate and conclude, in my name, all such Treaties, and to make and issue all such temporary and provisional Regulations for the ordering and management of the Civil and Military Government and of the Revenues of the said territories, as may be necessary for the immediate administration

and settlement thereof. The said Commissioners to be nevertheless subject to such orders and instructions as they shall from time to time receive from me, and regularly to report their proceedings to me, keeping an exact diary or daily record thereof under the signature of one of their secretaries: and I do hereby empower the said Commissioners to hold their Meetings at such places, either within the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun or elsewhere, as they shall judge most convenient, and to adjourn from time to time, and to change the place of their meeting according to the exigency of the public service: and I authorize and direct the said Commissioners to communicate from time to time with Meer Allum Bahaudur touching the objects of this Commission, and I nominate and appoint

to be secretaries, and

to be Assistant-secretary to the said Commission during my pleasure; and before the said Commissioners or any of them shall proceed to act in the execution of any of the powers or trusts vested in them by this Commission, save only the power of administering the oath hereinafter mentioned, he or they shall severally take and subscribe the following oath, that is to say :

I, A. B. do faithfully promise and swear, that as a Commissioner for the Affairs of Mysore, I will execute the several powers and trusts reposed in me according to the best of my skill and judgment without favour or affection, prejudice or malice, to any person whatever. I will not disclose or make known any of the orders or instructions which shall be transmitted to me, or to the said Commissioners by the Governor-General, or by his order, or any of the proceedings of the said Commissioners, save only to the other Members of this Commission, or to the person or persons who shall be duly nominated and employed in transcribing or preparing the same respectively, or in seconding the proceedings of the said Commissioners, or unless I shall be authorized by the Governor-General to disclose or make known the same. I do further promise and swear that I will not demand, take, or accept, directly or indirectly, by myself or by any other person, for my use, or on my behalf, or on the behalf or for the use of any other person any sum of money or other valuable thing by way of gift, present, or otherwise, and that to the Governor-General in Council I will justly and truly account for, answer, and pay the rents, duties, and other revenues and sums of money which shall come to my hands or to the hands of any person or persons in trust for or employed by me in execution of the powers and authority vested in the said Commissioners by the said Governor-General—

So help me God.

Which oath any two of the said Commissioners shall and are hereby empowered to administer to the others of them or any of them; and the said oath shall be entered by one of the secretaries to the Commission, amongst the acts of the Board, and be duly subscribed and attested by the said Commissioners at the time of their taking and administering the same to each other respectively.

And the several Secretaries and other officers of the said Board of Commissioners shall also take and subscribe before the said Board such

oath of secrecy, and for the execution of the duties of their respective stations, and the integrity of their conduct therein, as the said Board shall direct ; and when any three of the said Commissioners shall have taken the said oath, they shall immediately constitute a Board, and proceed to act under the Commission. And I do hereby empower and direct the said Commissioners to take charge and render an exact account to me of such public property as has been or shall be found within the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun, and also to collect and bring to account all such arrears of revenue and all such sums of money as were due to the Sirkar on the 4th of May, 1799, or have or shall become due, from and after that day to the Government of the Allies, and provided always that this order shall not be construed to prevent or impede the distribution among the Allied army of the prize taken in the Fort of Seringapatam, on the 4th of May according to the general order issued by the Governor-General in Council under date the ; and provided also that nothing contained in this Commission shall be deemed to preclude the right of captors of any fort or place taken on or before the said 4th day of May, 1799, to obtain from the Commissioners an attested account of the public property contained therein, in order that the claims of all such captors may be heard and determined by the Governor-General in Council or by the Honourable the Court of Directors or by His Majesty in Council according to the nature of the case. And I do hereby authorize and direct the said Commissioners immediately upon entering on their duties under this Commission to issue a Proclamation notifying the restoration of tranquillity, and promising to all the inhabitants of the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun security of person and of private property, and encouraging them to resume their ordinary occupations under the protection of the Allies. And I further direct that the said Proclamation shall contain the strictest injunctions to all persons within the said territories, under the most severe penalties, to abstain from acts of violence, outrage, and plunder.

No. XIII.

From Lord Mornington to Lient.-Colonel Kirkpatrick.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 5th June, 1799.

I have given full attention to the draft of the treaty transmitted by you, and although the substance, and many parts of the detail of that draft are perfectly conformable to my ideas, I think the whole transaction would be more conveniently thrown into a different form, from that which you have given to it. I do not see any necessity for ceding the whole Country in the first instance to the Rajah of Mysore, and accepting again as a cession under his authority, such districts as must

be retained by the Allies. I think it will be more convenient, and less liable to future embarrassment, to rest the whole Settlement upon the basis of our right of conquest, and thus to render our cession the source of the Rajah's dominion. For this purpose the proceeding should commence with a treaty between the Nizam and the Company, with power to the Peishwah to accede under certain conditions. The next step should be a treaty with the Rajah, containing all that relates to his connexion with the Company, and to his interior government.

The Rajah after his accession, may be made a party to the general guarantee, contained in my draft accompanying this letter.* The principal points in which I differ with you, are

[*Treaty of Mysore.*]

* *Treaty for strengthening the Alliance and friendship, subsisting between the English East India Company Bahaudur, His Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, and the Peishwah Row Pundit Purdaun Bahaudur, and for effecting a Settlement of the Dominions of the late Tippoo Sultaun.*

Whereas the deceased Tippoo Sultaun, unprovoked by any act of aggression on the part of the Allies, entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with the French, and admitted a French force into his army, for the purpose of commencing war against the Honourable English Company Bahaudur, and its Allies, Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, and the Peishwah Row Pundit Purdaun Bahaudur. And the said Tippoo Sultaun having attempted to evade the just demands of satisfaction and security, made by the Honourable English Company Bahaudur, and its Allies, for their defence and protection, against the joint designs of the said Sultaun and of the French; the allied Armies of the Honourable English Company Bahaudur, and of His Highness Nizam ul Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur proceeded to hostilities in vindication of their rights, and for the preservation of their respective Dominions from the perils of foreign invasion, and from the ravages of a cruel and relentless enemy.

And whereas, it has pleased Almighty God to prosper the just cause of the said Allies, the Honourable English Company Bahaudur, and his Highness Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, with a continued course of victory and success, and finally to crown their arms by the reduction of the Capital of Mysore, the fall of Tippoo Sultaun, the utter extinction of his power and the unconditional submission of his people. And whereas, the said Allies being disposed to exercise the rights of conquest, with the same moderation and forbearance, which they have observed from the commencement to the conclusion of the late successful war, have resolved to use the power which

the necessity of holding certain principal fortresses in absolute sovereignty. I have now limited that demand to the fortress

it has pleased Almighty God to place in their hands, for the purpose of obtaining reasonable compensation for the expenses of the war, and of establishing permanent security and genuine tranquillity for themselves, and their subjects, as well as for all the powers contiguous to their respective dominions. Wherefore, a treaty for the adjustment of the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun, between the English East India Company Bahaudur, and his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, is now concluded by Lieut.-General George Harris, Commander in Chief of the Forces of His Britannic Majesty, and of the English East India Company Bahaudur in the Carnatic, and on the Coast of Malabar; the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieut.-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieut.-Colonel Barry Close, on the part and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, K. P., Governor-General for all the affairs, civil and military of the British nation in India; and by the Nabob Meer Allum Bahaudur, on the part and in the name of His Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, according to the undermentioned articles, which by the blessing of God, shall be binding upon the heirs and successors of the contracting parties, as long as the sun and moon shall endure, and of which the conditions shall be reciprocally observed by the said contracting parties.

Article 1st.—It being reasonable and just that the Allies by this treaty should accomplish the original objects of the war, viz. a due indemnification for the expenses incurred in their own defence, and effectual security for their respective possessions against the future designs of their enemies, it is stipulated and agreed, that the districts specified in the Schedule A, hereunto annexed, together with the heads of all the passes leading from the territory of the late Tippoo Sultaun, to any part of the possessions of the English East India Company Bahaudur, of its Allies or tributaries situated below the Ghauts on either coast, and all forts situated near to, and commanding the said passes, shall be subjected to the authority, and for ever incorporated with the dominions of the English East India Company Bahaudur, the said Company Bahaudur engaging to provide effectually out of the revenues of the said districts, for the suitable maintenance of the whole of the families of the late Hyder Ali Khan, and of the late Tippoo Sultaun, and to apply to this purpose, with the reservation hereinafter stated, an annual sum of not less than two lacs of star pagodas, making the Company's share as follows:—estimated value of districts, enumerated in the Schedule A, according to the statement of Tippoo Sultaun in 1792, Canteria pagodas, 7,77,170; deduct provision for the families of Hyder Ali Khan, and of Tippoo Sultaun two lacs of star pagodas in Canteria pagodas, 2,40,000; remains to the East India Company, 5,37,170.

Article 2nd.—For the same reason stated in the preceding Article, the

of Seringapatam, which I cannot consent to part with. With regard to Chittledroog, Bednore, &c. lying within the terri-

districts specified in Schedule B, annexed hereunto, shall be subjected to the authority and for ever united with the dominions of the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, the said Nabob having engaged to provide liberally from the revenues of the said districts, for the support of Meer Kummer ud Deen Bahaudur and of his family and relations, and to grant him for this purpose a personal jaghire in the district of Gurrumcondah, equal to the annual sum of 2,10,000 rupees, or of 70,000 Canteria pagodas, over and above and exclusive of a jaghire, which the said Nabob has also agreed to assign to the said Meer Kummer ud Deen Khaun, for the pay and maintenance of a proportionate number of troops, to be employed in the service of his said Highness, making the share of his Highness as follows—estimated value of the territory specified in Schedule B, according to the statement of Tippoo Sultaun in 1792, 6,07,332 ; deduct personal jaghire to Meer Kummer ud Deen Khaun, 2,10,000 rupees, or Conterai pagodas, 70,000 ; remains to the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, 5,37,332.

Article 3rd.—It being further expedient for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, and for the general security on the foundations now established by the contracting parties, that the fortress of Seringapatam should be subjected to the said Company Bahaudur, it is stipulated and agreed, that the said fortress and the island on which it is situated, including the small tract of land or island, lying to the westward of the main island, and bounded on the west by a nullah, called the Mysore Nullah, which falls into the Cauvery near Chungul Ghaut, shall become part of the dominions of the said Company in full right and sovereignty for ever.

Article 4th.—A separate Government shall be established in Mysore, and for this purpose it is stipulated and agreed, that Maharajah Mysoor Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur, a descendant of the antient Rajahs of Mysoor, shall possess the territory hereinafter described upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned.

Article 5th.—The contracting powers mutually and severally agree, that the districts specified in Schedule C, hereunto annexed, shall be ceded to the said Maharajah Mysoor upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned.

Article 6th.—The English East India Company Bahaudur shall be at liberty to make such deductions from time to time, from the sums allotted by the 1st Article of the present treaty, for the maintenance of the families of Hyder Alli Khaun and Tippoo Sultaun, as may be proper in consequence of the decease of any member of the said families, and in the event of any hostile attempt on the part of the said family, or of any member of it, against the authority of the contracting parties, or against the peace of their respective dominions, or the territory of the Rajah of Mysore ; then

tory of the Rajah, the possession of Seringapatam, and the conditions of our subsidiary treaty with the Rajah, will I trust,

the said English East India Company Bahaudur shall be at liberty to limit or suspend entirely the payment of the whole, or any part of the stipend hereinbefore stipulated, to be applied to the maintenance and support of the said families.

Article 7th.—His Highness the Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur shall be invited to accede to the present treaty; and although the said Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur, has neither participated in the expense or danger of the late war, and therefore is not entitled to share any part of the acquisitions made by the contracting parties, namely, the English East India Company Bahaudur, and his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur; yet, for the maintenance of the relations of friendship, and alliance between the said Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur, the English East India Company Bahaudur, his Highness the Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, and Maharajah Mysoor Kistna Rajah Bahaudur, it is stipulated and agreed that certain districts, specified in Schedule D, hereunto annexed, shall be reserved for the purpose of being eventually ceded to the said Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur, in full right and sovereignty, in the same manner as if he had been a contracting party to this treaty; provided however, that the said Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur shall accede to the present treaty in its full extent, within one month from the day on which it shall be formally communicated to him by the contracting parties; and provided also, that he shall give satisfaction to the English East India Company Bahaudur, and to his Highness Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, with regard to certain points now pending between him, the said Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur, and the said Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, and also with regard to such points as shall be represented to the said Peishwah, on the part of the English East India Company Bahaudur, by the Governor-General, or the English resident at the court of Poonah.

Article 8th.—If, contrary to the amicable expectation of the contracting parties, the said Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur shall refuse to accede to this treaty, or to give satisfaction upon the points, to which the 7th Article refers, then the right to and sovereignty of the several districts, hereinbefore reserved for eventual cession to the Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur, shall rest jointly in the said English East India Company Bahaudur, and the said Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, who will either exchange them with the Rajah of Mysore, for other districts of equal value, more contiguous to their respective territories, or otherwise arrange and settle respecting them, as they shall judge proper.

Article 9th.—It being expedient for the effectual establishment of Maharajah Mysoor Kistna Rajah, in the government of Mysore, that his Highness should be assisted with a suitable subsidiary force, it is stipulated and

give us a sufficient command over them; but, I cannot consent to allow the Nizam to hold Chittledroog; it would be a very

agreed, that the whole of the said force shall be furnished by the English East India Company Bahaudur, according to the terms of a separate treaty, to be immediately concluded between the said English East India Company Bahaudur, and his Highness the Maharajah Mysoor Kistna Rajah Oodiavar Bahaudur.

Article 10th.—This treaty consisting of ten Articles, being settled and concluded this day, the 22d of June, 1799, (corresponding to the 17th of Mohurrum, 1214, Anno Higere), by Lieut.-General George Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieut.-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieut.-Colonel Barry Close, on the part and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, Governor-General aforesaid, and by Meer Allum Bahaudur, on the part, and in the name of his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, the said Lieut.-General Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieut.-Colonel William Kirkpatrick and Lieut.-Colonel Barry Close, have delivered to Meer Allum Bahaudur one copy of the same, signed and sealed by themselves; and Meer Allum Bahaudur has delivered to Lieut.-General George Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieut.-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieut.-Colonel Barry Close, another copy of the same signed and sealed by himself; and Lieut.-General George Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieut.-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieut.-Colonel Barry Close, and Meer Allum Bahaudur, severally and mutually engage, that the said treaty shall be respectively ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor General under his seal and signature, within eight days from the date hereof, and by his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, within twenty-five days from the date hereof.

Nizam's Seal.

Ratified at Hyderabad, by his Highness the Nizam, on the 13th day of July, Anno Domini, 1799.*

J. A. KIRKPATRICK, Resident.

SCHEDULE A.

1st.—The Company's Share.—The following Districts from Nuggur or Bednore.

Korial, (Mangalore) Bekul and Neliseram, 1,33,662 $\frac{7}{4}$; Karkul, 11,393 $\frac{2}{4}$; Barkoo, 48,389 $\frac{8}{2}$; Khoshaulpoor, 26,361 $\frac{7}{4}$; Bulkul, 9,177 $\frac{0}{4}$; Gairsopah, 9,192 $\frac{0}{4}$; Hunawur (Onore), 17,482 $\frac{9}{2}$; Mirjaun, 8,953 $\frac{4}{4}$;

* Ratified at Fort St. George, by the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, on the 26th day of June, A. D. 1799.

inconvenient arrangement in every point of view, and I, therefore, request you entirely to discourage the repetition of any

Ancolah Punchmahl, and Shadasghur (or Soonda Payen Ghaut) 28,332 2 ; Bilghuy, 18,929 4 $\frac{1}{4}$.—Total 3,11,874 6 $\frac{3}{4}$

COIMBATTOOR, &c. viz.—Coimbatoor, 80,000 ; Danaigincotah, 35,000 ; Cheedor, 27,000 ; Chinjerry, 27,000 ; Darapoor Chuckergerry, 64,000 ; Settimungalam, 30,000 ; Undoor, 8,000 ; Perondoora, 14,000 ; Vizimungul (Aravarcourchy), 20,000 ; Errode, 20,000 ; Caroor, 41,000 ; Coodgully, 15,000 ; Caveryporam, 4,000 ; total 3,85,000. Wynaad, from Amudnuggur Chickloor, from Talooks belonging to Seringapatam ; Panganoor, 15,000 ; Suttikal Alambady and Kodahully, 15,200 ; Oussore, 18,096 ; Decanicotah and Ruttungeery, 14,000 ; Vencatigryahcotah, 6,000 ; Ankusgeery and Solageery, 4,000 ; Baugloor, 3,000 ; Talmuttah and Talwaddy (half Talooks) of Hurduntruly, 5,000.—Total, 80,296, together 7,77,170 6 $\frac{3}{4}$.—Deduct provision for the maintenance of the families of Hyder Ali Khan, and of Tipoo Sultaun, star pagodas 2 lacs in canteria pagodas, 2,40,000.—Remains to the Company, canteria pagodas, 5,37,170,6 $\frac{3}{4}$

SCHEDULE B.

2nd.—The Nizam's Share.—Gooty—Fyze Hussur Rubal, 15,568 ; Kona Koomlah, 7,500 ; Pamri, 11,000 ; Wurjur Kurroor, 8,998 1 ; Yurutty Murajcherroo, 5,902 ; Bheem Rapah, 4,800 ; Muttoor, 2,700 ; Pravalli Munnimoorg, 9,426 3 ; Chunumpilly, 8,951 8 ; Mulkaira Koottoo, 22,251 8 $\frac{3}{4}$; Koortunni, 8,800 ; Yarky, 22,673 1 ; Pennacoondah, 60,000 ; Murrug Seera, 8,000 ; Hundyanpoor, 16,000 ; Koorgoor (remainder of), 11,629 ; Kunchungoondy, (remainder of) 10,000 ; of Gurrumcondah, all the districts not ceded in 1792, 1,85,810 ; Puttungerry (from Seringapatam), 10,000, Rydroog (6 talooks), 1,02,856 ; Kurnool Paishcush, 66,666.—From Chittledroog—Terrymullah, (1 talook), 7,800.—Total, 6,07,332 1 $\frac{1}{4}$.—Deduct a personal Jaghire to Kummer ud Deen Khan and relations, 70,000.—Remains to the Nizam, 5,37,332 1 $\frac{1}{4}$

SCHEDULE C.

Districts ceded to Maharajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur, Talooks belonging to Seringapatam.

Puttun Attockrun, 11,000 ; Mysore Attockrun, or Rahmut Nuzeen, 11,500 ; Nuzzer Bar, 14,000 ; Hurdunhully, 15,000 ; Periapatam, 6,200 ; Muddoor, 13,200 ; Hetghur Dewancotah, 8,000 ; Betudapoor, 7,000 ; Tyoor, 8,000 ; Yelandoor, 10,000 ; Malwelly (Gulinahabad), 9,000 ; Tulkar Sosilah, 8,100 ; Nursipoor, 10,200 ; Yestoorah, 7,200 ; Bailoor, 15,700 ; Arkulgoor, 4,300 ; Chinipatam, 12,100 ; Bullum Mungezabad, 10,000 ; Hussen, 7,900 ; Honawully, 9,400 ; Nagmungul, 4,700 ; Belloor, 3,100 ; Maharage Droog, 10,000 ; Gram, 3,500 ; Ramgheery, 7,400 ; Turkarumb, 7,400 ; Ahmudnugger, Chickloor, 10,000 ; Kurp, 12,000 ; Toorwy Khaira, 9,000 ; Coonydghul, 5,008 9 ; Hoolioordroog, 4,000 ;

such proposition on the part of Meer Allum. The question of ceding any part of Soonda to the Peishwah, may be re-

Kirkairy, 4,065; Chennyputtan, 9,138; Nooggairly, 3,000; Mairlatesh and Kishmagepoor, 6,100; Suckynputtan, 6,200; Banorawar, Guradungilly, Huranhelly, 10,000; Boodehall, 7,000; Nidghul, 6,000; Pasghur, 10,000; Hagnlvary, 12,000; Goomnairpollum, 10,000; Bangalore, 55,000; Magry, 8,400; Mudgerry, 36,000; Coorgherry, 4,000; Cankanhelly, 8,900; Nulwungle and Doorbillah, 16,000; Anicul, 10,300; Byroodroog, 4,000; Hyboor, 7,000; Dewankelly, 20,045; Ootradroog, 5,000; Chinroydroog, 8,000; Toomkoor and Devroy, 18,000; Nidgegul and Macklydroog, 16,000; Kundykeera and Chullnaighelly, 16,000; Chota Balapoort, 80,000; Colar, 80,000; Jungumcotah, 13,000; Chuckmoogalum, 8,134 4; Kudoor, 7,129 7½.—Total, 7,78,321 0½.

SERRA (Remainder of)—Serra and Amrapoor, 55,000; Hoosuttah, 50,754; Burra Balapoort, 40,000.—Total, 1,49,754.

NUGGUR above GHAUT.—Kusbah, 29,145 4½ 2; Coolydroog, 28,818 0½ 2 Koompsee, 8,094 2½; Kope, 22,864 5½ 2; Wosthara, 6,818 9; Eckairy and Sagur, 39,41 1½ 2; Ghooty (Hoably), 11,006 8½; Surbtowanundy, 10,458 ¼ 2; Serryanwitty, 17,424; Shaikarpoor, 11,774 ¾; Annunapoor, 10,191 9½; Lakouly-danwass, 11,629 6½ 1; Ordgunny, 13,614 1½; Simoga, 16,883 5; Hoolyhonore, 6,583 5½ 1; Biddery, 10,835,5 2; Chingeery Beswapatam, 22,091 1½ 3; Turrykeerah, 14,076 4½ 2; Azempoor, 10,696 2½ 3.—Total, 3,02,417 6 6.

CHITLEDROOG (remainder of) 12 Talooks.—Kusbah, 20,874 7½ 1; Beensumendar, 12,148 4 2; Dodiary, 12,984 9½; Husdroog, 11,936 2½ 3; Muttoor, 10,392 3½ 2; Murkal Murroo, 12,662 9½ 3; Tullick, 11,854 ¾; Burm Sagur, 10,163 6½; Kunkopah, 12,542 ½ 2; Bilchoor, 10,683 1½ 2; Hinoor, 10,010 2; Goodycotah, 11,330 5½ 3.—Total, 13,79,076 8 1.
Deduct 2 Pergunnahs of Hurdenhelly, viz, Talmall and Talwaddy, included in the Company's share, 5,000; balance, 13,74,076 8 1.

SCHEDULE D.

The Peishwah's Share—Harponelly, (6 Talooks), 1,10,030 8½; Soonda (above the Ghauts), 59,377; Annagoondy, 60,101. From Chittledroog, 2 Talooks, viz, Holulkaira, 11,425 4½; Mycoonda, 12,228 9½. From Bednore 1 Talook, viz, Hurryhur, 10,796.—Total Canteria Pagodas, 2,63,257,3½.

Ratified at Hyderabad, by his Highness the Nizam, on the 13th day of July, A.D. 1799.

J. A. KIRKPATRICK, Resident.

Ratified at Fort St. George, by the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, on the 26th day of June, A.D. 1799.

Separate Articles, appertaining to the Treaty of Mysore, concluded on the 22nd of June, 1799 (corresponding to the 17th of Mohurrum, Anno

served for future consideration. To-morrow, or at farthest on the next day, I hope to be able to forward to you the draft of the treaty with the Rajah. At present, it is not my intention to quit Madras, unless I shall learn from you and my brother, that my presence can be useful in Mysore. My baggage is still on the road, and I could move it at a very short notice.

I cannot at all agree with the Commissioners, that it is necessary to delay our settlement of the Country until Chittledroog shall be surrendered, or taken; and I desire that you will not wait for either event, but proceed forthwith to conclude the necessary treaties, as soon as you shall have taken the necessary precautions suggested in my instructions to the Commissioners for the affairs of Mysore. I fear that the final arrangement is likely to suffer delay, from our having no person on the spot authorized to sign a treaty on the part of the Nizam; perhaps Meer Allum may think himself authorized to do so at my request, under the full powers which I have received from His Highness,—with a view to obviate every difficulty, I have written to Hyderabad to desire that

Higeree, 1214) between the Honourable English East India Company Bahaudur, and the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur.

Article 1.—With a view to the prevention of future altercations, it is agreed between his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, and the Honourable English East India Company Bahaudur, that to whatever amount the stipends appropriated to the maintenance of the Sons, Relations, and Dependants of the late Hyder Ali Khaun, and Tippoo Sultaun, or the personal Jaghire of Meer Kummer ud Deen Khaun, shall hereafter be diminished in consequence of any one of the stipulations of the Treaty of Mysore, the contracting parties shall not be accountable to each other on this head.

Article 2.—And it is further agreed between the contracting parties, that in the event provided for by the Eighth Article of the Treaty of Mysore, two-thirds of the shares reserved for Row Pundit Purdaun Bahaudur, shall fall to his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, and the remaining third to the Honourable English East India Company Bahaudur.

(The Nizam's Seal.)

Ratified at Hyderabad, by his Highness the Nizam, on the 13th day of July, A.D. 1799.

J. A. KIRKPATRICK, Resident.

Ratified at Fort St. George, by the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, on the 26th day of June, A.D. 1799.

your brother will immediately obtain, and despatch full powers to Meer Allum for this purpose, but I think it would be a far preferable arrangement if Meer Allum could be brought to sign the treaty immediately, and thus enable us to proceed at once to the settlement of the Country.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XIV.

Lieutenant-General Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Camp, 7th June, 1799.

Your Lordship's private letter of the 3rd instant, apprizing me that it is your intention, as soon as you receive an account of the value of the ordnance and stores in Seringapatam, to recommend the whole amount to be granted to the army; was received yesterday, and is a most handsome added proof of the zealous interest with which your Lordship has entered into our concerns. A Committee is ordered for the above purpose, and its report shall be forwarded to your Lordship as soon as finished, but as it will be a considerable time in making out, and as a reference to his Majesty and the Court of Directors is required, you need not be under any apprehension that the amount will be of the least injury to the discipline or efficiency of the army; long before it can be received, the division you have ordered will have been completely despatched.

I am, with great regard and esteem,

My dear Lord,

your faithful Servant,

GEORGE HARRIS.

[The following were the orders issued by the Governor-General for the distribution of the prize money.]

General Orders by Government.

Fort St. George, 2d June, 1799.

The Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, having received from Lieutenant-General Harris a report of the ordnance, ammunition, military stores, and treasure, taken by the allied army in the fort

of Seringapatam, has much pleasure in anticipating the sanction of his Majesty and of the Court of Directors, for the distribution of prize-money on this memorable occasion.

His Lordship, accordingly, authorizes and directs the Commander-in-Chief to make an immediate distribution of the treasure and jewels to the troops of the allies, in such proportions as may be conformable to the usage of the British service in cases of a similar nature.

In respect to the ordnance, ammunition and military stores, his Lordship directs that they be reserved entire, until the pleasure of his Majesty, and the orders of the Honourable Court of Directors, shall be received.

The Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council feels particular satisfaction, that the happy circumstances, accompanying the glorious and final success of this brilliant campaign, enable his Lordship to afford a substantial proof of the public gratitude towards the army, by bestowing a reward, proportioned to the magnitude and importance of their services, and earned, not more by their labour, courage, and perseverance, than by their exact discipline, regularity, and exemplary subordination.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council,
J. WEBBE, Sec. to the Govt.

No. XV. ✓

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort St. George, 7th June, 1799.

Nothing can be more favourable than the state of affairs in Mysore; the accounts which I have received from Mr. Henry Wellesley and from Colonel Kirkpatrick, induce me to believe that I shall effect the settlement of the country with more advantage from this place than if I were to proceed to Seringapatam, and I shall therefore remain here, unless they should be of opinion that my presence upon the spot may be useful. In the meanwhile, the information which I have collected has enabled me to determine the basis and outline of the new settlement of the extensive empire which the glorious success of the war has subjected to our power.

I shall transmit to you, by a more convenient opportunity, an accurate view of the motives which have induced me to adopt the settlement of the country now carrying into effect in preference to any other; for the present, it may be sufficient to observe that, to have divided the whole territory equally between the Company and the Nizam, while it would have

afforded strong grounds for jealousy to the Mahrattas, would have aggrandized the Nizam's power beyond the bounds of discretion, and would have left in our hands a territory, so extensive, as it might have been difficult to manage, especially in the present state of the Company's service at this Presidency. To have divided the territory into three equal portions, allowing the Mahrattas, who had taken no part in the expense or hazard of the war, an equal share in the advantages of the peace, would neither have been just towards the Nizam, politic in the way of example to our other allies, nor prudent in respect to the aggrandizement of the Mahratta empire. To have given the Mahrattas no larger a territory than is now proposed, while the Company and the Nizam divided the whole of the remainder to the exclusion of any central power, would have been liable nearly to the same objection as that stated against a total exclusion of the Mahrattas from all participation. The establishment, therefore, of a central and separate power in the ancient territories of Mysore appeared to be the best expedient for reconciling the interests of all parties. It would certainly have been desirable that that power should have been placed in the hands of one of Tippoo's sons; but the hereditary and intimate connection established between Tippoo and the French, the probability that the French may be enabled to maintain themselves in Egypt, the perpetual interest which Tippoo's family must feel to undermine and subvert a system which had so much reduced their patrimony and power, added to their natural hatred of the English name, and to the aspiring ambition, indignant pride, and deadly revenge, congenial to the Mahomedan character, precluded the possibility of restoring any branch of the family of the late Sultaun to the throne, without exposing us to the constant hazard of internal commotion, and even of foreign war. Such a settlement would have cherished in its bosom a restless and powerful principle of its own dissolution; we could never have expected harmony or concord, or a spirit of friendship and alliance, where no true reconciliation could grow; even submission must have been reluctant and treacherous, where bitter memory of fallen dignity, wealth, and power, must have united every passion and vice with many of the noblest virtues, in a constant desire to recover an empire, originally acquired by an extra-

ordinary combination of falsehood, cruelty, and courage, and maintained for a long time with eminent policy and vigour, as well in its internal Government as in its foreign relations.

You will observe that, throughout this view of the subject I have assumed the justice and necessity of the late war against Tippoo Sultaun, and consequently the right of conquest under which I conceive the absolute disposal of the territory to have accrued to the Company and the Nizam. In the exercise of this right, if I were to look to moral considerations alone, I should certainly, on every principle of justice and humanity, as well as of attention to the welfare of the people, have been led to restore the heir of the ancient Rajah of Mysore to that rank and dignity which were wrested from his ancestor, by the usurpation of Hyder Ali.

The long and cruel imprisonment which several branches of this family have suffered, the persecution and murder of many of their adherents, both by Hyder and Tippoo, and the state of degradation and misery in which it has been the policy of both those usurpers to retain the surviving descendants of their lawful Sovereign, would have entitled the representative of the ancient family of Mysore to every degree of practicable consideration; but it is also evident, that every motive must concur to attach the heir of the Mysore family if placed on the throne to our interests, through which alone he can hope to maintain himself against the family of Tippoo. Something, perhaps, may also be expected from his gratitude, although that quality is not often found among States in any part of the world, and seldom, if ever, among the native States of India.

For some time I doubted whether this arrangement, however desirable, could be attained in opposition to the Mahomedan interest, which I imagined to be firmly established in Mysore, but I am happy to be able to assure you that the jealous policy of Tippoo, added to the brilliant and rapid success of the war, has left no Mahomedan influence in Mysore from which any serious opposition is to be apprehended. I cannot better explain the actual state of the Sultaun's dominions in this respect than by quoting a passage of a letter received this day from Lieutenant-Colonel Close, which corresponds entirely with all the information which I have collected from other quarters.

"That Tippoo loaded the departments of his Government with dronish Mussulmauns cannot be denied; but the characteristic of his domination was to retain all power within himself, and to allow of no hereditary claims or fixed offices that might in any shape oppose the dictates of his will. Individuals holding the principal offices of the State, doubtless, exercised authority, and from such cause possessed some influence; but of these, how many remain? Buchaun Ooddeen was killed at Sattimungalum. The Binky Nabob fell at Sedaseer, Syed Saheb, Mahomed Saduck, and Syed Ghofar, at the storm of Seringapatam, Purneah is forthcoming, and rests upon our will. Cummur-ud-Dien rests upon our generosity, and is perfectly at our devotion; where then is the Mahomedan influence to embarrass us, or give a turn to our politics? Tippoo's infantry are discharged; his Sillahdar horse are dissolved; his Killahdars pay us obedience; his Asophs, if so disposed, have not means to resist us. The stable horse remain, and look to our pleasure for subsistence; at best, they are but so many loose individuals, connected by no head, and kept apart by separate interests. They are ours for actual service at a nod." The Rajah of Mysore will, therefore, be easily restored to the throne, and maintained on it under the protection of the Company, the Nizam, and I trust also of the Mahrattas, who certainly all have a concurrent and common interest in the exclusion of Tippoo's family, especially since the discovery that Tippoo's alliance with France was directed not only against the existence of the British power in India, but also against the Mahrattas and the Nizam, at least to the extent of recovering the districts ceded to those powers under the treaty of Seringapatam. It is my intention to draw the connection between the Company and the Rajah as close as possible by a subsidiary treaty, under which I mean to retain the general power of garrisoning all his fortresses, such as Bednore, Chittledroog, &c., and I will so clearly define our powers of interference in his internal government as to preclude (if any precaution can preclude) the embarrassments which have occasioned so much distress in the Carnatic, Oude, and Tanjore.

Seringapatam I shall retain in full sovereignty for the Company, as being a tower of strength, from which we may at any time shake Hindostan to its centre, if any combination

should ever be formed against our interests. I shall not at present enlarge upon the advantages which are likely to be derived to the British interests from this settlement, they are too obvious to require any detailed explanation. The Nizam will acquire such an accession of strength, as, with the aid of our subsidiary force, will enable him to maintain himself against the Mahrattas, while he will not only have acquired no strength which can render him formidable to us, but, by our positions at Chitteldroog, Seringapatam, and along the heads of the passes, together with the establishment of about seven thousand of our troops in the heart of his dominions, he will depend almost absolutely on our power. If this power be used with moderation, I think it must be permanent; we must abstain religiously from all interference with the Nizam's internal government.

The Mahrattas will receive an accession of territory, the value of which is considerable to them, but cannot render them in any degree dangerous to us or to the Nizam, while we retain the power of garrisoning the forts of Bednore and Chitteldroog. As the Mahrattas have no claim of right to any share in this partition, I shall endeavour to connect the cessions made to them with some arrangements which shall tend to give additional strength to our interests.

The French influence in India, thanks be to God! is now nearly extirpated, some adventurers, however, still remain in the service of the Mahrattas; and I shall endeavour to render the cession of territory to the Mahrattas the instrument of annihilating every remnant of a French party in that quarter. I must repeat to you my most earnest and anxious entreaty, that you will never agree to the restoration of any part of the territories of France or of Holland (while connected with France) on the Continent of India. The papers found in Tippoo Sultaun's palace at Seringapatam will sufficiently prove the danger of allowing France to retain even the isles of Mauritius and Bourbon, and if the war should continue, I trust you will strike a blow against those prolific sources of intrigue in peace, and of piracy and buccaneering in war.

I transmit to you by this despatch a set of the French papers found in the palace at Seringapatam; it might appear vanity in me to make any comment upon them, further than

to request that you will compare them with the whole course of my communications with the Court of Directors, the Secret Committee and yourself previous to the war. I confess that, in reading these papers, I could not avoid trembling to reflect on the dangers which we have escaped, and which I trust are now effectually averted. If Tippoo had obtained the aid of two or three thousand French, there is not a doubt that he would have rushed into the Carnatic; and I refer you to all the communications from this quarter during the last summer for an estimate of the consequences of such an incursion; all the officers with whom I have conversed, who served in this campaign, have assured me that, with one thousand French, Seringapatam would have been nearly impregnable, not only from the strength of its own fortifications, but from the difficulty of approaching it through that strong barrier which lies at the entrance of the table land from the Carnatic in the neighbourhood of Kankanhelly, Anicul, &c. Through the whole of that line of forest down to Sultaun Pett, a very small body of good French troops might have checked the progress of our whole army.

You will observe, in the return of ordnance and stores taken at Seringapatam,* the magnitude of the Sultaun's military preparations and resources. I have not yet received authentic accounts of the state of his military establishments compared with that of last war, but I expect accurate information on that subject from the records found at Seringapatam. I understand that the Sultaun's horse appeared in larger bodies, and manifested more discipline, as well as boldness, in this war than in the last; that his infantry appeared to be less numerous, but to be greatly improved in efficiency for service, and that it both attacked and resisted our European troops on several occasions with great vigour, firmness, and resolution. Under these circumstances, I confess that it was a matter of exultation and triumph to me to see the standard of Tippoo Sultaun flying under the colours of Fort St. George on the 4th of June.

A little more eagerness than I could have wished has appeared in the army on the subject of the property captured in Seringapatam; the question would have been very awk-

* See Vol. I. Appendix, p 707.

ward, if the amount of the property had approached the first statements which had been made by common rumour, and which extended to the enormous amount of eight or ten crores* of rupees. The army conceive that, as the place was taken by storm, they are, of right, entitled to what was found in it; this is certainly an erroneous opinion, and if the principle had been established, and so large a sum as that which I have stated had been seized by the army and distributed, it is impossible to calculate the mischievous effects which would have resulted to our military power in India; no regular return has yet been made to me of the amount of the property taken; but I have every reason to believe that it does not exceed in value thirty lacs of pagodas, a sufficiently large sum. The official return has been withholden from an idea, that the right is absolute in the captors, and that they are not bound to render any account under the peculiar circumstances of the assault. I shall endeavour to persuade General Harris to make an official return of the property, with a view of saving the rights of Government and of correcting the erroneous opinions of the army; but I shall not hesitate to direct an immediate distribution of the treasure and jewels, as I am persuaded that, in so doing, I shall act conformably to your wishes and to those of the Crown, and the Court of Directors. The army would probably become a little impatient were I to propose to them to postpone all distribution until the orders of the Directors and the King could be received. The question is rendered still more delicate by some orders of Lord Cornwallis, admitting the exclusive right of the army to all property captured in places taken by assault. The amount of the ordnance and military stores being very considerable, I shall endeavour to preserve them entire, until I can receive the orders of the Court of Directors and of his Majesty. I entreat you immediately, upon receiving this letter, to procure from the King and the Court of Directors, full powers for me to dispose of the ordnance and military stores, either by granting them to the captors or otherwise, as I shall judge most expedient for the public service.

* A crore is now equal to £1,000,000 sterling; it was then about £1,200,000, owing to the difference of value in the rupee.

You will accompany these powers by a private letter from yourself, stating your wishes on the subject; and I beg that you will despatch these papers by express overland. My own opinion is decidedly that, unless the value of the ordnance and stores should amount to an enormous sum, this also should be given to the army. I take this opportunity of requesting that you will take particular care not to permit any allowance which I have found it necessary to make to any of the officers of this army to be curtailed; a great effort was to be made, and it was essential to send the men of the first talents in the army into the field full of zeal and cordiality. For this purpose I made a handsome allowance to Lieut.-Colonel Close, the Adjutant-General (a most able and excellent officer), and to others of General Harris's staff; to their efforts our success is to be attributed; if you reduce their appointments, it will be impossible to carry on government here in great emergencies.

The extension of our territory and revenue in the Peninsula, as well as the command which we have now acquired over the central part of Mysore, will render a revision of the limits of the Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay absolutely necessary.

You ought to endeavour to negotiate with Portugal the cession of Goa, for which you might give Malacca in exchange. This is an important point. The French look to Goa, and will labour to obtain it, either by force or intrigue. Our artillery throughout India is very deficient; we should feel this severely in the event of a French invasion. Has it ever occurred to you that it would be a good plan to incorporate all the Company's European regiments into the artillery in India? I cannot too strongly press the necessity of attention to the artillery in India; if you do not send out ample supplies of proper men and officers for this useful corps, it will soon fall to ruin; it is already on the decay. Indeed the whole army is alarmingly deficient in European officers; a larger annual supply of cadets, and a reduction in the annual export of writers would tend to secure the commercial interests of the Company in India. I believe these doctrines are not popular in London; but if the efficiency of the army in India be once allowed to decline, the territory, revenue and trade will not long survive: we must either be a

predominant military power, or we must be content to suffer the fate of those whose minds are unequal to the magnitude of their fortunes, and who are afraid of their own strength.

Believe me, my dear Sir, ever yours,
Most faithfully and affectionately,
MORNINGTON.

No. XVI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore.

GENTLEMEN,

Fort St. George, 8th June, 1799.

On the 5th instant I forwarded to Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick, and directed him to lay before you the draft of a Treaty* between the Company and his Highness the Nizam, together with four Schedules, containing a description of the respective portions of the territory of the late Tippoo Sultaun to be allotted to the Company, the Nizam, the Rajah of Mysore, and eventually to the Peishwa; this Treaty, or one similar to it, must form the basis of the new settlement of Mysore, on which will be founded the more detailed arrangements to be adjusted with the Rajah, as well as the conditions to be required from the Peishwa; each of these two latter objects will require a separate engagement; that which relates to the Peishwa is not immediately within the province of your commission, but I now transmit a draft of the Treaty to be concluded between the Company and the Rajah of Mysore.†

* See page 26.

† The "Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam" is as follows,—it is given here instead of in the Appendix, in order to render the despatch more intelligible.

A Treaty of perpetual Friendship and Alliance, concluded on the one part by his Excellency Lieutenant-General George Harris, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of his Britannic Majesty, and of the English East India Company Bahadur in the Carnatic and on the Coast of Malabar, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, on behalf, and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, K. P. Governor-General for all affairs, Civil

To avoid confusion, I shall for the future style the definitive treaty between the Nizam and the Company the "Treaty of

and Military, of the British Nation in India, by virtue of full powers vested in them for this purpose by the said Richard Earl of Mornington, Governor-General; and on the other part by Maha Raja Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur, Rajah of Mysore.

Whereas it is stipulated in the Treaty concluded on the 22nd June, 1799, between the Honourable English East India Company Bahaudur, and the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asop Jah Bahaudur, for strengthening the alliance and friendship subsisting between the said English East India Company Bahaudur, his Highness Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, and the Peishwa Row Pundit Purdaun Bahaudur; and for effecting a settlement of the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun, that a separate government shall be established in Mysore, and that his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur shall possess certain territories specified in Schedule C, annexed to the said Treaty, and that for the effectual establishment of the government of Mysore, his Highness shall be assisted with a suitable subsidiary force, to be furnished by the English East India Company Bahaudur.

Wherefore, in order to carry the said stipulations into effect, and to increase and strengthen the friendship subsisting between the said English East India Company and the said Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur, this treaty is concluded by Lieutenant-General George Harris, Commander-in-Chief of the forces of His Britannic Majesty, and of the said English East India Company Bahaudur in the Carnatic, and on the Coast of Malabar; the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel W. Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, on the part, and in the name, of the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, Governor-General aforesaid; and by His Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur, which shall be binding upon the contracting parties as long as the sun and moon shall endure.

Article 1st.—The friends and enemies of either of the contracting parties shall be considered as the friends and enemies of both.

Article 2nd.—The Honourable the East India Company Bahaudur agrees to maintain, and his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur agrees to receive, a military force for the defence and security of his Highness's dominions. In consideration of which protection his Highness engages to pay the annual sum of seven lacs of star pagodas to the said East India Company. The said sum to be paid in twelve equal monthly instalments; his Highness further agrees, that the disposal of the said sum, together with the arrangement and employment of the troops to be maintained by it, shall be left entirely to the Company.

Article 3rd.—If it shall be necessary for the protection and defence of the territories of the contracting parties, or of either of them, that hostilities shall be undertaken, or preparations made for commencing hostilities against any state or power, his said Highness Maha Rajah Mysore

Mysore ;" and that between the Company and the Rajah the " Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam."

Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur agrees to contribute towards the discharge of the increased expense incurred by the augmentation of the military force, and the unavoidable charges of war, such a sum as shall appear to the Governor-General in Council of Fort William, on an attentive consideration of the means of his said Highness, to bear a just and reasonable proportion to the actual net revenues of his said Highness.

Article 4th.—And whereas it is indispensably necessary that effectual and lasting security should be provided against any failure in the funds destined to defray either the expense of maintaining the permanent military force in time of peace, or the extraordinary expense described in the 3rd article of the present treaty; it is hereby stipulated and agreed between the contracting parties, that whenever the Governor-General in Council of Fort William in Bengal shall have reason to apprehend such failure in the funds so destined, the said Governor-General in Council shall be at liberty, and shall have full power and right either to introduce such regulations and ordinances as he shall deem expedient for the internal management and collection of the revenues, or for the better ordering of any other branch and department of the government of Mysore; or to assume and bring under the direct management of the servants of the said Company Bahaudur, such part or parts of the territorial possessions of his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur as shall appear to him, the said Governor-General in Council, necessary to render the said funds efficient and available either in time of peace or war.

Article 5th.—And it is hereby further agreed, that whenever the said Governor-General in Council shall signify to the said Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur that it is become necessary to carry into effect the provisions of the 4th Article, his said Highness Maha Raja Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur shall immediately issue orders to his Aumils, or other officers, either for carrying into effect the said regulations according to the tenor of the 4th Article, or for placing the territories required under the exclusive authority and controul of the English Company Bahaudur; and in case his Highness shall not issue such orders within ten days from the time when the application shall have been formally made to him, then the said Governor-General in Council shall be at liberty to issue orders by his own authority, either for carrying into effect the said regulations and ordinances, or for assuming the management and collection of the revenues of the said territories, as he shall judge most expedient for the purpose of securing the efficiency of the said military funds, and of providing for the effectual protection of the country, and welfare of the people; provided always, that whenever and so long as any part or parts of his said Highness's territories shall be placed, and shall remain under the exclusive authority and controul of the said East India Company, the Governor-General in Council shall render his Highness a true and faithful account of the revenues and produce of the territories so assumed; provided also that in no case whatever shall his Highness's actual receipt or

From the first to the ninth article of the draft of the Treaty of Mysore no explanation or particular instruction seems to be

annual income arising out of his territorial revenues, be less than the sum of one lac of star pagodas ; together with one-fifth of the net revenues of the whole of the territories ceded to him by the 5th Article of the treaty of Mysore, which sum of one lac of star pagodas, together with the amount of one-fifth of the said net revenues, the East India Company engages at all times, and in every possible case, to secure and cause to be paid for his Highness's use.

Article 6th.—His Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur engages, that he will be guided by a sincere and cordial attention to the relations of peace and amity now established between the English Company Bahaudur and their allies ; and that he will carefully abstain from any interference in the affairs of any state in alliance with the said English Company Bahaudur, or of any state whatever ; and for securing the object of this stipulation it is further stipulated and agreed, that no communication or correspondence with any foreign state whatever shall be holden by his said Highness without the previous knowledge and sanction of the said English Company Bahaudur.

Article 7th.—His Highness stipulates and agrees, that he will not admit any European foreigners into his service without the concurrence of the English Company Bahaudur ; and that he will apprehend and deliver up to the Company's Government all Europeans of whatever description who shall be found within the territories of his said Highness, without regular passports from the Company's Government, it being his Highness's determined resolution not to suffer, even for a day, any European foreigners to remain within the territories now subjected to his authority, unless by consent of the said Company.

Article 8th.—Whereas the complete protection of His Highness's said territories requires that various fortresses and strong places, situated within the territories of his Highness, should be garrisoned and commanded, as well in time of peace as of war, by British troops and officers ; His Highness Maha Raja Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur engages that the said English Company Bahaudur shall at all times be at liberty to garrison, in whatever manner they may judge proper all such fortresses and strong places within his said Highness's territories as it shall appear to them advisable to take charge of.

Article 9th.—And whereas in consequence of the system of defence which it may be expedient to adopt for the security of the territorial possessions of his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur, it may be necessary that certain forts and strong places within his Highness's territories shall be dismantled or destroyed, and that other forts and strong places should be strengthened and repaired ; it is stipulated and agreed, that the English East India Company Bahaudur, should be the sole judges of the necessity of any such alterations in the said fortresses ; and it is further agreed, that such expenses as may be incurred on this account shall be borne and defrayed in equal proportions by the contracting parties.

required. It appears to me, that the ninth, tenth, and eleventh articles contain the most eligible foundation of an arrangement

Article 10th.—In case it shall become necessary for enforcing and maintaining the authority and government of his Highness in the territories now subjected to his power that the regular troops of the English East India Company Bahaudur should be employed, it is stipulated and agreed, that upon formal application being made for the service of the said troops, they shall be employed in such manner as to the said Company shall seem fit; but it is expressly understood by the contracting parties that this stipulation shall not subject the troops of the English East India Company Bahaudur to be employed in the ordinary transactions of revenue.

Article 11th.—It being expedient for the restoration and permanent establishment of tranquillity in the territories now subjected to the authority of his Highness Maha Raja Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur, that suitable provision should be made for certain officers of rank in the service of the late Tippoo Sultaun, his said Highness agrees to enter into the immediate discussion of this point, and to fix the amount of the funds (as soon as the necessary information can be obtained) to be granted for this purpose in a separate article to be hereafter added to this treaty.

Article 12th.—Lest the garrison of Seringapatam should at any time be subject to inconvenience from the high price of provisions and other necessities, his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur agrees that such quantities of provisions and other necessities as may be required for the use and consumption of the troops composing the said garrison, shall be allowed to enter the place from all and every part of his dominions free of any duty, tax, or impediment whatever.

Article 13th.—The contracting parties hereby agree to take into their early consideration the best means of establishing such a commercial intercourse between their respective dominions as shall be mutually beneficial to the subjects of both governments, and to conclude a commercial treaty for this purpose with as little delay as possible.

Article 14th.—His Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur hereby promises to pay at all times the utmost attention to such advice as the Company's Government shall occasionally judge it necessary to offer to him, with a view to the economy of his finances, the better collection of his revenues, the administration of justice, the extension of commerce, the encouragement of trade, agriculture, and industry, or any other objects connected with the advancement of his Highness's interests, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both states.

Article 15th.—Whereas it may hereafter appear that some of the districts declared by the treaty of Mysore to belong respectively to the English Company Bahaudur, and to his Highness, are inconveniently situated with a view to the proper connection of their respective lines of frontier, it is hereby stipulated between the contracting parties that in all such cases they will proceed to such an adjustment, by means of exchange or otherwise, as shall be best suited to the occasion.

Article 16th.—This treaty, consisting of sixteen articles, being this day, the 8th of July, A D. 1799 (corresponding to the 3rd of Saffer, anno

for securing a provision for the family of Tippoo Sultaun.* The general principle on which that arrangement is founded is, that the Company and the Rajah of Mysore shall be charged exclusively with the expense of providing for the family of Tippoo Sultaun, and therefore should hold (over and above their proportion in the general partition) a territory equal in produce to the amount of this charge.

The tenth and eleventh articles are absolutely necessary for the security of the Company against any contingent increase in the expense of maintaining Tippoo's family, as well as against any possible misconduct in any of its branches; the Nizam may perhaps require (under the principle assumed to justify us in taking a larger share of territory than is assigned to him,) that in the event of any diminution of the expense of maintaining Tippoo's family, the amount of the saving should be paid over to his Highness; but this claim is satisfied by the tenth article, which exempts his Highness from any charge on account of any contingent increase of expense on the same head.

Whatever may be the amount of the Jaghire granted to

Hegere 1214, and to the 7th of the month Assar of the 1221st year of the Salluwunt æra), settled and concluded at the Fort of Nuzzabar, near Seringapatam, by his Excellency Lieutenant-General George Harris, Commander-in-Chief of the forces of his Britannic Majesty, and of the Honourable Company in the Carnatic, and on the Coast of Malabar, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieut.-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, with the Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur, the aforesaid gentlemen have delivered to the said Maha Rajah one copy of the same in English and Persian, sealed and signed by them; and his Highness the Maha Rajah has delivered to the gentlemen aforesaid another copy, also in Persian and English, bearing his seal, and signed by Luchuma, widow of the late Kistna Rajah, and sealed and signed by Purneah, Dewan of the Maha Rajah Kistna Rajah Oodiaver; and the aforesaid gentlemen have engaged to procure and deliver to the said Maha Rajah, without delay, a copy of the same, under the seal and signature of the Right Honourable the Governor-General, on the receipt of which by the said Maha Rajah, the present treaty shall be deemed complete and binding on the Honourable the English East India Company Bahaudur, and on the Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur respectively, and the copy of it now delivered to the said Maha Rajah be returned.

Ratified at Fort St George, by the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, on the 13th day of July, A. D. 1799.

* These articles formed a part of the *draft* of the treaty, but were omitted in the treaty itself, and the substance incorporated in the first article of that document.

Cummur ud Deen by the Nizam under the twelfth article, should be considered in allotting the Nizam's share of territory, in the same manner as the charges of maintaining the family of Tippoo Sultaun are considered in fixing the Company's share; so that upon the whole, the territory holden in sovereignty by the Nizam (after deducting the amount for the provision of Cummur ud Deen, and the territory holden by the Company, after deducting in the same manner the provision made for the family of Tippoo), should be equal in value. The remaining articles of the treaty of Mysore do not appear to require any explanation or particular instruction.

In the Treaty of Mysore no stipulation is inserted for providing an establishment for the Sirdars of Tippoo Sultaun, and for the families of such as fell in battle during the campaign. This charge must fall on the Rajah of Mysore, and I am induced to think that it will not amount to more than one lac of pagodas, I leave it to your judgment to insert an article in the Treaty of Mysore, guaranteeing the provision of the Sirdars if you should think it necessary; but it appears to me that it would be more advisable to secure their maintenance in the subsidiary treaty between the Company and the Rajah, as this arrangement will place them more immediately under the power of the Company.

The Draft of the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam* will not require any explanation from the first to the fourth article. In that article the sum of seven lacs of pagodas fixed for the subsidy, is as low as I can venture to rate it: during the Rajah's minority it cannot be felt, and as my present view of the revenues has induced me to refrain from burthening the Rajah with any charge for the expenses of the war, the amount of the subsidy cannot be considered to be unreasonable. The provisions of article 5th are absolutely necessary for the purpose of precluding the embarrassments which have arisen in Oude, the Carnatic, and Tanjore; and I think it a more candid and liberal, as well as a more wise policy, to apprise the Rajah distinctly from the first hour of his accession of the nature of his situation, than to leave any channel open for future ambiguity and discussion. This is a point which I hold to be so essential to the very ex-

* See p. 44.

istence of the new arrangement, that if it should appear objectionable (on grounds of which I am not now aware), I see no alternative but that of dividing the whole territory between the allies. No further observation appears necessary on the drafts of the subsidiary treaty. If it should appear unobjectionable to you, I authorize you to proceed forthwith to the conclusion of it in concert with the Commander-in Chief; I empower you to place the Rajah formally upon the Musnud, and to appoint, in the Rajah's name, Purneah to be his Dewan. The extreme youth of the representative of the Mysore family will render it necessary that his nearest male relation should sign the treaty in his name, and engage for his due performance of its several articles. The fortress of Mysore will be most eligible, and as I am informed, the most acceptable, seat of the Rajah's residence. In the event of your placing the Rajah upon the Musnud, I desire that you will, in my name, appoint Lieutenant-Colonel Close to the office of resident at Mysore.

I request that you will state to me without reserve in your next despatch, whether my presence in Mysore appears to you to be necessary or desirable for the despatch of the public service. My baggage is still upon the road, and I shall either finally recall it, or proceed directly to Ryakottah, according to the suggestions which I may receive from you.

I have the honour to be,

Gentlemen,
your obedient Servant,

MORNINGTON.

No. XVII.

General Order of Lieutenant-General Harris.

Camp, 9th June, 1799.

The Commander-in-Chief notifies in Orders that the Right Honourable the Governor-General with a view of affording to the army the immediate means of lodging their property in security, has been pleased to authorise his directing the pay-masters in camp, and in Seringapatam, to receive from individuals such sums of money as they may be desirous of investing in the Honourable Company's funds. For such sums

respectively (of 100 pagodas, or a larger amount), the pay-masters will grant receipts to the proprietor, entitling him to a bond of the Government of Fort St. George, bearing an interest of eight per cent. per annum from the day of payment in camp or Seringapatam, and payable in one or two years, at the option of Government. The Commander-in-Chief, who intends to profit by this indulgence himself, recommends to the army in general the adoption of this mode of obtaining immediate security for their property, and placing it to advantage, which, while it obviates all risk attendant on other means of remittance, offers to this army a pleasing occasion to mark that their confidence in the public credit of the state is equal to the zeal and gallantry they have ever shewn in asserting the claims, and defending the rights, of their country.

No. XVIII.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel Palmer, Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 12th June, 1799.

I conclude that under my letter of the 23rd of May,* you will have made any communication which circumstances may have rendered advisable to the Peishwa of my intention to cede a considerable part of the territory of the late Tippoo Sultaun to the Mahrattas under certain conditions, the justice and moderation of which cannot be disputed. I now direct you to take the first opportunity of assuring the Peishwa of my sincere disposition (notwithstanding all that has past), to cultivate his friendship and to promote his interests. You will proceed to inform him that it is my intention, under certain conditions, to make a considerable cession of territory to him, provided his conduct shall not in the interval have been such as to have rendered all friendly intercourse with him incompatible with the honour of the British Government. You will be careful in whatever communications you shall make on this subject to apprise the Peishwa that he has forfeited not only all claim to any portion of the conquered

* See p. 12.

territory under the terms of the triple Alliance, but also under those of the declaration which I authorized you to make in my instructions of the 3rd of April.* I wish, however, that the general tenor of your communications to the Peishwa should be of a conciliatory and amicable nature calculated to remove any impressions of jealousy or fear which he may conceive from the movements of General Harris's army to the northward of Mysore. You may assure the Peishwa in the most unequivocal terms that this movement has no other object than to secure the tranquillity and good order of our recent conquests; and that nothing can be more remote from my intentions, or those of General Harris, acting under my orders, than to offer any degree of violence to the Mahratta territory.

I wish you to transmit to me, without delay, the names and descriptions of all such districts lying within the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun at the time of his death as had been conquered from the Mahrattas, or were liable to any claims from that people. I am also desirous to learn what districts of the late Sultaun's dominions would be most acceptable to the Peishwa. These points I imagine you might easily ascertain through the means of Nana. You will take an early opportunity of making the same friendly declarations on my part to Scindiah as I have already directed you to make to the Peishwa. I am anxious to find some mode of engaging the interests of Scindiah in the new settlement of Mysore, under the condition of dismissing all the French officers from his service, and (if possible), under that of his delivering them over to our Government for the purpose of their being sent to Europe. I desire that you will turn your attention to this subject, and furnish me with an early knowledge of your sentiments upon my suggestion.

I am, Sir, &c.

MORNINGTON.

* See Vol. I. p. 509.

No. XIX.

Lieut.-General Harris, to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD, Camp near Milgottah, 15th June, 1799.

I am sorry to inform your Lordship that concurring reports from the north-westward describe all the country in that direction as overrun by a formidable banditti. Doondiah Waugh, a person whom Tippoo had confined, and who escaped from Seringapatam in the confusion of the assault, has collected a considerable force of horse and foot from the fugitives of Tippoo's army, and other men of desperate fortunes. He has, it is asserted, taken and governed Simoga, threatened Bednore, and its vicinity, and having stopped all communication to that quarter, I am not without apprehension that he may obtain possession of Chittledroog. He has united with Kishapah Naig the Poligar of Bullum, and with a near relation of Meer Mahomed Saduck, who had authority over some of the forts and districts in that quarter, the force of these adventures may be formidable as their followers are numerous, and well armed, and as the present crippled state of the army equipment render it perfectly impossible to move a sufficient force against them.

I am, with regard,
My Lord,
your very faithful and obedient Servant,

GEO. HARRIS.

No. XX.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-Colonel W. Scott, Resident at Lucknow.

(Private.)

DEAR SIR,

Fort St. George, June 18th, 1799.

I received your letter of the 13th of May with great pleasure, and I have since learnt that, by Mr. Lumsden's resignation, as well as by the arrangements which Sir Alured Clarke has made for filling the post of Adjutant-General to the army in Bengal, you are likely to be soon at liberty to enter on your new duties.

You are already apprized that my principal object is to effect a reform of the Nabob Vizier's army; and it would be a happy circumstance if any steps towards that most desirable end could be made during the present season before the alarm of Zemaun Shah's return to the frontier of Hindostan can be renewed. I have, therefore, thought it advisable to relax my injunction to you, not to take any step towards the accomplishment of the proposed military arrangements before you shall have received further instructions from me: I leave it to your discretion to act in this matter as you shall deem most expedient.

I entirely approve your suggestion of the advantages to be derived from availing ourselves of any instances of mutiny, treachery, or criminal neglect in any branches of the Vizier's army to reduce such divisions of the army as shall be convicted of these crimes.

The extreme unpopularity of the Nabob Vizier has been an object of serious regret to me: I understand that it arises principally from his excessive parsimony and his ungracious conduct towards the principal personages of his Court. It will be a matter of considerable delicacy to attempt to correct these defects; however, I request that you will direct your constant attention to them; and if any favourable opportunity should occur, that you will apprise the Nabob, in an amicable manner, of the concern with which I have learnt, that he does not pursue a course likely to conciliate the affection of his subjects; and you will signify to him, that the deep interest which I take in the stability, ease, and honour of his Government, renders me particularly anxious to hear that his Excellency has found means of removing the unfavourable impressions which have been conceived of his disposition.

At the same time you will express to his Excellency, in the strongest terms, my cordial approbation of the regularity which has marked his payment of the military subsidy ever since my arrival in Bengal. It is scarcely necessary to point out to you the importance of taking every step to encourage and improve the Nabob's disposition to the punctual discharge of his pecuniary engagements to the Company, forming, as they now do, the source of so considerable a branch of our revenue.

You are already informed of my views in the event of the

death of Almas Ali Khan, they are entirely conformable to your own ideas upon that subject. I request that you will apply to Mr. Lumsden for a copy of a private letter which I addressed to him a short time previous to my departure from Calcutta.* It contains a general outline of my sentiments with regard to the state of Oude.

I wish to call your particular attention to an evil which I consider to be of the first magnitude. I mean the number of real or pretended emissaries of Zemaun Shah who have spread themselves over the provinces of Oude and Benares for the last two or three years, exciting general alarm, and weakening the respect due to the British Government by inculcating exaggerated reports of the force of the Shah.

The imperious tone which the Shah has adopted in his communication with the Nabob Vizier and with the British Government must be abated. Our tacit admission of his presumptuous claims of sovereignty upon our provinces and their dependencies serves only to inflame his pride and ambition, and to degrade us in the eyes of our own subjects. From the papers discovered in the palace at Seringapatam, after the conquest of that place, it appears evident that Tippoo Sultaun had formed a connection with Zemaun Shah. Under all these circumstances, I desire that you will establish, in concert with Mr. Vanderheyden, a most vigilant control over any emissaries who may arrive from the Shah; and that you will, without hesitation, either send them beyond the frontier of Oude, or imprison them, as the case may require. I wish you to understand and to declare that I shall hereafter consider every person as a traitor who shall assert the royal authority of Zemaun Shah over any part of the dominions, either of the Nabob Vizier, or of the Company.

Your attention will necessarily be alive to the intrigues of Ambajee and of the French; with respect to the latter, my principle is very simple: wherever I find a Frenchman in India, within my power, I will send him back to Europe, and I desire that you will adopt this principle as the general rule of your conduct, from which you are never to depart, excepting in cases of a very special nature, which you will always report to me for my determination.

* See Vol. I. p. 386.

I am naturally anxious to visit Oude, but as I see no prospect of being able to return to Bengal before the month of September, it will be impossible for me to move from Calcutta before the month of December; indeed, after so long an absence from Calcutta, I should be desirous of remaining there until the commencement of the rains in the ensuing year, 1800, unless you see any necessity for my visiting Oude at an earlier period. On this question I wish for your unreserved opinion, by which my motions shall be regulated.

Believe me, dear Sir,

Yours, most sincerely,

MORNINGTON.

No. XXI.

Chief Justice Sir John Anstruther to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

June 25th, 1799.

I had your very kind letter some days ago, and yesterday brought me Tippoo's private correspondence with the French Government, you were so good as to send me. It affords convincing proofs of the good sense and judgment which dictated the commencement of the war, and of the danger which would have attended any delay, or any less exertion of vigour and activity than actually took place.

I am much flattered with the favourable place you gave me in your esteem, and sincerely assure you that I feel nearly as much satisfaction upon private as upon public grounds at the wonderful success of the war, but knowing what I do I cannot help wondering at the slight grounds upon which the fate of empires depend. The slightest delay in your passage, the slightest accident to the ship, an accidental sickness at the Cape, nay, had you yielded to the desires of many of your friends, and come to India without the Government being in you the instant of your arrival, all your exertions would have been in vain, and our empire in India might have been tottering at this day, instead of being fixed upon foundations I trust the most stable.

I am extremely happy to hear your determination upon the question of Seringapatam, which I have not disclosed to a

soul. Its central position, its local strength, joined to the river, being in a great measure a frontier almost all the way across the peninsula, and the facility with which an army may move from it to any point of attack, point it out as a material station for our army, and indeed, a line drawn by Colar Bangalore to Periapatam, affords a shorter line of defence to the Carnatic than we had before, and seems to point out that and Mangalore as a desirable acquisition for us. Gooty and Gurrumcoonda naturally are the places from whence the Nizam will secure his share of the conquest, and in the present circumstances an addition to his power is rather desirable than dangerous, adds to our strength, and not to our alarm, an additional effect of the wise measures of your Government. Were I in your place I should be more puzzled with Bednore than any other part of the country. It is distant from us. The Mahrattas will claim it. They deserve little, and in their present state, although not very formidable, yet might become so; and it is a rich province. I dare say your determination will be the best and the wisest.

The correspondence you sent me I think, in some degree, proves what I have long suspected, that the principles upon which the treaty of Seringapatam was founded were but fallacious, and more suited to defend the treaty in an English House of Commons than to assist its operations in this country. To Tippoo the triple alliance appeared the effect of weakness rather than ability, and moderation was by him, and I suspect by our allies too, supposed the effect of our inability. Besides the remote good arising from the balance of power wisely held to any Indian mind cannot come in competition with any immediate advantage whatever. Our successes have been too rapid for any Indian to give us credit for our moderation, and their false and fickle conduct will, I am afraid, prevent us from practising it long. I have no doubt but had the Frenchman's advice in the last letter in the collection*

* This was conveyed in a letter from M. Dubuc to Tippoo Sultaun, dated 16th of December, 1798, urging Tippoo to make overtures to the Mahrattas for their cooperation against the English, and entreating Tippoo so to stimulate the Mahrattas that they might take alarm and attack the East India Company's territories. See p. 134 of Mr. Edmonstone's translation of the discovered documents.

been taken with vigour, that you would not have had the Mahrattas so quiet, and possibly their delay may be in some degree owing to its having been attempted to be carried into execution. Adieu! may every good attend you, and every success follow your measures.

Yours, ever sincerely,

J. ANSTRUTHER.

No. XXII.

Captain (afterwards Sir Thomas) Munro to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Seringapatam, 29th June, 1799.

I should hardly have ventured to trouble your Lordship with a letter on the subject of my appointment as a joint Secretary to the Commissioners for the affairs of Mysore had not their instructions, directing me to communicate with you on the civil administration of Canara, opened the way for me to make my acknowledgments to your Lordship for having twice pointed me out as a person that might be usefully employed. As it is probable that your Lordship may hear that I hesitated for some time in accepting this appointment to Canara, I shall, without reserve, explain the motives by which I was guided on this occasion. I felt a reluctance to quit the coast, where I had served near twenty years. After having been the greatest part of the last nine years in tents, I dreaded that my constitution would not support the fatigue of leading the same kind of life for two or three years longer in investigating the revenues of a new country. I thought it possible that I might be ordered to take charge of a part of Coimbatore, and as I know perfectly, from my long residence in the neighbourhood of that province, that it yielded more than double the estimate of Tippoo Sultaun; I flattered myself with the hope of gaining some credit by augmenting the public revenue. On the contrary, I saw that, by going to Canara, I should only disappoint the expectations which your Lordship might have formed; for I never had any doubts of

the truth of the report which prevailed in 1792, that the Sultaun had overrated the whole of the Malabar coast in order to secure to himself a part of it for keeping up his French connection. This report seems to be confirmed by experience in Malabar, where, after a trial of seven years, the revenue is still lower than the schedule. I could scarcely hope to bring the country up to its estimated value in a short time; to do in one year what had not in the adjoining province been done in seven; and I therefore foresaw a certain unavoidable loss of reputation. But I considered that it was my duty to go, and the more especially as I was conscious that though I should never be able to realize any sanguine ideas that might be entertained on the subject of the revenue of Canara I should yet, from possessing the advantages of long experience, be enabled to render it as productive as it could have been in any other hands.

I understand that two gentlemen have been proposed as my assistants, but I am not sure whether or not they have been actually confirmed. It is hardly necessary to mention to your Lordship that no person can be of the smallest use in this revenue who does not understand some one or other of the country languages; besides this indispensable qualification, an assistant ought also to possess great perseverance and great temper with the natives. I am as yet ignorant how far the gentlemen in question are endowed with these requisites; but if I find them deficient, I shall not fail to report to your Lordship, in full confidence that I shall be furnished with abler assistance.

I shall trust to your Lordship's candour for excusing the freedom with which I have expressed myself in this first address.

I have the honour to be,
your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

TH. MUNRO.

No. XXIII.

The Earl of Mornington to Captain J. A. Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 30th June, 1799.

I now proceed to furnish you with such observations as occur to me to be necessary for your guidance in discussing the several articles of the treaty of Mysore with the Court of Hyderabad, if contrary to my hope any such discussion should arise. In the first place, I wish to state distinctly the fundamental principles on which I have framed the new settlement. I have always been disposed to pay not only every attention to the just pretensions of his Highness the Nizam, but even to exceed the limits of his strict rights in allotting the measure of his participation in the advantages of our late conquests, but I cannot admit the claim of his Highness to an equal partition of all or any of those advantages to be founded on any principles of justice or reason. His Highness cannot avail himself of the treaty of Paungul to maintain this claim because the article of that treaty relating to an equal partition of conquests could not be construed to apply to the late war. No other written or verbal engagement existing to support such a claim on the part of his Highness, I have endeavoured to estimate his rights under the alliance by an entirely different, and in my opinion, more equitable standard. My view has been to distribute the recent acquisitions of revenue between the two States in a due proportion to the efficient share, which each has borne in the expense and hazard of the war, as well as to the security which each is likely to derive from the assistance of the other in maintaining their common interests, and in consolidating the basis of the peace.

Although I have assumed this principle as the general foundation of the whole settlement, I am persuaded that a fair review of the details of the treaty of Mysore will convince any impartial mind that I have made concessions to the Nizam far exceeding the limits of the rule which I had thus

prescribed to myself as the just measure of his Highness's rights. It is unnecessary to enter more minutely into this part of the subject; you will find no difficulty in applying these observations to the articles of the treaty.

The preamble of the treaty requires no remark.

The 1st and 2nd articles leave to the Nizam and to the Company shares of territory, as nearly as is practicable, of equal value, after deducting from each the charges for which they have reciprocally engaged to provide on account of the maintenance of the families of Hyder Ali Khan, and Tippoo Sultaun, and although on account of the Jaghire of Meer Cummur ud Deen, it may be observed, on the part of the Nizam, that, under the power reserved to the Company in the 6th article, the Company may derive a greater benefit from its share of territory than that which now appears upon the face of the treaty, because the Company having reserved the power in certain contingencies of diminishing the allowances of the deposed family is not to be accountable to the Nizam for any such contingent advantage. On the other hand, it is apparent that the Nizam will be entitled to similar advantages with regard to the Jaghire of Cummur ud Deen, which his Highness, under his rights of sovereignty over Cummur ud Deen, will at any time possess the power of limiting or suspending, although no such power be expressly reserved in the treaty. His Highness also is exempt from the charge of any contingent increase in the expense of maintaining the deposed family, a contingency by no means improbable.

Meer Allum having objected to the operation of the 6th article, I offered, on the part of the Company, to render annually to the Nizam an account of the expense of maintaining the deposed family, and to divide equally with his Highness any contingent saving within the sum stipulated by the treaty for their annual maintenance, provided his Highness would consent to pay one-half of any eventual excess beyond the stipulated sum. Meer Allum declined this equitable proposal, and agreed to the articles in their present form.

It appears that the Nizam is desirous of retaining a part of Tippoo Sultaun's family within his Highness's territory,

the objections to such a plan must be obvious to every friend, not only of the British interests, but of the alliance between his Highness and the Company, the residence of the deposed family in the territory of the Company can never be an object of jealousy to the Nizam. Within his Highness's dominions it might become an object not only of jealousy to the Company, but of serious danger to the stability of the new settlement of Mysore. In addition to this observation, I must also remark, that the separation of the different members of the family of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun would be heavily felt by them as an unnecessary act of severity. It has been my duty to mitigate the rigour of this sudden change of their fortunes, and having been apprized that any separation of the several branches of the families would greatly aggravate the unavoidable pressure of their actual condition, principles of humanity, as well as of policy, forbid me to adopt the plan suggested by Azim-ul-Omra.

The whole of the deposed family will therefore be settled at Vellore, under the care of Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton, and no reasonable expense will be refused by me which can contribute to their comfort or accommodation on a munificent scale, suited to the rank in which they were born.

Before I quit the 1st and 2nd articles, I think it proper to repeat that a mistake has arisen in enumerating the districts of Coimbatore retained by the Company, the district of Kanjam having been omitted in the schedule A.

The necessity of the third article is evident, as without that article Seringapatam would never become an efficient military post in the hands of the allies. I am persuaded that the Nizam will soon feel and acknowledge the security which he is likely to derive from the establishment of a large British force at Seringapatam.

The fourth article contains the basis of an arrangement founded on the strongest principles of justice, humanity, and policy. It does not appear to me necessary to state any thing farther on this, or the fifth article; you will naturally observe that, if the Nizam's claim to an equal partition of territory had been founded in right, and consequently admitted by me, this adjustment so honourable to the moderation, generosity, and wisdom of the British character, would not have taken place.

I have already remarked the operation of the 6th article on the interests of the Nizam, its necessity with a view to those of the Company is obvious. The policy of the 7th and 8th articles, I should trust, would not be disputed even by the illiberal, rapacious, and vindictive spirit of which I have perceived so many disgusting symptoms at Hyderabad, even since the fall of Seringapatam.

That the new settlement of Mysore should be rendered as acceptable as possible to all the powers contiguous to the respective boundaries of the allies, is a principle founded on the soundest maxims of prudence, as well as of generosity. The conditions which I have annexed to the provisional cession of territory to the Mahrattas will, I trust, satisfy the Court of Hyderabad of my sincere disposition to promote the interests of the Nizam by every effort compatible with the laws of my country, and the rules of public faith and justice.

You have already been apprized through my correspondence with Colonel Palmer, of the general outline of the conditions which I propose to require from the Peishwa, as well as of those which the Peishwa has proposed to me, I trust I shall be able, in the course of to-morrow, to forward to Colonel Palmer the draft of a treaty founded on his late communications. The despatch prepared for Colonel Palmer will pass through your hands, and you will communicate its contents to the Nizam, conformably to the stipulations of the treaty of Hyderabad. I desire that you will furnish me and Colonel Palmer, by the speediest conveyance, with such observations as may occur to you relative to the adjustment of affairs between the Peishwa and the Nizam.

The Ninth Article of the treaty of Mysore is intended to form the foundation of a connection of the most intimate nature between the Company and the Rajah of Mysore; you will inform me whether this arrangement is likely to excite any degree of jealousy in the mind of the Nizam. It is my decided determination not to admit of any relation between the Rajah of Mysore and any other power otherwise than through the Company's Government. I am persuaded that in this determination I have made the best practicable arrangement for the interests of the Rajah, the Nizam, and the Company. The Nizam will not be a party to the subsidiary

treaty with the Rajah. I have not yet determined, however, whether a treaty of general guarantee between the three states to which the Peishwa hereafter may be invited to accede, would not be an advisable measure.

With regard to the two separate articles of the treaty of Mysore, the nature of the first has already been explained in my observations on the 6th article of the treaty. The 2nd requires some further remarks; it was proposed by Meer Allum as a mode of removing all jealousy from the mind of the Nizam, and of reconciling the Court of Hyderabad to Meer Allum's conduct in signing the treaty without having received powers from his Court.

The article appears to me to be perfectly nugatory, unless it be supposed that the Court of Hyderabad possesses sufficient influence with that of Poonah to prevent the Peishwa's consent to conditions which might otherwise prove acceptable to him, or unless it be intended insidiously to favour some unreasonable pretensions of the Nizam against the Peishwa. I shall, however, pursue through the whole of the negociation the course which shall appear to my judgment to lead to the ends of reason and justice, and I will not suffer myself to be diverted from those ends by any intrigues at either court.

It is difficult to express to you the degree of disgust which has been occasioned in my mind by some of the late official documents from Hyderabad. It is evident that Meer Allum, notwithstanding his obligations to the British Government, and personally to myself, has employed every art to create discontent against both, by the tenor of his unfounded complaints, addressed to Azim ul Omra, from Seringapatam. I am credibly informed that the cause of Meer Allum's conduct is no other than his disappointment at not having personally shared in the distribution of the spoils of Seringapatam; and I understand that he has the imprudence to proceed so far as to hint his right to a share in the prize, equal to that allotted to Lieutenant-General Harris. The rejection of this unreasonable claim was immediately followed by the most marked symptoms of a discontent, which has never since been removed. This is a proceeding unworthy of his character, inconsistent with his professions, and incompatible with his obligations to the British Government; from this moment he

will ever be, in my opinion, an object both of suspicion and contempt. The conduct of the Nizam, and of Azim ul Omra, is of a similar character. Nor can I conceive any attempt more despicable in principle, or indiscreet in policy, than that which they have made, to deprive our army and the Nizam's of the just and customary rewards of their gallantry and honourable labours.

I will transmit to you by an early opportunity copies of the orders of Lord Cornwallis, during the last war, respecting the right of the army to property found in places taken by assault.* I will add copies of my late orders on the same subject. You will remark that Lord Cornwallis' opinion proceeds far beyond mine on this subject, although practically our determination has been the same. The plain truth is, that the claims of the army under such circumstances have never been resisted in His Majesty's service, nor do I think they could have been resisted at Seringapatam on any grounds of justice or policy, unless the amount of the captured property had been so enormous, as that its distribution must have affected the discipline of the army. The Nizam's force formed so small a proportion, either in point of number or efficiency, of the whole army, that it would have been the height of injustice to have admitted his Highness' claim to an equal participation of the whole prize, an admission which would have deprived our army of its reasonable advantages, without serving that employed by his Highness. No other principle, therefore, could be adopted but that of allowing his troops to share rateably with ours; excepting always his cavalry, the irregular construction of which rendered such an arrangement impracticable. For his cavalry, therefore, a compromise was made with Meer Allum. Whether Meer Allum defrauded his Highness' infantry of their share of the prize money, and reserved it for his Highness' private use, to the prejudice of those who had so well earned it in the field, is a question which I confess freely it never occurred to me to ask; nor will I degrade the character of the British Government by mixing in such a transaction, although the consequence of my refusal should be the total loss of his Highness' alliance.

* See Appendix.

When Lieutenant-General Harris communicated to me Meer Allum's requisition to be admitted on the part of the Nizam, to make a valuation of the treasure, I immediately gave my assent to Meer Allum's proposition with some expressions of surprise, that the Commander-in-Chief should have thought any reference to me necessary. Subsequent information, however, has convinced me that the Commander-in-Chief not only acted with propriety in declining Meer Allum's original proposal, but that he has also been completely justified in suspending the execution of my orders; for it now appears that the Court of Hyderabad, as well as the whole army, would have construed the concession into a formal recognition of the personal right of the Nizam to one-half of the captured property.

I shall close this letter with some general reflections arising out of the recent conduct and language of the Nizam, Azim ul Omrah, and Mustakeem oo Dowlah.

It is with infinite regret that I perceive throughout the whole tenor of the reports of their recent conversations a spirit extremely dangerous to the stability of our connection with the Court of Hyderabad. The language of Mustakeem oo Dowlah is particularly offensive, and as he is nearly connected with Meer Allum, it is not difficult to trace the source of his insolence and boldness in the disappointed avarice of his patron and kinsman; it appears, however, that the language which he used had been previously concerted with Azim ul Omra, a circumstance which renders it the more deserving of animadversion. I desire that you will take an early opportunity of bringing Mustakeem oo Dowlah to a distinct explanation of his statement of the powers which the Nizam had vested in me. That statement is, if possible, as false and absurd as it is disrespectful to the supreme power of the British Government vested in my hands. His Highness the Nizam, since the fall of Seringapatam, on two distinct occasions declared, in the most positive terms, that he would not in any degree interfere to restrain those plenary powers which he had requested me to exercise with respect to all his interests in the conquest of Mysore. I desire that you will take an early opportunity of reprimanding Mustakeem oo Dowlah, in the most public and pointed manner, for the disrespectful terms in which he has spoken of the British

Government, and that you will deprive him of his pension if you should deem it necessary to proceed to such an act of severity; at the same time, you will take an opportunity of signifying to the minister the extreme concern with which I have learnt that he has suffered any of his servants to utter with impunity expressions so unwarrantable. It may not be useless to embrace this occasion of awakening Azim ul Omra to a just sense of the extensive advantages which have been acquired by the Nizam's Government, within the last year, by means of his connection with the British power. Within that short space of time the Nizam has been delivered from the violence and arrogance of an armed party in the centre of his dominions, which menaced the independence, if not the existence of his throne. His enemies have been deterred by the intervention of the British power from prosecuting against his Highness' kingdom designs which he possessed no means of resisting, and which probably would have terminated in his destruction. His most formidable enemy has been utterly destroyed, with scarcely any expense to his Highness' treasury; and in place of that enemy has been substituted a power, connected with him by all the ties of interest and public faith, and affording perfect security to his dominions in that quarter, formerly the most vulnerable. He has acquired a large accession of territory and revenue, as well as of reputation and glory, by the conduct of his troops under the direction of British officers during the war.

Finally, from a weak, decaying, and despised state, he has recovered substantial strength, secured the means of cultivating and extending his resources, with power and honour at home and abroad, and resumed a respectable posture among the princes of India. These have been the consequences of his connection with the British power, acquired without effort or hazard on his part.

It is for his Highness and Azim ul Omra to determine whether these benefits are all counterbalanced by our adherence to the invariable practice of our military service, and by our justice to the merits of that army which has secured his tranquillity as well as ours. Perhaps it may occur as a prudential consideration, whether his Highness' disappointment at not being permitted to lay hands on rewards, appropriated by the custom of the British Government to encourage the

zeal of those who risk their lives in the public cause, should be so far indulged, as to hazard any interruption of that friendship from which he has derived advantages so solid, substantial, and honourable.

The treaty of Mysore appears to me to be highly favourable to his Highness' interests.* If, however, he should object to the basis and fundamental principles of it, he will not excite an emotion of alarm or uneasiness in my mind. I am perfectly prepared to carry the new settlement into effect by the aid of British arms alone; and his Highness must be aware of the advantages which he will open to the Court of Poonah, if he should compel me to resort to such extreme measures. But if his Highness should object merely to partial details, or particular stipulations of the treaty, I trust he will not hesitate to ratify it, relying on me to remove all such objectionable parts, unless they should appear upon examination either to be necessarily connected with the whole arrangement, or counterbalanced by advantages, which had escaped his Highness's observation.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXIV.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel Palmer, Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 4th July, 1799.

I have already stated to you the grounds of my decided opinion, that the Peishwa has forfeited all right to claim any share in the advantages of the late war with Tippoo Sultaun. In this place therefore, I shall only observe, that the plea of inability to fulfil its engagements stated by the Durbar of Poonah, in the 5th article of the Peishwa's proposition, is a direct admission that the Mahratta State is not entitled to any share of the partition of Mysore, for whatever might be their inclination, nothing less than an effective co-operation in the field could have been deemed to amount to such a performance of their engagements, as could constitute the foundation of a right to participate in the division of our recent

* See p. 26.

conquests ; but even their inclination has been at least equivocal, and by their continued intercourse with the enemy, they have precluded themselves from the benefit of your declaration made in my name, under the express condition of their renouncing all such intercourse during the war—their conduct in the former war cannot serve as a plea to justify a totally different behaviour in the present ; it might as well be contended that the Nizam should be now punished for his want of zeal in the former war, as that the Mahrattas should be now rewarded for their alacrity at that period.

You must, therefore, understand and explain distinctly to the Peishwa, that I cannot consent to negotiate with him under any admission of his right to an equal, or any, share of the dominions of the late Tippoo Sultaun. Whatever cessions may be made to the Peishwa from those territories, must be deemed gratuitous on the part of the Company, and of the Nizam, excepting in as far as they shall be compensated by correspondent concessions on the part of the Peishwa.

It may be necessary to observe, that it is my intention to exclude both the Nizam and the Mahrattas, especially the latter, from any interference in the affairs of the Rajah of Mysore, who is to be considered as a dependant of the Company. You will judge whether any specific engagement, on this subject, will be necessary to restrain the Court of Poonah from intriguing in Mysore.

The whole system of my policy, is a sufficient earnest of my anxiety to expel the French from the service of Scindiah ; but it might be dangerous to proceed to any steps which tend to fix Scindiah in the interests of France. I desire you will keep this object constantly in view, nothing would be more satisfactory to me, than to find means of conciliating Scindiah's interests in the present pacification ; perhaps it might be possible to arrange this most desirable object, by some equitable adjustment of his pecuniary claims on the Nizam and on the Peishwa ; on this subject you will concert your measures with the Resident at Hyderabad.

I am, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXV.

From Sir Sidney Smith, to His Excellency the Right Hon. the Governor-General of the British Possessions in India.

MY LORD,

Tigre, off Cyprus, 9th July, 1799.

[Received at Fort William 15th Oct. 1799.]

I feel I cannot do better towards meeting the natural impatience, and relieving the anxiety of our friends and coadjutors in India, than to transmit copies of my late despatches to Rear Admiral Lord Nelson, containing the detail of the seige of Acre, which Bonaparte was forced to raise precipitately, after sixty-three days labour, and eleven fruitless attempts to carry the place by assault. He returned towards Cairo with the remnant of his exhausted army, which was originally twelve thousand men on the Syrian expedition, and is reduced at least one third. Egypt will afford him a reinforcement of about twelve thousand men, left there under General Kleber, so that his *utmost* force is now twenty thousand men, but by no means so formidable as they were before they met with a check, and felt their situation as it really is, cut off from all resource, and in a country by no means congenial to their habits, or furnishing the means of supplying their wants, still, however it is my duty to state that we have experienced desperation to be a strong principle of action both in Bonaparte and a portion of his followers, consequently as they find themselves hard pressed on this side by the Ottoman armies, they may push across the Isthmus, and carry terror among those who don't know them ; it is necessary, therefore, that his Majesty's and the Right Honourable Company's servants in India, should continue to be on their guard, notwithstanding the recent defeat of that portion of the French army which entered Syria, and if the British forces should have it in their power to attack the first of the enemy's troops, which make their appearance to the southward of the Isthmus, the success of his Majesty's arms, which (after what I have witnessed) I look on as certain, cannot fail to have the same good effect on the opinion of the natives, that our early successes had in this country, in which case the most formidable part of the evil is

done away, and the rest must be subject to the ordinary course of events in war, where a succession of fresh troops have to deal with a fatigued, diminished and dispirited enemy. If this is the case with them in Egypt, I am happy likewise, from recent official information to be able to say, it is equally so in every other quarter where the French arms have hitherto carried all before them. The Russian and Austrian combined armies under the command of General Suvarof, have beaten them out of Italy. The Austrians on the Rhine have been equally successful, the enemy having been driven back across the river. In Switzerland, the Austrians have everywhere been received as liberators, and the French expelled. We have no direct news from the interior of France, but these events according to the spirit which I know to prevail, both in Paris and the provinces bid fair to overturn the monstrous system, which has nearly reduced all the surrounding nations to the same pitiable state which France is in herself, and consequently to restore tranquillity to Europe.

Sir Charles Whitworth writes me word, that he has exchanged the ratification of a subsidiary treaty with Russia, by which she engages to furnish us 45,000 men, which will no doubt, enable Government to support your Lordship in the laudable exertions you are making to secure our Empire in India. You may be apprehensive on hearing, that the French fleet sailed from Brest, in the latter end of April, and had not been heard of when the last letters left London; they have however, made their appearance on the coast of Italy, having entered the Mediterranean on the 5th of May; they are followed by our superior fleet.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
With perfect respect and regard,
W. SIDNEY SMITH.

not been undertaken in pursuit of schemes of conquest, extension of territory, or augmentation of revenue. In proportion to the magnitude and lustre of our success, it became a more urgent duty to remember, that a peace, founded in the gratification of any ambitious or inordinate view, could neither be advantageous, honourable, nor secure.

The approved policy, interests, and honour of the British nation therefore required, that the settlement of the extensive kingdom subjected to our disposal, should be formed on principles acceptable to the inhabitants of the conquered territories, just and conciliatory towards the contiguous native States, and indulgent to every party, in any degree affected by the consequences of our success.

To have divided the whole territory equally between the Company and the Nizam, to the exclusion of any other State, would have afforded strong grounds of jealousy to the Mahrattas, and aggrandized the Nizam's power beyond all bounds of discretion ; under whatever form such a partition could have been made, it must have placed in the hands of the Nizam many of the strong fortresses on the northern frontier of Mysore, and exposed our frontier in that quarter to every predatory incursion ; such a partition would have laid the foundation of perpetual differences, not only between the Mahrattas and the Nizam, but between the Company and both those powers.

To have divided the country into three equal portions, allowing the Mahrattas, (who had borne no part in the expence or hazard of the war,) an equal share with the other two branches of the triple alliance, in the advantages of the peace, would have been unjust towards the Nizam, and towards the Company ; impolitic, as furnishing an evil example to our other Allies in India, and dangerous, as effecting a considerable aggrandizement of the Mahratta empire at the expence of the Company, and of the Nizam. This mode of partition also, must have placed Chitteldroog, and some of the most important northern fortresses, in the hands of the Mahrattas, while the remainder of the fortresses in the same line, would have been occupied by the Nizam, and our unfortified and open frontier in Mysore, would have been exposed to the excesses of the undisciplined troops of both powers.

The Mahrattas unquestionably had no claim to any por-

tion of the conquered territory, and any considerable extension of their empire was objectionable, especially when accompanied by the possession of strong fortresses bordering on the line of our frontier. It was, however, desirable to conciliate their goodwill, and to offer to them such a portion of territory as might give them an interest in the new settlement without offence or injury to the Nizam, and without danger to the frontier of the Company's possessions. On the other hand, it was prudent to limit the territory retained in the hands of the Company and of the Nizam within such bounds of moderation as should bear a due proportion to their respective expences in the contest, and to the necessary means of securing the public safety of their respective dominions.

For the information of your Honourable Court, I have annexed to this despatch a comparative statement of several plans for the partition of Tippoo Sultaun's dominions, drawn up under my instructions with a view to the relative interests and power of the Nizam, the Mahrattas, and the Company; to the nature, produce, and geographical boundaries of the country, and to the position and strength of the several fortresses and passes; an attentive investigation of every comparative view of these important questions terminated in my decision that the establishment of a central and separate government in Mysore, under the protection of the Company, and the admission of the Mahrattas to a certain participation in the division of the conquered territory, were the expedients best calculated to reconcile the interests of all parties, to secure to the Company, a less invidious, and more efficient share of revenue, resource, commercial advantage, and military strength, than could be obtained under any other distribution of territory or power, and to afford the most favourable prospect of general and permanent tranquillity in India.

Having decided these leading principles of the new settlement, I proceeded to determine the rule of distribution for the respective shares of the Company, the Nizam, and the Mahrattas, to fix the most eligible position for the cessions to be made to each party, and to define the limits of the new government of Mysore.

To the Company's share naturally fell the Province of Ca-

nara, the Districts of Coimbatoor and Daraporam, with all the territory lying below the Ghauts between your possessions in the Carnatic, and those in Malabar. These acquisitions appeared the most eligible, not only on account of their intrinsic value in point of produce, but as securing an uninterrupted tract of territory from the coast of Coromandel to that of Malabar, together with the entire sea-coast of the Kingdom of Mysore, and the base of all the eastern, western and southern Ghauts. To these I thought it necessary to add the forts and posts forming the heads of all the passes above the Ghauts on the Table Land. The possession of the base of the Ghauts alone formed no effectual barrier for the inhabitants of the Low Lands against an enemy possessing the summits of those mountains ; and I, therefore, considered the acquisition of all the entrances of the Passes situated above the Ghauts, to be an essential object of security, against every possible approach of danger from the Table Land. This acquisition derived a further importance in my opinion, from the means which it appeared to afford of curbing the refractory spirit of the Polygars, and of all other turbulent and disaffected subjects in the Carnatic, and on the coast of Malabar ; I also considered the district of WynAAD to be an useful possession with a view to the tranquillity of your territories on the latter coast. The last addition which I deemed it necessary to make to your share of the conquered dominions, consisted of the fortress, city and island of Seringapatam, the possession of which would effectually secure the communication between your territories on both coasts, and consolidate all your lines of defence in every direction.

To the Nizam, it appeared most expedient to allot the districts of Gooy and Gurrumcondah, bordering on the cessions which he acquired by the peace of 1792, together with a tract of country, the frontier of which should be drawn nearly along the line of Chitteldroog, Sera, Nundydroog, and Colar, leaving, however, these fortresses to the southward to form the frontier of the new Government of Mysore. The Nizam certainly could not assert any just claim to an equal participation with the Company in the advantages of the peace. The operation of the 6th Article of the Treaty of Paungul, respecting an equal division of conquests, was

limited to the war which terminated in 1792. Since the peace of Seringapatam, the 10th is the only Article of the Treaty of Paungul which can be considered to continue in force; and no subsequent engagements had been contracted with the Nizam which could entitle him to any advantages in the present peace exceeding his relative proportion in the expences and exertions of the allied force during the late war. It was, however, desirable that the territorial revenue retained in sovereignty by the Company (after deducting whatever charges might be annexed to the tenure) should not exceed the Nizam's portion, and accordingly I determined that this principle should be observed in the partition; reserving, however, to the Company, as a just indemnification for their superior share in the expences and exertions of the war, the principal benefit of whatever advantages might flow from any engagements to be contracted with the new Government of Mysore.

For the Mahrattas, I resolved to reserve a portion of territory, the revenues of which should not exceed two-thirds, nor fall short of one half, of the portions retained in sovereignty by the Nizam and the Company respectively, after deducting their respective charges; considering that any cession to the Peishwa must be viewed as a matter of mere favour, it appeared to me that the share to be allotted to him was amply sufficient, it would contain Harponelly, Soonda above the Ghauts, Annagoondy, part of the district of Chitteldroog, part of Bednore above the Ghauts, and other districts, but the frontier fortresses of Chitteldroog and Bednore would remain for the protection of the new Government of Mysore. I also determined that no portion of territory should be ceded to the Peishwa unconditionally, and that the cession should form the basis of a new treaty with the Mahratta empire.

The territory remaining unoccupied by this partition could be bounded to the northward by a strong line of hill forts and posts, forming a powerful barrier towards the southern frontiers of the Nizam and of the Mahrattas, from Punganoor on the line of the eastern, to Bednore on that of the western Ghauts, and would be entirely surrounded to the east, west and south, by the territories of the Company

above and below the Ghauts, the Company also holding the Fort of Seringapatam in the centre of the Table Land.

The necessity now occurred of determining in what hands the new Government of Mysore should be placed, and although no positive right or title to the throne existed in any party, it seemed expedient, that my choice should be made between the pretensions of the family of Tippoo Sultaun, and those of the ancient house of the Rajahs of Mysore.

The claims of humanity on both sides rendered the decision a painful and ungracious task. No alternative remained, but to depose the dynasty which I found upon the throne, or to confirm the Mahomedan usurpation, and with it the perpetual exclusion and degradation of the legitimate Hindoo sovereigns of the country. The usurpation, although not sanctioned by remote antiquity, had subsisted for such a length of time as to have nearly extinguished the hopes of the Hindoo family, and to have accustomed them to the humility of their actual fortunes, while the sons of Tippoo Sultaun, born in the state of royalty, and educated with the proudest and most exalted expectations of sovereignty and power, would be proportionably sensible to the sudden change of their condition, and to the unexpected disappointment of their splendid prospects. In this view of the subject it would have been more grateful to my mind (securing a munificent provision for the ancient family of Mysore) to have restored that of Tippoo Sultaun to the throne; if such a restoration could have been accomplished without exposing Mysore to the perpetual hazard of internal commotion and foreign war, and without endangering the stability of the intended settlement of your interests and those of your Allies in this quarter of India.

Since the peace of Seringapatam, and more especially since the year 1796, the destruction of the British power in India has formed the favourite and unremitting object of Tippoo Sultaun's hopes and exertions. His haughty mind never could be reconciled to the sacrifices which he was compelled to make for the purchase of peace in 1792; and his increasing eagerness to recover the extensive portion of his dominions, then ceded to the allies, urged him to pursue a systematic course of intrigue against the British power among all

the native states, and to revert to his ancient and hereditary connection with France, as the only effectual means of gratifying either his ambition or revenge.

The proofs which I had obtained, previous to the war, of the nature and objects of his machinations, were sufficient to satisfy my judgment; they have since been corroborated by the voluminous records discovered in the Palace of Seringapatam; it is now incontestable that Tippoo Sultaun's thoughts were perpetually intent upon the ruin of the British power, that he trusted to have accomplished our expulsion by instigating the French to invade India; and that he prosecuted this unalterable purpose with all the zeal and ardour of passionate resentment and vindictive hate, as well as with the steadiness of a deliberate maxim of state.

Perhaps the most wise policy which Tippoo Sultaun could have pursued would have been to have rested satisfied with the dominions remaining in his hands after the peace of 1792. But a policy of so moderate and pacific a spirit being utterly incompatible with the impetuosity of his temper, with the principles of his religious faith, and with the military character of his government, it might be at least a matter of rational speculation, whether a close alliance with France (however dangerous in its remote consequences) was not his true interest, in the actual state of his immediate views and pursuits. The possession of his lost dignity, wealth, and power could not be recovered without the conquest of a great part of the Company's territory, nor effectually secured without the total subversion of the British interests in India;—a French army was the only instrument by which such an enterprize could be attempted;—an alliance with France was, therefore, the necessary consequence of Tippoo Sultaun's restless, but natural desire to restore his empire to its former splendour and strength. In addition to his correspondence with the French at Tranquebar, with those at the Isle of France, and with the executive Directory at Paris, his embassy to Zemaun Shah, his intrigues at Poonah and Hyderabad, and his correspondence with Mons. Raymond, (all which transactions appear distinctly in the records discovered at Seringapatam) furnish abundant evidence that his antipathy to the English was the ruling passion of his heart, the

main-spring of his policy, the fixed and fundamental principle of his councils and government.

The heir of Tippoo Sultaun must have been educated in the same principles, and encouraged to indulge in the same prejudices and passions, and instructed to form the same views of the interests and honour of the throne of Mysore. These sentiments would necessarily acquire additional force in his mind from the issue of the late war. Our unexampled success had subverted the foundations of his father's empire, and transferred to our possession every source of the civil or military power of Mysore. Placed on the throne by our favour, and limited by our controul, he would have felt himself degraded to a state of humiliation and weakness so abject as no Prince of spirit would brook. Under such an arrangement our safety would have required us to retain at least all the territory which we now hold by the partition Treaty of Mysore. Whatever we retained must have been considered by the prince as a new usurpation upon his royal inheritance, and an additional pledge of his degradation and disgrace. In proportion to the reduction of his territory and resources he would have less to lose and more to regain in any struggle for the recovery of his father's empire; nor does it seem unreasonable to suppose that the heir of Hyder Alli and Tippoo Sultaun, animated by the implacable spirit and bold example of his parents, and accustomed to the commanding prospect of independent sovereignty, and to the splendour of military glory, might deliberately hazard the remnant of his hereditary possessions in pursuit of so proud an object, as the recovery of that vast and powerful empire, which for many years had rendered his ancestors the scourge of the Carnatic, and the terror of this quarter of India.

In the most narrow view of the subject, it must be admitted that the son of Tippoo Sultaun must have felt a perpetual interest in the subversion of any settlement of Mysore, founded on a partition of his father's dominions, and on a limitation of his own independence. If, therefore, a prince of this race had been placed on the throne of Mysore, the foundations of the new settlement would have been laid in the very principles of its own dissolution. With such a prince no sincere alliance, no concord of sentiments, or union of

views could ever have been established ; the appearances of amity or attachment must have been delusive, even his submission must have been reluctant, if not treacherous ; while all his interests, his habits, prejudices, and passions, his vices, and even his virtues must have concurred to cherish an irreconcilable aversion to our name and power, and an eager desire to abet the cause, to exasperate the animosity, and to receive the aid of every enemy of the British nation. Whatever degree of influence or strength might have been left to the native Government of Mysore in such hands, would always have been thrown into the scale opposed to your interests. The hostile power of Mysore would have been weakened, but not destroyed ; an enemy would still have remained in the centre of your possessions, watching every occasion to repair the misfortunes of his family at your expense, and forming a point of union for the machinations of every discontented faction in India, and for the intrigues of every emissary of France.

Under these circumstances, the same anxiety for the security and repose of your possessions, which originally compelled me to reduce the power of Tippoo Sultaun, now appeared to require that I should provide effectually against the revival of any degree of a similar danger, in the person of his son.

On the other hand, the restoration of the descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore was recommended by the same course of reasoning which excluded the heir of the Mahomedan usurpation.

The indignities which the deposed family of Mysore had suffered, especially during the cruel and tyrannical reign of Tippoo Sultaun, and the state of degradation and misery to which they had been reduced, would most naturally excite a sentiment of gratitude and attachment in their minds towards that power, which had not only delivered them from oppression, but had raised them to a state of considerable affluence and distinction. Between the British Government and this family, an intercourse of friendship and kindness had subsisted in the most desperate crisis of their adverse fortune. They had formed no connection with your enemies. Their elevation would be the spontaneous act of your generosity, and from your support alone could they ever hope to be maintained upon the throne, either against the family of Tippoo Sultaun,

or against any other claimant. They must naturally view with an eye of jealousy, all the friends of the usurping family, and consequently be adverse to the French, or to any state connected with that family, in its hereditary hatred of the British Government. The heir of the Rajahs of Mysore, if placed on the throne, must feel that his continuance in that state depended on the stability of the new settlement in all its parts. His interest must therefore be to unite with cordiality and zeal in every effort necessary to its harmony, efficiency, and vigour. The effect of such an arrangement of the affairs of Mysore would not be limited to the mere destruction of the hostile power which menaced our safety. In the place of that power, would be substituted one, whose interests and resources might be absolutely identified with our own, and the kingdom of Mysore, so long the source of calamity and alarm to the Carnatic, might become a new barrier of our defence, and might supply fresh means of wealth and strength to the Company, their subjects, and allies.

In addition to these motives of policy, moral considerations, and sentiments of generosity and humanity, favoured the restoration of the ancient family of Mysore. Their high birth, the antiquity of their legitimate title, and their long and unmerited sufferings, rendered them peculiar objects of compassion and respect; nor could it be doubted that their government would be both more acceptable and more indulgent than that of the Mahomedan usurpers, to the mass of the inhabitants of the country, composed almost entirely of Hindoos.

These considerations induced me to adopt the resolution of preferring the descendants of the Rajahs of Mysore to the heir of Tippoo Sultaun.

I determined at the same time to grant to the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun a more magnificent maintenance than either had enjoyed during the late reign, and to provide with the same liberality for the principal Mahomedan officers and chiefs of the state, who had survived the Sultaun, and for the families of all those who had fallen in the course of the war.

For the accomplishment of a settlement founded on the principles which I have had the honour to detail to your

Honourable Court in the preceding paragraphs, I issued a special commission on the 4th of June,* appointing Lieutenant-General Harris, The Honourable Colonel Wellesley, The Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, commissioners for the affairs of Mysore, with the ample powers specified in the commission; and I named Captains Malcolm and Munro to be secretaries, and Mr. Edward Golding and Lieutenant Charles Pasley assistant secretaries to the commission. As the favourable state of the country has rendered my presence at Seringapatam unnecessary, I accompanied the commission with instructions directing the commissioners to proceed without delay to lay the foundations of the new arrangement, and for the purpose of precluding the intrigues of the natives, and of all the great interests which were in suspense; I enjoined the commissioners and their secretaries to take an oath of secrecy, in order that no part of my plan might transpire until the arrangements for the whole had been completed.

The commissioners assembled at Seringapatam on the 8th of June, and under my instructions, their first act was to make provision for the principal surviving officers and chiefs of the late Sultaun, and for the families of those slain during the campaign. I am happy to inform your Honourable Court, that this measure produced the most salutary effect in tranquillizing the minds of the principal Mahomedans remaining in Mysore, and in placing the clemency and generosity of the British Government in the most conspicuous and honourable light. It was determined, that Meer Kummur ud Deen should be settled at Gurrumcondah, with a jaghire from the Nizam, and another from the Company. This arrangement having been concluded, Kummur ud Deen departed from Seringapatam on the 19th of June, with many expressions of gratitude towards the Company's Government. The Brahmin Poorneah, who had been the principal financial minister of the late Sultaun, having given satisfactory proof of his readiness to serve the new Government in the same capacity, it was determined that he should be appointed Dewan to the young Rajah of Mysore.

The next proceeding of the commissioners, in pursuance of my directions, was to undertake the painful, but necessary task of removing the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun from Seringapatam to the Carnatic.

I had previously given orders that the fortress of Vellore should be prepared for the reception of the families, and I had appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton to the command of that fortress, and had also entrusted him with the payment of the stipends allotted to both families, directing him to spare no reasonable expense in providing for their accommodation, on a scale suitable to their former rank and expectations. The four princes, Futtah Hyder, Abdul Khaulik, Moyez oo Deen, and Moyee oo Deen, with their families, arrived at Vellore on the 13th of July; they expressed their satisfaction in the accommodations provided for them. The remainder of the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun will be removed as soon as may be practicable.

Previously to the departure of the princes from Seringapatam, the commissioners had cautiously abstained from all intercourse with the family of the Rajah of Mysore; but as soon as the four elder sons of the late Sultaun had left the capital, the commissioners paid a visit to the young Rajah, whom they found with others of this persecuted family, in a condition of poverty and humiliation, which excited the strongest emotions of compassion; it was determined to fix the residence of the Rajah in the ancient town of Mysore, as being the most eligible situation for the seat of his government.

On the 5th of June I had furnished the commissioners with the first draft of a treaty between the Company and his Highness, the Nizam, for the partition of Mysore, and having received the fullest communication of their sentiments and of those of Meer Allum, on the subject, I made such alterations as appeared to be advisable. On the 22nd of June this treaty was executed by the commissioners and Meer Allum, at Seringapatam, and ratified by me in council at Fort St. George, on the 26th of the same month, and by his Highness the Nizam, at Hyderabad, on the 13th of July. A copy of this treaty is annexed to this despatch under the title of the Partition Treaty of Mysore.*

* See p. 26.

On the 30th of June the Rajah of Mysore was formally placed on the musnud, by the commissioners, assisted by Meer Allum.

On the 8th of June I had forwarded to the commissioners the first draft of the subsidiary treaty, to be concluded between the Company and the Rajah of Mysore. After an ample discussion with the commissioners who had communicated the whole arrangement to the Brahmin Poorneah, and conciliated his co-operation; and after the adoption of several alterations, this treaty was executed in the fortress of Nuzzerbah, near Seringapatam, by the commissioners, and certain proxies on the part of the young Rajah, on the 8th of July, and ratified by me in council on the 23rd of July, under the title of the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam*

In framing this engagement, it was my determination to establish the most unqualified community of interests between the Government of Mysore and the Company, and to render the Rajah's northern frontier in effect, a powerful line of our defence. With this view, I have engaged to undertake the protection of this country, in consideration of an annual subsidy of seven lacs of star pagodas; but recollecting the inconveniences and embarrassments which have arisen to all parties concerned under the double Governments and conflicting authorities unfortunately established in Oude, the Carnatic, and Tanjore, I resolved to reserve to the Company the most extensive and indisputable powers of interposition in the internal affairs of Mysore, as well as an unlimited right of assuming the direct management of the country (whenever such a step might appear necessary for the security of the funds destined to the subsidy), and of requiring extraordinary aid beyond the amount of the fixed subsidy, either in time of war, or of preparations for hostility.

Under this arrangement I trust that I shall be enabled to command the whole resources of the Rajah's territory, to improve its cultivation, to extend its commerce, and to secure the welfare of its inhabitants. It appeared to me a more candid and liberal, as well as a more wise policy, to apprise the Rajah distinctly, at the moment of his accession, of the exact nature of his dependance on the Company, than to

* See p. 43.

leave any matter for future doubt or discussion. The right of the Company to establish such an arrangement, either as affecting the Rajah or the allies, has already been stated in this despatch.

I entertain a sanguine expectation that the Rajah and his ministers being fully apprized of the extensive powers reserved to the Company, will cheerfully adopt such regulations as shall render the actual exercise of those powers unnecessary. Much indulgence will be required at the commencement of the new Government, and it is my intention to abstain from any pressure upon the Rajah's finances, which by embarrassing them, might tend to the impoverishment of the country, and to the distress of the people.

Soon after the enthronement of the Rajah, the Brahmin Poorneah was appointed by the commissioners to be his Highness' Dewan.

The eminent talents and integrity of Lieutenant-Colonel Close, added to his extraordinary skill in the country language, and his experience in the manners, customs, and habits of the natives of India, induced me to select him for the important charge of resident with the Rajah of Mysore. He was accordingly appointed to that office immediately after the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam had been signed; and the commission was then dissolved on the 3rd of July.

Although your Honourable Court will perceive in the commission the names of two persons, of whose merits it may be difficult for me to form an impartial judgment, I feel it to be my duty to recommend the conduct of the commissioners to your most public and distinguished approbation.

The conclusion within one month of two treaties, so extensive in their consequences, and complicated in their details, together with all the subordinate arrangements connected with this important settlement, will appear the most extraordinary effort of diligence and ability, when it is remarked, that reference was necessarily made to me at Fort St. George, in every stage of the business. It will also be satisfactory to your Honourable Court to observe, that the whole arrangement has been conducted at Seringapatam, with a spirit of humanity and liberality, which cannot fail to conciliate the good will of the inhabitants of Mysore.

The command of Seringapatam will remain in the hands of

Colonel Wellesley; it is a trust of great delicacy and importance, which it is my duty to repose in a person of approved military talents and integrity, and to superintend with peculiar vigilance and care.

Although I shall deem it prudent to detain the army in the field for a short period of time, I have the satisfaction to assure your Honourable Court, that far the greater part of the dominions of Tippoo Sultaun is now in a state of perfect tranquillity.

A detachment from the army of Bombay took possession of Mangalore on the 4th of June, and the province of Canara, with the exception of the fortress of Jemaulabad, appeared disposed to submit cheerfully to our authority. I have little doubt that the commanding officer of Jemaulabad will soon be induced to surrender to the Company's arms; in any event, however, the fort will be reduced without difficulty. In this confidence, a collector has been appointed for the province of Canara.

The remainder of the territory allotted to the Company in Coimbatoor, has passed into our hands without any difficulty, and collectors have been appointed for the administration of the revenue. The fort of Gurrumcondah is in the possession of his Highness the Nizam, and those of Sera and Chitteldroog are now garrisoned by the British troops. Some disturbances have taken place in Bidnoor, in which province an adventurer had assembled a banditti, which had distressed the inhabitants of the country; a division of the army being now on its progress towards Bidnoor, I have every reason to expect that the commotions in that quarter will speedily be quelled.

Since the fall of Seringapatam, the conduct of the Mahrattas has been of the most conciliatory nature; it would be premature at present to enter into any detail on the subject of the negociations depending at Poonah; but I have the satisfaction to assure your Honourable Court that no interruption to the settlement of Mysore is likely to proceed from the Mahrattas. Whatever may be the secret inclination either of the Peishwa or of Scindiah, their mutual weakness and reciprocal jealousy are sufficient securities against any danger from that quarter.

The advantages resulting to your interests from the recent

settlement of Mysore, are sufficiently obvious, as they appear in the preceding parts of this despatch, and in the papers which accompany it. It may not, however, be useless to submit to your Honourable Court, in a connected form, a general view of the whole of this important question, together with the reflections which have arisen in my mind from an anxious and assiduous attention to every branch of the subject.

Since the first war with Hyder Ali, the tranquillity of your possessions has been continually menaced by the power of Mysore. Even in the intervals of peace, which have succeeded to the several wars in which the company has been engaged with Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun, your security in the Carnatic has ever been precarious. During the cessation of actual hostilities, the designs of the Sovereign of Mysore have still continued uniformly hostile, and his means of executing them have always remained considerable, while the degrees of your safety have fluctuated with the state of your military establishments and preparations, and with the distribution of your force.

The baneful effects of this perpetual state of uncertainty and solicitude, have been felt not only in the decay of agriculture, and of the arts of peaceful industry on the coast of Coromandel, and in the rebellious spirit of certain descriptions of your subjects on that coast, and on the coast of Malabar, but occasionally throughout all India, in the diminution of the British Influence and consideration at foreign courts, in the rising hopes of the turbulent and disaffected, and in the decline of public and private credit, shaken by repeated rumours of war, and by the constant necessity of guarding against a surprise from the sudden aggression of an enemy, whom no clemency or moderation could conciliate, and no faith could bind.

The reduction of Tippoo Sultaun's power and resources effected by the treaty of Seringapatam in 1792, had weakened, but not extinguished the cause of these complicated evils. Soon after the conclusion of peace, this cause and its effects appear to have recovered a considerable degree of activity and vigour, until in the year 1796, the intrigues and military movements of Tippoo Sultaun compelled the Government General to assemble the army on the coast of Coromandel,

and in the Autumn of 1797, such apprehensions were justly entertained of his designs and power, as induced the Government of Fort St. George to abandon the prosecution of an expedition ably planned, intimately connected with your interests, and which had already brought a heavy charge on your finances.

Judicious indeed, and provident was the policy which dictated the relinquishment of that enterprise, since subsequent discoveries and events have manifested the great probability, if not the absolute certainty, that the departure of the large force destined for Manilla would have proved a signal to the watchful vengeance of Tippoo Sultaun to invade the Carnatic, or to attack the dominions of the Nizam, even without waiting for succours from France, the assistance of which might not, perhaps, have appeared to him necessary during the absence of so considerable a portion of our army.

But the apprehension of the designs and movements of the power of Mysore had never, perhaps, been more anxiously or more justly entertained, than between the months of June and September, 1798. It cannot be denied that during that period, your interests were menaced by a combination of the most serious dangers. The anxiety and fears hitherto entertained with regard to the designs of Tippoo Sultaun, were now confirmed by a certain knowledge of his having actually proposed to the French projects of the most extensive hostility against your possessions in India. The alarm, as well as the danger, was considerably aggravated by the formidable preparations of the French in the Mediterranean, by the apparently desperate state of our alliances in the Deccan: by the peculiar situation of the Court of Hyderabad, subjected to the will of a powerful French army and French faction; by the menacing declarations and probable views of Zemaun Shah; by the dispersed and defective condition of the army of Fort St. George; and above all, by the general persuasion, that an early attempt to assemble or to move that army, would serve only as a provocation to the enemy to invade and desolate the Carnatic, without furnishing the means of repelling the invader.

The situation of our allies at this period of general despondency, is now well known to your Honourable Court.

It will therefore be sufficient in this place to observe, that the degree of danger with which the Nizam and the Peishwa were threatened by the impending storm, exceeded that which menaced our possessions in the same proportion, as the distractions and weakness of the Governments of Poonah and Hyderabad rendered them less able than the Company to counteract the machinations or to repel the assault of the enemy. It is true, that Tippoo Sultaun's views against the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, were ostensibly limited to the recovery of the cessions made by him to those powers in 1792. But it cannot be doubted, that his ambition and rapacity would have augmented with the progress of his victories, and his revenge was not of a temper to be mitigated by success.

Your Honourable Court is apprised of the changes which successively and rapidly took place in the condition of our alliances and of our army, substituting at Hyderabad in place of a French faction and a French army, British influence and a considerable British force, and producing ultimately the happy restoration of confidence and energy among your servants at Fort St. George. It is therefore unnecessary to dwell on that part of the subject; but it may be expedient to advert to the state of the general expectations at different periods of time previous to the war, and to compare our actual situation with those expectations, as well as with our position in the month of June, 1798.

At that time, even the most sanguine dispositions, and those least affected by the prevalent panic, would probably have been content to have detached Tippoo Sultaun from his alliance with the French nation; in the hope that, without the aid of a French force, he would not attempt to disturb the tranquillity of the Carnatic.

Even at a later period, when the subversion of the French party at Hyderabad, the restoration of the Nizam to the condition of an efficient ally, and the advanced state of our military preparations had inspired a general spirit of confidence and zeal, the most confident and zealous would have deemed the issue of the approaching contest prosperous as well as honourable, if it had effected a considerable reduction of the power and resources of Tippoo Sultaun, and had obtained a reasonable indemnity for the expenses of the allies.

The entire destruction of Tippoo Sultaun's power, or the absolute transfer of his resources to any hand, less inimical or less violent, would have been deemed a glorious termination even of a long and expensive contest.

But the success of your arms in the short period of the late campaign has not merely excluded the French from Mysore, provided an ample indemnity to you and your ally for the charges of the war, destroyed the hostile power of Tippoo Sultaun, and effectually precluded its revival, but has transferred the sword of your implacable enemy into your own hands, and turned to your use the main springs of his wealth and strength.

By the partition treaty of Mysore you have acquired an augmentation of direct territorial revenue to the annual amount of about star pagodas 6,47,641,10, (£259,056 sterling).* By the subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam, you have secured an annual subsidy of star pagodas 7,00,000, (£280,000 sterling), making together, with your new territorial revenue, the sum of star pagodas 13,47,641,10, (£539,056 sterling), and leaving (after deducting the provision allotted for the families of Hyder Ali Khan and Tippoo Sultaun) an annual increase of your funds in this quarter of India, equal to star pagodas 11,47,641,10, (£459,056 sterling). But a reasonable expectation is entertained, that the territory acquired by the Company, under the treaty of Mysore, will yield, in the course of a few years, a sum not less than, star pagodas 14,78,698, (£591,479 sterling). If such an advance in the nominal revenue of the acquired districts should actually be realized, the positive augmentation of your available annual resources, in consequence of the late settlement of Mysore, will amount nearly to 20 lacs of star pagodas, (£800,000 sterling). But in estimating the increase of your annual available resources since the month of June 1798, the augmentation which took place in the subsidy payable by the Nizam, is not to be omitted. By the treaty of Hyderabad, concluded on the first of September 1798, the annual subsidy was augmented from Arcot rupees 6,44,556, to Arcot rupees 24,17,100, making an increase annually of Arcot rupees 17,72,544, or star pagodas 5,64,982, (£225,992 sterling). Thus, the total augmentation of your available annual resources since June 1798, in this quarter of your possessions,

* Calculating the star pagoda at 8s.

amounts actually to, star pagodas 17,12,623, (£685,048 sterling), and, if the increased revenue of the newly acquired territory should be realized, (according to just expectation), it will amount to star pagodas 25,43,680 (£1,017,472 sterling).

Against these acquisitions must be placed the expense of whatever additions it may be found necessary to make to your military force, either in consequence of the extension of your territory, or of the subsidiary engagements which have been contracted with the Nizam and with the Rajah of Mysore.

The subsidiary force at Hyderabad must be considered as a part of your efficient strength prepared for your service on any emergency, and ready to aid you in any future war, as it has aided you in the last. It does not appear to me probable that it will be necessary to make any considerable addition to the military establishment of Fort St. George, in consequence of the treaty of Hyderabad, nor do I apprehend that the requisite increase of that establishment, and of the army of Bombay, in consequence of the two treaties annexed to this despatch, will bear any proportion to the increase of your revenue and resources. For it must never be forgotten that, while your territory has been extended, your frontier has been contracted and strengthened, your principal enemy utterly destroyed, and an ally, and dependant of the Company, substituted on his throne.

I do not yet possess the means of stating with sufficient accuracy to your honourable Court, either the amount of the charges incurred in consequence of the various measures of preparation and precaution, which became necessary on the discovery of Tippoo Sultaun's hostile designs in June 1798, or the amount of the expense which is to be placed to the account of the operations of the late war. The accumulated charges both of our preparations and of the war must be considerable; but whenever a statement of the expenses of the late war can be submitted to your honourable Court, your wisdom and justice will necessarily distinguish the charges incurred for the purpose of assembling an effective army in the field, from those actually belonging to the operations of your armies in Mysore, and to the siege of Seringapatam.

From the moment that Tippoo's negotiations had transpired, it became an indispensable duty to place the Carnatic in a posture of complete defence. The experience of former wars with Mysore, the nature of the frontier of the Carnatic,

exposed in various points by its almost innumerable passes to the incursion of the enemy, the actual state of affairs in India and in Europe, all concurred to convince me, that the only rational system of defence against Tippoo Sultaun was to assemble your armies on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, in such force, in such a state of equipment, and in such a position, as should excite in the mind of the Sultaun a just alarm for the safety of his capital; no other plan was calculated to secure the Carnatic against the ravages of his numerous cavalry; because no other plan would have compelled him to concentrate his forces within his own territories, for the defence of the vital point of his empire. His capital was not only the object of his pride, but the centre of his power; it was his strongest fortification, the principal granary of his army, his only arsenal, the repository of his treasure, and the prison of the legitimate claimant of his throne, as well as of the families of all his great chieftains; whose obedience he secured, by retaining the objects of their reverence and affection within the walls of the fortress of Seringapatam. On the preservation of that fortress, therefore, depended the fate of his kingdom, and (although I did not neglect any practicable precaution against a contrary course of events) my judgment was always decided, that he would never abandon the defence of Seringapatam, but with his life.

The success of the plan (founded on this opinion) fully answered its primary purpose; since no part of the Sultaun's force ventured to enter the Company's possessions in the Carnatic during the late hostilities. It also fully answered the secondary purpose of enabling your armies (when our pacific negotiations had failed) to act offensively with promptitude, vigour, and effect.

Neither the expense of the magazines of grain and other stores on either coast, nor of the battering train, with its equipment of cattle, ought therefore to be charged to the account of the war; for every expense incurred previous to the 3rd of February 1799 (the day on which Lieutenant-General Harris received orders to march) must, and would have been incurred, if no war had taken place; and ought to be charged to the account of the indispensable defence of your possessions, according to the only plan, which could provide effectually for that object.

The expenses of moving the battering train to Seringapatam, as well as of maintaining the army in Mysore, cannot have much exceeded the charges which must have been continued if the whole had remained within your frontier; and when it is considered that, if the army, with the battering train, had not moved to Seringapatam, the expensive, but necessary, system of defence already explained, must have been protracted until all dangers from Tippoo Sultaun's connection with the French should have been averted;* your honourable Court will probably sanction my decided opinion, that the rapid movement of the British forces towards the scene of their certain triumph, was not only the most effectual, but the most economical measure which could have been adopted, to frustrate the views of the enemy, and to secure the tranquillity of your possessions.

For, on the one hand, no prospect appeared of any practicable reduction in the expense of a defensive system, during the continuance of the war between Great Britain and France; while every hour of delay in the movement of our army afforded to Tippoo Sultaun the means of increasing his strength, of receiving succours from the French, and consequently of aggravating to the Company, both the expense and hazard of the impending contest.

On the other hand, the state of our army, the arrangements which had been made for its equipment and supply in every department, and the period of the season, left no doubt that the great object of the war would be attained in one short campaign. Nor did this calculation prove to have been in any degree sanguine; for although an alarm of a deficiency of grain prevailed in the army before Seringapatam on the 16th of April, it appeared soon after, upon an accurate examination, that at that time (exclusive of the immense dépôt established in the district of Coorga) a quantity of grain remained in camp sufficient to maintain the whole of the fighting men of the army, at half allowance, until the 20th of May; and on the 13th of that month, Major-General Floyd returned to Seringapatam with the large supplies, which had been forwarded from the Carnatic, under the care of Lieutenant-

* The war between England and France lasted for fifteen years, after the fall of Seringapatam.—*Ed.*

Colonels Read and Brown. It may also be useful to remark in this place, that if any accident had protracted the operations of the siege beyond the 4th of May, ample time would still have remained for the reduction of the place previous to the rising of the Cauveri; since the four eldest sons of Tippoo Sultaun, with an escort of 1500 men, and a considerable train of attendants, crossed that river on the 18th of June, on which day the water was nearly as low as on the day of the assault.

Reviewing all these circumstances, your honourable Court will hereafter compare the expense incurred by the movement of the army to Seringapatam, with the probable charges of any other practicable plan of policy, or of military operation; in any view of the subject it will probably appear, that the increase of your revenue and pecuniary resources obtained by the issue of the war, far overbalances the combined expense of the preparations for your defence, and of the operations of the late campaign.

But in addition to this positive indemnification for your expenses, your honourable Court will also consider the augmentation of your commercial and military resources arising from the conquest of Mysore.

Hitherto, all traffic between your subjects or dependants, and those of the late Sultaun has been nearly prohibited, by the restraints to which his hatred of the British Nation, or his ignorance and prejudice had subjected the communication with your possessions. These restraints being removed, and every proper encouragement to commercial intercourse being substituted in their place, it may reasonably be expected that the neighbouring, and now united countries of the Carnatic and Mysore, will mutually consume a considerable portion of their respective productions and manufactures; and that even a proportion of British commodities will soon find a market in Mysore. My information with regard to the articles produced, manufactured, or consumed, in the countries acquired by the Company, and by the Rajah of Mysore, is at present too imperfect to enable me to form any accurate calculation of the imports from the coast of Malabar to Europe; but it appears probable, that your investment in the article of pepper, may soon be augmented to any extent, which you may deem advisable.

Your military resources may be considered to have received a great augmentation, not only from the additional supplies of grain, provisions and cattle, which your connection with Mysore places at your disposal, but from the new channels, which it opens for recruiting the native force, both of the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay; under this head may also be considered the superiority of the climate of Mysore, to any in this quarter of India, and the means which it affords of preserving the health and consequent efficiency of European troops.

Highly as I estimate these immediate and direct advantages of revenue, and of commercial and military resources, I consider the recent settlement of Mysore to be equally important to your interests, in its tendency to increase your political consideration and influence among the native powers of India, together with your means of maintaining internal tranquillity and order among your subjects and dependants, and of defending your possessions against any enemy, either Asiatic, or European.

These are principles of substantial and durable security, the operation of which must be felt throughout every part of your possessions, and in every branch of your affairs both in India and Europe.

The balance which it was the policy of the treaty of Ser-ingapatam in 1792, to establish between the native powers of India, was soon deranged by the course of events; our influence in the general scale proved insufficient, not only to maintain peace between our allies, but to check either the rapid decline of their respective resources and strength, or the growing ascendancy of the French faction at Hyderabad, or the systematic machinations of Tippoo Sultaun. Experience has manifested that the power preserved to that infatuated and restless Prince, must always have been thrown into the scale opposed to our interests, and that in no possible combination or conflict of the views of the courts of Poonah, and Hyderabad, could the interposition or neutrality of Tippoo Sultaun become favourable to our security. If he menaced war, or sought alliance with either, or with both those states, his uniform object was our disturbance. If he remained neuter either in their dissensions or union, it was in order to preserve his own strength unimpaired and unembarrassed for that con-

test with ours, which formed the favourite scope of all his views. In no case, has his power been brought into action, or remained at rest, without a hostile design, and an injurious effect upon our influence and consideration. The balance is now in our own hands, we now possess the irresistible power either of concentrating the most efficient part of the resources of Mysore in one mass, for our single defence against any possible combination; or of throwing the same weight into that scale, which shall appear to require such an aid for the preservation of the general tranquillity, on the solid basis of moderation and justice.

If the Nizam or the Mahrattas, notwithstanding their real interest in maintaining the new order of things, should harbour a disposition to disturb it, our means of defence, as well as of offence with regard to both those states, are become so powerful, as well from the advancement and strength of our frontier, as from the other relative considerations already stated in this despatch, that the internal union of all the divided feudatory chiefs of the Mahratta Empire, or even a confederacy between the Peishwa and the Nizam, could no longer be formidable to your possessions; and your honourable Court is apprized, that the first of these events is highly improbable, and the latter nearly impossible—on the other hand, it is evident that, having annihilated the power of Tippoo, no injury can result to us from the interminable feuds of the Mahratta Empire, or from the mutual jealousy of the Peishwa and the Nizam.

The connexion between the Nizam and the French is entirely dissolved, under circumstances which, I trust, will render its renewal impracticable, at least, for many years.

It is certainly true, that an alliance between the Mahrattas and the French, might prove highly injurious to the British power in India; but it is well known, that whatever may be the disposition of the Mahrattas towards us, it would require a most violent exercise of injustice and oppression, on our part to dispose the suspicious and cautious councils of the Court of Poonah, to favour the progress of a French force in India.

But, although we have nothing to apprehend from the Nizam, or from the Mahrattas, danger may still perhaps be apprehended from an invasion of Oude by Zemaun Shah. I

am not disposed to undervalue this danger, but I am satisfied that it is less formidable now, than it has been at any former time. The loss of such an ally as Tippoo Sultaun, must materially affect the hopes of Zemaun Shah; and it is obvious, that although he should persist in his threatened invasion, our means of repelling it are greatly increased; since the army of Fort St. George, in a case of exigency, might now co-operate against Zemaun Shah with that of Bengal. Even during the late alarm of invasion from Zemaun Shah, (although war with Tippoo Sultaun was apprehended, and 3,000 native volunteers with a considerable force of artillery, had been detached to the coast of Coromandel) we still were able to maintain an army of at least 20,000 men, on the frontier of Oude.

The intrigues of Tippoo Sultaun among the Rajahs inhabiting the coast of Malabar, among the Poligars in the Carnatic, and among every other description of your disaffected or refractory subjects, were the sources of continual commotion within your territories, while the vicinity of the hostile frontier of Mysore, offered refuge and impunity to every offender against your authority, and to every disturber of the public peace. It may reasonably be expected, that the establishment of your influence in Mysore, will operate as a powerful check on the spirit of disorder in your own possessions, and by removing the causes of internal weakness, will enable you to oppose every foreign attack with greater confidence and vigor.

With regard to any danger from the designs of France, it is evident that the probability of her making any effort to disturb the tranquillity of India, will be greatly diminished from the moment that the intelligence of Tippoo Sultaun's fate shall reach Europe. Perhaps it is not too sanguine a view of our situation, to consider the annihilation of the only native ally of France in India, as the final ruin of all her ambitious and vindictive projects against this great source of the wealth and power of Great Britain. The aid and co-operation of some native State must always be indispensably necessary to any European force, in attempting a serious impression on your possessions in India; without such aid, it seems impossible that any European army should be able to advance from the sea-coast, or even to maintain itself wherever it might

land. If however, contrary to every reasonable expectation, France should still persist in her projects against the peace of India, she will have to contend unsupported by the arms, and (what is of more importance) by the resources of any Indian ally, with a British army, animated by recent success, unembarrassed either by any native enemy in Mysore, or by any French faction at Hyderabad, and free to act on any point which France might venture to assail.

Such appear to me to be the consequences of the late settlement, as they relate more immediately to the interests of the Honourable Company; but it will be proper to consider them also as they affect our allies.

Although the advantages offered to the Peishwa by the treaty of Mysore, may not be calculated to satisfy the rapacious character of the Mahratta State, it is reasonable to suppose, that under all the circumstances of the case, they will be received as a distinguished testimony of our amicable disposition towards the Court of Poonah; and that they will tend to appease its characteristic jealousy, if not to conciliate its cordial attachment.

The establishment of an Hindoo State in Mysore, with the restoration of the temples and endowments of that religion, must be grateful to the Government of Poonah, independently of the advantages arising from the substitution of a power of the same religion, and of pacific views, in the place of an odious Mahomedan usurpation, scarcely less hostile to the Mahratta than to the British nation.

With regard to the Nizam, his ambition would also have been more gratified with an arrangement, which should have thrown into his hands a larger share of territory and power; and the distribution of the property captured at Seringapatam, among the British troops and those of his Highness, disappointed his private expectations of appropriating a large portion of that property to his own use. The solid and permanent benefits however, which have resulted to his Highness from the recent improvement of his connection with the Company, and particularly from the new settlement of Mysore, are so obvious and considerable, that they may reasonably be expected to overbalance any temporary disappointment of his avarice or ambition. The existence of his throne was saved by the destruction of the French party at Hyderabad, in October, 1798.

The formidable power of Tippoo Sultaun, which perpetually menaced his Highness's possessions, and filled his Court and dominions with intrigues and treason, has been annihilated, and a friendly and allied state established in Mysore. His Highness has received a large increase of territory, revenue, and power; together with several important fortresses tending greatly to secure the tranquillity of his dominions. His expenses in the war have been inconsiderable; and if a comparison were to be instituted of the advantages accruing to him, and to the Company from the whole arrangement, those obtained by his Highness would probably be found to preponderate; for, the danger from which he has been delivered was even more imminent than that which menaced the Company's possessions; and while his expenses have borne no proportion to ours, he has attained equal benefits both of indemnification and security. The collateral benefits derivable by the Company from its connexion with the Rajah of Mysore, will necessarily extend to the Nizam, and be scarcely less felt by him than by us, while he shall remain faithful to his alliance with the Company; and the advantages which his Highness would receive from the proposed mediation of the Company between him and the Mahratta empire, are highly estimated by all those who understand the interests of the Court of Hyderabad. If that mediation should fail, his Highness will receive an increase of territory beyond the amount of the proportion acquired by the Company, in the general partition; I have the satisfaction to know, that although his Highness's extravagant expectations have not been gratified to the full extent, his most able and experienced counsellors are fully sensible of the extensive and solid benefits acquired by his Highness, under the general operation of the late treaties. I am, therefore, persuaded, that his Highness's just sense of the permanent interests of his state, will command his cordial co-operation in the maintenance of the new settlement.

The interests of the Rajah of Mysore, being identified with those of the Company, and the safety, prosperity, and honor of the Peishwa, and of the Nizam, being amply secured by the treaties of Hyderabad and Mysore, and by the subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam; I entertain a confident expectation, that the recent settlement of the dominions of

Tippoo Sultaun will prove not less durable, than I trust, it will be found equitable in its fundamental principles, beneficial in its general operation, and conformable in every point of view, to the liberal character of the English East India Company, and to the just and moderate policy prescribed by parliament, for the Government of the British empire in the East.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXVII.

The Right Hon. Henry Dundas to the Earl of Mornington.

Wimbledon, 18th March, 1799.

MY DEAR LORD,

Received at Fort William, 5th August, 1799.

The financial state of our affairs in India, and the arrangement of them in future, will be the subject of official correspondence from the Court of Directors, by some early conveyance; but the present situation of the finances and commerce of India have suggested to my mind many important considerations, which I would think it wrong to withhold from you in the form of a private communication, as the opinions I shall lay before you may probably operate upon your conduct previous to the period when the same opinions may reach you in the more tedious form of despatches through the medium of the Court of Directors. This mode of earlier communication with you is the more necessary, as I am aware some of the opinions which I hold will be the cause of a difference of opinion among the Directors, and must ultimately be settled by the authority of the Board of Control, a form of proceeding necessarily productive of delay.

If there had been the prospect of the war coming to any speedy conclusion, I should not have been uneasy by the circumstance of a very considerable addition of the debt in India, for the purpose of continuing a large investment from an Indian capital, because from the experience I have already had in extricating their affairs under very unpromising circumstances, I should have felt perfectly satisfied that a few years after the return of peace, would have sufficed, speedily,

to wipe off the debt which the mixt exigencies of war and commerce had created. This, however, has its bounds, for if the debt in India is allowed to increase so much as to become unwieldy and unmanageable, we are cut off from the means of extricating our affairs when peace shall have returned. The loans, from being made in times of difficulty, are accomplished at an exorbitant rate of interest, and thereby exhaust the whole of the surplus revenues, which is to operate as the sinking fund for the redemption of the debt after the return of peace. It is the more necessary I should give a particular attention to these considerations, because it is very natural for the Court of Directors to turn their eyes chiefly to the state of their affairs in Leadenhall-street, and both they and the Proprietors are flattered, by the view of sales at home, uncommonly large, and a swelling balance in their coffers at home; while, at the same time, it is obvious to every person who will take a comprehensive view of their affairs, that this flattering delusion, permitted to go on for a very few years, would bring irretrievable ruin upon the finances of India, and totally disable us from maintaining there that pre-eminence of wealth and power which has proved so important to the general interests of the British Empire.

Viewing this subject in all its bearings, I am well aware of the importance of keeping up the means of a large investment from India. This principle is important, not only from the encouragement it affords to the navigation and shipping of the kingdom; from the addition it makes annually to the wealth and capital of the country, and from its being a fruitful source of revenue; but in addition to all these and similar considerations, I must add the necessity of such an investment, as immediately connected with the prosperity of our Indian provinces. *It is to the increased exports from India to Europe, that we are to attribute the increase of Indian prosperity, industry, population, and revenue;* and the manufacturers of that country would be reduced to very deplorable circumstances if any severe check was to be given to the usual investment and exports from India. These considerations necessarily lead to the conclusion of bringing home as large an investment as our means will enable us to do. I see no difficulty in accomplishing this, but it must be done by means of resources which do not lead to the ruin of our

finances in India. The same circumstances which have led to put the whole commerce of the world into the hands of this country, do operate in a proportionable degree to extend beyond the example of all former times, the trade of the East India Company, and the produce of their sales in Leadenhall-street. This ought to be encouraged by every means; but the overflowing balance from thence arising after defraying their necessary burdens at home, ought to be employed in the purchase of bullion, to be consigned to India and China, for the purchase of a large and profitable investment. The times, from the influx of wealth into this country, are highly favourable to such an operation, the beneficial effects of which are obvious in a variety of ways. Your Lordship states, and all the other settlements concur in the same statement, that our Indian possessions are greatly distressed from the want of specie. The measure I have mentioned effectually removes that distress, and is likewise productive of another essential benefit. It is stated that the increase of the loans at so high a rate of interest, checks all private credit, and obstructs all other pecuniary transactions; but this inconvenience would not be found, if the system I have alluded to, was carried into execution.

It is with much satisfaction I observe in some of your Lordship's recent despatches, that you find yourself warranted by the opinions of some of the most intelligent persons upon the spot, that the export of manufactures from this country may be considerably increased. This is certainly the most desirable of all resources for the supply of a commercial investment from India, and it ought to have no limits, except what are prescribed by the power of selling them in India or China.

Another commercial resource, is what can be got in India upon the foundation of the remittance plan. This, I understand, has likewise received a check, in consequence of the high rate of interest paid for the government loans in India; but if these loans are stopped, and the capital of the debt itself considerably diminished each year by the remittance plan, an effectual cure is administered to this inconvenience, and the commercial resources of the Company materially aided, without the necessity of extravagant loans for that purpose.

These are the outlines of the system which, in my opinion, ought to be pursued during the remainder of the war, and as

during its continuance our commerce will remain unbounded, and the wealth of the world continue to be collected here, no inconvenience whatever can arise from the export of bullion to India and China; on the contrary, I understand it would rather be in this point of view, materially convenient. The result, therefore, of what I have stated, is that the investment ought not to be diminished, but kept up at its present standard, and the resources for doing so are,—1st, The surplus revenues in India, after defraying the expense of establishment and the interest of debt. This fund will increase in proportion as the debt is diminished by the plan of remittance. 2ndly, By bills upon the East India Company to the amount of what can be got there, applicable to the reduction of the capital of the debt in India. 3rdly, An increased amount of the export of manufactures from this country, which generally upon an average, has been reckoned for some years past for India, exclusive of China, to amount to about five hundred thousand pounds. And lastly, a remittance of bullion to whatever amount may be necessary, joined to the above mentioned resources, to keep up the usual investments from India.

If this system is adopted, and invariably adhered to, we will be enabled, without any material inconvenience, to continue the war so long as our inveterate enemy shall be disposed, or in a condition to carry on the contest. The many other collateral advantages resulting from such a system, and connected with the prosperity and safety of India, are so obvious, it is unnecessary to trouble your Lordship with detailing them.

Having stated all that appears to be necessary, so far as concerns the finances of India, and the commercial resources of the East India Company, as connected with their finances, I wish now to direct your Lordship's attention to the trade of India, in a more extended point of view.

It is notorious that at no period the capital or commercial powers of the East India Company have been able to embrace the whole, or near the whole of the wealth of India, exported from thence by trade to Europe. This is placed beyond a doubt by a great share of the Indian trade now in the possession of neutral nations, a great part of which rests upon the capital and fortune of the servants of the East India

Company. Your Lordship will recollect that at the time I introduced the proposition for renewing the Charter of the East India Company, I endeavoured to remedy this obvious absurdity by obliging the East India Company to allot a certain proportion of tonnage to the purposes of private trade. They agreed to it with reluctance, and it is so managed as to render the provision almost illusory. I need not enumerate to your Lordship the causes which have rendered it of no avail. They appear in the applications made to the Government of India by the resident traders in India, and are recorded in the correspondence between the Board of Trade and Supreme Council in India, so that they must be perfectly familiar to your Lordship. In truth, there is no remedy for this evil but two—1st, Alluring the trade of India to resort to the port of London, by diminishing the expenses of doing so. The 2nd is, By authorising the Government of India to license the *appropriation of India-built shipping to the purpose of bringing home that Indian trade, which the means and capital of the East India Company is unable to bring home.* The first of those ways will, I trust, be effectuated by the Bill which Mr. Pitt has agreed to introduce for the reduction of the duties upon imports from India, and the second must be accomplished by giving to the Government in India that authority to license India-built shipping, to which I have already alluded.

— This last measure will, I take it for granted, undergo much discussion before it can be carried into execution, but it must be carried. The whole weight of the shipping interest will be opposed to such a proposition, under a most false and erroneous idea that it is prejudicial to their interests. Nothing but ignorance of the subject could lead them to entertain such an idea. They made an attempt to accomplish it by inflaming the interests of the ship carpenters in the river Thames, at the time of the general mutiny in the navy. It was an unhandsome proceeding upon their part, and was resisted by me in a letter I then addressed to the principal ship builders in the river. I do not know whether they did not choose to answer it, or whether they found it to be unanswerable; but I never received any reply to it. I have often thought upon the subject since, and the more I have thought upon it, the more I am convinced of the truth of every propo-

sition which that letter contains; I send you a copy of it,* and you may rest assured, that no exertion shall be wanting on my part speedily to introduce into practice the system detailed in that letter.

It has not reached me in any authentic form, but I am credibly informed that your Lordship, upon the application of the resident traders in India, has authorized a number of India-built ships to be taken up, for the purpose of bringing home the surplus trade of India. I hope the information is true, both because it is a measure of much wisdom, and because it will bring the point directly to issue, and you need not be under any apprehension as to the result of it.

Although, from the influence I have stated, there may be a contest in the Court of Directors with regard to the subject last mentioned, I do not believe there will be any material objection offered against any of the other measures I have had occasion to treat of in this letter; indeed, one leading principle has already been acted upon to a considerable extent, for the Court of Directors have already sent out to India, bullion to the amount of £759,226, and they have it in contemplation to send more. In short, I make no doubt of their being induced to send out what is requisite for the accomplishment of the commercial plan, I have detailed in the course of this letter.

I have nothing further to trouble you with at present. It is only necessary for me to remind you, that although the opinions I have laid before you, rest for the present merely upon the footing of a private unofficial communication, I trust they, or the substance of them, will speedily be conveyed to you in due official form.

I remain, my dear Lord,
Your's very faithfully,
HENRY DUNDAS.

* See Appendix.

No. XXVIII.

The Right Hon. Henry Dundas, to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Whitehall, 21st March, 1799.
[Received at Fort William, 5th August, 1799.]

By this conveyance I have troubled your Lordship with a despatch* on the general system of alliance, which we ought to pursue with a view to the security of our Indian possessions, and likewise with a despatch on the subject of our Indian finance and commerce.† In the present letter, I wish to bring under your view a few observations on the interior administration of our different settlements.

On the subject of Bengal, I have much satisfaction in feeling that I have occasion to say very little. The wise system adopted during Lord Cornwallis's administration, and to which I make no doubt you will adhere, leaves me no reason to apprehend any real danger to the wealth and resources of the valuable provinces under your immediate administration. I think, for the last two years I have observed, that the arrears of land revenue were somewhat larger than they used to be; I trust this has been owing to some accident, and not to any defect in the system of permanent security given to the landowners of India. Among the many other important benefits expected to arise from that beneficent plan, a prominent one was the regularity in payment of the stipulated jumma, and nothing has ever occurred to me, or been stated to me which had a tendency to lessen the prospect of that benefit resulting from it. I could not however, refrain from bringing the circumstance to which I have referred, immediately under your view.

As we have limited the extent of land revenue in India, by the measure of a permanent settlement, it has sometimes occurred to me to reflect, that the principles which led to the adoption of that system, naturally opened a prospect of other sources of revenue, in so far as it entitled us to expect an increase of the wealth, industry and population of the country. Every circumstance which has since happened, has led to the conviction that these effects have been produced by it. The increasing produce of the revenue on salt, opium and spirit-

* See Vol. I. p. 608.

† See p. 301.

ous liquors, all tend to corroborate this observation. I wish therefore to direct your attention to consider, and report to me, how far in your opinion, there is, either in the articles I have mentioned, or in any others of a similar nature, any prospect of raising more revenue on articles of general consumption among the natives of India. This can never be attempted but with a perfect consideration to their happiness and content; and I am likewise aware that a people whose wants are very limited and simple, do not present to their Government the same various objects of taxation, which exist in other countries differently circumstanced. It appears however, to be a point worthy your consideration, if possible, at all times to insure a revenue in India, equal to all the exigencies, not only of our expensive establishments, but for the payment of a tribute to this country, through the medium of a beneficial and encreasing commerce.

The circumstance connected with the Government of Bengal, to which one can look with the least confidence is the situation of Oude. I trust the late arrangements made by Lord Teignmouth, may enable your Lordship to give further improvement to this essential part of our system. I have nothing very minute to suggest; all I have to say, is comprehended under two general heads. The first is, a just and pure administration by the Vizier of his own country, in which is comprehended an accurate collection of his real revenues, and an economical expenditure of them. The second is, that he could be induced to keep up an efficient military establishment for the security of his own, and our frontier. This object never can be accomplished, but by dispersing his useless rabble, and forming an army to be kept up and disciplined under our immediate superintendance.

Respecting the affairs of the Coromandel coast, I had so full a communication with you before your departure, it is not necessary to add much more at present. I think for some time past the interior administration of affairs there, have considerably improved. Their revenues are encreasing, their estimates are made with more accuracy, and their accounts are kept much more regularly than they used to be; and I have a perfect reliance on the assiduity, talents and integrity of Lord Clive, that the improvement will be progressive. Our chief difficulties in the administration of the Carnatic,

are, first—the anomalous connection in which we stand with the Nabob of Arcot. Secondly, a similar inconvenience attending the Government of Tanjore. Thirdly, the insubordination and distractions so frequently prevalent in the northern Circars.

The double Government existing in the Carnatic has long been felt as a serious calamity to that country. It enfeebles the natural resources of the country, and above all, tends to continue that system of intrigue and consequent corruption which has been imputed to the Madras Government so much more than to our other settlements. It is singular to remark, that the country of Oude is the other part of India, where the purity of the Company's servants has been most suspected, and that the same circumstance of a double government has always been assigned as the cause. Consistently with our treaties with the Nabob of Arcot, we cannot at present materially meliorate his government, but must wait favourable opportunities, and embrace such means of conciliation and attention to him, as are most likely to accomplish this desirable object. We must lay our account with being at all times obstructed in our views, by that corruption and intrigue to which I have referred. Nothing will counteract it but a pure and steady government, acting instantaneously against any of the Company's servants, who may be detected in those practices. Lord Hobart's administration was characterized by a very laudable spirit in this respect, and you cannot doubt, that the same purity and spirit will actuate the conduct of Lord Clive, who will have the additional advantage of the newly-established judicature to aid him in the punishment of those offenders. I have always thought however much it has been the fashion to clamour against it, that the Supreme Judicature at Calcutta, has had very beneficial effects in preserving the purity of the servants under that presidency.

The affairs of Tanjore are more simple in their nature, and less complicated in their administration. It is exposed in a certain degree, to the same inconveniences which have been injurious to the government of the Carnatic; but from the recent transactions which have taken place there, and from the feelings of gratitude which appear to operate on the mind of the Rajah, I flatter myself he will be inclined more and more, to listen to the admonitions of our government, to whose

power and justice he is indebted for his situation. If those sentiments regulate his conduct, our part is simple and easy; we have nothing to ask of him, but a pure and virtuous administration of the affairs of his country, the effects of which will be equally felt by him and us, in the respective interests we have in the prosperity of Tanjore.

The northern Circars have certainly never produced to us those advantages which the extent of the country, and the fertility of the soil in many parts, entitle us to expect. I know not to what cause to attribute it, but the inhabitants of some of its higher parts seem to be in a state of very uncivilized society, and this can only be gradually removed by a steady, just and vigorous government. We must not too rapidly apply to that part of our possessions the same principles of government, which have been wisely applied to the more civilized Provinces of Bengal. I believe the same observations may to a considerable degree be made, with regard to some parts of the Circars, that I shall immediately bring under your view, with regard to the Malabar Provinces.

From the situation of the countries in our possession, on the Coast of Malabar, they are calculated to be either a great security, or a great annoyance to our power in India; and whether they shall be one or the other, depends much on the manner in which they are managed.

I remain, my dear Lord,
Your's most faithfully,
HENRY DUNDAS.

No. XXIX.

The Earl of Mornington, to the Honourable Jonathan Duncan.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 5th August, 1799.

The annual menace of Zemaun Shah's invasion of Hindostan having recently been renewed, I think it necessary to take immediate measures, with a view to impose an effectual check upon the designs of that Prince. Although the zeal and ability which Mehdi Alli Khan has shewn in conducting the negotiations committed to his charge merit commendation, yet he has manifested so much indiscretion throughout his conduct, that I cannot think him a proper person to be entrusted with the sole management of measures of so important

and delicate a nature, as those which I have it in contemplation to adopt at present at the Court of Persia, or eventually at that of Cabul. At the same time, I am far from wishing to subject Mehdi Alli Khan to any disgrace, or even to withhold from him a suitable reward for the services he has rendered; but I think it necessary to apprise you, that with a view to the object before adverted to, I have determined to send a gentleman on an embassy to Baba Khan, and eventually to Zemaun Shah. Mehdi Alli Khan's local knowledge and address may render him useful, and, therefore, I think it advisable that he should be directed to consider himself under the orders of the gentleman who may be deputed. The gentleman whom I have selected for this duty, is Captain John Malcolm, Assistant to the Resident at Hyderabad, in whose abilities, knowledge, activity and integrity I repose the utmost confidence. He will be directed to receive a considerable part of his instructions from you, and will make all his equipments at Bombay, whither he will proceed in the course of a few days.

As I expect the best effects from the mere promulgation of this measure, I have resolved to make the embassy quite public. Upon the whole of this subject, it is my intention to write to you more particularly hereafter.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXX.

Spencer Smith, Esq. to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Constantinople, 24th August, 1799.

I am too much flattered by your Lordship's reception of my past correspondence, and assurances of reciprocity, not to endeavour to cultivate a commerce, of which the balance must be so vastly to my advantage. It is not, however, easy for me to find a moment free from interruption for private scribbling, in a climate which has rendered me a valetudinarian, and at a post where I have more than enough to do was I in health; your Lordship will therefore appreciate the goodness of my intentions accordingly.

What I have done in point of political cooperation, is suffi-

ciently stated in my correspondence with the Presidency of Bombay for me to pass that topic over here; as indeed I may such articles of public intelligence as enter into my letters to Mr. Manesty, which of course reach you by *ricochet*.

I have just received most interesting letters of about a month old from Sir William Hamilton and Lord Nelson, who, with the King of the *two* Sicilies (as he is become again) and Mr. Acton, were all together on board the *Foudroyant* in the Bay of Naples, settling the new government.

The Admiral arrived there most fortunately in time to annul a disgraceful treaty on foot between the enemy and Cardinal Ruffo, and to save the King's honour by rejecting with disdain any terms but unconditional submission within a very limited number of hours on the part of rebels. So that while the French in the castle of St. Elmo were enticed by a decent capitulation (which I forward to Bussora) the rebels in the castles *Nuovo* and *dell' Uovo* came out without any honours; the principals were seized, and conducted on board the ships of the squadron, and their accomplices confined in fourteen transports under our guns. And thus *John Bull* fights almost alone on one element for the common cause, and recovers kingdoms for sovereigns, who by following half measures have been kicked out of them by a set of thieves.

An express was just arrived (on 25th past) at Naples from Tuscany, Mr. Wyndham was returned to Florence, and that once happy country was again free from French tyranny, as well as Lucca. F. M. Sowvarof, after beating Messieurs Macdonald, Moreau, and Co., on the 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th, was advancing to Genoa. Mantua surrendered on or about the 25th. The Arch Duke Charles was at Zurich, with his *left* communicating with the Field Marshal's *right* over the Alps, whose summit between *Bernard* and *Gothard* was occupied by a central army under General Bellegarde, aiming at turning Massena by the *Valais*, and Mont Blanc.

So much for *terra firma*. In the Mediterranean, Lord St. Vincent, laying with a single ship of the line at Gibraltar, has had the mortification of seeing the combined fleets, 61 sail of the line, pass him to the westward on the 9th past, and only able to precede them by a privateer 24 hours to Portugal, and by another privateer who met Lord Keith with 35 sail off Ivica on the 14th, who immediately set out after them.

My brother, after the siege of Acre, and revictualling at Cyprus, returned to the coast of Egypt on the 18th of July, just in time to throw himself into the castle of *Aboukir*, which the Turks had stormed on the 16th, where he was preparing for a second edition (but rather more offensive) of his herculean labours in Syria.

The siege of Acre forms such an epocha in the annals of these times, that I regret my want of leisure to keep pace with events, and give that heroic achievement a more distinct place in my historical correspondence, far independent of my fraternal feelings upon that point. No one as a minister and a man can better judge of its salutary influence in the common cause. Had Acre fallen, Constantinople would have tottered; Vienna felt the shock, and Europe, as Buonaparte himself elegantly expresses it, “*prix par les reins.*”

I have the honour to be,

My dear Lord,

your faithful Servant,

SPENCER SMITH.

No. XXXI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort St. George, Sept. 3d, 1799.

Since the date of my last separate letter to your Honourable Court of the 3d of August,* few occurrences have happened of sufficient importance to be communicated by the present despatch. But as a considerable part of the army still remains in Mysore, and as some detachments of it have been actively employed, notwithstanding the happy termination of the war, it may not be unacceptable to you that I should review the cause and nature of the operations in which the army has been engaged since the date of my last letter.

It might have been expected that, in the complete settlement of Mysore, some difficulties would arise from the attempts of the various Poligars and others who had been

* See p. 72.

dispossessed by Hyder Ali Khan and Tippoo Sultaun. The early settlement of the country, however, has not been materially delayed by any resistance of this nature. It has, however, been somewhat impeded by the endeavours of a few of the commandants of the principal fortresses to obtain an unreasonable price for their submission, and of others to favour (by a demonstration of an intention to resist) their retreat with the plunder which they had found means to collect. It is to be imputed to one of these causes that the Fort of Gurrumcondah did not surrender to the British detachment by which it was surrounded on behalf of the Nizam, until it had been seriously threatened; and that Lieut.-Colonel Bowser was actually obliged to breach one of the lower walls of the fortress of Gooty before his Highness' garrison was admitted. The refusal of the Kelladar of Jemaulabad (the only place of considerable strength in Canara) to submit to the British Government is to be imputed to a similar cause; but that place will certainly be reduced as soon as the state of the season in Canara will admit of the march of a sufficient force against it; an event which may be expected to have taken place within the course of the month of August.

The only impediment of any importance to the speedy and quiet settlement of the whole of the country assigned to the Rajah of Mysore by the partition treaty, has proceeded from some disturbances which have arisen in the province of Bednore, but which are now happily quelled.

A partisan of the name of Dhoondia, originally in the service of the Patan State of Savanore (or Shanoor) having committed various depredations on the territories of Tippoo Sultaun, had incurred the resentment of that Prince. Tippoo Sultaun having contrived to secure the person of Dhoondia, compelled him to conform to the Mahomedan faith, and afterwards employed him in military service; but, either detecting him in some treacherous projects, or suspecting his fidelity, the Sultaun confined him in irons at Seringapatam some time previous to the commencement of the late war. From this situation he was released, together with several other prisoners, by the inconsiderate humanity of the British troops on the 4th of May. He immediately fled from Seringapatam, and being joined by a few of the Sillahdar cavalry of Tippoo Sultaun's disbanded army, took the direction of Bed-

nore, in his way to which province his force received some augmentation, some of the principal Asophs and Killadars in Bednore betrayed their trusts to him; and in this manner many of the principal places of the district had fallen into his hands before it was in the power of Lieut.-General Harris to detach from the army a sufficient force to act against him. In the mean while Dhoondia, had laid the rich country of Bednore under severe contributions, which he exacted with the most unrelenting cruelty, perpetrating throughout the province the most atrocious acts of rapine and murder.

At length a light corps of cavalry and native infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel James Dalrymple of the Madras establishment, moved against Dhoondia from Chitteldroog on the 21st of July, and overtook a party of his banditti, consisting of about 250 horse and 400 infantry. The shocking cruelties which these plunderers had recently committed rendered it necessary to make a severe example; it was, therefore, determined to refuse them quarter, for the purpose of deterring others from similar enormities.

Dhoondia having crossed the Tungbuddra, Hurryhur, a fort on the eastern bank of that river, was taken on the 30th of July by a division of Colonel Dalrymple's detachment.

While Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple attacked this banditti on one side, Colonel Stevenson was advancing into Bednore in another direction, at the head of a light force, composed also of native cavalry and infantry. On the 31st of July Colonel Stevenson crossed the Tungbuddra, and advancing against Simoga, took that place by assault on the 8th of August. On the same day the fort of Hoornelly, situated on the western bank of the Tungbuddra, was taken in the same manner by the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Dalrymple.

Both detachments having now effected the passage of the Tungbuddra, it was determined to make a combined attack on the camp of Dhoondia, which occupied a strong position near the town and fort of Shikarpoor. Accordingly Lieut.-Colonel Dalrymple, on the 17th of August, charged Dhoondia's cavalry, and drove them with considerable loss into a river situated in their rear. Our infantry at the same time attacked the fort of Shikarpoor, and carried it by assault;

Dhoondia escaped by means of a boat prepared for the occasion.

Colonel Stevenson (the progress of whose detachment had been impeded by difficult roads) now arrived and assumed, as senior officer, the command of the united detachments, and immediately pursued Dhoondia so closely as to compel him to take refuge in the Mahratta territory, within the limits of which Colonel Stevenson, on the 20th of August, saw him encamp with the remnant of his banditti, which it would have been easy for Colonel Stevenson to have taken or destroyed had he been at liberty to pass beyond the boundary of the Mahratta dominion. But my particular orders having strictly prohibited any violation of the frontier of the Mahratta empire, Colonel Stevenson, with great judgment and discretion, halted his army on the line of the boundary, and signified to the Mahratta officer of the adjoining district that the respect of the British Government for the rights of the Mahratta State precluded the further progress of their army.

As Dhoondia had, on several occasions, by acts of robbery and murder, rendered himself extremely obnoxious to the Mahrattas, there is no danger of their affording him an asylum in opposition to the remonstrances of the British Government; and I have received accounts from Colonel Stevenson that Dhoondia Punt Ghoklah, a chief commanding a division of the Peishwa's army, had plundered Dhoondia's camp within a few hours after it had been pitched within the territory of the Mahrattas, had carried away all his elephants, camels, bullocks, and guns, and entirely deprived him of the means of future depredation. The province of Bednore will be completely delivered from the banditti which had acted under Dhoondia's command, for, although they continued to retain some posts in the country at the period of his flight, those posts will certainly be evacuated on the approach of the British troops.

I think it my duty to request the particular attention of your Honourable Court to the judicious and spirited conduct displayed during the late operations against Dhoondia, as well by Colonel Stevenson as by Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple; and I am persuaded it will be satisfactory to your Honourable

Court to observe the great activity and energy which has marked this movement of the troops within so short a period after their late brilliant successes, and in the midst of a season of the year which has hitherto been supposed to render military operations impracticable.

Lieutenant-General Harris, with the main body of the army, had advanced to the eastern bank of the Tungbuddra to the support of the detachments under Colonel Stevenson and Colonel Dalrymple. Judging, however, that it was no longer necessary after the dispersion of Dhoondia's followers, and after the flight of their leader, to detain the army in Mysore he immediately determined to form the subsidiary detachment for the permanent protection of Mysore, and to recal the remainder of the forces into the Carnatic. Having made his arrangements for this purpose, and left the honourable Colonel Wellesley in command of the troops which are to remain in Mysore, General Harris quitted the army on the 25th of August at Hoonelly, and arrived here on the 30th following. I am now occupied with him in making the necessary arrangements for the general distribution of the troops into garrison and cantonments.

I have availed myself of the opportunity of my residence at this Presidency to enter into the consideration of various branches of its internal Government, and it is my intention, with the assistance of Lord Clive, to take early measures for the improvement of the administration of your affairs in this quarter.

As I was on the point of closing this despatch, accounts reached me from the army in Mysore, purporting that the fortress of Bednore, and every other place of any consequence in that province, were in the possession of the Company's troops, and that tranquillity was every where established.

I have the honour to be, honourable Sirs,

with the greatest respect,

your most obedient and faithful Servant,

MORNINGTON.

No. XXXII.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel Palmer, Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort William, Sept. 16th, 1799.

I received your letter of the 28th of August on my arrival yesterday at this Presidency.

It would be useless to speculate on the probable motives which have governed the conduct of the Peishwa in the course of the late negotiation. I shall content myself for the present with observing, that I have from the commencement of it entertained considerable doubts of his sincerity.

I desire you will immediately inform the Peishwa and Nana Furnavese that I consider all negotiation on the basis of the treaty of Mysore to be concluded; but that, although I deeply regret his Highness's rejection of an arrangement, which had no other object than the improvement of the friendship and alliance subsisting between the three States, and which was at least as much calculated to promote the interests of the Peishwa as those of the Company and the Nizam, I do not feel any diminution of my amicable disposition towards his Highness.

You will further apprize the Court of Poonah that, conformably to the stipulations of the treaty of Mysore, the Company's Government will proceed immediately, in concert with his Highness the Nizam, to a division of the reserved territory, I rely with confidence that his Highness will take effectual means to prevent any of the officers of his Government from attempting to interrupt, in any degree, the execution of this measure; and that he will compel them to respect the rights of the Company and the Nizam in their recent acquisitions on the side of the Mahratta frontier, with the same solicitude which the Company's Government invariably manifests to respect the rights of all its neighbours.

You will also inform the Peishwa that, although he has not thought proper to accede to the treaty of Mysore, I am not on that account less confident that he will perceive the necessity and propriety of causing all his subjects, of every description, to abstain, with the utmost care, from trespassing in any manner on the territories of the Rajah of Mysore. The

Peishwa is already generally apprized of the union of interests subsisting between the Company and that Rajah: but it may be proper to inform him further, that the Company are bound to defend the Rajah's territories against all powers without exception.

While I wish you to continue to cultivate the best possible understanding with the Court of Poonah, I must desire you to refrain carefully from any interference in the disputes which are now likely to be revived between Bajee Rao and Dowlut Rao Scindiah. You are never either to invite or encourage any renewal of the late negotiation; but to reply to every attempt of that nature, that your instructions permit you merely to transmit to me any propositions of that tendency which may be made to you.

I am, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXXIII.

General Order—Public Department.

Fort William, 17th September, 1799.

The Governor-General has great satisfaction in resuming his seat in Council at this presidency in recording his sense of the zealous co-operation which he experienced during his absence, from his Excellency the Honourable the Vice-president in council, in the prosecution of the late war against Tippoo Sultaun, and particularly in the prompt despatch of the extensive and important supplies of money, grain, and other Articles which were required from Bengal for the use of the army destined to act against Mysore.

No. XXXIV.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, 22nd September, 1799.

I embarked from Fort St. George on the 5th instant, and arrived here on the 14th following, after a pleasant and favourable passage.

At the time of my departure from Fort St. George the

state of affairs in Mysore was perfectly satisfactory. General Harris had arrived at the Presidency from the army to the charge of which Colonel Wellesley had succeeded.

Soon after my arrival at this place I learned from Poonah the failure of the negotiation which I had directed to be opened with the Peishwa on the basis of the partition Treaty of Mysore. It was broken off ostensibly upon the article respecting the exclusion of foreigners from the service and dominions of the Peishwa; to this article the Peishwa would not assent, excepting under limitations, which would have defeated my object in the stipulation. I am not satisfied that the ostensible was the real cause of the failure of the treaty; I suspect either that the Peishwa has been insincere throughout the negociation, or that Scindiah has contrived to influence the Peishwa against the measure. In consequence of this event I have adopted immediate measures for dividing the reserved territory between the Company and the Nizam conformably to the stipulations of the 2nd separate article of the treaty of Mysore.

Although this issue of the late negociation is unfavourable to my design of acquiring such an influence at the Court of Poonah as should enable me effectually to hold the balance between the Peishwa and the Nizam, I apprehend no other serious disadvantage from it. The Peishwa will probably regret the loss of a considerable territory which he might have acquired on terms, not only moderate and just, but highly beneficial to him; and he will view with jealousy the transfer of that territory to the hands of the Company and of the Nizam. But however his perverse temper may incline him to overlook the reason or justice of the question between us, the consciousness of his own weakness, and of our strength, affords us ample security against any rupture with the State of Poonah on this occasion. I consider the same argument to be equally applicable to the probable conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Before my departure for Fort St. George I had placed the affairs of Tanjore in such a train as will lead, I trust, to a speedy and favourable settlement. I left in Lord Clive's hands my plan of a new arrangement in the form of a treaty,* which was to be immediately proposed to the

* See Appendix.

Rajah. The leading principle and object of this treaty is to secure an ample provision for the Rajah, and to vest the government of the country exclusively in the Company.

I ordered the preliminary steps towards the introduction of a system of judicature and definite settlement of revenue into the Company's possessions on the coast, and into the ceded and conquered districts to be taken at Fort St. George; and I am now employed in forming the details of the plan which I hope to transmit to Fort St. George in the course of a few weeks.

Vizier Ali having effected his escape to Jynagur, has been placed under personal restraint at my desire, by the Rajah of that place, who, I hope, will soon deliver the assassin into my hands.

I have the satisfaction to inform you that I have received accounts which seem entitled to credit, that Zemaun Shah has been under the necessity of moving towards Herat for the purpose of defending his dominions against the revolt of his brother Mahomed Shah, and an invasion threatened from Persia. This danger the mission of Captain Malcolm to the court of Baba Khan, will, I trust, serve to confirm and augment; and in the meanwhile I hope to be able to effect such a reform of the Nabob Vizier's military establishments as shall afford us a reasonable degree of security against any future attempts which may be made by the Shah to disturb the peace of India. I have already commenced my operations at Lucknow for this purpose with a fair prospect of success.

Before I left Madras the finances of that presidency had reached a point of prosperity, unexampled at that presidency since 1793; and I have now the satisfaction to inform you that the condition of the finances of Bengal, notwithstanding the heavy demands to which our resources have been subjected, is daily improving.

I remain, my dear Sir, &c. &c.
MORNINGTON.

No. XXXV.

Major-General Sir J. H. Craig to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Cawnpore, 25th September, 1799.

I beg to offer to your Lordship my compliments of congratulation on your safe return to the Presidency.

The services that have been rendered to the national interests in these parts by the decided energy of your Lordship's administration, are too conspicuous not to be acknowledged by all, while the benefits derived from them are of too solid a nature not to inspire a general sense of gratitude in the public mind, and the testimonies of their sentiments, which will no doubt be offered to your Lordship, have certainly never stood upon a fairer foundation than upon this occasion.

Amongst others, I find that it has not been uncouthmory for the officers at the different stations in this country to offer their sentiments by a public address, and I see by the public papers that one of my colleagues in command has already stood forward in the present instance. I am ignorant how far the example may have been followed by other stations; but I think myself called on to request of your Lordship, that if the station under my command is apparently backward upon the occasion, your Lordship will not attribute it to our not joining most cordially in the general sense of admiration and gratitude, or to our not feeling every inclination to manifest our respectful attention to your Lordship, by means that we conceive to be proper in our situation.

The truth is, that I have had so many occasions of very publicly expressing my decided opinion on this subject, (and that long before it would be foreseen that an occasion would so soon occur, which if any occasion can do so, would warrant the practice,) that I imagine no one here will think it a proper step to propose it. My idea is, that military addresses are highly improper in every point of view. If we assume the right of expressing our approbation of the conduct of our superiors, we have at all times equally the power of marking our disapprobation at least by withholding any testimony of the former sentiment; and from thus passing

our judgment on the actions of those with whom the direction of the affairs of Government rests. I should think it not improbable, at last, that we might be brought to think that we could manage them better ourselves.

But, exclusive of the impropriety and indecency of this assumption towards our superiors, and not adverting to the danger to which I have alluded, and which must, at least, be looked upon as possible I confess, my Lord, that being entirely a soldier of the old-school, I cannot but consider all deliberation in any public assembly of an army, as subversive of every idea of discipline and subordination. If I call together the officers under my command, and submit a proposition to their consideration, it is inconsistent with every notion of justice that they should not enjoy full liberty of discussion, and I should feel extremely mortified, and should consider myself as having voluntarily stepped into a situation highly unbecoming my station, and equally militating against my duty to the service were I to find myself involved in a political opposition with some of the unthinking, hot-headed boys which abound in every army.

This opinion of mine, in relation to the propriety of officers as such, in a body, expressing their sentiments on public occasions, is very well known here, and it is supported by all the old and respectable officers, who view the subject precisely in the same light that I do. It is indeed on their account, my Lord, that I take the liberty of intruding the subject on your Lordship. My own sentiments I trust your Lordship will do justice to, but I am anxious that your Lordship should know that it is solely on grounds of what they conceive to be their duty, that the higher ranks of the officers of the station under my command think themselves obliged to abstain from offering any public testimony of what they individually feel on the occasion.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most faithful

and obedient humble servant,

J. H. CRAIG.

No. XXXVI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Honourable Lord Clive.

MY DEAR LORD,

October 2, 1799.

The latest intelligence from Mysore indicates a disposition on the part of Purseram Bhow to form a closer connexion with the English authorities in that country than appears to be necessary for the mere purpose of cultivating that degree of good understanding which it is expedient to maintain with all contiguous states.

The general character, recent condition, and actual situation of Purseram Bhow, combined with the distracted situation of the Mahratta Empire render it extremely probable that this ambitious chieftain should be desirous of strengthening his political position by obtaining the countenance and support of the British government unexpectedly established on the borders of his territory.

Although I am not satisfied either with the particular conduct of Bajee Row, or with the general system of Mahratta affairs; and although the course of events might render the active friendship of Purseram Bhow useful, our national character and policy, require that we should discourage any advances from feudatories of the Mahratta Empire of a nature hostile to the Peishwa's authority.

Your Lordships will perceive that this degree of reserve will not preclude such an intercourse between our officers, civil and military, in Mysore, and those of the bordering Mahratta States (whether Purseram Bhow or any other) as may appear necessary to the maintenance of good understanding, and useful in the adjustment of those differences which frequently arise upon the borders of contiguous states. In confining our correspondence with the officers of the several Mahratta powers within these limits, my object is to avoid any step which might furnish a just ground of jealousy to the Peishwa, and at the same time to preserve such a degree of communication with his feudal chiefs on the borders as may be occasionally improved to any extent which we may find expedient.

Although the apparent disposition of the persons in authority at the Mahratta frontier at present affords a reasonable hope

that they will not countenance any violation of the territories of the Company or of the Rajah of Mysore, it is proper to provide against the contingency of a change of their disposition. With this view it is necessary that orders should be sent to the officer commanding in Mysore to repel any such violation of territory in the most prompt and decisive manner. Severe and instant chastisement applied, in the first instance of any acts of aggression and plunder within the borders, or those of the Rajah, will have the salutary effect of deterring the Mahrattas from the habitual indulgence of their predatory disposition. We must cautiously avoid all offence, and religiously respect the Mahratta frontier; but if any party of Mahrattas should be found in arms acting within the limits which I have described they must be punished on the spot, without waiting for any reference to your Lordship or to me.

I remain, my dear Lord,

Yours, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXXVII.

The Earl of Mornington to Major-General Sir J. H. Craig.

SIR,

Fort William, 9th October, 1799.

I return you many thanks for your obliging letter of the 25th of September.*

Your sentiments with regard to our late happy successes, your just view of the principles of military discipline, and the correct boundary which you have drawn between the individual feelings of the officers, and the collective duties of the army on the present occasion, afford me the most sincere satisfaction.

The natural desire of honourable distinction, and the sense of public character have disposed me to receive with gratitude and pleasure, the testimonies of uninfluenced and unsolicited good-will, which have been presented to me by the British inhabitants of Madras and Bombay, and by the British and Native inhabitants of Calcutta. The favourable sentiments

* See page 122.

of the army bear an estimation in my opinion proportioned to my great respect for that body; but I entirely concur with you in the danger of admitting any army in its military capacity, to the exercise of any share of a deliberative voice in political affairs. Military addresses, even on subjects immediately connected with the interests of the army, are unnecessary and irregular; the rules of the service having prescribed established channels through which the interests of the whole, or of any branch of the army may at all times be conveyed to the civil power, without injury to that freedom of judgment which, over the affairs of the army is essential to the maintenance of public order.

With these sentiments, it would be criminal in me, for my personal gratification, to countenance in my own instance a practice which my own conscientious judgment condemns, as tending to produce insubordination in the army, and confusion in the State.

It has therefore given me particular pleasure to learn from the Commander-in-Chief, that he has prevented several complimentary addresses of different stations of the army from reaching me; and I have already returned him my thanks for having anticipated my wishes on a subject of such delicacy and importance.

My acknowledgments are equally due to your judicious conduct on the present occasion, and I have the honour to assure you, that the continuance of your zealous and able exertions to restore and improve the discipline of that part of the army placed under your command, will always be the most acceptable pledge which you can offer to me, of your personal approbation and esteem. Your public conduct and that of the higher ranks of the officers at Cawnpore, as stated in your letter of the 25th, render your individual sentiments on the late transactions additionally valuable to me; and I shall always reflect with pride and satisfaction, that my endeavours in the discharge of my duty towards my country, have been approved by persons who have manifested so just a discrimination of the genuine principles, on which that duty is founded. I am happy to learn from your authority, the beneficial effects which have been produced in the vicinity of your station, by the prosperous settlement of Mysore. I have every reason to believe, that the same effects have been ex-

tended to every part of India, in which the nature of our cause, and the splendour of our triumph have been understood. You will be glad to hear, that I have been able to garrison Goa with British troops; this arrangement took place on the 6th of September; and I trust it will effectually secure our new acquisitions against any possible disturbance either foreign or domestic.

I have, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXXVIII.

The Earl of Mornington, to the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, October 25th, 1799.

I have great satisfaction in informing you, that in consequence of a negociation which I had opened with the Government of Goa, a detachment of British troops, consisting of about eleven hundred rank and file, (furnished by H. M's. 75th 77th, and 84th Regts.) under the command of Colonel Sir William Clarke, was admitted into that place on the 6th of September, with every demonstration on the part of His Excellency the Governor and Captain-General, of the most perfect cordiality and the most distinguished attention.

The importance of providing in the most effectual manner for the safety of Goa, was strongly impressed on my mind as early as the month of July, 1798, at which time I entered on the consideration of the measures which might eventually be adopted for that important purpose. My anxiety on this subject was increased considerably, by the subsequent establishment of the French in Egypt. The extensive preparations however, which became indispensable in consequence of that event, combined with the hostile proceedings of Tippoo Sultaun, would have precluded the possibility of my furnishing a force for the special protection of Goa, even if I had been certain of the disposition of the Portuguese Government to receive it. Under these circumstances, I deemed it useless to commence any formal negociation on the subject; determining however to make an attempt to place a British garrison in Goa, on the first favourable occasion which should occur.

Immediately, after the fall of Seringapatam, I lost no time in adopting the measures necessary to the accomplishment of an object, rendered considerably more urgent by the discoveries which followed the conquest of Mysore, and which are already before your Honourable Committee in the papers found at Seringapatam.*

I selected Mr. Uhthoff, (one of the Commissioners in Malabar,) for the office of Envoy to the Government of Goa, and his conduct, in the course of this important and delicate transaction will, I am persuaded, obtain the approbation of your honourable Committee.

The question respecting the payment of the British troops, employed in defence of Goa, has been agreed to be referred to the respective Governments of Great Britain and Portugal, in Europe. In the meanwhile, care will be taken to keep the accounts of the expenses of those troops, in a regular and separate form.

I have in the same manner proposed to His Excellency the Governor of Goa, to submit to the decision of our respective Governments in Europe, certain claims which are advanced by the Government of Goa, to a part of the territory of Canara, recently conquered by our arms, and secured to us by the treaty of Mysore.

The details of all these proceedings will be transmitted to your honourable Committee, by the Government of Fort St. George.

I have the honour to be, &c.
MORNINGTON.

No. XXXIX.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, 24th October, 1799.

My despatch of this date to the Secret Committee will apprise you of the success which has attended the measures which I directed Mr. Duncan and Mr. Uhthoff to take with a view to the important object of establishing a British garrison at Goa.

* Vol. I. Appendix, p. 711.—Letter from Tippoo, to the French Directory, and note of demands by Tippoo's Ambassadors.

It is my intention to augment that garrison without delay, but even at present it is sufficient to secure us against any possible attempt of an European enemy in that quarter, it will also operate as an effectual check upon the Mahrattas. You are already informed of my opinions with regard to the importance of the possession of Goa to our security and interests in every point of view; and I should hope that the present might prove a favourable opportunity for accomplishing the great advantage of obtaining the cession of Goa either to the crown or to the Company in exchange either for Malacca or the Spice Islands, or for some equivalent pecuniary compensation. It appears to me, that the attempt to obtain this cession ought not to be delayed, and as I know you concur with me in my estimate of its value, I rely on you that the negociation with the Court of Lisbon will be immediately opened.

The claims of Portugal to any part of the Canarese dominions of the late Tippoo Sultaun are so obviously weak, that I do not think it necessary to trouble you further on that subject than to request you to advert to the length of time during which the places claimed by the Portuguese have belonged to the State of Mysore, and to the nature of the conquest which brought them under our power. The Governor and Captain General's pretensions to be considered as an Ally in the late war, appear to be founded principally on the share which his Excellency bore in issuing an order for a royal salute to be fired from Fort Alguada on the occasion of the fall of Seringapatam, and of the death of Tippoo Sultaun. Although this claim is certainly more powerful than any which can be alleged by his Highness the Peishwa, I do not expect that, in the most liberal construction, this meritorious effort of forward and active zeal of his Excellency the Governor and Captain-General will be deemed to entitle her most faithful Majesty to any portion of our conquests. Even if the principle could be applied to cases of alliance in war, I doubt whether any degree of promptitude and alacrity manifested in rejoicing over the destruction of our late enemy, could justify a claim on the part of the Governor and Captain General to the rights of an accessory after the fact.

The general aspect of affairs becomes every day more favourable in Mysore, the whole of the country is now re-

duced to our authority and to that of the Rajah and Nizam; and a seasonable fall of rain affords a prospect, that even in this year we may realize no inconsiderable part of our new revenue and subsidy without injury to the country.

With regard to the Court of Hyderabad, its temper returns, and with it the establishment of an additional regiment of cavalry to the subsidiary force will soon be admitted. The Court of Poonah continues in the same state of weakness and confusion, and the distractions of the Mahratta empire have recently been aggravated by hostilities which have broken out between the Rajah of Kolapore and Purseram Bhow. The latter is stated (by accounts which appear credible) to have fallen in an engagement with the former. Upon the whole no apprehension appears to me justifiable by the actual state of the Mahratta empire. For the present I have been compelled by the perverseness of the Peishwa's disposition to proceed to carry the second separate article of the Treaty of Mysore into effect; but I shall anxiously watch any opportunity of renewing my proposals at Poonah on their original basis; and I do not yet despair of success.

At Fort St. George the whole state of affairs is astonishingly improved, and I am perfectly satisfied with the present course of that government. You will soon receive my new Treaty* with the Rajah of Tanjore, vesting the whole administration of his government and revenues in the Company. You will also, I trust, learn the success of the steps which I had ordered for disarming the Southern Polygars, who had begun to revolt even during the short period of the late war. We are now employed in framing a code for the introduction of a permanent settlement of revenue, and a system of judicature for the Company's possessions in the Peninsula, I have ordered two members of the board of revenue to proceed immediately from Madras to Calcutta for the purpose of aiding in this salutary work: and I trust that its benefits will be extended in a short time over the whole of the northern Circars, the Jaghire, the countries under the Company's dominion ceded in the last war, and those conquered in this (with the exception of Malabar and Canara) the countries of

* See Appendix.

the Southern, Eastern and Western Polygars, and the kingdom of Tanjore.

I found Bengal and the provinces in a state of profound tranquillity; the effect of our success in Mysore has utterly annihilated the spirit of insubordination and contempt which for some time past has been gaining ground among our Mahomedan subjects. I have commenced a negotiation with the Nabob Vizier for the reform of his military establishments. The resident with Scindia has proceeded to Jynagur, in order to receive from the Rajah the person of Vizier Alli. I shall soon write to you in detail on the state of our courts of justice, of the revenue and general finance, and of our commercial interests. With respect to finance I shall only say, that great and unprecedented as the effort has been which I was compelled to make within the last, and must make within the present year, our resources have corresponded with the exigency of the occasion, and public and private credit have improved to an astonishing degree, and are still progressively improving.

I think it necessary to apprise you of my intention to adopt without delay a plan for the improvement of the civil service at Bengal in a most important point. The state of the administration of justice, and even of the collection of revenue throughout the provinces affords a painful example of the inefficacy of the best code of laws to secure the happiness of the people, unless due provision has been made to ensure a proper supply of men qualified to administer those laws in their different branches and departments. This evil is felt severely in every part of this government, and it arises principally from a defect at the source and fountain-head of the service—I mean the education and early habits of the young gentlemen sent hither in the capacity of writers. My opinion, after full deliberation on the subject is decided, that the writers, on their first arrival in India should be subjected for a period of two or three years to the rules and discipline of some collegiate institution at the seat of government. In such an institution they might attain the groundwork of the several native languages necessary for their respective stations, together with the principles of general law, those of the Mahomedan and Hindoo Codes, and the voluminous regulations enacted by the Governor-General in Council for the ad-

ministration of justice in Bengal and the provinces; other branches of knowledge, also, suitable to their intended duties might be acquired, and habits of activity, regularity and decency formed instead of those of sloth, indolence, low debauchery, and vulgarity now too apt to grow on those young men, who have been sent at an early age into the interior parts of the country, and have laid the foundations of their life and manners among the coarse vices and indulgencies of those countries. I shall not pursue this topic further at present, intending to make it the subject of ample discussion at an early period. But I now wish to inform you that I feel the mischief to be so pressing, that I intend, without waiting for orders from home, to proceed to found such an institution at Calcutta. I have already taken some steps towards the measure, and I hope to be able to carry my plan into effect with little (if any) additional charge to the company.

I rely on your active and zealous support of this arrangement, in which I feel the greatest interest.

Ever, my dear Sir,
Yours sincerely and affectionately,

MORNINGTON.

No. XL.

The Earl of Mornington to his Excellency the Vizier of Oude.

Fort William, 5th November, 1799.

Some days have elapsed since I had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter, wherein your Excellency, after observing "that the benefits even both immediate and future, of a reform of your military establishment, are even more strongly impressed on your Excellency's mind than they were described by me," assures me that you would, "without a moment's delay, consult with Colonel Scott upon what was practicable and what occurred to your Excellency's mind, and communicate to me what should be conjointly determined upon as advisable."

From the period of my receiving this letter, I have anxiously expected to learn from Lieutenant-Colonel Scott that your

Excellency, in conformity to your promise, and in pursuance of the suggestions of your own discernment, had entered fully and unreservedly with that gentleman upon the discussion of this urgent and important business. But although this expectation has been hitherto disappointed, such is my confidence in the punctuality and prudence of your Excellency, that I continue to be firmly persuaded that I shall soon have the satisfaction of learning from Lieutenant-Colonel Scott that considerable progress has been made in the new arrangement.

The general considerations which render it extremely necessary that this arrangement should be carried into execution without delay, have been already fully explained to your Excellency, and you have concurred with me in my views on the subject. One argument in favour of a speedy determination on this subject, possibly may not have occurred to your mind, and I, therefore, take this occasion explicitly to state it to your Excellency.

The Company are bound by existing treaties "to defend the dominions of your Excellency against all enemies;" but the number of British troops ordinarily stationed in your Excellency's dominions not exceeding 13,000 men, would not, it is obvious, be adequate to that purpose in the event of an invasion of those dominions; while, on the other hand, it must be evident to your Excellency, that various circumstances in such an event might render it impossible for the Company's Government to augment the ordinary force, either to the extent or within the time required by the emergency. The probable result of such a situation of things requires no explanation to a person of your Excellency's penetration.

If this danger were even remote and doubtful, it would behove a prudent government to guard against it by seasonable precautions. What then must be your Excellency's duty and mine when that danger certainly menaces your dominions? Of the hostile intentions of Zemaun Shah against your Excellency's possessions no doubt can be entertained, since the discoveries made at Seringapatam. Whether these intentions will be carried into effect at a more early or more distant day, may be a question; but it is the part of wisdom to preclude the possibility of their success. But Zemaun Shah is not, perhaps, the only power against whose restless and unprincipled ambition your Excellency should be protected,

other enemies may arise in other quarters, and it becomes you to provide against every contingency.

It might not be in the power of the British Government, on a sudden emergency, to reinforce the troops in your Excellency's country with sufficient expedition; my firm opinion, therefore, is that the Company can in no other manner effectually fulfil their engagements "to defend the dominions of your Excellency against all enemies," than by maintaining constantly in those dominions such a force as shall at all times be adequate to your effectual protection, independently of any reinforcement which the exigency might otherwise require, but which might not be disposable in proper season.

The Seventh Article of the Treaty with your Excellency, by Sir John Shore, provides for the occasional augmentation of the Company's troops in your Excellency's dominions in terms which evidently render the Company's Government competent to decide at all times on the requisite amount of such augmentation. The same article binds your Excellency to defray the expense of any force which shall be deemed necessary by the Company for your defence.

The precise numbers of the additional force which I judge necessary for the effectual protection of your Excellency's dominions, will be stated to you, in my name, by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott.

To enable your Excellency to defray the expense of the additional British force, which is now become indispensably necessary to the security of your Excellency's dominions, without any new charges upon the finances of your Excellency, nothing further is requisite than that you should disband the numerous disorderly battalions at present in your service, which, instead of contributing in any degree to the defence of your country, or to the support of your Government, have long proved injurious to the prosperity and strength of both.

For the details of the plan by which the dismission of these troops may be most easily and speedily effected, I beg leave to refer your Excellency to Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, who is in full possession of my sentiments on this subject, and on whose prudence, judgment, and experience, I rely with the utmost confidence.

The advanced period of the season absolutely requires that

the British troops in Oude should immediately be augmented to the amount which will be stated to your Excellency by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott; and I earnestly recommend to your Excellency the early adoption of those measures which will be pointed out to you by Colonel Scott, for the purpose of relieving your Excellency from the heavy expense at present incurred in maintaining that force, whose numbers are dangerous only to your Excellency and your subjects. By such a reform your Excellency will be fully enabled to defray the charge of the additional troops.

It will not be in my power to furnish your Excellency immediately with the full number of additional troops, which are necessary for the effectual security of your Excellency's dominions; but I am so deeply impressed with the necessity of carrying the measure into effect as speedily as possible, that your Excellency may rely on my making every practicable exertion to complete the proposed force at so early a period of time as shall place your Excellency's country beyond the reach of any surprise, either from foreign or domestic enemies.

I have, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XLI.

*The Earl of Mornington to Captain J. A. Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

(Secret.)

SIR,

Fort William, 6th November, 1799.

The general state of the Nizam's health for some time past, and the communications which I have lately received from you on that subject, joined to the great changes recently produced in the political state of India by our conquest of Mysore, have suggested to me the necessity of revising the principles which regulated my instructions to you of the 8th of July, 1798,* with regard to the conduct proper to be pursued by the

* See Vol. I. p. 94.

Company's Government in the event of his Highness's death. If we neglect to interfere in settling the succession upon the death of the Nizam, the Mahrattas will not fail to avail themselves of our inactivity, and will establish a preponderant, if not an exclusive, influence at the Court of Hyderabad.

The establishment of the exclusive influence of the Mahrattas at Hyderabad would be equivalent in its operation on our interests to the absolute subjugation of the Deccan by the arms of the Mahratta power; and it should be no less our care to prevent the Mahrattas from governing the territory of the Nizam in the name of a prince elevated to the Musnud by their interference, than to check the progress of any hostile attempt which they might make to extend their dominions at the expense of the Court of Hyderabad. It is, therefore, now as necessary that the succession to the Soubahship of the Deccan should be settled by the Company's authority as it was in July, 1798.

In every view which I am enabled to take of this question, it continues to appear to me desirable that we should raise Secunder Jah to the Musnud in preference to any of his brothers. The right of primogeniture is in his favour; his connections are among those persons best affected towards our interest; he is the only son of the Nizam who has ever maintained any authorised intercourse with us, or who has ever manifested any desire to cultivate our friendship. Alli Jah was disposed to connect his views with those of Tippoo Sultaun; Feridoon Jah has carried on intrigues in the same quarter, and Jehander Jah has been suspected of endeavouring to engage the Mahrattas to take him under their protection.

In favouring the pretensions of Secunder Jah, we must not overlook what is requisite to the improvement of our connection with the Court of Hyderabad, and to the establishment of that connection on a basis of the most solid advantage, and of the most permanent security.

No obligation of treaty binds us to take part in any contested succession, arising either from the total silence of the Nizam respecting his intended successor, or from a disputable declaration of his Highness's intentions on the subject. Even in the case of an unequivocal nomination of a successor by his Highness, we should not be bound by the Treaty of Sep-

tember, 1798, or by any other obligation to support that successor against any rival, whose cause might be espoused by the Mahrattas. Whatever secret or political motives therefore may exist to induce us either to interpose our influence in the settlement of the succession, or to prefer the pretensions of Secunder Jah, our faith is not pledged to raise that prince to the Musnud, or unconditionally to support him upon it against any effort of the Mahrattas, or of any other power in favour of another candidate.

Having stated the general principles which should govern our conduct in the conjunction under contemplation, I shall proceed to furnish you with an outline of the particular conditions on which I am willing to support the succession of Secunder Jah against all competition.

These conditions are as follow :—

1. The Treaty of September, 1798, shall be confirmed by Secunder Jah, for himself and his heirs, in all points not expressly altered by the New Treaty.

2. The subsidiary force shall be augmented to four regiments of native infantry, two regiments of native cavalry, and three companies of artillery, including a proportionable increase of gun lascars.

3. The additional force shall be subsidized at the same rate as that now serving in the Nizam's dominions.

4. A territory to be selected by the Company, producing a net revenue at least adequate to the payment of the whole subsidy (under the treaty of 1798 as well as under the new engagement), shall be assigned to the sole and absolute management of the Company: the Company to account to the reigning prince for any surplus of revenue exceeding the amount of the subsidy, which may be realised from the said territory under their management.

5. The Peishcush at present payable by the Company to the Nizam, on account of the northern Circars, shall be remitted for ever.

6. If the number of troops stipulated to be subsidized, should at any time appear to be inadequate to the purpose of securing Secunder Jah on the Musnud, against the attempts of any competition, whether supported or not by the Mahrattas, or by any other power, the Company will augment the subsidized force to such an extent as the Company may judge

necessary; and Secunder Jah shall in that case defray the expense of such temporary addition of force.

7. All Rahdary duties on goods passing to and from the respective territories of the contracting parties shall be abolished. No articles of merchandize shall pay duty more than once, and a proper tariff shall be established for the regulation of the single duties to be so levied; and a treaty of commerce shall be concluded between the two states on just and equitable principles of reciprocal interest and common benefit.

8. Secunder Jah shall engage to pay at all times the utmost attention to such advice as the Company's Government shall occasionally judge it necessary to offer to him with a view to any objects connected with the advancement of his interests, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both states.

Such is the outline of the terms upon which I propose to support and maintain the succession of Secunder Jah, whether he should obtain the previous nomination of his father, or not, or even if it should be pretended that his Highness had declared in favour of some other of his sons. You will prepare without delay an instrument in the Persian language in conformity to the foregoing outline, in order that Secunder Jah (at the moment of his father's death, or whenever that event shall appear to approach) may be apprised of the terms on which we are ready to support his cause, and may be enabled by immediately executing a formal instrument, to accede to my propositions in a regular manner.

I think it necessary to permit you either totally to suppress or to modify the Eighth Article according to your discretion, apprising you, however, that I consider it to be of great importance to obtain such an ascendancy over the councils of the Nizam, as is described in that Article.

Secunder Jah must not be allowed to procrastinate his determination. If at the end of a stated and short period of time he should not determine to accept the proffered Treaty, you will proceed in concert with Azim ul Omrah and Meer Allum, to place one of the younger sons of the Nizam on the Musnud, previously stipulating that the prince succeeding to the Musnud shall fulfil all the conditions of the Treaty proposed to Secunder Jah.

I am aware that the objects proposed might be obtained from Secunder Jah with less difficulty, previously to the death of the Nizam, and that it would on that account be desirable that a negociation should be opened immediately with Secunder Jah. But many objections occur to deter me from such a step. The attempt (if it should transpire either by accident or design) would probably lead to mischievous consequences; I am, therefore, of opinion that no such attempt should be hazarded until the Nizam shall be at the point of death.

It is manifest that our power of settling the succession in the manner described, and of obtaining the advantages which I have enumerated, will depend in an eminent degree, if not absolutely, on the local position of the subsidiary force at the time of his Highness's death. It is, therefore, of the last importance that the force should not only be kept together, but stationed as near as possible to the residence of the Nizam; and I accordingly direct you to adopt every practicable means of accomplishing these most desirable and essential objects without delay.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XLII.

Sir Sidney Smith to the Earl of Mornington.

Camp of his Highness the Supreme Vizier,
near Jaffa, the 9th November, 1799.

MY LORD,

[Received 8th April, 1800.]

It is my duty to give your Lordship early information that a disposition on the part of the French army in Egypt to treat for their return to France, by the evacuation of their new "colony," has been at length openly manifested; first, by an official communication to that effect from General Buonaparte to his Highness the Supreme Vizier, in a letter full of the pretended predilection of the French for "Islamism" as a ground for peace, and since in a more reasonable strain from his successor in the command, General Kleber, by letters addressed to his Highness and to me.

General Buonaparte made an attempt to renew the intercourse with me, which he had abruptly broken off from a fear of the defection of his army, that defection having been increased rather than diminished by his unqualified abuse of the English commander, to whom alone the army could look for favour in the hour of their distress. The Aid-de-camp sent off to the Tigre appeared to have been commissioned to say that General Buonaparte had ever spoken of me in terms of the utmost respect, although his writings, for *political* reasons, contained matter calculated to discourage his army from deserting to me at a critical moment of their sufferings in Syria. I could not help cutting the conversation short by saying what I really felt at the time, knowing the man as I do, viz., "that I should be very sorry to have his approbation." However, it being evident, from this and other circumstances, that the discontent of the army was kept under only by the terror his severity inspired, I took occasion to acquaint him of his being (together with General Berthier) recalled to command the army in Italy (N. B. not then in existence) this, as I expected, was eagerly caught at. A second flag of truce asked whether I was serious, and a confirmation being sent, he embarked in a few days afterwards for Europe, giving only a few hours notice of his intention to those who were to accompany him, and causing the command to devolve on General Kleber by a sealed packet; it was given out in the army that he was gone to Constantinople to make peace, which affords a proof how much the army wish for some such means of extrication.

. Having early apprized Lord Nelson of the probability of General Buonaparte's quitting Egypt singly and *incognito*, I entertain strong hopes that some of his Lordship's cruisers may have fallen in with him, although the *Theseus*, which I had detached with a squadron for that purpose, has returned unsuccessful.

I have been employed assembling a force, and directing an attack on Damietta, which took place on the 1st instant. Like that on Aboukir, it failed of entire success from the same causes, viz. the insubordination, disorder, and obstinate inactivity inherent in a Turkish fleet and army. The attack, however, like that in the Red Sea of Yambo Arabians, has had the good effect of proving to the French army that these

irregular hosts can be brought *hand to hand* with them; and it is likewise evident, that a succession of these sort of engagements must annihilate them to a man, although they may each time remain masters of the field of battle from the effect of European tactics, which, as at Damietta, produces a corps de reserve, or a flanking charge of cavalry, to route the *victorious rabble*. The French superior officers, with whom I have had frequent intercourse of late by flags of truce seem fully sensible of this, and extremely anxious to quit a theatre whereon they can neither gain honour or secure their profits, and where it is evident to them that they do their country no sort of service since I have communicated the glorious news from India (sent me by Mr. Manesty, extremely apropos). Allow me, my Lord, to take this opportunity of congratulating your Lordship on the signal success which has crowned the well combined measures of Government in India by the able and gallant exertions of Lieutenant-General Harris and his highly distinguished army, at the same time that I offer your Lordship and them this tribute, in the proof of the additional and extensive utility of your joint labours.

It is but justice to the French army to say that, though they evidently dread the appearance of the conquerors of the Mysore in Upper Egypt, they are under no sort of apprehension of the Vizier's motley disorderly multitude; but they are sensible that, reduced as they are to 18,000 men, they could not profit by a victory, where they are exposed in the end to be assailed by regular troops both from the Red Sea and the Mediterranean; and I trust a demonstration of the truth of this will be made in support of my assertion to that effect, should the conference I am about to hold with General Desaix and Mr. Poussielgue on board the *Tigre* close without our settling the terms of evacuation.

I have the honour to be,
with the utmost respect, my Lord,
your Lordship's faithful, humble Servant,

W. SIDNEY SMITH.

No. XLIII.

The Earl of Elgin to the Earl of Mornington.

Constantinople, Nov. 16th, 1799.

[Received at Calcutta, 4th March, 1800.]

MY LORD,

I beg leave to acquaint your Lordship that I arrived here on the 6th instant, in the quality of his Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Ottoman Porte.

Your Lordship will have known from Mr. Dundas, and from some of the Directors of the East India Company, with whom I conferred confidentially in London, that I am authorized, in considering this post as one that may afford me occasions of interesting communication with Asia; and that my attention was particularly directed by them to that object. I may be allowed, on my own part, to say, that no part of the duty connected with this mission is more agreeable to me than the intercourse it establishes with your Lordship; and that my exertions shall be unremitting, in so far as I may be enabled, while here, to contribute to the benefit of the British interests in India, and to the glory and success of your administration there.

I reached Constantinople in a conjuncture, the circumstances of which claim your Lordship's particular notice. The enclosed letters* had just been received here from the Grand Vizier, whose head-quarters were then at Damascus; and the Russian Envoy at this place, and my predecessor, Mr. Smith, had been applied to, to favour the negotiation, thus set on foot, for the evacuation of Egypt by the French. The conferences which had passed, and one which I also had on the subject, do not enable me to furnish you with more than the above papers. For, as Sir Sidney Smith is acting, and with the most brilliant success against that army, and has intercepted the original letters written by the French General, and opened a communication upon them with the

* Referring to Buonaparte's address to the Grand Vizier, and the reply of the latter; Kleber's proclamation; the Grand Vizier's reply thereto; and the report of the Capigi Bachî.

Vizier; I have referred all proceedings on this negotiation to him, who, no doubt, will comply with every proposal, consistent with the dignity and interest of the allies, to procure the deliverance of Egypt. Orders are also sent to the Grand Vizier on this occasion, to act with Sir Sidney Smith: and I have requested Sir Sidney to acquaint your Lordship, by the most expeditious conveyance, of any proceedings that may take place in consequence of the dispositions thus shewn by the French to quit the Turkish provinces.

I am sorry I have no authority to say whether the Grand Vizier is justified in the construction he has put upon the letters from Buonaparte and Kleber. But as they are written after the defeat at Acre, after Buonaparte's flight, and after a proclamation has been circulated among the French troops; it is, I perceive, Sir Sidney Smith's opinion, as well as the Vizier's, that this step did proceed from a desire to evacuate Egypt.

Our interests in India are so nearly concerned in defeating the attempt of the French to establish themselves in Egypt, that every facility will be afforded on the part of the British influence in this part of the world, to remove the French troops now there, if the terms they propose shall prove at all acceptable. At the same time, it is my duty to point out that, in case the suggestion thus made by the French Generals, has proceeded from the very unfavourable aspect which the affairs of France lately assumed on the continent of Europe, that cause is liable to much variation. The last accounts from Switzerland leave very little hopes of any part of that country being now occupied by the allied troops, or that they will be able to do more than take up winter quarters in the rear of Feldkirk, and the line from whence the Arch Duke commenced his operations this campaign.

On the other hand, the Court of Vienna is, I apprehend, acting without sufficient concert with Russia and England, in directing the civil and military agents attending its armies to take possession of all they conquer, in the name of the Emperor of Germany, and not in that of the lawful Sovereigns. So much so, as to have given occasion to some very strong remonstrances, which, if without effect, may possibly force the other allies to refuse further cooperation with the Aus-

triants. The enclosed paper* has, in consequence of what I allude to, been delivered to the foreign ministers at Petersburg, and will, I make no doubt, appear to your Lordship a paper of the highest import in the present crisis.

Should, unfortunately, any disunion take place among the armies now employed on the continent against France, we may hope that the Emperor of Russia, whose zeal is, undoubtedly, very great in this important contest, will still offer military, as well as naval, succours to be employed against the French in Egypt. Such aid is stipulated by treaty, and applications for it have been of late renewed by the Porte, and favourably met on the part of Russia. Yet it appears the French are still 15,000 strong, besides numerous bodies of natives, embodied under them; their position, as your Lordship will see by the annexed map, with its explanation, is as secure as the nature of the country will admit. They receive, as I learn from Admiral Blanket, supplies even of ammunition by the aid of the neighbouring powers; and if the present negotiation fails, the inadequate assistance which could be spared by Russia, or admitted by the Porte into its provinces, does not present the means of driving the French from their present post, however able and brilliant our naval operations against them continue to be.

As to the Turks, your Lordship will perceive, by the annexed paper,† that very little is to be expected from them. Besides, I fear, there is great insubordination among the rulers in the distant provinces of the empire, which obliges the Grand Vizier to proceed with more than usual caution, and occasions a material diminution of the force he apparently has along with him.

I am, my Lord, totally without authority for what I am about to add, but as the whole of the information before me leads me to foresee the probability of its becoming necessary to employ considerably more force than is now preparing, to

* This was a *note verbal* from the Emperor of Russia to the foreign Ministers, declaring that his Majesty's desire is to re-establish the former kingdom of France, the Government of the United Provinces, of the Helvetic Cantons, and of the Germanic empire; but that he will withdraw his forces unless these measures be vigorously prosecuted.

† A document, in French, shewing the actual state and disposition of the Turks.

attack the French in Egypt; I, individually, presume it is worthy your Lordship's attention to consider whether, in that event, a respectable diversion could be made from the Red Sea by troops from India, and the naval force under Admiral Blanket.*

The rescuing Egypt from the French would be a glorious continuation of the splendid victories which those troops have lately gained in India, with such unequalled benefit to their country.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect, my Lord,
your Excellency's most obedient, humble Servant,

ELGIN.

No. XLV.

Lieut.-Colonel Scott, Resident at Lucknow, to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Lucknow, 22nd November, 1799.

A meeting having been appointed by his Excellency the Vizier, at the resident's house on the 12th instant, for the purpose, as I understood, of concerting with me the means of carrying into immediate effect the important military reform recommended by your Lordship, his Excellency imparted to me his secret, though determined, resolution of abdicating the government, but did not until the 20th authorize me to make a communication of his intentions to your Lordship.

This resolution of his Excellency is of so extraordinary and interesting a tendency in its intermediate object, and involves considerations of such magnitude and delicacy in its execution and future consequences, that I feel it my duty to recite to your Lordship, as distinctly and as fully as my memory will allow, in a connected detail, the several conversations which have taken place upon the subject, and as they were not of long duration, and committed to paper immediately upon their conclusion, I trust, that no material part of them can have escaped me.

His Excellency began by observing, that he had frequently

* This suggestion was made by Lord Mornington (see Vol. I. p. 587.)

declared to me the impossibility of his conducting the affairs of his country under existing circumstances; that probably, I had not comprehended the full drift of those expressions, or had conceived they were uttered in a moment of ill-humour, that the real meaning of them was an earnest and sincere desire to relinquish a government which he could not manage with satisfaction to himself, or to the advantage of his subjects.

Desirous of penetrating into the motives which influenced his Excellency to such a resolution, and of discovering the sincerity of his declarations, I entreated his Excellency would impart to me the causes which rendered it impossible for him to regulate and conduct the affairs of his government.

He replied, that they were well known to me, to which I observed, that I must candidly confess, that under the present total want of arrangement for the despatch of public business, and without the aid and advice of able, zealous and responsible ministers, to take a share in the laborious and incessant concerns of this extensive empire, the affairs of it must fall into confusion, and the interests of his subjects be neglected, but that if his Excellency would condescend to avail himself of the advice and assistance, which I was commanded by your Lordship to afford, and which I was at all times, and all occasions ready to exert to the utmost of my abilities I would be answerable, that the affairs of the country could be conducted to the prosperity and happiness of his people, to his own ease and to the acquisition of a great name.

His Excellency replied, that this was true, but that it was impossible for one person to judge of the feelings of another, and that his mind not being disposed to the cares and fatigues of government, he had come to the fixed resolution of retiring from them; and added, that as your Lordship would on his abdication exalt one of his sons to the Musnud, his name would remain.

Acknowledging the justness of the remark of the impracticability of penetrating into the secret feelings of another person, I desisted from further reasoning; but to take away every ground on which the expectation or hope could be built of the selection of a successor, I adverted to the right attached by our government to primogeniture, so strongly exemplified in his own person; in which remark his Excellency acquiesced,

and said, whichever of his sons your Lordship thought proper.

His Excellency declared in unequivocal terms, that in relinquishing the empire, he renounced every wish of interfering in its concerns, or of residing within its limits, and that the money he was in possession of, was sufficient for his own support, and for the procurement of every gratification he could desire in a private station, but he trusted your Lordship would establish suitable allowances for his sons and the other branches of his family, whom he wished to leave at Lucknow.

Anxious on so solemn an occasion as the abdication of an empire, to be in possession of some written document, lest my recital of a private conversation, without the presence of a third person should be denied or affirmed to be in part misrepresented, I asked His Excellency, if he did not think it advisable to address himself direct to your Lordship; this he declined, on the pretence that there was no person about him in whom he could confide in an affair of so much secrecy and delicacy.

I then informed his Excellency, that I should immediately communicate the substance of the conversation to your Lordship, but he desired that I would prepare the draft of a letter in English, and before the despatch of it, submit for his perusal a translation in the Persian language.

This I promised to execute, and exhorted his Excellency to reflect most seriously in the interval on the measure he had in contemplation, which was the most momentous that could be undertaken by a Sovereign.

Having prepared in Persian an abstract of the conversation, I waited upon his Excellency on the 14th, when he declared his perseverance in the determination he had two days before revealed to me, accompanied by some explanations of the motives which influenced his resolution; these however, not being new in substance, called from me only a repetition of that advice and those assurances, which I had frequently urged to his consideration.

They consisted of general accusations against the refractory and perverse dispositions of the people at large, of complaints against the fidelity and zeal of the men immediately about his person, of the arrogance of some of the Amils and of the open disobedience of others. I replied,

that the remedy to this aggregate of evils was easy and within his Excellency's own power, that a vigilant, strong and just administration would secure the obedience of the bulk of his subjects, on the firm principles of attachment to his person and government, that a conciliatory and encouraging conduct on his part, would secure fidelity and enliven zeal, and that the reform of his military establishment on the principles so forcibly and repeatedly urged by your Lordship, was the specific measure that would curb the arrogance of the Amils, and enforce a prompt execution and implicit observance of any revenue regulations which his wisdom might establish ; and in conclusion, I again pledged myself, if his Excellency would reject the interested advice of favourites, and be guided by the impartial and friendly counsel which your Lordship would convey to him through me, that the affairs of his government could be conducted with ease to himself, to the acquisition of an high reputation, to the prosperity of his country and to the happiness of his subjects.

Having presented for his Excellency's perusal, the abstract in Persian of the first conversation his Excellency retained it, and expressed his intention of addressing himself direct to your Lordship.

On the 16th I sent a message to his Excellency, intimating a desire of waiting upon him the following day, to which I received an answer, that if my intended visit was to confer on the subject known to us, he was intent upon it and preparing the necessary paper ; and as he meant to pass the 17th at a Garden, and purposed visiting me on the 18th, if I had not any urgent business to communicate, he could wish that the interview might be postponed until that day.

His Excellency did me the honour of a visit on the 18th, and after consulting me on the settlement with one of his Amils was taking his leave, when I took the liberty of asking his Excellency whether he had made any progress in his intended address to your Lordship, to which he replied, that he had written something.

On the 19th, his Excellency sent me a verbal message, that he purposed breakfasting with me on the following morning. In the evening my Moonshee waited upon him, and expressed my acknowledgments for the honour his Excellency intended me ; but, that as he had honoured me with

a visit the preceding day, it was my wish as well from respect as inclination, to attend upon him. He replied, that amongst friends it was the same thing, that my house was his, and his mine.

According to appointment, his Excellency honoured me with a visit on the 20th; and when retired into a private apartment, produced the letter which I had presented to him on the 14th. Wishing to make some alterations in it, he desired the attendance of the Moonshee who had written it; pen and ink being brought, his Excellency with his own hand, wrote several alterations and additions which had been previously traced with pencil.

Having added at the end of the paper, that he would place his son on the Musnud with his own hands, his Excellency observed, that it was introduced with a view of shewing to the world, that his abdication was at his own suggestion, and voluntary; to which I replied, that I trusted it never could be imagined, that the English Government had used compulsive means, or even persuasions for the removal of his Excellency from his hereditary dominions.

His Excellency delivered the paper into my hands desiring, that after a copy of it was taken, it might be returned to him with a fair copy, and enjoining me to lose no time in addressing your Lordship on the subject.

After receiving the paper, I observed to his Excellency, that your Lordship would naturally make this reflection, that if his Excellency, (a man of mature judgment, sound understanding, and extensive experience,) found it impossible to conduct the affairs of the empire, what grounds were there to expect that a young man, uninstructed in the ways of the world, and unpractised in business, could possess the necessary qualifications for so arduous a situation. To which his Excellency replied, that he would have the benefit of that advice and assistance so often proffered to him.

I was then going to prepare his Excellency to expect, that your Lordship's wisdom would most probably suggest some modifications of the treaty or comprehensive arrangements for the future government of the country; but before I could make any progress, he interrupted me by saying, that your Lordship's answer might be expected in the course of twenty days.

After talking some time on other subjects, the Nawaub observed, that your Lordship would feel much uneasiness at the contents of the paper; to which I replied, that your Lordship would certainly be concerned and surprised at the momentous measure determined on by his Excellency. He said, the measure was doubtless momentous, and the most serious that a sovereign could undertake, that he considered it not only a renunciation of a kingdom, but of the world ; but added emphatically, that the execution of it was indispensable, since he was neither pleased with the people nor they with him, and that in fact his mind was not from the first disposed to the cares of government, nor reconciled to them upon experience.

His Excellency some hours after his departure sent me a note, requesting that I would return by my Moonshee the draft of the paper, corrected by himself, being desirous of considering of some further alterations. It was accordingly sent, when he expressed himself obliged by my readiness in returning it, and promised to restore it immediately. In the evening it was brought back to me by one of his favourite servants, (Ruttun Chund,) a person whom I had never seen before, with some corrections.

A copy of the Persian paper as it now stands, and one shewing the alterations, together with translations, are here-with transmitted for your Lordship's information.

Having thus detailed the whole of the conversations which have been held on this important subject, I shall take the liberty of making such reflections on his Excellency's resolution as occur to my mind ; and though, as his Excellency justly observed, it is not possible to penetrate into the internal feelings of another person, yet an attentive study of his Excellency's character, and a review of his conduct since his exaltation to the empire, may serve to throw some light upon his sentiments.

His Excellency for a series of years, felt and enjoyed the comforts of a private station ; ambition, (if that quality ever had possession of his breast,) might have been weakened by the despair of gratifying it, and at length have subsided in other habits and pursuits. The tenour of his discourse strongly indicates the act to be the result of mature and long deliberation, and not the sudden suggestion of passion ; it is

not therefore improbable, that at the moment of ascending the Musnud he was meditating the period and the means of a retreat.

Power, since his accession to the empire, has only been exercised in acts that tend to the gratification of his ruling propensity, avarice; timid in his disposition he is afraid of secret enemies amongst the old servants of his brother whom his unkindness has disgusted, and unconciliating in his manners, he has acquired no new friends. In his public conduct as a prince, he has in no one instance evinced a desire for the prosperity of his country, nor shewn a wish to transmit his dominions to his posterity, improved in their resources, or meliorated in their administration.

Unequal himself to incessant application to business, with a neglect inexplicable, unless from a jealousy of having his secrets penetrated into, it has been his aim to conduct the affairs of his government in seclusion without ostensible assistance; and with an avidity unaccountable, unless from a secret wish of abandoning his empire, he has grasped at immediate and trifling advantages to the relinquishment of future and substantial benefits; and whilst accumulating wealth in his private treasure, suffers the pensioners and public servants to experience the most severe distress by a long detention of their established allowances.

The money and jewels found upon his accession, have been removed from the usual place of deposit to the women's apartments, and it is generally believed, that his accumulations amount to a crore of rupees.* A sum however enormous, probably not much exaggerated, when it is considered, that in addition to Nuzzurannas and other means of acquiring wealth which have been practised, he has uniformly, as it is affirmed, appropriated to himself the same monthly sums for his personal expences as were fixed by his brother, though the establishment of every department has been considerably diminished, and the strictest economy observed in every household arrangement.

Your Lordship will observe by the additions in the paper, that his Excellency dwells even to repetition, on the expressions of "existing circumstances, or in this manner, and certain causes." It is not easy to conjecture what may be the

* £1,000,000 sterling.

causes which he insinuates, but conceals with so much reserve. If they have a reference to my conduct, I can only affirm, that it has been confined to expostulations and advice, and that he has never asked my assistance until his own measures have failed, and then expecting the exertion of my influence to enforce payment of demands, under an implicit and unbounded confidence in the statement which he was pleased to make of the case, inquiries and investigations on the other side of the question, without which I invariably and candidly told him, I could not interfere, may be regarded by him as a distrust of his own principles of probity and justice, and as a design to support his Amils against him.

His Excellency has no children alive by marriage. Four sons of the age of manhood usually attend him, the eldest of whom, (Gazee u deen Hyder,) is 25 years of age, or more, and appears to be of a mild but rather heavy disposition. A son five or six years old sometimes makes his appearance at the Palace, and there may probably be several other children in the Mehl.

Not to interrupt the thread of the narrative upon this important subject, I omitted to introduce in their proper places the frequent allusions made by me to the Reform of the military establishment. In every conversation however, I took occasion to press the subject upon his Excellency's consideration; but he invariably, and somewhat impatiently, evaded the discussion by declaring, that under the proposition to be submitted to your Lordship it was totally unnecessary.

I have the honour to be,

With the greatest respect, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, and

Most faithful humble Servant,

W. SCOTT.

Translation of a paper prepared in Persian by the Resident at Lucknow, at the desire of his Excellency the Nawaub Vizier, submitted to his Excellency on the 14th of November 1799, and returned to the Resident on the 18th of the same month, when the alterations which appear on the face of the Persian paper, were written by his Excellency's own hand,* in the

* They are here placed in small type over the original words

presence of the Resident and his Moonshee Mohubbut Ally Khan. The alterations which appear in red ink* in this translation, are subsequent corrections by his Excellency, he having sent for the draft for the purpose.

On Tuesday, the 13th of Tummadie ul Sannie, A.H. 1214, or 12th of November, 1799, his Excellency the Nawaub Vizier, honoured me with a visit, and in a private conference enjoined me to address the right honourable the Governor-General to the following effect :

That his Excellency finding it impossible under existing circumstances for certain reasons, to conduct the affairs of his government, with ease to himself and to the advantage of his subjects, was desirous from the suggestions of his own mind, cordially and voluntarily to relinquish the empire. I entreated his Excellency to explain the motives which influenced him to relinquish so great an empire, and begged that he would state the whole of the causes which induced him to that resolution, in order that measures might be taken to remove them, since by the friendship and assistance of the English Company, and by the zealous exertions of myself, his sincere well-wisher, the administration of his government could assuredly be conducted to the prosperity of his country, to the happiness of his subjects, to the ease and satisfaction of himself, and to the acquisition of a great name. His Excellency replied, that this was true, but that owing to (the dissensions, enmity, disobedience and negligence of the people here,) (*and certain causes,*) the incessant toils and cares of government, his mind was utterly withdrawn from it and disgusted, and that on this account he entertained the firm resolution of relinquishing the empire, and as his Lordship would nominate one of his sons to succeed him, his name would remain established.

After the relinquishment of the government, his Excellency had no wish
^(at Lucknow)

of residing (here,) nor of interfering in the smallest degree in the concerns of the country. What his Excellency possessed was sufficient for his necessary expences, but that whatever his Lordship might establish for his sons and other branches of his family, would be a source of great satisfaction to him, and that his Excellency would with his own hands place his son on the Musnud.

A true translation.

W. SCOTT, Resident at Lucknow.

* They are here placed in italics *over* the original words.

No. XLV.

The Earl of Mornington to the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, 28th Nov. 1799.

I. According to the latest accounts dated on the 2nd of November, the affairs of Mysore were in the most favourable condition. The whole of the country (including Sondah and the rest of the reserved territory, now about to be divided between the Company and the Nizam) having been completely settled, with the exception of the inconsiderable possessions of the Polygar of Bullam, against whom a small detachment had been sent, the army in Mysore was on the eve of being distributed in garrisons and cantonments.

Under the disadvantages resulting from the recent military operations throughout the country, Purneah had discharged the first monthly kist of the subsidy stipulated by the late treaty of Seringapatam, namely, that for the month of July, and had announced his intention of soon paying the kists for August and September.

I have very great satisfaction in informing your honourable Committee that the measures which I concerted with Lord Clive, previously to my departure from Fort St. George, for the purpose of reducing the southern Polygars to order and legal government have been executed with the greatest ability and success by Major Bannerman, and that the military power of that refractory race of people is now completely extinct.

The settlement of Tanjore has been arranged with the same happy success. Previously to my departure from Fort St. George, with Lord Clive's assistance, I framed the outlines of a new treaty between the Rajah and the Company vesting the entire and exclusive administration, civil and military, of that country in the Company's government. This treaty* was ratified by me in council on the 26th instant.

II. The affairs of Oude have occupied a considerable share of my attention. No probability existing that Zemaun Shah will be able in the course of the present season to renew his

* See Appendix.

hostile attempts against Hindostan, and a conjuncture so favourable coinciding with our successes in Mysore, the most eligible opportunity appeared to be opened for carrying into execution such a reform of the Nabob Vizier's military establishments as should secure us from all future danger on the frontier of Oude, and should enable me to introduce a variety of necessary improvements in the government of that country. With this view it was my intention to establish a considerable augmentation of our troops in Oude without delay, and to induce the Vizier to disband, under certain regulations, a proportional part of his own useless and dangerous force. I had accordingly given orders to the Resident at Lucknow to commence a negotiation with his Excellency for this desirable purpose, and had also directed the movements of several bodies of troops in the provinces to be so arranged as to enable me, before the expiration of the cold season, to increase our force in Oude considerably. Before, however, the Resident at Lucknow could open the proposed negociation with the Vizier, or had disclosed to him any part of my intended plans, his Excellency, of his own accord, made a proposition to the Resident which necessarily supersedes every other arrangement.

III. For several months past his Excellency had intimated to the Resident from time to time an earnest desire to communicate to me an improved system for the government of Oude. But whenever the Resident had pressed his Excellency for a more full explanation of the nature of the proposed arrangement in order that it might be transmitted to me, his Excellency had evaded the discussion with evident symptoms of agitation of mind. At length on the 12th of November, at an interview which his Excellency had himself desired (and it is important again to remark that at this period no proposition had reached his Excellency from the Resident or from me with relation to the increase of the force in Oude), his Excellency signified an anxious desire and a fixed determination to abdicate altogether the government of Oude, and requested the Resident to draw, for the purpose of being forwarded to me, the enclosed paper which I received last night.*

* See p. 153.

IV. His Excellency appears to have adopted the resolution of abdicating the government upon the maturest deliberation. Your honourable Committee will observe that his Excellency declares this resolution to have originated in the reciprocal aversion subsisting between himself and his subjects (an aversion, which, on his part, he declares to have grown into absolute disgust), and in his sense of his own incompetency from various other considerations, to administer the government either with satisfaction to himself or advantage to his people. But although such considerations may in some degree have influenced his Excellency's determination, I am inclined to believe that the principal causes are to be traced in the timidity and the avarice of his disposition; for it is proper to apprise your honourable Committee that he has intimated an expectation of being permitted to retire with the treasures which he may have amassed.

V. Your honourable Committee will remark that the Resident has used several arguments, but without effect, to dissuade his Excellency from the proposed abdication. If therefore his Excellency should ultimately persevere in this declared intention, it must be deemed entirely and absolutely his own voluntary act.

VI. Whatever may have been the motives, or whatever shall be the ultimate decision of his Excellency on this occasion, it is my intention to profit by the event to the utmost practicable extent; and I entertain a confident hope of being able either to establish, with the consent of the Vizier, the sole and exclusive authority of the Company within the province of Oude and its dependencies, or at least to place our interests in that quarter on an improved and durable foundation.

VII. It occurs to me to be necessary to add in explanation of the close of the third paragraph of this letter, that although the necessity of a reform of the Vizier's military establishments had been for a considerable time under discussion between his Excellency and me, and had even been fully admitted by his Excellency, no detailed measures with a view to the execution of such a plan had yet been suggested, nor had my intention of immediately augmenting our force in Oude been communicated to his Excellency when he opened his mind to the Resident at Lucknow.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XLVI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Honourable Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 12th Dec. 1799.

This letter will be presented to your Lordship by a prelate of the Armenian Church, the Archbishop and Nuncio of Mount Ararat.

He arrived here lately from Armenia, in his progress to visit the different Armenian churches in India, a septennial visitation of which takes place, as I understand, under the direction of the Chief Patriarch of the Armenian Church. I received the Archbishop of Ararat at my levee soon after his arrival here; on this occasion he presented to me an address, subscribed by himself and another Armenian divine (the Nuncio of Jerusalem) congratulating me on the happy termination of the late war with Tippoo Sultaun.

As the Archbishop now proceeds in the discharge of his mission, to Fort St. George, I beg leave to recommend him to your Lordship's countenance and attention during his residence at the seat of your government.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XLVII.

Lt.-Col. Wm. Kirkpatrick to Lt.-Col. William Scott, Resident at Lucknow.

SIR,

Fort William, 16th Dec. 1799.

I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor-General to acknowledge the receipt of your letter to his Lordship, dated the 22nd of November,* containing a paper communicated by you to his Lordship in pursuance of the earnest injunction of the Vizier.

I have the honour to enclose an answer from his Lordship to that paper, together with a translation of the same in Persian.

* See page 152.

His Lordship is pleased to authorize you to make such alterations in this paper (adhering to its general spirit and tenor) previously to the communication of it to the Vizier, as circumstances not at present in the knowledge of his Lordship may suggest to you to be necessary or advisable. You are even empowered not to deliver the paper to his Excellency if, previously to your receipt of it, his Excellency should either have actually acquiesced in the general tenor of the treaty forwarded to you on the 22nd ultimo, or have indicated a disposition to do so; and you should have any reason to apprehend that the communication of this paper might have the effect of retarding or of otherwise disturbing the arrangements. His Lordship, however, is inclined to think that the train of reasoning contained in this document is equally calculated (by establishing the reasonableness and necessity of the modification of his Excellency's wishes proposed by his Lordship), to remove any objection which his Excellency may have started to the main principle of the treaty, and to confirm his approbation of it, should he have already acceded to it.

In the event of your communicating to the Vizier the accompanying paper, or the substance of it, you will previously affix to it a copy of the treaty transmitted to you on the 22nd ultimo, with such alterations in the same as you may have thought proper to adopt in consequence of the authority given you for this purpose.

You will perceive that the enclosed answer of the Governor-General to the paper containing the formal annunciation of the Vizier's determination to abdicate the Government is silent on that passage of the letter which relates to the maintenance of his Excellency's name. The reason why his Lordship has not judged it necessary to notice this topic is, that it did not appear to him to have originated with his Excellency, but to have arisen rather out of what had dropped from you in the course of the discussion; a consideration which, joined to the general character of the Vizier, disposes his Lordship to believe that his Excellency may not insist on this point. If, however contrary to the expectation of his Lordship, his Excellency should appear anxious on the subject, his Lordship conceives it will be sufficient to answer,

that as his Excellency's absolute and formal abdication of the government is neither wished for nor approved by his Lordship, and that as his Excellency will not only retain, together with his wealth, all his present distinctive honours and titles, but will also possess the power of transmitting both to his heirs, there can be no more danger of the extinction of his name than attaches equally to every other human establishment.

I am further directed by the Governor-General, to signify to you his Lordship's desire, that you will furnish him as soon as possible, with a detailed report of the causes which appear to you to have led to the recent and unexpected proposition of the Vizier. In reviewing this transaction, his Lordship wishes you to consider and state particularly, whether his Excellency has in any, and in what degree, been influenced on this occasion, by any of the measures adopted by his Lordship with a view to the reform of his Excellency's military establishments.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

WM. KIRKPATRICK, Military Secretary.

Minute by the Governor-General.

Fort William, 16th December, 1799.

The Right Honourable the Governor-General having received from the Resident at Lucknow a paper in the Persian language (with a translation of the same in English), prepared by the Resident in conformity to the desire of his Excellency the Nawaub Vizier, and subsequently transmitted to the Governor-General, in consequence of the earnest injunction of his Excellency; and the Governor-General having given the most attentive consideration to the wishes of his Excellency the Nawaub Vizier expressed in that paper, the Resident is hereby commanded to address his Excellency in the name of his Lordship, to the following effect:—

His Lordship is fully apprised of the various difficulties which obstruct the due administration of the Government of Oude in his Excellency's hands, as well as of the nature of those secret causes which disturb the tranquillity of his mind. The Governor-General entirely concurring in the truth of his Excellency's voluntary and candid declaration, that the adverse disposition, enmity and disobedience of his people, added to the negligence of his ministers, render it impossible for his Excellency to conduct the affairs of his Government, either with ease to himself or advantage to his subjects.

The Governor-General has observed, with the most anxious concern, the inveterate abuses which have disgraced every branch of the Civil Government of Oude, perverted the administration of justice, impaired the sources of revenue, industry, and commerce, and destroyed the foundations of

public prosperity and individual happiness in that fertile, but declining country. His Lordship has also lamented the unequivocal symptoms which have occurred within his own knowledge, of the disorderly and mutinous spirit of his Excellency's army; of the refractory temper of a great proportion of his people, and of the general disaffection unhappily prevailing towards his Excellency's person and Government. The pressure of these calamities has been much aggravated, in his Lordship's judgment, by his certain conviction of the utter insufficiency of any instruments or means which his Excellency's own service or resources can furnish, to repress evils of such magnitude, violence, and power. His Lordship, therefore, has always been satisfied that the direct aid and interposition of the Company's Government, strengthened by the liberal confidence and cordial cooperation of his Excellency, were indispensably necessary to restore the welfare of his people, the dignity of his Government, the security of his person and dominions, and the repose of his mind.

Under these impressions, his Lordship represented to his Excellency the urgent necessity of a speedy reform in his Excellency's military establishments, as a measure preliminary to the introduction of any possible improvements in other branches of the Government, and absolutely requisite for the immediate protection of his Excellency's person and dominions against domestic treason or foreign invasion.

His Excellency has repeatedly declared the proposed reform to be indispensably necessary to the accomplishment of the salutary purposes already enumerated, and in the same spirit of candour and justice has acknowledged this important measure to be impracticable without the aid and interposition of the British Government, employed to invigorate his Excellency's authority, and to confirm his power.

The Nawaub Vizier's abdication of the Government was never in the Governor-General's contemplation, nor has his Lordship ever deemed such a step to be necessary, with a view either to the reform of the army or of the Government of Oude. The resolution which his Excellency has signified, is therefore entirely novel to his Lordship's mind, which had never formed any other view than to conciliate his Excellency's entire confidence in the power and wisdom of the Company, and his cordial acceptance of their assistance in correcting the abuses of which his Excellency has complained, and in improving the administration of his affairs.

The resolution to make an absolute and formal abdication of the Government having, however, originated in his Excellency's mind, and being the result of his own free will and mature deliberation, grounded on incontestible facts, and maintained by arguments of considerable force, the Governor-General will distinctly state for the Nawaub Vizier's consideration, such modifications of his Excellency's original resolution as appear to his Lordship calculated to secure the just object which it is designed to accomplish, and the extensive interests which it involves.

The Governor-General, however, must declare, without reserve, that he considers the formal abdication of the Nawaub Vizier, in the manner proposed by his Excellency, to be utterly incompatible with his Excellency's proposed objects, as well as with the security of every interest connected with the prosperity of Oude.

In considering the arguments on which his Lordship's objections are founded, it is necessary to state the nature and effect of his Excellency's abdication according to the terms of his own proposition.

The nature of the Nawaub Vizier's proposition is, that he should relinquish the Government altogether, quit Lucknow, and abstain from all interference in the concerns of the country, that the Governor-General should nominate one of his Excellency's sons to succeed to the Musnud, and to be placed on it by his Excellency's own hands; that his Excellency should retire with possessions, which he states to be sufficient for his necessary expenses; and finally, that the Governor-General should establish a provision for the expenses of his Excellency's sons and of the other branches of his family.

Whatever latitude the practice and laws of Hindostan may admit with regard to questions of succession to sovereign power, the Governor-General is decidedly of opinion, that in the event of his Excellency's abdication, no reasonable ground would exist for the exclusion of his Excellency's eldest son. His Excellency's abdication, therefore, on the terms proposed, must be accompanied by the immediate accession of his Excellency's eldest son to the Musnud.

Under whatever terms or arrangements a successor might be placed on the Musnud, he must retain all the necessary responsibility and state of that elevated situation, and must be rendered accountable for all the public debts, and for all the arrears of the civil and military establishments. The discharge of these demands, and the provision to be made for the unavoidable expenses of the Nawaub Ghauzee u deen Hyder Khaun would necessarily diminish those funds which the Nawaub Saadut Ali Khaun probably proposes to reserve entire for his own separate use. His Excellency the Nawaub Saadut Ali cannot reasonably expect that those treasures which now form a part of his Excellency's means of fulfilling his public engagements, and consequently a part of the Company's security can be absolutely alienated from the Musnud of Oude, and the Nawaub Ghauzee u deen Hyder Khaun subjected to the same engagements as the Nawaub Saadut Ali, with reduced means of fulfilling them.

The Nawaub Saadut Ali, upon his abdication, would therefore deem it just to transfer a large portion of his treasures either to his successor or to the Company, and he would thus necessarily reduce in a proportionate degree the funds allotted for his own private maintenance.

It is for his Excellency's serious consideration, whether the tranquillity of his mind would be restored by the establishment of his eldest son in a situation which might produce a relaxation of filial duties, affections, and obligations, and might excite sentiments of distrust and jealousy, if not of animosity and aversion.

The Governor-General is persuaded that after his Excellency the Nawaub Saadut Ali had actually abdicated the Government, his Excellency would neither feel nor express any desire to resume sovereign authority, or to contend with the exalted dignity and power transferred to the hands of the Nawaub Ghauzee u deen Hyder Khaun. But the history of the world has proved that few princes have possessed the fortitude to remain

content in retirement after the abdication of sovereign power; and the Nawaub Ghauzee u deen Hyder Khaun, adverting to historical examples, and to the uniform experience of former ages, would always apprehend the possibility of a change in the Nawaub Saadut Ali's resolution, and would perpetually anticipate the revival of the spirit of ambition, of the desire of empire, grandeur, and honour, the natural passions of great and noble minds. Such apprehensions and jealousies in the mind of his Excellency's successor might produce the most fatal attempts against his Excellency's repose, and even against his personal safety.

His Excellency states it to be his intention to quit Lucknow after his proposed abdication, but does not expressly signify whether the place of his residence would be fixed within the dominions of the Nawaub Ghauzee u deen Hyder Khaun, or of the Company. If his Excellency, deprived of power, should remain in Oude, the disquietudes and dangers of his situation would be greatly multiplied in number, and aggravated in effect. He would be surrounded by solicitude and alarm, and menaced not only by the jealousy of his successor, but by the enmity of all those among his Excellency's former subjects, who may now be discontented with his Excellency's Government, or disaffected towards his person.

Even if it were possible, in point of justice, that his Excellency should abdicate, reserving to himself the sole property in his entire treasure, and should be settled in Oude, under the government of the Nawaub Ghauzee u deen Hyder Khaun, with such an immense mass of wealth, it is evident that his Excellency's peril would be increased in proportion to the magnitude of his treasure; nor would the Company engage to protect his Excellency's property, or his personal safety, within the territories of Oude, under the government of his Excellency's successor.

His Excellency's danger would certainly be less within the Company's provinces, but it would be too sanguine an expectation to suppose that anxiety and danger would not reach his retreat even in that situation, while the Musnud of Oude should be occupied by a successor suspicious of his Excellency's intentions, and jealous of his wealth.

On the whole, therefore, it would be contrary to every principle of justice and good faith, that his Excellency should abdicate with this treasure, leaving his successor with reduced means to satisfy engagements contracted by his Excellency himself, and leaving the Company with a diminished security, and an increased charge to provide for the defence of the country, and for the maintenance of his Excellency's numerous family.

Even this arrangement would expose his Excellency to perpetual hazard and vexation in his retirement.

His Excellency, however, being incapable of insisting on any proposition, of which the injustice towards his successor and the Company is manifest, no alternative would be left but to encroach on the funds destined for his private maintenance, and thus his abdication, accompanied by the accession of one of his sons, would at once reduce his Excellency's income, and aggravate the solicitude of his mind.

Such are the objections to his Excellency's abdication in the manner proposed by himself, as far as they relate to his individual comfort and

personal ease. The Governor-General, however, is satisfied that his Excellency would readily sacrifice these considerations to the advantage of his subjects; and if the surrender of a large portion of the funds requisite for his Excellency's private maintenance, if the degradation of his dignity, the exposure of his person to danger, and of his mind to perpetual agitation and alarm, could secure a wise and just administration of the Government of Oude, or could restore the happiness of the people, the Governor-General would applaud his Excellency's benevolent determination to incur the pressure of such accumulated sufferings for the public good; but his Lordship is satisfied that the Nawaub Saadut Ali's abdication, accompanied by the accession of one of his sons, would be as injurious to the interests of the people of Oude, as to those of the Nawaub Saadut Ali himself.

The same wisdom and penetration which have opened to his Excellency's view the real nature of the embarrassments in which he is involved, and convinced him of his inability to extricate himself by his own exertions, will equally satisfy him, that evils of such magnitude and inveteracy cannot be remedied otherwise than by the gradual and regular operation of a system of administration founded on principles of substantial justice and of true policy, and enforced by all the power and energy of the British Government.

It must be obvious to his Excellency that the immediate accession of his eldest, or of any of his sons, to the Musnud, would be altogether incompatible with the establishment of such a system. What rational hope could be entertained that any of these young princes would be competent to the correction of those evils which his Excellency himself, aided by all his knowledge and experience of public affairs, has confessed, himself, unable to remedy.

Under the administration of a successor, destitute of his Excellency's experience and knowledge, all the existing evils in the state and condition of the country of Oude would, of necessity, be augmented, and with the rapid increase of every abuse in the Civil and Military Government, the danger of the country from foreign enemies, and the domestic misery of the inhabitants, would be aggravated in an equal proportion.

Long and severe experience has manifested the inefficacy of any partial or indirect interference of the British Government for the reform of the administration of Oude. The same causes which have hitherto frustrated every endeavour of the Company's Government to accomplish that salutary object by the mere effect of advice and admonition, would continue to operate under every divided Government. No beneficial result can be expected from the utmost efforts of the wisdom and justice of the Company whilst another power shall exist in the country to exclude the introduction of every salutary reform, or to counteract its operation.

If a wise system of administration could be established and enforced under a divided authority, his Excellency must be sensible that his own government afforded the most favourable prospects to the Company; the Governor-General confidently expected to find in his Excellency the Nawaub Saadut Ali whatever the personal character of the Sovereign of Oude could supply to counteract the inherent defects in the frame of the Government. The sense entertained by his Excellency of his own diffi-

culties and the unreserved communication which he has made of their causes, afford the strongest pledges of his sincere disposition to effect a substantial reform. If with these inclinations on the part of his Excellency, and with the anxiety of the British Government for the establishment of a just and efficient system of administration throughout the country of Oude, both parties now despair of accomplishing their common views under the present constitution of the Government what prospect can remain of such improvement under a successor whose youth and inexperience might not only render him insensible to the present system of abuse, but might expose him to the evil influence of every person interested in its perpetuation? If, therefore, the Nawaub Vizier should be disposed to relinquish a large portion of his treasure for the purpose of substituting one of his sons on the Musnud, the Governor-General must object to such an arrangement; because he is convinced that, under such a successor, the present abusive system of Government would become absolutely incorrigible, and the inhabitants of Oude would be exposed to the utmost extremity of distress.

But let his Excellency seriously reflect on the situation of his successor, deprived of the treasures of the State, and possessing no other resource than the current collections from the country to provide for the arrears of the civil and military establishments, for the sums due to the native public creditors, and for the necessary expenses of the Government. The Governor-General is persuaded that his Excellency will acknowledge the necessary operation of such an arrangement on the condition of the people. Their sufferings must accumulate in proportion to the embarrassments of the Prince on the Musnud; and the result must inevitably be a state of general confusion, and ultimately of desolation and despair.

With regard to the interests of the Company, they are inseparably connected with the safety of his Excellency, and with the prosperity of Oude; every objection, therefore, to his Excellency's abdication affecting either of these important objects, must be considered to apply with equal force to the security and honour of the British Government. But his Excellency's proposition involves the immediate interest of the Company directly, and in the most serious and important articles of its military resources, and of the protection and defence of its own dominions.

His Excellency was placed on the Musnud by the justice of the British Government, and has been maintained in that high situation by the British Power; and he is bound towards the Company by certain public engagements, the just performance of which it is equally the duty of his Excellency and of the Governor-General to secure. Since his Excellency's accession he has been enabled to make a considerable addition to his treasure, while the arrears of certain branches of the public establishments have increased, and no provision has been made for their discharge. Under these circumstances, his Excellency's retirement from the Government in favour of any other successor than the Company would indeed exonerate his Excellency from his engagements under the late treaty; and (on the conditions stated by his Excellency) would leave him in possession of whatever public treasure has devolved to him by the removal of Vizier

Ali, or has since been accumulated by himself, under the protection of the Company. But the embarrassments of the state of Oude and of the Company would be augmented in the same proportion in which his Excellency would be relieved. His Excellency's successor would be left in a situation of the utmost distress, with resources utterly inadequate to the present payment of the subsidy; while the security of the Company for the future payment of that demand would be shaken to the foundation by the desperate state of the country. The Governor-General has already adverted to this argument in preceding passages of this paper; but the particular obligations of the arduous trust reposed by the Company in his own person compel his Lordship to declare that, on this ground alone, (if no other objection had existed) he should have deemed himself compelled by his duty towards his country, and towards the English Company, to discountenance and even to oppose the retirement of his Excellency from the Government of Oude, on the conditions of his appropriating a share of the public treasure to his own use, and of his leaving at the same time a successor on the Musnud, bound by the treaty which his Excellency concluded with Sir John Shore, but deprived by his Excellency of the power of executing its stipulations.

His Lordship also declares his opinion, that the interests of the Company would be directly injured by a transfer of the Musnud of Oude (even if accompanied by a transfer of the whole treasure) to one of his Excellency's sons, because none of those young Princes can be so well qualified as his Excellency to discharge either the duties of alliance and friendship towards the Company or those of protection towards the people of Oude.

Having thus enumerated the obstacles which preclude the Governor-General's acquiescence in the Nawaub Vizier's proposition as communicated by his Excellency's command, his Lordship submits to his Excellency's consideration in the annexed draft of a treaty, an arrangement which appears calculated to reconcile his Excellency's desire of retiring from the Government of Oude with the principles of national justice, sound policy, and public faith, as well as with those of personal dignity, security, and honour.

The Governor-General adheres to the judgment which he originally formed respecting the Government of Oude, retaining a firm conviction that it can never be administered with ease to his Excellency, or with advantage to his subjects, without the direct introduction of the British power; and his Lordship also continues of opinion, that his Excellency may be enabled to invigorate and amend the administration of the Government of Oude, and also to secure for himself a safe and dignified retreat from the cares and dangers of his present situation without proceeding to the extremity of a formal abdication of the Musnud.

The Governor-General, however, is willing to accede to the Nawaub Vizier's desire of retiring from Lucknow, and his Excellency may rely on the most anxious exertions of the British Government to afford him every demonstration of respect and attachment wherever he may fix the place of his retirement. It must be evident to the wisdom of the Nawaub Vizier that the evil dispositions, enmity, and disobedience, of which his Excel-

lency now complains, as well as those causes which have withdrawn his mind from the Government of Oude, and disgusted him with his present situation, must ever expose his residence in any part of Oude to disquietude and disturbance. His Lordship, therefore, strongly recommends, that his Excellency should fix the seat of his future residence within the Company's dominions.

His Excellency appears to be fully convinced not only that it will ever be impossible to apply an effectual remedy to any of the evils existing in the state of Oude, while a divided authority shall be exercised in the country, but that no other power than the British Government is competent to exercise a single and individual authority over that extensive empire for the beneficial purposes of restoring public order, internal tranquillity, and external strength.

The Governor-General, therefore, advises the Nawaub Vizier to vest the exclusive administration of the civil and military Government of Oude and its dependencies in the hands of the Company, with such ample powers as shall enable the Company to act with vigour and promptitude in every branch and department of the State.

The Nawaub Vizier is well apprized that no temporary power can be efficient. Instability in the constitution of a Government is the source of languor and weakness in all its operations. The subjects of a temporary Government are perpetually agitated by the expectation of change; and the Government itself cannot establish any systematic or comprehensive plan of administration. In such a state, mutual doubt and uncertainty destroy that confidence which forms the most solid foundation of the reciprocal duties of allegiance and protection between the people and the governing power.

The Nawaub Vizier, by his own voluntary declarations, and by the extraordinary communication which he has directed to be made to the Governor-General, has imposed on his Lordship a solemn duty of the utmost delicacy, but of the most comprehensive extent; affecting the dearest and most valuable interests of a great Empire, not merely for the present moment, but to the most remote period of time; and touching the honour of the British name, as long as that name shall be commemorated among mankind. This duty is to be discharged with respect towards his Excellency, but with a freedom proportioned to the importance and solemnity of the occasion. With these sentiments, in replying to the Nawaub Vizier's communication, his Lordship conceives himself to be bound to consult the permanent and perpetual interests of the inhabitants of Oude in the establishment of a just and wise system of government, on such solid foundations as shall assure its continuance, by the best securities which the nature of circumstances can afford in this quarter of the globe.

The Governor-General, therefore, strongly recommends that the powers to be vested by the Nawaub Vizier in the Company shall be perpetual in duration, as well as ample in extent; and his Lordship, in the name of the English Company, hereby declares, that he will not accept the administration of the Government of Oude under a limited or temporary com-

mission; because such a commission would only serve to delude the Nawaub Vizier, his subjects, and the Company, by vain expectations of a reform, which could neither be effectual nor permanent.

With these preliminary observations, the Governor-General requests the attention of the Nawaub Vizier to the articles of the annexed draft of a treaty, which his Lordship trusts will be found to contain the most liberal provision for his Excellency and his family, as well as the most salutary arrangement for the Government of Oude.

If his Excellency should be pleased to conclude a treaty on the basis of the annexed draft, Lieutenant-Colonel Scott is furnished with full powers for the purpose. The Nawaub Vizier's retirement from Lucknow may be accomplished at any period of time most convenient to him, without any formality offensive to the honour or dignity of his Excellency; and as it has been generally understood that the Governor-General's public duties may detain his Lordship for some time to come within the Company's provinces, his Excellency might retire from Lucknow at a proper season for the ostensible purpose of meeting his Lordship either at Benares, or at any place to be appointed in Bahar or Bengal. In the mean while his Excellency must be sensible that every consideration of his own security and interests, as well as of the peace of Oude requires, that no part of this important transaction should transpire until the necessary arrangements shall be sufficiently mature to admit of its final disclosure.

With this view the Governor-General trusts that the Nawaub Vizier will afford every facility towards the augmentation of the British force in Oude, as well as to its distribution, in such manner as the Resident shall recommend.

The Nawaub Vizier will consider the contents of this paper to be derived exclusively from his Excellency's own unsolicited and unsuggested proposition, as signified to the Resident on the 12th of November, 1799.

If his Excellency's wisdom should dispose him to decline any arrangement founded on the annexed draft of a treaty, the Governor-General most earnestly and anxiously solicits his Excellency to advert, with all practicable despatch, to the indispensable necessity of adopting effectual measures for the reform of his military establishments previous to the conclusion of the present favourable season. His Lordship relies on the Nawaub Vizier's repeated assurances, that this most urgent and important object will neither be frustrated nor delayed.

No. XLVIII.

The Vizier of Oude to the Earl of Mornington.

Received at Fort William, 21st December, 1799.

I have just now understood from a letter received by Colonel Scott from Colonel Collins, that Rajah Pertaub Sing, of Jye-pore, having secured the assassin, Vizier Ali, had delivered him up to Colonel Collins, and that officer was proceeding with him in safe custody to this quarter; intimation of which pleasing intelligence afforded me the sincerest joy and satisfaction. This event must be attributed to the wisdom and prudence of the Company's Government, and to the fear entertained of their power and influence, and will doubtless be an example and disappointment to the enemies of the two states. May the just and righteous God ever in this manner abandon and punish the enemies of our respective governments, and may he prosper to all friends, this grateful intelligence.

I hope from your Lordship's kindness, that, deeming me desirous of receiving the pleasing accounts of your Lordship's health, you will continue to gratify me with letters until I may have the pleasure of a personal intercourse with your Lordship.

A true Translation,
N. B. EDMONSTONE.

No. XLIX.

Lieutenant-General Stuart to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD, Head Quarters, Bombay, 21st December, 1799.

As the returning ships of the season are preparing to leave this port, I cannot think of quitting India without conveying to your Lordship my grateful acknowledgments for the numerous instances of attention with which you have been pleased to honour me, and to express my unfeigned sentiments of veneration for your eminent character. The full establishment of the British Empire in India has been accomplished

under your Lordship's administration. By the energy and wisdom of your councils, the English arms have been directed to the most decisive and resplendent conquest that has been achieved in any age. But a discerning mind, my Lord, will not fail to respect the moral goodness of your Government, and to distinguish on a scale, even superior to victory, the uniform exercise of authority for virtuous purposes.

I shall not engage your Lordship's time further, at present, than to inform you that I have taken my passage on the *Woodford*, and expect, finally, to sail from the coast of Malabar in the first week of February. It will afford me infinite satisfaction to receive any commands that you may have for England previous to my departure; and although I cannot flatter myself of being of any service to you in that country, I beg you to accept of my fervent wishes for the continued prosperity of your Lordship's administration of these invaluable possessions,—and I have the honour to remain, with perfect respect,

My Lord,
Your Lordship's most faithful, obliged,
and devoted servant,

J. STUART.

No. L.

The Honourable P. Speke, Member of Council, to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

1st January, 1800.

Nothing can be so cordially grateful to me, as any mark of your Lordship's favour. A seal of Tippoo Sultaun's the gift of your Lordship, is indeed a most auspicious commencement of the new year. May it bring your Lordship, if it is possible, an increase of glory. No length of time can ever weaken in the slightest degree, my sensations at the prodigies we have seen in the East in the year 1799, or my admiration of the talents and great qualities that could give them in so short a space, both birth and maturity.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,
Your Lordship's highly honoured
and most faithful Servant,

P. SPEKE.

No. LI.

The Honourable William Cowper, Member of Council, to the Earl of Mornington.

My LORD,

Calcutta, January, 1st, 1800.

I am highly honoured and gratified by the receipt of your Lordship's note, and the seal which accompanied it. I will ever keep it in memory of the great and glorious events of this past year, and allow me, my Lord, to add, that I shall never look upon it without emotions of grateful respect and attachment for the noble donor.

I have the honour to subscribe myself, my Lord,
Your Lordship's faithful and devoted Servant,
WILLIAM COWPER.

No. LII.

(Military Department.)

Fort William, January 11th, 1800.

Minute by the Governor General,

I think it proper to record the annexed papers for the information of the members of the Council, and of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

To the Earl of Mornington, K.P. &c. &c.

My LORD,

Madras, November 12th 1799.

The army which by your Lordship's directions, proceeded to the capital of the late Tippoo Sultaun, and achieved the conquest of Mysore, resolved upon the plains of Seringapatam, to request your Lordship's acceptance of a star and badge of the order of St. Patrick, made from the jewels of the Sultaun, as a mark of their high respect.

In the name, and by the desire of that army, I have now the honour to present your Lordship with the star and badge.

In performing this pleasing duty, I am proud to feel and to acknowledge, that the splendid success of the late campaign must, under divine Providence, be in justice referred to the instructive wisdom and characteristic energy of your Lordship's councils. Those councils have formed a memorable

era in the history of India. From their effects the Company has gained a new source of increasing prosperity, and in their operation the wide spread interests of the British empire in the East, being consolidated and raised on a firm and durable basis, have attained an eminence of elevation and security hitherto unknown.

The glory of having been made by your Lordship instrumental to the acquirement of some of these inestimable advantages, excites in my mind feelings of satisfaction and gratitude, which no language can adequately convey.

A copy of the letter to me from Major-General Floyd, President of the Prize Committee, I have the honour to enclose.*

I remain with the highest respect,

Your Lordship's

very faithful and devoted humble Servant,

GEORGE HARRIS,

Lieut.-General and Commander-in-Chief
of his Majesty's and the Honourable Com-
pany's Forces, on the coasts of Coromandel
and Malabar.

* Enclosure.

To Lieut.-General Harris, Commander-in-Chief, &c.

SIR,

Choultry Plain, November 9th 1799.

The army, that under your command achieved the conquest of the empire of the late Tippoo Sultaun, in the spring of this year, being anxious to offer the Earl of Mornington, K.P. Governor-General, whose wisdom prepared and directed that event, some marks of its high esteem, has caused a star and badge of the order of St. Patrick to be prepared, in which as many of the jewels as could be found suitable, where taken from the treasury of Tippoo.

I have now the pleasure of sending you the same, in a gold box and a wooden case.

I have the honour to request you will be pleased to present the star and badge to the Earl of Mornington, in the name of the army, as a mark of its respect.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient, and most humble Servant,
J. FLOYD, M.G. President Prize Committee.

To his Excellency Lieut.-General Harris, Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's and the Honourable Company's Forces, on the Coasts of Coromandel and Malabar.

SIR,

Fort William, January 7th, 1800.

Any mark of the respect of that gallant army, which achieved the conquest of Mysore, must ever be esteemed by me as a distinguished honour.

The resolution now communicated to me by your Excellency, having been adopted by the army in the hour of victory, and on the field of conquest, affords a most satisfactory testimony of their intention to associate my name with the memory of their unexampled triumph.

Under this impression, the sentiments of public zeal and the just sense of honourable ambition, concur to render me sincerely desirous of accepting the gift of the army, and wearing it as an emblem of their glory, and of their good will towards me.

I am satisfied that it never was in the contemplation of the legislature of Great Britain, to prohibit the acceptance of such honorary marks of distinction; but an attentive examination of the laws relating to the Government of the British possessions in India will convince your Excellency, that I could not accept the gift, which you present to me in the name of the army, without violating the letter of existing statutes, and without creating a precedent, which might hereafter become the source of injury to the public service.

I must therefore request your Excellency, in assuring the army of my high estimation of the honour which they design to confer upon me, to signify that my acceptance of it is precluded by the positive letter of the law.*

I return your Excellency my thanks for the obliging expressions of your letter; it is the unfeigned wish of my heart that your Excellency may long enjoy the grateful recollection of your eminent public services; and that you and the unrivalled army employed in the late glorious war, may receive from your king and country every public demonstration of the same sentiments of admiration, gratitude and affectionate respect, which your conduct has excited throughout the British empire in India.

I have the honour to be with the greatest esteem and regard, Sir,

Your Excellency's most faithful Servant,

MORNINGTON.

* The Governor-General in the following letter to the Chairman of the Court of Directors, had previously signified his intention to decline accepting the star.

To the Chairman of the Honourable Court of Directors.

DEAR SIR,

Fort St. George, 6th August, 1799.

You will perceive by the public papers, that the army have come to a resolution to present me with a diamond star, as a testimony of their respect.

Although I feel highly gratified at the favourable opinion, which an army so distinguished for their gallantry and exertions entertain of my conduct, I have upon full consideration, determined to decline this mark of honour, and it is my intention to signify to the army, the grounds on which I have formed this decision, whenever the honour intended shall be offered to me.

No. LIII.

The Earl of Mornington, to Lieut.-General Stuart, &c.

SIR,

Fort William, 12th January, 1800.

I have had the honour to receive your several letters, of the dates noted in the margin; the last announcing your intention of embarking for Europe early in the month of February. I lament extremely, that the state of your health should compel you to adopt this measure; and I shall regret with a sincerity proportionate to my high sense of your professional character, the loss which the public service will sustain by your departure from India.

I am much obliged to you for your suggestion relative to those islands of the Lacadives and Maldives, which formed part of the dominions of the late Tippoo Sultaun; and I propose hereafter to give the necessary directions on that subject. These possessions certainly depended either on Malabar or on Canara; and in either case, the sovereignty of them has devolved on the Company. Whether it may be expedient to take formal possession of them, is a question for future consideration.

I request you will convey my thanks to Captain Walker, for the supplementary memoir on Malabar, enclosed in your letter of the 2nd November. I have received great satisfaction from his several able communications on that subject, and I entertain so high a sense of his talents, integrity, knowledge, and general character, that after your departure from India, it would be very satisfactory to me, if I could induce him to enter into my family. Having however, no situation to offer him but that of aid-de-camp, I fear his interests might suffer by the arrangement. My intention is to endeavour to select at all times, from the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay, officers of high character, qualified to give me information with regard to the local details of each Presidency. I found the greatest advantage under this plan, in the assistance of Major Beatson previously to the late war; and I am satis-

At present, the intention of the army has only appeared in the resolution of their Prize Committee. I trust that you and the Court of Directors will approve my conduct in this respect.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.

fied that Captain Walker's services might be employed with great public benefit in my family.

You carry with you to Europe my most cordial good wishes and sincere regret for your departure; if my anxious and repeated recommendation can have any effect, you will meet with the just reward of your eminent services upon your return to your native country; it will give me great satisfaction to learn that justice has been done to my wishes, and to your merits.

Believe me with great respect and esteem, Sir,

Your most faithful and obliged Servant,

MORNINGTON.

No. LIV.

The Governor General in Council to the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, 18th January, 1800.

In conformity to the intention expressed in our letter of the 31st ultimo from this department, we shall now enter into a detail of the negotiations opened at Poonah, under the direction of the right honourable the Governor-General, in consequence of the treaty of Mysore.

It is necessary, however, to premise that soon after the capture of Seringapatam the Governor-General thought it proper to apprise the Resident at Poonah, that he did not intend to admit the Peishwa to an equal participation with the Company and the Nizam of the advantages resulting from the success which had crowned the efforts of the combined Armies. His Lordship observed, on this occasion, that in strict justice the Peishwa was entitled to no share whatever in these advantages, nor could the Court of Poonah, acting as it had done during the war, found the slightest claim upon the terms of any assurances which had been made to it on the part of the British Government. Considerations of policy would, however, his Lordship remarked, incline him to extend the benefits acquired by the exclusive exertions of the Company and of the Nizam, even to the Peishwa, faithless as his conduct had been. Of the cessions

which on this ground it might be expedient to make to the Mahratta Government, his Lordship could not then state the precise extent, since, in the decision of such a question, much would depend on the behaviour of the Peishwa under the new posture of affairs, and much on the dispositions which he should indicate towards the Nizam.

This communication was made to the Resident, with a view to enable him to regulate his language with regard to any expectations or hopes which he might understand the Peishwa to have formed in consequence of the overthrow of the Government of Mysore.

The Governor-General, at a very early period after the reduction of Seringapatam, conceived the design of accomplishing the whole of the arrangement with the Court of Poonah, sketched out in the instructions of the 8th of July, 1798, to Colonel Palmer by means of the territorial cessions, which it was now in the power of his Lordship to make to the Peishwa. The establishment of a subsidiary British force at Poonah still appeared to his Lordship to be a most desirable measure, although its importance had been much diminished by the conquest of Mysore. But whether a renewal of this proposition, under the actual circumstances, should prove acceptable or not to the Court of Poonah, there were some parts of the original plan of alliance on which his Lordship declared it to be his determination absolutely to insist, as indispensable, preliminaries to any cession of territory whatever to the Peishwa. Such was a complete adjustment under the arbitration of the British Government of every point then at issue between the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, as well as an engagement to abide by the arbitration of the Company on all future points of difference which might arise between the Courts. Such also was the perpetual exclusion of the French from the territories and armies of the Peishwa and a defensive alliance against any French invasion of India.

The Resident was subsequently directed by the Governor-General, while the negotiations for the final settlement of Mysore were yet depending to take the first opportunity of assuring the Peishwa of the sincere disposition of the British Government (notwithstanding all that had passed) to cultivate his friendship, and to promote his interests, and to in-

form him that it was intended under certain conditions (the justice and moderation of which were indisputable) to make a considerable cession of territory to him, provided his conduct should not, in the interval, be such as to render all friendly intercourse with him incompatible with the honour of the British government. This reservation was suggested by a suspicion that the Mahratta forces on the southern frontier of that state had been secretly ordered by the Peishwa to enter and take possession of some of the contiguous districts of the conquered country, subsequently to his learning the fall of Seringapatam.

It having become necessary about this time that the army in Mysore should make a movement in the direction of the northern frontiers, the Resident at Poonah was further directed to assure the Peishwa in the most unequivocal terms (for the purpose of removing any impressions of jealousy or fear which that movement might create) that the measure had no other object than to secure the tranquillity and good order of our recent conquests ; and that nothing could be more remote from the intentions of the Governor-General, or those of Lieutenant-General Harris (acting under his Lordship's orders) than to offer any degree of violence to the Mahratta territory. The same conciliatory and amicable declarations were directed to be made to Dowlut Rao Scindia.

Your honourable Court will observe that those articles of the Treaty of Mysore relative to the Peishwa, were framed in exact conformity to the intentions of the Governor-General as announced by his Lordship to the Resident at Poonah so early as the 23rd of May.*

That treaty being ratified by the right honourable the Governor-General in Council at Fort St. George on the 26th of June, was transmitted on the same day to the Resident at Hyderabad, who, upon its ratification by his Highness the Nizam, was directed to forward without delay a copy of the same to the Resident at Poonah. Colonel Palmer was instructed immediately on receipt of the treaty, to communicate it to the Peishwa, and to invite him to accede to it. The mode in which it appeared to the Governor-General to be expedient that the Peishwa should accede to the treaty of

* See page 12.

Mysore, being by a separate treaty to be concluded between his Highness and the Company, a draft of such a treaty was transmitted by his Lordship's orders to the Resident.

Colonel Palmer was desired by the Governor-General to suggest any alterations or amendments in this draft which might appear to him advisable; but if no point arose requiring a deviation from the fundamental principles of the proposed treaty, and of his Lordship's instructions, the Resident was directed and empowered to proceed to the completion of such treaty without further reference to the Governor-General.

Although the Governor-General was anxious, if the subsidiary force should be applied for, that it should be made permanent; yet the importance of establishing a British force at Poonah in the actual crisis was such, that his Lordship signified to the Resident, that he was disposed to accede even to a temporary arrangement for that purpose, provided the period was made definite, and not too short. This qualification appeared necessary to his Lordship, because it was obvious that without it the expense of providing the new military force might suddenly become an additional and embarrassing burden upon the finances of the Company.

With a view to obviate, as far as possible, any objection by the Court of Poonah to the article relative to the subsidiary force, on the ground of expence, the Governor-General endeavoured (respecting the Mahratta collections in Surat) to provide the means of relieving the Peishwa, in a considerable degree from the burden of the subsidy. Nor was it improbable that the government of Bombay would be disposed to allow to the Peishwa, by way of commutation for his claims in Surat, a much larger sum than he ever had, or could have derived from that source of revenue. At a subsequent period Colonel Palmer was empowered, as an additional means of facilitating his negociation, to treat for the cession of Bancoot, or Fort Victoria, to the Peishwa.

The counter propositions of the court of Poonah, founded on those which had been submitted to the Peishwa on the part of the Governor-General, were delivered to Colonel Palmer on the 16th June, and transmitted by him to his Lordship on the following day. Your honourable Court will observe,

that the plea of inability to fulfil its engagements, stated by the Court of Poonah in the 5th article of the Peishwa's propositions is a direct admission that the Mahratta state was not entitled to any share of the conquered territories of Mysore, for whatever might be their inclination, nothing less than an effective co-operation in the field could have been deemed to amount to such a performance of their engagements, as could constitute the foundation of a right to participate in our recent conquests; but even their inclination had been at least equivocal, and by the continued intercourse with the enemy, they had precluded themselves from the benefit of the Resident's declaration, made in the Governor-General's name, under the express condition of their renouncing all such intercourse during the war. Their conduct in the former war could not serve as a plea to justify a totally different behaviour in the late one. It might as well have been contended, that the Nizam should be now punished for his want of zeal in the former war, as that the Mahrattas should now be rewarded for their alacrity at that period.

On these grounds, the Governor-General directed the Resident to explain distinctly to the Peishwa, that his Lordship could not consent to negotiate with him under any admission of his right to an equal, or to any share of the dominions of the late Tippoo Sultaun; and that whatever cessions might be made to him from those territories, must be deemed gratuitous on the part of the Company and of the Nizam, excepting in as far as they should be compensated by correspondent concessions on the part of the Peishwa.

By a letter from the Resident at Poonah, dated the 29th June, the Peishwa's minister did not scruple to express a hope that his Court would be admitted to an equal share of the conquered Territory of Mysore. Such a pretension appeared to the Governor-General the more extravagant and untenable, as his Lordship did not admit even the Nizam's claim to equal partition, for although a share of free territorial revenue, holden in direct sovereignty had been assigned to His Highness the Nizam, equal to that of the same description retained by the Company, yet His Highness's right extended only to a share of the conquests, proportioned to his expence and exertions in the war, and if any advantage

had been given to the Nizam beyond that proportion, it was wholly gratuitous. Under this principle of partition it was obvious that the Peishwa was destitute of every claim; and admitting even that the stipulations of the treaties of Poonah and Paungal applied to the late war, (which they evidently did not, those of the 10th article excepted) the Peishwa would still be excluded from all participation in the conquered territory, by the very terms of the 10th article of the treaty of Poonah, which specify, that the allies respectively shall be entitled to a share of such conquests only as shall be made subsequent to the entrance of their respective armies into the enemy's country.

In addition to the foregoing arguments, with which the Resident at Poonah was furnished by the Governor-General for the purpose of justifying the principles of the treaty of Mysore to the Court of Poonah, his Lordship observed, that if the Peishwa's pretensions to a share of the conquered territory were unfounded, the selection of districts which he had demanded in order to constitute that share, was still more extravagant, both with respect to their value and geographical position.

His Lordship further remarked on this occasion to the Resident at Poonah, that the benefits which accrued to the Mahratta State, from the subversion of Tippoo Sultaun's dominions were of much greater importance than the acquisition of territory. Since it had appeared from the various authentic papers, found in the palace at Seringapatam, some of which were in the Sultaun's own hand writing, that it was his determined resolution, by the aid of the French, to recover from the Mahrattas, as well as the Nizam and the English, the territory which he had been compelled to cede to them at the conclusion of the war in 1792. His Lordship directed this circumstance to be particularly pointed out to the Court of Poonah; observing, that it ought to make a considerable impression on the Peishwa's mind, and convince him how essentially his own security was concerned in uniting cordially with the other allies, to oppose a barrier to the designs of the French. In conclusion, the Governor-General desired it might be represented to the Peishwa, that in the place of a formidable power, hostile to the Mahratta State, from the impulse of bigotry, ambition and revenge, was now substituted

a friendly dominion, under a Prince of the same religion with the Peishwa; and that, together with this eminent advantage, he had it in his power to make a considerable addition to his territorial possessions, by acceding to an arrangement of which the effect would assuredly be the re-establishment of his authority, and the prosperity and security of his government and country.

The conduct of the Court of Poonah in the pending negotiation, although in some respects unreasonable and unsatisfactory, had not hitherto been calculated to extinguish the hopes entertained by the Governor-General, of the Peishwa's ultimate accession to the treaty of Mysore, on the principles and conditions of his Lordship's propositions, which were not now less favourable to the true interests of the Peishwa than in the summer of 1798, when that Prince had manifested an eager desire to treat with the Company on a similar basis. It soon appeared, however, that either the Peishwa had not been sincere in any stage of the negotiation, or that the subjection in which he continued to be held by Scindia (who probably foresaw the destruction of his own usurped power, in the proposed arrangements between the Company and the Court of Poonah) operated to prevent his concurrence in a plan which would not have conduced more to the security of the British interests, and to the general tranquillity of India, than to the re-establishment of the rights and authority of Baajy Row himself.

Your honourable Court will observe with astonishment that the Peishwa is represented by the Resident as expressing a reluctance, not merely to comply with any particular article of the proposed treaty, but to recognize one of its most inseparable principles; namely, that the Mahratta State would not commit any act of aggression against the Rajah of Mysore's territories. This reluctance appeared the more extraordinary to the Governor-General, as the Peishwa had not long before declared a similar engagement with regard to the Nizam to be superfluous, because the Mahratta State was already bound by treaty, *not to commit any aggression against the allies of the Company*. The conduct of the Peishwa in thus avowing a disinclination to comply with the just and reasonable condition referred to, joined to the intimation conveyed by Nana on that occasion (viz., that this reluctance

might be overcome by an increase of the Peishwa's share in the conquered territories) amounted, in the Governor-General's opinion, to an indication of a spirit so hostile to all good understanding, as greatly diminished his Lordship's desire to pursue the negotiation any further. For this reason the Resident was instructed, in the event of the Peishwa's not having acceded to the treaty of Mysore, within the period fixed by the 7th article of that treaty (i. e. by the 19th of August), and of the negotiation having been in consequence broken off, to signify both to Baajy Row and to the Minister, not only the extreme displeasure excited in his Lordship's mind by the last communication from the Court of Poonah, but also the determination of his Lordship not to renew the late discussions between the two Governments, until he should be better satisfied of the sincerity of his Highness's disposition, to cultivate and improve his connection with the British nation.

The Resident was directed to call upon the Peishwa, in the event of his not having acceded to the treaty of Mysore within the limited period, to adopt effectual measures for withdrawing immediately such of his troops as might have entered the territory of Mysore, whether by or without his Highness's authority, to the end that when the Company's forces came to take possession of the reserved districts, destined to compose the Peishwa's share, there might be no danger of any thing occurring of a nature prejudicial to the friendship and good understanding actually subsisting between the two Governments.

Such was the state of the negotiation on the departure of the Governor-General from Fort St. George. On his Lordship's arrival at this Presidency, he received a letter from the Resident at Poonah, by which it manifestly appeared that nothing was further from the intention of the Peishwa than to accede to the treaty of Mysore, on the conditions which had been proposed to him.

In consequence of these advices Colonel Palmer was immediately directed to inform the Peishwa and Nana Furnavese, that we considered all negotiation, on the basis of the Treaty of Mysore, to be concluded; but that, although we deeply regretted his Highness's rejection of an arrangement, which had no other object than the improvement of the friendship

and alliance subsisting between the three States, and which was, at least, as much calculated to promote the interests of the Peishwa as those of the Company and the Nizam; we did not feel any diminution of our amicable disposition towards his Highness.

The Resident was further instructed to apprise the Court of Poonah that, conformably to the stipulations of the treaty of Mysore, the Company's Government would proceed immediately, in concert with his Highness the Nizam, to a division of the reserved territory. Colonel Palmer was at the same time informed that we relied with confidence on the Peishwa's taking effectual means to prevent any of the officers of his Government from attempting to interrupt, in any degree, the execution of this measure, and on his compelling them to respect the rights of the Company and of the Nizam, in their recent acquisitions on the side of the Mahratta frontier, with the same scrupulous attention which was invariably manifested by the Company's Government, in regard to the rights of all its neighbours.

To these communications the Resident was ordered to add a declaration of our confidence, notwithstanding the Peishwa had not thought proper to accede to the treaty of Mysore, that he would perceive the necessity and propriety of causing all his subjects of every description to abstain, with the utmost care, from trespassing in any manner on the territories of the Rajah of Mysore, which the Company were bound to defend against all powers without exception.

Colonel Palmer was in conclusion directed never either to invite or encourage any renewal of the late negotiation, but to reply to every attempt of the nature, that his instructions permitted him merely to transmit to the Governor-General in Council any propositions of that tendency which might be made to him.

Your Honourable Court will perceive, on a reference to the correspondence of the Resident, that the Peishwa throughout the negotiation manifested great anxiety that the objects of it should be carefully concealed from the knowledge of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. You will find likewise that, although the Governor-General had provided, in his plan of a treaty, for the absolute dismission of all the French in the service of the Peishwa, and was not insensible to the importance of procur-

ing their general expulsion from the Mahratta empire, the Peishwa unexpectedly anticipated his Lordship's wishes in this respect, by spontaneously proposing that all the French then in the service of the Mahratta State should be expelled, and that if obstruction should be offered the two Governments, should concert together the means of removing it. Your Honourable Court will observe, that the Peishwa was particularly solicitous that this part of the negotiation (evidently pointing at the French officers in the service of Scindiah) should not transpire; and that for this purpose his Highness suggested the adoption of extraordinary precautions. Notwithstanding, however, so many appearances of an earnest, and (as it seemed) a prudent desire to keep Scindiah in ignorance of the tenour of the pending treaty; you will find, by the subsequent despatches of Colonel Palmer, that his Highness not only himself revealed the whole transaction to Scindiah, but consulted with that chieftain respecting the conduct proper to be pursued on the occasion. Although, therefore, the Court of Poonah continued to indicate a wish to keep the negotiation open, it was evident, as well from the duplicity of Baajy Rao in this last stage of it, as from various instances of his caprice and exorbitant pretensions during its progress, that no advantage could result to your interests from a longer pursuit of the object under such unfavourable circumstances, and especially while Scindiah maintained an exclusive and despotic sway over the Councils of Poonah. The Governor-General, therefore, finally determined to relinquish the measure for the present, and to await a more propitious conjuncture, and in pursuance of this resolution, his Lordship proceeded to the division of the reserved territory, between the Company and the Nizam.

We shall conclude this account of the late negotiation at Poonah with observing, that its failure has not excited in us any apprehension for the general tranquillity. For while the justice and liberality of our propositions have been so manifest, and our conduct throughout the negotiation so moderate and conciliatory, as to preclude any reasonable ground of complaint on the part of the Court of Poonah, the actual state of the Mahratta empire affords us abundant security against any aggression on the part of that restless and ambitious nation.

The failure of the negotiations is indeed to be attributed to the same causes which leave us without any apprehension of its effects. The Mahratta empire, in its present distracted condition, is in fact rendered incapable of forming or of maintaining any engagement with other States, and the weakness and instability of the Councils of Poonah are become more conspicuous as well as more desperate from the perverse and intractable character of Baajy Rao. In such a posture of affairs, the arguments on which the Governor-General (in his separate letter to your Honourable Court of the 3rd of August, 1799),* rested the policy of a cession of territory to the Peishwa, are no longer applicable to the actual circumstances of the case, and the direct and immediate advantages of territorial acquisition by the Company, under the division of the reserved territory, are unquestionably preferable to any contingent benefit which could be expected from a more intimate connection with the Mahratta empire in its present condition. The Governor-General in Council, however, will anxiously observe any change of circumstances which may favour an improvement of our political relations with the Court of Poonah.

We have the honour to be,

HONOURABLE SIRS,

your most faithful, humble Servants,

MORNINGTON.

ALURED CLARKE.

PETER SPEKE.

WILLIAM COWPER.

No. LV.

Minute by the Governor-General.

Fort William, January 19th, 1800.

The 10th regiment of native infantry having arrived at Cawnpore, after an absence from this Presidency of more than three years and a half, the most noble the Governor-General in Council has great satisfaction in expressing his

* See p. 72.

entire approbation of the exemplary conduct of this distinguished regiment, in the several arduous and important services on which it has been employed in the Peninsula of India during its long absence from these provinces.

His Lordship in Council is happy to bear this public testimony to the merits of the European officers, under whose command this corps has attained so high a state of discipline, regularity, and order; and he entertains a just sense of the fidelity and attachment to the service manifested by the native officers and private soldiers of the regiment throughout the whole period of their laborious duties at Hyderabad, in Mysore, and during their long march from the Deccan to the province of Oude.

The conduct of the artillery and lascars, who have been attached to the regiment during the time of its absence from these provinces, is equally entitled to commendation.

To perpetuate the memory of the services of the 10th regiment, to distinguish the individuals who have served in the corps, and to recommend their laudable example to the emulation of the whole native service, the most noble Governor-General in Council is pleased to order that honorary medals be conferred on all the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and sepoys of the 10th regiment, and also to the lascars belonging to the artillery, which has been attached to that regiment during the time of its absence from these provinces.

MORNINGTON.

No. LVI.

The Governor-General in Council to the Honourable the Court of Directors, for the Affairs of the Honourable the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies.

HON. SIRS,

Fort William, January 23d, 1800.

Being convinced, on a consideration of the present importance of the British interests in India, that it is highly expedient to establish a regular plan for affording to your Honourable Court, at a stated period annually, a complete and distinct view, in the most compendious form, of the state of the Indian finances, and being satisfied, after much attention to the subject, that it is scarcely possible to devise a

more concise and perspicuous mode of arranging the matter necessary to be laid before you for this purpose, than the mode observed by the late Select Committee of Finance of the House of Commons of Great Britain in their first report, dated March the 31st, 1797. We propose to adopt the form of that report in this despatch as closely as circumstances will admit.

We conceive that, the period of the close of our official year in India is of all others that which is best calculated for enabling us to afford, in the proposed view, the most complete and accurate information.

We shall, therefore, proceed to lay before your Honourable Court a view of the public debts bearing interest at the close of the respective official years 1797-8 and 1798-9, as well as of the actual revenues and charges in those two official years respectively, of the demands outstanding on the 1st of May, 1799; of the estimates of the expected revenues and charges for the current year 1799-1800; and of the progress which has been made and may be expected to be made in the reduction of the public debts.

I.—Public debts bearing interest :—The total amount of public debts bearing interest at the several Provinces, as they stood on the 1st of May, 1798, was, sicca rupees, 7,18,73,261,* viz., Bengal, 4,91,83,471; Fort St. George, 1,61,58,469; Bombay, 60,47,659; Bencoolen, 4,83,662.—Total 7,18,73,261.

The annual charge at the several Presidencies for interest on the principal above stated, at the same period, was, sicca rupees, 59,51,282, viz., Bengal, 42,39,555; Fort St. George, 12,36,134; Bombay, 4,39,343; Bencoolen, 36,250.—Total, 59,51,282.

The increase in the public debts at the several presidencies between the 1st of May, 1798, and the 30th of April, 1799, was, sicca rupees, 1,04,05,002, viz. Bengal, 72,74,510; Fort St. George, 17,89,941; Bombay, 13,40,551.—Total, 1,04,05,002.

The annual charge at the several Presidencies for interest on the above increase of debt was on the 1st of May, 1799, sicca rupees, 12,90,938, viz., Bengal, 7,23,906; Fort St. George, 3,87,486; Bombay, 1,79,546.—Total, 12,90,938.

The total amount of the public debts of the several Presidencies as they

* In the statement of the public accounts in this despatch, the Bombay rupee is reckoned of equal value with the Bengal sicca rupee; the star pagoda is converted into Bengal money at the rate of crs. 400 per 100 star pagodas, and the dollar at Bencoolen, at 2½ sicca rupees per dollar.

stood on the 1st of May, 1799, was, sicca rupees, 8,22,78,263,* viz., Bengal, 5,64,57,981; Fort St. George, 1,79,48,410; Bombay, 73,88,210; Bencoolen, 4,83,662.—Total, 8,22,78,263.

The total annual charge for interest thereon at the period above stated, was, sicca rupees, 72,42,220, viz., Bengal, 49,63,461; Fort St. George, 16,23,620; Bombay, 6,18,889; Bencoolen, 36,250.—Total, 72,42,220.

The sum to be issued by the Commissioners in Bengal for reducing the public debts in India at the rate of 2 per cent. on the principal outstanding on the 1st of May, 1799, was, sicca rupees, 16,45,565.

And the total amount of the annual charges of the public debts, including sums applicable to the reduction thereof, as it stood on the 1st of May, 1799, was 88,87,785.

We beg leave to state in this place, that the observations of the Select Committee of Finance in their first report, regarding the public debt in England, apply exactly to the above statement of the public debt in India, viz.

1st. "That its amount is not to be considered as if it could only be extinguished by a redemption at par, in as much as the progressive reduction of the debt by the present sinking fund constantly operates, by buying up the debt according to the current price of the stocks," the effect of which will be stated more fully in a subsequent part of this address.

2nd. "That the funded capital of the public debt includes in it the amount of the capital purchased by the Commissioners for reducing the public debt."

And 3rdly. "That the annual charge upon the public by way of interest, includes in it the interest of the stock purchased by the Commissioners."

II. Actual revenues and charges in the years 1797-8 and 1798-9.

The total amount of the revenues collected in the official year 1797-8 was sicca rupees, 6,66,27,065, viz., Bengal, 4,92,35,489; Fort St. George, 1,43,16,593; Bombay, 30,22,385; Bencoolen, 52,598.—Total 6,66,27,065.

The total amount of the revenues collected in the official year 1798-9 was, sicca rupees, 7,14,25,026, viz., Bengal, 5,06,98,124; Fort St. George, 1,74,09,931; Bombay, 32,64,373; Bencoolen, 52,598.—Total 7,14,25,026 And consequently the amount of the revenues collected in 1798-9 exceeded the amount collected in 1797-8 in the sum of sicca rupees, 47,97,961, viz., Bengal, 14,62,635; Fort St. George, 30,93,338; Bombay, 2,41,988. Total, 47,97,961.

The total amount of the charges in the official year 1797-8 was, sicca ru-

* The accounts for 1798-9 not having been received from Bencoolen, the revenues, charges, and debts of that settlement are here stated at their amount in the preceding year.

pees. 6,14,20,632, viz., Bengal, 3,34,07,555; Fort St. George, 1,86,00,634; Bombay, 85,77,180; Bencoolen, 8,35,263.—Total, 6,14,20,632.

The total amount of the charges in the official year 1798-9, was, sicca rupees, 7,34,83,473, viz., Bengal, 3,28,59,710; Fort St. George, 2,88,53,865; Bombay, 1,09,34,635; Bencoolen, 8,35,263.—7,34,83,473. And consequently the amount of the charges in 1798-9 exceeded the amount of the charges in 1797-8 in the sum of sicca rupees, 1,20,62,841, viz., Fort St. George, 1,02,53,231; Bombay, 23,57,455. Deduct, 1,26,10,686. Decrease in the charges at Bengal in 1798-9, 5,47,845. Net excess, 1,20,62,841. The amount of the revenue collected in 1797-8 was 6,66,27,065; the amount of the charges in that year was, 6,14,20,632. The amount of the charge for interest of the public debts in that year was 49,02,398.—Total, 6,63,23,030. And consequently the surplus revenue in 1797-8 was 3,04,035; the amount of the revenues collected in 1798-9 was 7,14,25,026; the amount of the charges in that year was 7,34,83,473; the amount of the charges for interest of the public debt in that year was 63,31,381.—Total 7,98,14,854. And consequently the amount of the charges in 1798-9 exceeded the amount of the revenues collected in that year in the sum of 83,89,828.

III. Demands outstanding on the 1st of May, 1799. The amount of the outstanding demands, including arrears of allowances, &c. not bearing interest on the 1st of May was, sicca rupees 1,85,24,814, viz., Bengal, 1,53,06,298; Fort St. George, 16,21,738; Bombay, 15,96,778.—Total, 1,85,24,814.

IV. Estimate of the expected revenues and charges in the year 1799-1800. The total amount of the revenues expected to be collected in the official year 1799-1800 is, sicca rupees, 7,72,57,591, viz., Bengal 5,25,29,429, Fort St. George, 2,15,05,676;* Bombay, 32,22,486.—Total, 7,72,57,591.

The total amount of the estimated charges of the official year 1799-1800 is, sicca rupees, 6,90,99,350, viz., Bengal, 3,59,33,064; Fort St. George, 2,01,71,686; Bombay, 1,29,94,600.—Total, 6,90,99,350. The amount of the revenues expected to be collected in 1799-1800 is 7,72,57,591. The amount of the charges estimated for that year is 6,90,99,350. The amount of the estimated charge for interest of the public debts in that year is 72,42,220.—Total 7,63,41,570. And consequently the estimated surplus revenue in 1799-1800 is 9,16,031.

V. Reduction of the public debt.—The annual sum applicable to that purpose on the 1st of May, 1799, was, sicca rupees, 16,24,000, viz, the original appropriation of 2 per cent. on the estimated amount of the public debt on the 1st of January, 1798, being 6,50,00,000, was 13,00,000.

The further appropriation at the same rate on the amount of the increase of the debts between the 1st of January and the 31st of December, 1798, being, in round numbers, 1,03,60,000 was 2,07,000. The estimated

* There is reason to expect from advices received from Fort St. George since the date of the estimate of that presidency, that the estimated receipts from the new territorial acquisitions in Mysore, as well as on account of the subsidy of the Rajah of Mysore will be considerably exceeded.

amount of interest receivable on securities redeemed and to be redeemed was 1,16,800. The total appropriation in 1799-1800 was 16,24,000.

The amount of government securities redeemed in 1798-9 was, sicca rupees, 15,90,186 viz., principal in 8 per cents, 12,43,379, ditto in 6 per cents, 2,89,729.—Add, interest which had accrued on the principal, but which was not due at the time of purchase, 57,060.—Total, 15,90,186.

The amount actually applied to the purchase of securities on account of the appropriation for the year 1797 being, sicca rupees, 13,00,000 was 12,97,466.

The interest which was received in 1798-9 on account of securities previously redeemed was 51,249.

The total amount appropriated in 1798-9 to the purchase of government securities was 13,48,715. And consequently the gain being the difference to the Company between the actual rate of purchase and a redemption at par was 2,41,471.

With regard to the further progress which may be expected to be made in the redemption of the debt now existing, we cannot venture at present to question the calculation stated in the Accountant General's letter dated the 10th of January, 1798, of the sum to be appropriated annually, being likely to produce on an average eight per cent. per annum, although the late purchases have considerably exceeded that rate.

In the event of that calculation being correct, the whole of the debts existing on the 1st of January, 1798, viz., sicca rupees 6,50,00,000 will be redeemed in nineteen years; to be reckoned from the 1st of May, 1799, and the further increase of debt incurred between the 1st of January, 1798, and the 31st of December of the same year inclusive, viz., sicca rupees, 1,03,60,000, will be redeemed in twenty years, to be reckoned also from the 1st of May, 1799.

In one point of view, however, there seems to be some reason for considering the calculation above stated of the average produce of the fund as rather too high, although, if it should prove so, the error in the calculation cannot by any means be regarded as a subject of regret.

It is probable that such an addition may be made in a few years to the active capital of these provinces from the increasing confidence of the natives in the solid establishment, good faith, and just laws of the British Government, combined with the natural augmentation of capital to be expected from the growing prosperity of the country, as to raise public credit, and consequently the value of the public securities, in such a degree as shall reduce the produce of the funds to be

invested by the Commissioners considerably below the estimated average of eight per cent. per annum.

If, however, this should prove to be the case, Government would be enabled to raise money at a reduced rate of interest for the discharge of the eight per cent. debt, and consequently to obtain for the Company by such reduction of interest an advantage probably more than equivalent to the deficiency in the estimated produce of the sinking fund; while the reduction, which would naturally follow in the general rate of interest to be paid for mercantile purposes, would afford the most substantial aid towards promoting the general industry and trade of the people, subject to the authority of the British Government in India.

The preceding observations apply only to the general sinking fund established at this Presidency on the 3d of April, 1798, for the redemption of the whole of the Company's debts in India.

We cannot at present enter into any detailed view of the effect of the separate sinking fund established at Fort St. George on the 1st of October, 1799, for the purpose of confirming the restoration of public credit of that Presidency, and of aiding the general sinking fund in Bengal, so short a period has elapsed since its institution.

We beg leave, however, to observe that, the separate sinking fund at Fort St. George, as well as the general sinking fund in Bengal, has been of essential advantage to public credit.

It is scarcely possible to form any estimate of the produce of the sinking fund at Fort St. George, of any distant period, since its operation is to cease as soon as the public securities of Bengal shall be at par, which may be the case, at a short or a more remote period, according to circumstances, but which cannot be considered as coming within the scope of calculation at present.

It must, however, be evident to your Honourable Court, that the Government will then have to consider the propriety of extending the operation of the sinking fund at Fort St. George to a more distant period.

We shall, therefore, content ourselves on the present occasion with stating, that the sum applicable to the reduction of the debts of that Presidency, amounting on the 1st of May,

1799, to sicca rupees 1,79,48,410, at the rate of two per cent. was 3,58,968.

Having now completed our proposed view of the finance of India, and of the ordinary revenues and charges, according to the order observed by the Select Committee of Finance, we shall proceed to lay before your Honourable Court, a view of the extraordinary receipts and disbursements in the past year 1798-9, including the deficit before stated, on a comparison of the revenues and charges of that year; and also in like manner, a view of the estimated receipts and disbursements in the current year 1799-1800; in order to shew, in the clearest point of view, the whole amount of the extraordinary services to be provided for, and our means of providing for them in each of those years respectively.

The amount of the deficit on a comparison of the ordinary revenues and charges in 1798-9 was as is before stated, sicca rupees, 83,89,828.

The amount of the extraordinary services to be provided for, exclusive of the deficit above stated was 3,93,34,275, viz., temporary loans and bills falling in course of payment in the same year, Bengal, 61,00,623; Fort St. George, 25,17,852.—Total, 86,18,475.

Arrears of bills at Bengal, 17,83,505. Investments for Europe, Bengal, 58,26,426; Fort St. George, 26,20,886; Bombay, 13,39,384.—Total, 97,86,696.

Supplies to China.—Bengal, 12,93,099; Fort St. George, 9,14,268; Bombay, 17,474.—Total, 22,25,201.

Supplies from Bengal to Bencoolen, Ceylon, Amboyna and Malacca, Prince of Wales' Island, St. Helena, and the Cape of Good Hope, 31,13,123.

Arrears and other miscellaneous disbursements, Bengal, 60,71,986; Fort St. George, 63,62,768; Bombay, 13,72,521.—Total, 1,38,07,275.—Total, 3,93,34,275.—Total, 4,77,24,103.

The amount of the extraordinary means of providing for the above services was 1,99,83,302, viz., sale of imports, Bengal, 18,75,009; Fort St. George, 10,80,269; Bombay, 20,00,834.—Total, 49,56,112.

Specie received at Madras from England, and Bills drawn by that government on the Court of Directors, 24,95,203.

Miscellaneous receipts.—Bengal, 68,51,996; Fort St. George, 47,06,593, Bombay, 9,73,308.—1,25,31,897.—Total, 1,99,83,302. And consequently the total amount of the deficit of the year 1798-9 was sicca rupees, 2,77,40,801, the amount of the loans actually made to provide for the above deficit was 2,18,30,396 viz., Bengal 12 per cents. 65,28,631; 10 per cents, 65,89,142; 6 per cents. 3,06,589. Fort St. George, 12 per cents. 33,60,579; 10 per cents. 25,06,359; 8 per cents. 7,72,224. Bombay, 12 per cents, 12,73,945; 10 per cents 4,78,300; 9 per cents. 14,829.—Total, 2,18,30,596.

The amount of the difference between the deficit before stated, and the sum actually raised as above stated, and which was supplied by a reduction of the estimated balance, and an increase of the arrears of bills of exchange from other Presidencies was 59,10,205.—Total sicca rupees 2,77,40,801.

The amount of the estimated extraordinary services to be provided for in the current year 1799-1800 is 5,98,39,631, viz., temporary loans, Bengal, 61,20,000; Fort St. George, 1,14,23,448; Bombay, 5,67,833.—Total, 1,81,11,281.

Arrears of bills at Bengal, 50,00,000.

Investment for Europe.—Bengal, 90,51,724; Fort St. George, 45,83,231; Bombay, 30,50,000.—Total, 1,66,84,955.

Supplies to China.—Bengal, 15,00,000; Fort St. George, 2,40,328; Bombay, 2,00,000.—Total, 19,40,328.

Supplies to Bencoolen, Ceylon, and other subordinate settlements.—Bengal, 20,60,000; Fort St. George, 12,79,310; Bombay, 55,000.—Total, 33,94,310.

Arrears and other miscellaneous disbursements.—Bengal, 69,98,080; Fort St. George, 67,50,490; Bombay, 9,60,207. 1,47,08,777.—Total, 5,98,39,651.

The amount of the estimated extraordinary means of providing for the above services is 2,02,65,576, viz., Bengal, 25,00,000; Fort St. George, 12,57,214; Bombay, 20,30,000.—Total, 57,87,214,

Specie from, and bills on England, Bengal, 34,80,000; Fort St. George, 26,88,720; Bombay, 12,00,000.—Total 73,68,720.

Miscellaneous Receipts. Bengal, 29,16,052; Fort St. George, 34,08,710; Bombay, 7,84,880. 71,09,642—Total, 2,02,65,576.

Add the estimated amount of the surplus revenue for 1799-1800, being as is before stated, 9,16,021—Total, 2,11,81,597. And consequently the total amount of the estimated deficit of the current year 1799-1800 was, 3,86,58,054.

The amount of the loans estimated to be made in 1799-1800, 3,88,46,641, viz., Bengal, 2,84,00,000; Fort St. George, 78,56,641; Bombay, 25,90,000—Total, 3,88,46,641.

On a view of the information afforded by the preceding statements, the following results will appear—

1st. That the amount of the loans contracted at Bengal and Fort St. George on the condition of theirs being re-payable in one or two years, at the option of Government, for the payment of which provision was to be made in the last and current years (a large portion of which, it was indispensably necessary to discharge at Fort St. George at the critical period of the army taking the field), was sicca rupees 2,67,29,756.

2nd. That the amount of the advances for investments for Europe at the several Presidencies within the same period, was 2,64,71,651.

3rd. That the amount of the provisions made for the supply of the treasury at Canton, within the same period, (which has since been largely increased) was sicca rupees 41,65,529.

The extraordinary magnitude of these services, and the heavy drains upon our finance for the support of the several possessions obtained by conquest from the French and Dutch, combined with the extreme urgency of effectual provision being made for the vigorous prosecution of the late war with Tippoo Sultaun, will, we trust, fully satisfy your Honourable Court that, under all the circumstances of our situation, it was not possible for us to have raised so large pecuniary supplies within the limited period, in which they were required, on terms more advantageous for the Company than those on which the respective loans were elected.

We have now the satisfaction to acquaint your Honourable Court that, although the late eight per cent. loan was opened under most disadvantageous circumstances, in consequence of the heavy pressure of the draughts upon us from Fort St. George, which kept our general treasury in a state of insolvency during the whole period in which the loan was open, the sum subscribed to it amounted to about thirty-three lacs of sicca rupees.

We have the farther satisfaction to acquaint you that the state of public credit is now more favourable than it has ever been during the last three years; the discount being this day (January 23rd,) on eight per cents. about five per cent., and on six per cents. about thirteen and a half per cent.; and that, under the present promising appearances of the continuance of peace in India, of the progressive improvement of the public revenue, and of the beneficial effects of the sinking funds established at this Presidency and Fort St. George, combined with the advantages resulting from the mode which we have lately adopted of borrowing money on obligations, payable only according to priority of date and number, and with the aid of the annual supply of bullion to be expected in consequence of the large amount of the provisions which we have made for the supply of the treasury at Canton, we entertain considerable expectation that the state of public credit will be so far improved in the course of another year as to raise our ordinary eight per cent. notes to par.

We have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON and Council.

No. LVII.

Sir J Anstruther, to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Chowringhee, January 24th, 1800.

I had the honour of yours yesterday, enclosing copies of two letters from General Harris, upon the subject of the present made to you by the army, which achieved the conquest of Mysore, and a copy of your letter to General Harris, dated 7th January, 1800.

It is almost unnecessary after what your Lordship knows of my sentiments upon the subject, to say how perfectly I coincide in every sentiment contained in your letter. You know too, that my opinion upon the subject was early formed long before I had the possibility of any personal communication with you, and while the matter was only known here through the medium of Madras newspapers.

At the same time that I am under the necessity of saying, that the letter of the law stands in the way of the receipt of such a present, I must regret that it prevents the acceptance of a gift equally honourable to the giver and the receiver; I am fully sensible that the spirit of the law never intended, or could intend to put such cases like the present, yet I am far from being sure that the letter of the law is either improvident or unwise. That which is to day the honourable testimonies of the esteem of a gallant army, for that wisdom which guided, and that vigour which animated, its exertions, may to-morrow become the reward of some less glorious service.

If the army is to express its opinion of the abilities and talents of the Governor-General, by a large and a valuable present, why is not the civil service to do the same.

If upon the occasion of a great, a splendid and important conquest, why not upon any other occasion in which it may appear to the givers that the conduct of the Governor-General merits their approbation, till in the end the letter of the law becomes indeed a dead letter.

In enacting the laws which prohibit the receipt of gifts or presents in India, the legislature had in view the extreme difficulty in most cases, and the impossibility in many, of penetrating into the motives which actuate the giver and the

receiver. It therefore thought it wise to prohibit the receipt altogether, without in any case entering into the honourable or the dishonourable motives which might influence the conduct either of the giver or the receiver. I must therefore in the present instance, add my mite of approbation to your Lordship's determination, although I own I do it with a full persuasion that the letter of the law alone stands in the way of your acceptance of this mark of the esteem of an army, which under your auspices has achieved the most splendid conquest, which ever graced the British arms in India, but of which, even the splendour was almost effaced by its important and permanent consequences.

I am, my dear Lord yours, very sincerely,

J. ANSTRUTHER.

No. LVIII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, January 25th, 1800.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the duplicate of your letter overland, dated the 18th of June, 1799.* The original has not yet reached me.

I have great satisfaction in being able to acquaint you, that your adoption of the measures which I recommended of sending large supplies of bullion to India, has been attended with advantages to the public interests fully adequate to my most sanguine expectations.

It is to this measure, combined with the prosperous issue of the late war in Mysore, that I attribute the improved state of public credit, visible in the present prices† of government securities, and in the terms on which we have borrowed money at the several Presidencies.

It is also owing to this measure that we have been enabled to make provision at the several Presidencies in India, for the supply of the treasury at Canton in the ensuing year, 1800-1, to an amount which will fall little short of a million sterling.

* See Vol I. p. 614.

† January 23, 1800. 8 per cent 5 } discount. 12 per cent 1½ } premium.
6 ditto 13½ }

The proportion of the bullion received in Bengal, amounting to sicca rupees 34,80,000, has also contributed to produce another very important effect; the late coinage of silver having completely relieved the government, as well as the community from the inconvenience and loss of batta on the exchange of gold for silver money; this has been for many years a serious subject of complaint at this Presidency; and I have no doubt, when further progress shall have been made in the coinage and circulation of the last supply of specie by the Asia and Charlton, that we shall experience its beneficial effects in the further improvement of public credit.

On a consideration of the large amount of the provisions which I have made in India for the supply of the Treasury at Canton for the ensuing year 1800-1. I confidently expect, that your anxiety, with regard to the provision of your China investment will be completely relieved.

I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that, although our pecuniary embarrassments have been great, we have contributed very largely towards the supply of the treasury at Canton; while no part of the treasure consigned by the Honourable Court, to the Supra-cargoes has as yet been applied to any other than the intended purpose.

Your approbation of the arrangements which I formed at Fort St. George, in April, 1798, preparatory to the execution of the orders of your Honourable Committee, relative to the succession to the kingdom of Tanjore, is very satisfactory to me. I trust that the final settlement made under my directions, with the Rajah of Tanjore; and reduced previously to my departure from Fort St. George, to the form of a treaty ratified by the Governor-General in Council on the 26th of November last,* will equally meet the approbation of your Honourable Committee.

I entertained a confident persuasion that the principles of justice and good faith, which governed my decision in the case of Wynnaad, would obtain the sanction of your honourable Committee; and although the spirit in which that resolution was formed, was not capable of mitigating the vindictive disposition of the late Tippoo Sultaun towards the British nation;

* See Appendix.

I have every reason to believe, that it conduced in a considerable degree, to impress the surrounding powers with a conviction that the war which ensued between that Prince and the Company, had not been provoked by the British Government.

Wynaad having been finally assigned to the Company by the partition treaty of Mysore, I directed as soon as circumstances would permit, that it should be taken possession of on their behalf. The Pyché Rajah had in the interval established himself in Wynaad under pretences, which had they been as substantial as they are frivolous, it was his duty to submit to my examination and decision, before he presumed to introduce his authority into the district. These considerations, joined to the refractory character of the Pyché Rajah, have determined me in the event of his offering any resistance to the establishment of the Company's authority in Wynaad, to punish his contumacy in the most signal and exemplary manner.

The decided approbation with which you have honoured the subsidiary treaty, which I concluded with the Nizam on the 1st of September, 1798,* is highly satisfactory to me, independently of the eminent advantages which have been already derived from that treaty, I entertain a sanguine expectation, that it will lead to further beneficial consequences of the utmost importance.

The sanction which your Honourable Committee has been pleased to give to the opinions recorded in my minute of the 12th of August, 1798,† respecting the succession to the Nizam affords me the utmost satisfaction. Our political position in India is so materially changed since that period, in consequence of the happy termination of the late war with Tippoo Sultaun, that the necessity no longer exists for an unconditional support of the pretensions of Secunder Jah. I continue to think it desirable, that this prince should succeed his father in preference to any of his brothers; but this arrangement is not now so indispensable to the interests of the Company, as to be enforced by their government gratuitously, at the hazard of a war with a rival candidate, probably supported by the Mahratta State. These reflections induced me some-

* See Vol. I. Appendix E.

† See Vol. I. page 159.

time after my return to this Presidency from Fort St. George, to consider the subject of the succession to the Nizam, and your Honourable Committee will find the result of my attention to this important question, in the accompanying copy of my instructions to the Resident at Hyderabad, under date the 6th of November last.* It is possible that circumstances may hereafter suggest the expediency of some alterations in the details of the plan described in my letter to Captain Kirkpatrick; but I foresee no probability of my being compelled to depart from any of its fundamental principles; or to renounce in a material degree any of the advantages which it is calculated to secure to the Company.

The events which have occurred in India since the date of your letter, preclude the necessity of my troubling your honourable Committee with any remarks on those paragraphs of it which relate to the hostile disposition and designs of Tippoo Sultaun, I shall only observe, that it affords me the highest satisfaction to find, that your honourable Committee had so entirely concurred, (while the consequences were yet in suspense) in the view which I had taken of that Prince's conduct and projects, and in the justice and policy of the measures which I had proposed to adopt.

The short duration of the war rendered it inexpedient for me to assume the management of the respective countries of the Nabob of the Carnatic, and of the Rajah of Tanjore on behalf of the Company. The immediate effect of such an assumption would have been a considerable failure of actual resource at a period of the utmost exigency; I shall hereafter communicate my sentiments at large, with respect to the state of Tanjore and the Carnatic. The latter now occupies my particular attention, and I fear that the perverse councils of the Nabob of Arcot, will prove a serious obstacle to any effectual improvement of your affairs in that quarter.

I am happy that in abstaining from the full exercise of my legal powers, during my residence at Fort St. George, I have met the approbation of your honourable Committee; from the hour of my arrival at that Presidency, until my departure from it, Lord Clive and his council, as well as the whole civil and military service of that establishment, and all the prin-

* See page 135.

cipal inhabitants of the settlement, afforded me the most zealous and cordial assistance in the discharge of my duty, and the most satisfactory testimonies of their attachment to your interests and government.

I am concerned to inform your honourable Committee, that I have now every reason to believe, that the proposition of the Nabob Vizier to abdicate the sovereignty of his dominions was illusory from the commencement, and designed to defeat by artificial delays, the proposed reform of His Excellency's military establishments. I have the satisfaction however, to be enabled to acquaint your honourable Committee, that I entertain no doubt of ultimately accomplishing my original object of reforming his Excellency's army, and of substituting a British force in its place. A very considerable increase of our permanent force in Oude will be immediately made; and a further augmentation of it will take place as soon as possible. The disbanding the greater part of his Excellency's undisciplined and useless force must necessarily follow. Of the measures now in progress in Oude, I shall at present say no more, than that they are calculated to secure the external defence and internal tranquillity of his Excellency's territories; to reduce your military expences by transferring the charge of a very large body of your troops to the funds of the Nabob Vizier, and to diminish his Excellency's military expences, while the effective strength of his kingdom will be considerably augmented. It will no doubt, become necessary to raise some additional corps, in the place of those which are to be furnished for the service of Oude; but this augmentation will be kept within as narrow bounds as possible, and will at all events, bear no proportion to the relief resulting to your finances, from the intended increase of the troops to be paid by the Vizier.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LIX.

The Earl of Mornington, to the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, January 27th, 1800.

On the 13th instant, I had the honour to receive under the signature of the Secretary to your honourable Court, an official copy transmitted by your directions of your resolutions of the 24th of September, 1799,* adopted in consequence of the glorious and decisive success of the British arms against the deceased Tippoo Sultaun.

I request your honourable Court to receive the cordial assurance of my most grateful acknowledgements, for the distinguished honour of your favourable acceptance of my endeavours to discharge the duty of my station in your service.

I entertain a confident hope that the settlement which I have been enabled to effect by the treaty of Mysore, and by the subsidiary treaty, of Seringapatam, will correspond with your Honourable Court's expectations of lasting peace in India, and of increasing prosperity to the Honourable Company's affairs. The glory of your triumph does not surpass the value of your acquisitions, nor the solid and permanent advantages resulting from the terms of the pacification; I have the satisfaction to assure you, that the beneficial effects of the late war, and of the treaties in which it terminated, are now sensibly felt in every branch of your extensive and complicated interests; and that, in every part of India, while the moderation, equity and humanity of the Honourable Company are the theme of general praise, the British power is the object of universal confidence and respectful awe.

No part of the resolutions of your Honourable Court was more satisfactory to me, than that which expresses your just sense of the services of the Governments of Fort St. George and of Bombay, and of the commanders, officers and troops employed in Mysore, during the late successful contest.

On this occasion, it is a pleasing duty to repeat to your Honourable Court the sentiments of gratitude, which I have expressed in several of my despatches, and in various recorded proceedings, towards His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief

* See Vol. I. page 635.

of his Majesty's and the Honourable Company's forces in India.

To his Excellency's cordial and active co-operation, I attribute the speedy equipment of the native volunteers from this establishment, the spirit and alacrity with which they embarked for the coast of Coromandel, and their early arrival at Madras, by which a most effective and seasonable addition was made to the army opposed to Tippoo Sultaun.

To the same zealous and able support must be ascribed the considerable augmentation made to the artillery of the army in the Carnatic, by detachments from Ceylon and Bengal.

During my absence from Bengal, I committed the arduous charge of this government to his Excellency's hands, under a strong apprehension that the difficulties of the impending contest with Tippoo Sultaun, would be aggravated by the approach of Zemaun Shah to the frontier of Oude.

The concert and correspondence subsisting between Tippoo Sultaun and Zemaun Shah, are now matter of public notoriety; and, if a fortunate coincidence of events had not recalled Zemaun Shah from Lahore, to the defence of his own dominions, it is my decided opinion, that the personal services of Sir Alured Clarke must have been required in the field for the protection of Bengal, while your army in Mysore was engaged with the forces of Tippoo Sultaun.

During this period, under the direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, the British Forces on the frontier of Oude were maintained in a state so respectable, as to afford every prospect of effectual security in any contingency which could have arisen; and the judicious distribution of our army in Oude and Benares, at that crisis, unquestionably preserved the Vizier's dominions from internal commotion, under the combined dangers of the revolt of Vizier Ali, and of the approach of Zemaun Shah.

In his capacity of vice-president in council at Fort William, his Excellency, by a most zealous effort, and under circumstances of extraordinary difficulty and embarrassment, furnished me with such timely aid as enabled me to order Lieutenant-General Harris into Mysore, with treasure sufficient for the army during the campaign.

The detail of these circumstances in their full extent,

could not have been brought under the particular notice of your Honourable Court, previously to the 24th of September, 1799. In the station in which you have placed me, it is a duty of public justice and gratitude, to bear this sincere and respectful testimony to the meritorious conduct of Sir Alured Clarke; whose approved military talents, experience and honourable spirit, would have acquired additional lustre in Mysore, if the exigency of the public service, and my earnest entreaty had not demanded his presence in Bengal.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,
Honourable Sirs,

Your most obedient and faithful Servant,
MORNINGTON.

No. LX.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, January 29th, 1800.

Your kind letter of the 27th of September, 1799, reached me on the 13th instant, together with those of the 6th and of September, and the duplicate of the 23rd of July. I need not say how happy I feel in the honourable reception given to my packet, by the *Sarah Christiana*; it was peculiarly satisfactory to me to perceive that the motion of thanks to me was postponed, until the whole circumstances, causes and conduct of the war with the Sultaun could be fully before Parliament. I am very anxious however, that you should cause distinguished notice to be taken of the services of Sir Alured Clarke. They are particularly enumerated in my separate letter by this despatch to the Court of Directors. I sent a copy of my letter to Sir Alured after I had made it up for despatch, and I enclose a copy of his answer to me, which reflects the greatest honour on his character. You will really oblige me by obtaining a peerage for him, and I wish you to state the application to the king, as a personal request from me.

My despatches in various departments for these last eight months, have nearly anticipated the answers to all your letters; and I trust in God that before this time, my brother

Henry's arrival in England has satisfied your expectations respecting the settlement of Mysore. To have retained the whole territory for ourselves, would have raised such a flame both at Hyderabad and Poonah, as could hardly have been extinguished without another war. Henry will have informed you of the difficulties which delayed even the settlement as ultimately effected at Hyderabad. The Nizam's pride would not have been satisfied without a considerable cession of territory; and territory is more acceptable to his Highness's ministers, as affording a larger field both for patronage and peculation; money or jewels accompanying territory would also have been acceptable no doubt; but, distinct from territory, would not have contented the Nizam, and as they would have passed directly into his private coffers, would have been inaccessible to his ministers. The present settlement is more gracious, and as effectual in point of real power, as that which seems to have formed the extreme point of your wishes.

The affairs of Oude continue in the same uncertain state; but advantage will certainly flow from what has passed.

The private tonnage this season has given me much trouble, it is difficult to decide such a question permanently on principles supposed contradictory to the orders of the Court of Directors. I shall endeavour to proceed, at least so far as to prevent the trade from taking a bent towards foreign European markets in this year; and you ought, in justice to my situation to decide the question at home.

I remain, my dear Sir,

Yours most faithfully and affectionately,

MORNINGTON.

No. LXI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

January 30th, 1800.

I think it necessary to request your immediate and particular attention to the novel circumstance which has recently occurred of a Danish frigate entering the river Hooghly. She is said to be designed to protect the homeward-bound

trade of the Danish nation from Bengal. Under the same pretext, a squadron of Danish ships of war might be introduced into this river. The same pretext might equally be applied to serve the purposes of other neutral and friendly nations; all of whom might suddenly become our enemies. Hitherto the frigate in question (owing, possibly, to a strong suggestion which I conveyed to the Chief of Serampoor) has not attempted to proceed higher than Kedgeree; but I wish to know from you how this Government is to act in the case of a foreign ship of war attempting, without permission, to pass Fort William. Considering the value of our commercial fleets which remain for a great part of the year in Saugor roads, or at Kedgeree and Diamond harbour, it becomes a question whether the privilege of the river to any extent, however limited, ought not to be placed under very strict regulations in the case of foreign ships of war; and particularly during a period of war in Europe.

Among other regulations on this head one might be, that no foreign ship of war, the destination of which had not been formally announced to the Government in India by the Government at home, should be at liberty to enter this river. In the present instance, the only intimation which I have received respecting the Danish frigate has been from the Danish Government at Serampoor.

You already know how injurious Tranquebar has proved to our interests during the whole of the present war, I assure you that the Danish settlement of Serampoor is in some respects a still greater evil. Its vicinity to the seat of Government in Bengal renders it peculiarly obnoxious; adventurers of every nation, jacobins of every description, swarm at Serampoor, and it is the asylum of all our public defaulters and debtors.

These circumstances cannot fail to have the effect of occasionally unsettling the notions of many of our native subjects with regard to the extent and source of the authority of this Government; and this impression is assisted by the affectations of importance and state, sometimes assumed by the Chief of this paltry factory which, as it happens, is placed exactly opposite to the cantonment* occupied by the garrison of Fort William.

* Barrackpore, 16 miles from Calcutta.

You are not, perhaps, apprized that Colonel Bie is *Governor and Commander-in-Chief of all the Danish dependencies in the provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa*; and that he announces himself in this high character through the channel of the public newspapers.

I will conclude with assuring you that you would render a most important service to our national interests in this part of the world, if you could devise any means of annihilating the whole of these petty European States throughout the continent of India: but above all, those of Tranquebar and Serampoor.

I remain, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXII.

The Earl of Elgin to the Earl of Mornington.

Constantinople, February 5th, 1800.

MY LORD,

[Received 10th June.]

Little had happened since I last had the honour of writing to your Lordship from hence, till I received the letters and enclosures, which I now have the honour of forwarding. The first collection was captured by one of Lord Nelson's cruisers; and although thrown overboard, they were recovered by the activity of our sailors. Your Lordship will read them, I am sure, with much interest. The second set have come here from Vienna, and require no comment from me, further than the assurances I have received from the Porte, that M. Descorches will not be permitted to come to Constantinople, nor the Grand Vizier be allowed to treat with him in Egypt.

Sir Sidney Smith, in the mean while, is carrying on a negotiation with deputies from the French army in Egypt. He has concluded an armistice for a month, from the 28th of December, in the hopes of arranging the evacuation of that province. Not having accounts of a late date from himself, I only know the fact indirectly.

The Grand Vizier has taken El-Arish by assault. Still, as we know that an expedition is fitting out from Brest of six sail of the line, and some frigates, with some thousand troops,

and a good deal of money on board, as a reinforcement for Egypt; and as a fleet of ships has, within these few days, been seen off Candia, steering towards Egypt, I hope the intention (if it has existed) of making a diversion through the Red Sea by troops from India, may not be abandoned.

Naples, I am sorry to say confidentially to your Lordship, is by no means in so tranquil a state as could be wished. The rigour with which the King has persecuted the defaulters during the late invasion of the French, has rooted so very deeply the hatred towards the ancient Government, that the Russians who have gone there of late to form a garrison, have actually represented to the Court, now at Palermo, the impossibility of restoring order, unless more moderation is adopted.

The misunderstanding between Russia and Austria, which I have already had the honour of mentioning to your Lordship, is not removed. The Russian troops pass the winter in Bohemia: but lately the Austrian General, Frölich, who took Ancona, not only excluded the Russians from the capitulation, but consented in the capitulation to a declaration made by the French, that the Russians disregarded all laws of war. Upon this acknowledgement, the Emperor of Russia, not obtaining any satisfaction, has prohibited the Austrian Ambassador from appearing at the Court of Petersburg till the Emperor of Germany removes this insult and injury.

Lord Minto, in the mean time, speaks in the most favourable terms of the present views and intentions of Austria.

From France I know absolutely nothing but what your Lordship will find in the papers. . . . Thank God! we have little communication from thence at this place.

I have nothing from England subsequent to the date of my last letters to your Lordship.

I have the honour to be,
with great truth and regard,
My Lord,
your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servant,
ELGIN.

No. LXIII.

Sir Sidney Smith to the Earl of Mornington

MY LORD, Tigre, off the Coast of Syria, 6th February, 1800.

[Received at Fort William, 22nd April, 1800.]

I lost not a moment after the ratification of the articles of convention for the evacuation of Egypt to send Admiral Blanket a copy with a request for him to forward the same to your Lordship, through the most proper channel in order to curtail any expense on your western frontier that might be deemed to have become necessary from the removal of the French army, their presence in Egypt being to be considered as the object of armaments and fortifications in that quarter. I now send a duplicate direct to your Lordship through the Honourable Company's very zealous and active agent resident at Aleppo; and although the ordinary conveyance will do for a public document, and convey it quicker than any European officer could possibly carry it, I feel incumbent on me to say a few words which cannot be trusted to the chance of their falling into wrong hands, and which may induce your Lordship to suspend your orders for the absolute discontinuance of your preparations to the westward.

Although everything is apparently settled finally, and the French army decidedly bent on profiting by the opening now fairly made for their return home; yet, when they come to learn that Buonaparte on his return home has usurped the reins of government, and become almost Dictator from the ascendancy of his active, enterprizing, and vindictive character over his consular colleagues, Sieyes and Ducos, Generals Kleber, Desaix, and other principal officers of the Egyptian army may not dare to carry through the measure, and appear before their arbitrary Generalissimo after having thwarted one of his favourite projects, the dismemberment of the Turkish empire, in conjunction with any northern power he may be able to influence, of which project he was full when he quitted Cairo, though the army anxiously hoped he never would have it in his power to realize it. General Kleber could not have known of the success of this modern Cromwell, when he confined his pretensions in our late negotiation

to the security and honour of the army under his command, his rancour against Buonaparte may stimulate him to carry his army home in order to oppose him with the best of all possible weapons, a body of veterans that has his name in execration for having, on all occasions, sacrificed them, and ultimately deserted them without leaving them a hope of return. As to succour, they deprecate its arrival as the seal of their perpetual exile; and I know of no man so fit or so likely to become the Monk of this entire imitation of the History of England as Kleber. Desaix is too volatile and too much absorbed in Indian projects; he dreams of nothing but attacking England in all its extremities, and pores over the conquest of Mexico till he fancies himself Hernando Cortes disciplining Thalascalans to assist his European followers in the execution of the most gigantic schemes of conquest and colonization.

If I can but succeed in transporting this guest of mine, to whom I gave a passport five days ago, fairly on his native land, he loves his country too much, and has too precise ideas of real liberty to be a quiet spectator, much less an active instrument of Buonaparte's usurpation; and although I feel it my duty to warn your Lordship of a possible change in the Egyptian arrangement, I do not despair of again garrisoning Toulon with anti-jacobins, unmixed with the element of which Babel was formed, as in 1793.

Your Lordship's most faithful,
humble servant,
SIDNEY SMITH.

No. LXIV.

The Earl of Mornington to the Nabob of Oude.

Fort William, 9th February, 1800.

The duty imposed on me by my public station, and the concern which I take in your Excellency's personal honour and welfare, as well as in the prosperity and happiness of the inhabitants of Oude, compel me to communicate to you, in the most unqualified terms, the astonishment, regret, and

indignation which your recent conduct has excited in my mind.

In order to apprise your Excellency in the most unequivocal manner of the causes and objects of this letter, I propose to state my observations with reference to the following distinct propositions in your Excellency's correspondence with me, and in your declarations made to the British Resident at Lucknow.

1st. Your Excellency, since my arrival in India, has repeatedly complained of the ruinous condition of your internal government, and earnestly solicited my direct interference, as being indispensably necessary for the purpose of effecting a complete reform in your affairs, and especially in your military establishments.

2nd. After having received from me a plan for the reform of your military establishments,* you expressed, in the most deliberate and unqualified terms, your approbation of the same, and your hope that it would be carried into effect.

3rd. You have recently declared to Lieut.-Colonel Scott, that this same plan for the reform of your military establishment never, in any measure, met with your approbation or acceptance, or was deemed expedient by you.

4th. You have attempted, by various means, to delay, and ultimately to frustrate the execution of the plan above mentioned, of which you had, after full deliberation, expressed your entire approbation.

5th. The means which your Excellency has employed for this purpose are calculated to degrade your character, to destroy all confidence between your Excellency and the British Government, to produce confusion and disorder in your dominions, and to injure the most important interests of the Company to such a degree as may be deemed nearly equivalent to positive hostility on your part.

In the beginning of August, 1798, your Excellency informed me, by letter, that the organization of your government, which had for a long period of time been very loose and confused, was become in the last degree ineffective and irregular, adding a request that I would instruct Mr. Lumsden (the Company's Resident at Lucknow) to afford your Excel-

* See page 212, and subsequent letters.

lency his effectual aid in establishing your authority on a *new basis*. A variety of circumstances having rendered it impossible for me to give immediate consideration to your Excellency's representation, your Excellency in a subsequent letter, written in June, 1799, revived the subject, observing, "it will be impossible to remove the embarrassment under which I labour until I shall have carried into effect the retrenchment of superfluous expenses, and shall have established a systematic settlement of the country, and of the *military* (*which is indispensable*) for promoting the security and ease of the ryots,* the prosperity of the country, and the tranquillity of the people." Your Excellency added "although I have been informed by Mr. Lumsden that your Lordship has written to him upon this subject; yet nothing regarding it has been written by your Lordship to me; and I therefore hope you will repeat your orders to the Resident to be aiding and assisting me in all matters, so that I may *concert with him* the means of *removing my embarrassments*, and, *with his assistance, carry on the affairs* of my government in a manner to produce ease and satisfaction to my mind." Your Excellency concluded by declaring, "I rely on your Lordship for support and assistance in everything."

Such forcible representations of the disordered state of your Excellency's government in its military as well as civil branches, combined with my own intimate knowledge of the actual existence of the evils so repeatedly and emphatically described by your Excellency, authorized a full confidence in the sincerity of your Excellency's reiterated wishes for my active interference in your affairs, and for my assistance in remedying the defects of which you so justly complained. I therefore determined to adopt, without delay, those measures now apparently not less requisite for the ease and satisfaction of your Excellency's mind, than they had long been manifestly essential to the safety of your person and to the security and prosperity of your dominions. Under this impression, while yet occupied by most important affairs at Fort St. George, I appointed Colonel Scott to reside with your Excellency, furnishing him at the same time with such instructions as appeared to me to be best calculated to enable him to accomplish the apparently earnest wishes of

* Small farmers and cultivators of the soil.

your Excellency for establishing an improved system of civil and military government within your dominions.

In considering the course of measures best adapted to this salutary purpose, I became satisfied that it was absolutely necessary to commence with that reform of your Excellency's military forces, which your Excellency had declared to be indispensable. I was originally led to this conclusion by a review of the correspondence and negotiations which had passed between your Excellency and Mr. Lumsden in consequence of the advance of Zemaun Shah to Lahore, towards the end of the year 1798; and I was further confirmed in my opinion by a retrospect of the events which had followed the rebellion and flight of Vizier Alli.

The conduct of different corps of your Excellency's army had in several instances previously to the approach of Zemaun Shah, abundantly manifested that no reliance could be placed either in their fidelity or discipline. Many of them had mutinied, and were prevented from proceeding to acts of open violence against your Excellency's person by the presence of the Company's troops. Your Excellency, when consulted by Sir James Craig and by Mr. Lumsden on the measures of defence to be adopted against the threatened invasion of Zemaun Shah, declared that "no confidence was to be placed in your troops," and you not only avowed your military force to be inadequate to contribute any assistance towards the defence of your dominions, but required the presence of part of the British army within your capital for the express purpose of protecting your person and authority against the excesses of your own disaffected and disorderly troops, in the same moment when the services of the whole of the British army were most urgently demanded upon your Excellency's frontier to resist the approach of Zemaun Shah. Hitherto, however, the fidelity and utility of your Excellency's troops had been distrusted principally on grounds suggested by their repeated contumacy and disobedience. That they were actually capable of betraying the interests of your Excellency in a crisis of positive danger, was subsequently proved beyond a possibility of doubt by their treacherous conduct during the commotions excited by Vizier Alli.

The necessity of commencing the general improvement of your Excellency's government by a radical reform of your military establishment being then manifest, Lieut.-Colonel

Scott, together with a letter which Sir Alured Clarke addressed to your Excellency, by my desire, delivered to you such further explanations of the proposed measure as the occasion required. It is remarkable that the delivery of Sir Alured Clarke's letter to your Excellency had been preceded within the short space of five days by repeated complaints on the part of your Excellency of the turbulent and disorderly state of your troops.

In the plan of reform for your military establishment presented to your Excellency at that period of time, I proposed that the greatest part of your useless and dangerous forces should be disbanded, and should be replaced by a suitable number of the Company's troops. The reception which your Excellency gave to the proposition corresponded with the expectations which your Excellency's repeated declarations and applications to me had led me to form. Your Excellency perused the letter of Sir Alured Clarke *with satisfaction, and declared your thorough concurrence in the sentiments which it contained.* Your Excellency also, at a subsequent conference with the Resident on the 5th of September, observed, of your own accord, that the proposed measure *was not impracticable, but such as you hoped might be accomplished.*

It is of importance to remind your Excellency in this place that, soon after the opening of these discussions by Lieut.-Colonel Scott, a fresh mutiny broke out among your Excellency's troops, which your Excellency was enabled to quell solely by the assistance of the British Resident at Lucknow.

Having in a letter to your Excellency dated the 26th of September, 1799, expressed my satisfaction in your ready concurrence in the expediency of the measure which had been generally proposed in the letter of Sir Alured Clarke, and particularly explained by Lieut.-Colonel Scott, and having at the same time earnestly exhorted your Excellency not to suffer any consideration to delay for a moment the necessary alterations in your military establishment (referring to the plan which had been minutely detailed to you by Lieut.-Colonel Scott), your Excellency in reply declares "the benefits, both immediate and future, of such a reform are even more strongly impressed upon my mind than they have been described by your Lordship; *a year before this time, under a sense of the benefits in question,* and of the evils ari-

sing from the failure of my resources, and the increase of my expences, I planned, *of my own accord*, in my mind, a *reform of the system*, and was *the first to propose it.*"

To the observation which I had submitted to your Excellency relative to the possible return, in a more formidable shape, of the dangers which had already threatened the safety of your Excellency's person and dominions, your Excellency answers, in the same letter, "please God, by introducing a reform in the *military system*, all dangers and all apprehension of disturbance will be removed."

These extracts from your Excellency's own letters, and from Colonel Scott's reports of your verbal communications noted and recorded at the time, warrant me in declaring that your Excellency, in the most direct terms, originally solicited me to prepare a plan for the reformation of your military establishment, and that you afterwards positively approved the plan prepared and submitted to you at your own request. I leave it to your Excellency to judge with what emotions I now learn from Lieut.-Colonel Scott, that you have not hesitated to assert that this identical plan framed at your own suggestion, and approved by your deliberate sanction, *had never, in any measure, met with your approbation or acceptance, or been deemed expedient by you.*

In this place it may not be inexpedient to observe, that even if your Excellency had not professed your approbation of the plan in question, it would have been equally my duty and right to have required your Excellency's adoption of a measure, the execution of which is indispensably necessary to enable the Company to fulfil their engagement "of defending your dominions against all enemies."

In my letter to you of the 5th of November last* I have sufficiently established the right of the Company to augment their forces within your Excellency's dominions to whatever extent the British Government in India may judge requisite to the permanent security of the common interests. I have also explained in what manner your Excellency is bound by the 7th Article of the Treaty concluded between your Excellency and Sir John Shore, to defray the expense of any force which the British Government shall deem necessary for

* See p. 153.

the effectual protection of your dominions. The right of the British Government to make such an augmentation, even against your Excellency's consent, in the event of an invasion of your dominions, or of any sudden or temporary alarm either of domestic or foreign danger, has never been disputed by your Excellency; but I understand that you have expressed to Lieut.-Colonel Scott an intimation, that the same right does not extend to a permanent increase of the standing army of the Company in Oude. Can your Excellency then suppose that the treaty was intended to provide against dangers merely of a temporary and transient nature, and that it did not embrace the permanent and perpetual security of your dominions, and the lasting interests of that party which has bound itself to protect them against every danger, whether existing or contingent? If a danger shall exist, permanent in its nature, but of which the immediate approach to your Excellency's dominions may be so sudden and rapid as to preclude the possibility of providing against it by any other means, than a consistent and permanent system of preparation and precaution; shall it be contended that the legitimate protector and guardian of your dominions is not bound by every principle of duty to provide such a system without delay? and is not the season of peace and tranquillity the most favourable for the establishment of external security and internal order?

It is certain that the resources of your Excellency are inadequate to the double burthen of the proposed additional force of the Company, and of your own existing military establishment. But if your resources could bear this accumulated pressure, I should still feel myself bound to require that your Excellency should reduce your own disorderly troops. The expediency of disbanding as large a proportion of your own troops as can possibly be dispensed with in the business of the revenue collections, and in the purposes of ceremony and state, does not rest solely on the inefficiency of your troops in a military view, but also on their disaffection, and insubordination, and on the danger with which such a body of armed men must ever menace your person, and the public tranquillity in time of peace; a danger infinitely aggravated in the season either of domestic convulsion, or of foreign attack. The dismission therefore of the troops in question, is not only recom-

mended by considerations of economy, but indispensably requisite by the soundest maxims of prudential policy. So long as these troops shall be entertained, a large proportion of the Company's force must be constantly employed to maintain the peace of the Country; and in the event of an invasion of your Excellency's dominions by a foreign enemy, the necessity of diverting a still more considerable part of the British army from the defence of your frontier, for the purpose of controlling your own licentious and disaffected soldiery, would increase exactly in proportion to the magnitude and imminence of external danger. It must therefore be obvious to your Excellency, that the continuance of these dangerous troops in your service, instead of leading to a diminution of the requisite amount of the British force in Oude, would require a far more considerable augmentation of that force than any hitherto proposed.

Your Excellency always professing the utmost anxiety for the reform of your own troops, having however delayed to concert the necessary arrangements for that purpose with Colonel Scott, it became my duty to accelerate the adoption of those measures for the defence of your Excellency's dominions, which daily became more urgent. It would have been highly gratifying to me, if your Excellency's activity on this occasion had been proportioned to the exigency of the case, or to the earnestness and apparent candour of your own declarations; but the responsibility in this case attaching, according to the stipulations of treaty, solely on the Company I could not have been justified by any consideration, in suspending the measures incumbent on the Company's Government.

On these grounds I determined early in the month of November last, to introduce immediately into your Excellency's dominions as great a proportion as possible, of the force which I deemed necessary to their effectual and permanent defence, in addition to the Company's troops already stationed in Oude.

I communicated this determination to your Excellency, in a letter written on the 5th of November, and forwarded by me to Lieutenant-Colonel Scott.*

Before Lieut.-Colonel Scott could deliver this letter, your Excellency had made a proposition to him, which, as he con-

* See p. 153.

ceived, precluded the necessity of presenting any letter to you; and accordingly it was not delivered until your Excellency thought proper to recall the proposition in question.

In the meanwhile the additional troops which I had determined to send into your Excellency's dominions, continued to assemble for that purpose; because in every event the necessity of the intended reinforcements must have remained unalterable.

The proposition of your Excellency, to which I have adverted was, that you should abdicate the government of your dominions, and, appropriating to your private use all the treasures of the state, retire from Lucknow. You signified at the same time, a desire that one of your sons should be substituted on the Musnud.

Lieutenant-Colonel Scott remonstrated against your Excellency's declared resolution to abdicate the government; but your Excellency persisted, and finally enjoined him to communicate it to me, as the result of your deliberate consideration.

This unexpected determination of your Excellency, although it induced Lieutenant-Colonel Scott to withhold my letter of the 5th of November, until further orders from me, did not prevent him from occasionally pressing upon your consideration the subject of the reform of your military establishment. Your Excellency however, invariably evaded the discussion by declaring, that under the resolution which you had announced of abdicating the government, it was totally unnecessary to proceed at present in the proposed reform.

Your Excellency has been in possession for some time past, of a formal and detailed answer from me (authenticated by my signature) to your declaration of your resolution to abdicate the sovereignty of your dominions.* To the arguments by which I endeavoured to modify your Excellency's original plan of abdication, and to the terms on which I declared myself willing to facilitate your retirement from the cares of your government, (the administration of which you have acknowledged yourself to be utterly unequal to conduct.) Your Excellency has not yet returned any reply; you have deemed it sufficient to signify to Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, that under

* See minute by the Gov.-General, p. 159.

my determination not to admit your Excellency's proposition in the terms stated by yourself, you were ready to abandon your design of retirement, and to retain the charge of the government; supporting this apparently new resolution on general grounds of justice to your family. I will not at present enquire whether means might not still be devised for securing ample justice to your family, without reducing your Excellency to the painful and dangerous necessity of continuing in a station, the duties of which you have declared yourself to be incompetent to fulfil, and of governing a people whom you have declared "neither pleased with you, nor you with them; with whose evil dispositions, enmity, disobedience and negligence, you are disgusted; and from whose government your mind is utterly withdrawn."

Having requested your Excellency to return a formal and precise answer to my detailed observations and proposals, in consequence of your Excellency's declared wish to abdicate the government, I shall abstain from entering into any minute examination of the nature of the subsequent change in your Excellency's mind, until I shall be furnished in a regular manner, with an explicit statement of the motives which induced that change. I must however remark, that every circumstance accompanying your Excellency's conduct, which has hitherto fallen under my observation, on this extraordinary occasion, appears to me to indicate that your Excellency never previously entertained the design of abdicating your government, however convinced of the truth of those incontestible facts which you alleged as the motives of your abdication, but that you professed such a design with the sole view of defeating by delay, the long meditated measure of a reform of your military establishment.

It is most painful to be compelled to state a charge of so serious a nature, against a person of your Excellency's high rank and exalted dignity; but what other conclusion can I draw from your Excellency's conduct, when Lieutenant-Colonel Scott informs me, that after you had engaged his attention and mine for nearly two months, by your ostensible intention to abdicate the government, you suddenly relinquished that intention, and at the same moment declared for the first time, that if "the reform of your military establishments were to be adopted on the principles proposed, it would annihilate your Excellency's authority in your own dominions," al-

though not only the general principles, but all the material details of that reform, to which you now object, had been repeatedly approved by your Excellency, as being essential to the maintenance of your authority, and indispensable to the peace and safety of your dominions.

But your Excellency has proceeded to other measures of a tendency infinitely more dangerous, utterly incompatible with all your professions, and repugnant to the fundamental principles of your connection with the Company, and to every duty of friendship and honourable alliance.

Lieutenant-Colonel Scott informs me, "that your Excellency, instead of affording any cordial assistance for devising and carrying into execution a plan for the dismission of your battalions, has thrown every possible impediment in the way of that measure, by endeavouring to restrict the additional British force to one position and by delaying to furnish Lieutenant-Colonel Scott with the statements of your military establishments repeatedly required, and absolutely necessary to the commencement of the undertaking."

Lieutenant-Colonel Scott informs me, that your Excellency is equally desirous of *impeding the progress of the additional British troops, by exposing them to difficulties in obtaining supplies of provisions*; to prove this intention on the part of your Excellency, Lieutenant-Colonel Scott states, that although he had repeatedly applied to your Excellency for the necessary purwannahs to your several aumils, your Excellency had not yet issued a single purwannah; the consequence of which was likely to prove not only seriously distressing to the British troops destined to the protection of your dominions, but dangerous to the peace of the country through which those troops proposed to march.

It is impossible for me to express in terms of sufficient force, the sentiments which this intelligence has occasioned in my mind.

The conduct of your Excellency in both instances stated, but more flagrantly in the last, is of a nature so unequivocally hostile, and may prove so injurious to every interest, both of your Excellency and of the Company, that your perseverance in so dangerous a course, will leave me no other alternative than that of considering all amicable engagements between the Company and your Excellency to be dissolved, and of regulating my subsequent proceedings accordingly. I am

however, always inclined to hope that your Excellency may have been inadvertently betrayed into these imprudent and unjustifiable measures by the insidious suggestions of evil councillors, and being ever averse to construe your Excellency's actions in such a manner as must compel me to regard and to treat you as a Prince no longer connected with the Company, by the ties of amity and of a common interest; I trust that my next accounts from Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, may enable me to view your Excellency's conduct in a more favourable light, but lest my wishes in this respect should be disappointed, it is my duty to warn your Excellency in the most unreserved terms, that your Excellency alone will be responsible for all the evils which cannot fail to result from any further perseverance in the fatal and imprudent course of measures which you have recently pursued. I also think it necessary to entreat your Excellency not to delay for a moment, whatever further steps may be pointed out to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, as necessary to effect the two urgent and indispensable objects; namely, the reform of your military establishment, and the provision of funds for the regular monthly payment of all the Company's troops in Oude.

The least omission or procrastination in either of those important points, must lead to the most serious mischief.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXV.

Lieut.-General Stuart to the Earl of Mornington.

The Hon. Company's ship *Woodford*,
16th February, 1800, off Anjango.

MY LORD,

Your Lordship will do me the justice to believe, that your letter, under the 12th of January,* which I have just had the honour to receive, has been no less gratifying than flattering to me. Nor can I here sufficiently express my high sense of your Lordship's goodness on every occasion, and more especially for this recent and handsome manner in which you have been pleased so particularly to notice me.

* See p. 173.

If my health had permitted, I should most readily have sacrificed every private consideration, and continued to exert my best endeavours in the service of my country, under your Lordship's auspices in India. It is impossible that so many motives can ever again conspire to lead me to resume an active life, for while the highest objects were held forth to my ambition, I had the further stimulus of your Lordship's wishes; but there is a period, my Lord, when the mind and the body demand repose, and when the spirits no longer animated by sanguine expectations, are unfit for excessive labour. It is now time that I should withdraw from a scene in which I have acted a part for forty years, and if I shall find an honourable retirement in my native country under that middling state of affluence which is sufficient for a man who has but moderate wants, I shall rest contented. But I have not by this resolution, my Lord, absolutely devoted the remainder of my life to ease; for as I have always been of opinion, that it requires the full enjoyment of health to support with firmness the vicissitudes of military affairs, should I have the good fortune to recover that blessing, I shall again, I am sure, think of resuming the exercise of a profession which has constituted my employment and happiness for so many years.

I beg to assure your Lordship that my friend, Captain Walker, as well as myself, feels with due gratitude the very handsome terms in which you have been so good as to express yourself respecting him. He requests of me to make his grateful acknowledgements to your Lordship for the confidence you are pleased to place in him, and for the great honour proposed by admitting him a member of your family. The offer of so distinguished a situation has made that proper impression on his mind that it ought, and which your Lordship had a right to expect. At the same time his appointment under the Presidency of Bombay has been lately improved by being nominated to succeed to the present Auditor-General, who has announced an intention of returning to England soon, and his future prospects are thus, in a great measure, confined to that station. His diffidence, and an apprehension that he would not be able to fulfil your Lordship's expectations, is an additional, and perhaps, a greater motive to induce him to decline the honour which your Lordship's goodness would confer on him. But if your

Lordship should have occasion to employ him at Bombay, either in obtaining any heads of local information there, or in whatever other manner, I am certain that he will, to the best of his judgment, execute your commands with fidelity and alacrity.

I return to England fully impressed with your Lordship's kindness and generosity. Nor can your unsolicited efforts to promote my future comfort and happiness ever cease to be warmly remembered by me while I live. I have indeed but one subject of regret in quitting this country, that in any instance my ideas should not have entirely accorded with your Lordship's superior and more profound judgment.*

A name so great as yours, my Lord, does not stand in need of praise from a person in my sphere, but I know that you value the esteem of every honest man, and in this character, while I congratulate my country on possessing so eminent a statesman, I most seriously wish that success to attend your Lordship's administration, which has already added such conspicuous lustre to the British arms, and established on the most solid basis the English empire in India.

I have the honour to remain,
with the greatest respect and regard, my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful, obliged,
and devoted Servant,

J. STUART.

No. LXVI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Honourable Jonathan Duncan.

SIR,

Fort William, February 16th, 1800.

Having fully considered the arguments adduced by Lieut.-General Stuart, in the minute recorded by him previously to his departure, for Europe (and approved by you in your letter to me transmitting that minute) in proof of the necessity of an augmentation of the native infantry of your establishment, I am satisfied that some increase of that corps is indispensably requisite. I am in particular convinced that it

* Referring to a proposition of Lieut.-Gen. Stuart's for augmenting the force of the army at Bombay, and the Gov.-General's objections to any increased military expenditure.—[ED.]

is expedient to enable you, as soon as possible, to reinforce the native troops at Surat; and to dispense with the services of the auxiliary troops of the Rajah of Travancore.

For these reasons, I authorize you to make an immediate addition of one regiment of native infantry to the army under your Presidency, and to adopt the necessary measures for that purpose without delay.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

P.S. I take this opportunity of requesting that you will have the goodness to direct all your separate letters to me, to be numbered under two heads.

Official—comprehending such letters as are intended for record, and which should always be countersigned by one of your Secretaries.

Private—containing your communications of that description.

I wish this regulation to commence from the 1st of January, 1800, and I shall observe the same. Accordingly I shall number your letters.

Official, No. 1, dated the 4th of January, 1800.

Private, No.

The numbers are to recommence with every year.

No. LXVII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Honourable Jonathan Duncan.

SIR,

Fort William, Feb. 18th, 1800.

Having fully considered your several communications relative to the affairs of Surat, I have directed a despatch to be prepared on that subject for my signature in Council, together with the draft of a Treaty to be concluded with Nussur ud Deen previous to confirming him in the station of Nabob.

As it may require a few days to complete these papers, I think it advisable to give you an early intimation of the general principle on which my instructions will be founded.

Being convinced that it is not only the complete right, but the positive duty of the British Government to secure the external defence, as well as the internal order and good government of the City of Surat; and being satisfied that the

original Treaty between the Company and the Nabob Moyen ud Deen presents no obstacle to any conditions requisite to the permanent establishment of these important and salutary objects, I am resolved not to confirm Nusser ud Deen in the station of Nabob, until he shall have agreed to transfer the whole civil and military administration and revenues of the city into the hands of the Company; reserving to himself an annual stipend sufficient for the maintenance of himself and his family, to be paid by the Company from the revenues of Surat.

An arrangement, founded upon this principle will, of course, include the institution of regular courts of justice under the authority of the Company.

I think it will be advisable that you should proceed in person to Surat for the purpose of concluding this important arrangement. I shall not, however, suggest this measure in my letter in Council; but you will understand my decided opinion to be, that, without your presence at Surat, the proposed reform cannot be carried into effect.

In my official letter (No. 2) of the 16th instant, I authorized you to add one regiment of native infantry to your establishment. A more attentive consideration of your communications relating to Surat, and of Lieutenant-General Stuart's minute of the 21st of January, has convinced me of the necessity of extending that authority to the addition of another regiment, according to the suggestion of General Stuart in that minute.

You will, therefore, proceed without delay to add two regiments of native infantry to your establishment.

It is also my desire, that you should immediately increase the force at Surat to one company of European artillery, two companies of European infantry, and one complete regiment of native infantry.

You will observe, that it is desirable that this force should precede your arrival at Surat.

You may expect my despatch in Council in a few days, but I request that you will not delay these preliminary measures under that expectation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXVIII.

The Earl of Elgin to the Earl of Mornington.

Constantinople, Feb. 20th, 1800.

MY LORD,

[Received at Fort William, May 10th, 1800.]

Although Sir Sidney Smith will, no doubt, have sent to your Lordship the earliest accounts of the capitulation which the French have signed for the evacuation of Egypt, yet I lose no time in forwarding the intelligence from hence, and enclosing an abstract of the terms agreed upon.

I most sincerely congratulate your Lordship upon this additional security to our East India possessions. The period of your administration has surely been the most brilliant, and has procured more essential benefits to those interests than any Government ever was so fortunate as to obtain. No one takes a warmer share than I do in whatever must contribute so greatly to your satisfaction and reputation.

There are at this moment eight mails from England missing. It would appear that the Elbe is frozen; and the roads on this side of Vienna are almost impassable. I can, therefore, offer you no news from hence.

We have merely common report from France: nor do we know of any act worthy to be cited of the new Government at Paris.

I wish I could give your Lordship any hopes that the Court of Russia shewed more disposition than of late for continuing a continental war against France. I have not heard from Lord Minto since he went to Prague last month, for the purpose of an interview with Marshal Suwarow. At first it was said that their conferences had ended as we might wish; but my accounts from Russia state the determination of the Emperor to be, to recal his troops.

By advice from London, it is expected there that Russia continues hearty with *us*; and the same language is held to the Porte. But if it does not act on the Continent, I am not sanguine as to the benefit we are to derive from its efforts.

Meanwhile the Court of Vienna continues its preparations

for another campaign. At present we do not hear any surmise of Buonaparte's having proposed fresh terms of peace to Austria.

I have the honour to be,
with great truth and regard, my Lord,
your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servant,
ELGIN.

No. LXIX.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Honourable Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, March 5th, 1800.

Although most of the points touched in your several despatches have already been anticipated, either by my letters to you, by the communications which I trust you have received through Mr. Wellesley, or by my despatches to the Secret Committee and the Court of Directors, I propose in this letter to reply regularly to such of your communications as have not already been directly answered by me.

HYDERABAD.—I received with the greatest satisfaction your approbation of the treaty of Hyderabad.* Subsequent events have abundantly confirmed the justice of the expectations, which you formed upon the first view of that treaty. It was indeed the source of all our recent successes in India; and even if it has in any degree aggravated the characteristic jealousy of the Mahrattas, it has furnished ample compensation in establishing an impregnable barrier against their power. The system on which the treaty of Hyderabad was founded, would certainly be most effectually completed by the conclusion of a similar engagement at Poonah, and I am resolved never to lose sight of that most desirable object.

The various instances in which the jealousy of the Mahratta State has lately been disclosed, are rather to be attributed to the peculiar character of that nation, and to the singular disposition of the present Peishwa, than to any formed aversion to a nearer connection with the British power.

The influence of Scindia has also contributed to frustrate my proposed measures, because their necessary effect must have been to restore the Peishwa to a certain degree of credit

* See Vol. I. Appendix

and power; and to reduce Scindia in the same proportion. I have no reason to believe that Scindia would be averse to a separate connection with us, but not perceiving any possible advantage which could arise from such a connection under all the circumstances of the present moment, I have taken no steps to cultivate it, while I have avoided any manifestation of an unfriendly disposition.

The distractions of the Mahratta empire must continue to increase, until they shall be checked by foreign interference. No power in India excepting the British now possesses sufficient strength to interpose with effect in these dissensions; and I shall not be surprised if ultimately the subsidiary force, which I am so anxious to establish at Poonah, should be required with equal anxiety by the Mahratta State, as the only means of restoring order, and of saving the whole of that country from plunder and desolation.

Mr. Colebrooke has now resided several months at Nagpoor, and I have every reason to believe, that the Rajah of Berar will prove well inclined to support whatever plan the British Government may ultimately adopt with regard to the affairs of the Mahratta empire.

With respect to the views of Zemaun Shah, the papers found in the palace at Seringapatam have completely justified your opinion of Tippoo's disposition to obtain the assistance of that Prince; and of Zemaun Shah's inclination to afford it.

For some time to come, I trust that Zemaun Shah will be too much occupied at home, to admit of turning his arms against Hindostan; and I am inclined to think that the encouragement of divisions in his own government, and of hostility between the contiguous State of Persia and his dominions, is the system of defence against Zemaun Shah on which it is most safe to rely under the present circumstances of affairs in India.

The profligacy of Scindia's character, the distracted state of his councils and armies, and the distress or rather ruin of his finances preclude the hope of effecting a secure or useful alliance with him.

The establishment of a subsidiary force at Poonah, would compel Scindia to return to his own dominions; and in that event, it might not be difficult to convince him that his best security would consist in imitating the example of the Nizam

and of the Peishwa; and in placing himself under the immediate protection of the British power.

With respect to the general system of policy to be adopted by us in India in consequence of the conquest of Mysore, I shall re view all the important considerations connected with that extensive question in a separate despatch, addressed by some future opportunity, either to you or to the Secret Committee.

I conclude, that the power of the French in Egypt is either already extirpated, or that you will continue the war until that indispensable object shall be completely effected. Notwithstanding the present proud and commanding predominance of the British power in India, we cannot expect an uninterrupted continuance of tranquillity while France shall be permitted to maintain a powerful establishment in Egypt.

Since I wrote the preceding paragraph, I have received despatches from Lord Elgin, dated the 22nd December, 1799, by which it appears that Kleber remains in Egypt with 15,000 men, and that Buonaparte is at the head of a new Government in France. Lord Elgin proposes a powerful diversion from India, through the Red Sea, for the purpose of accelerating the evacuation of Egypt by the French, but after a full discussion of this subject with General Stuart, I am satisfied that it would be an useless waste of treasure and blood to attempt such an expedition on a large scale, unless the whole plan of co-operation from the Mediteranean had been previously concerted.* Desultory operations against any places retained by the French on the shores of the Red Sea may be advantageous, they would neither be perilous, nor expensive.

You are already apprized of my entire coincidence in your opinion, respecting the importance of Goa; and I trust that you will be enabled to give full effect to the measures which I have adopted for the purpose of rendering that possession an additional source of strength to the British Empire in India. I also consider the possession of Diu to be a most desirable object, particularly with a view to the coercion of the Piratical States on the north western coast of the peninsula of India.

* This was the suggestion of the Governor-General to Mr. Dundas on the 16th of May, 1799. See Vol. I. p. 587.—[Ed.]

FINANCES.—Notwithstanding the large import of bullion during the present season, the expences of the war, and the considerable amount of the 12 per cent securities, coming in course of payment within the current and succeeding year of account, have compelled me to continue the system of adding to the debt in India, in order to secure a considerable commercial investment for the ensuing season. I have however, the satisfaction to assure you, that every symptom has concurred to confirm my opinion, that the debt in India is likely to become more manageable in every succeeding year. The loans which I have opened at this Presidency during the current year, have been made at a rate of interest much more favourable than any which has been raised since the year 1796, as will appear by the terms of the loans of this year. Although the second loan on the same terms is actually open, the state of the public securities is now—

5th March, 1800.

	Buying.	Selling.	
6 per cent.	13 0 0	14 0 0	} Discount.
8 per cent.	5 0 0	6 8 0	
10 per cent.	10 8 0	9 8 0	} Premium.
12 per cent.	1 8 0	2 0 0	

Having been at the corresponding period in the preceding year—

5th March, 1799.

	Buying.	Selling.	
6 per cent.	24 8 0	25 8 0	
8 per cent.	14 8 0	15 8 0	} Discount.
10 per cent.	—	—	
12 per cent.	0 2 0	0 6 0	

The distress for specie has gradually vanished, and private credit has proportionably been improved; and I have been enabled to send home with valuable cargoes every regular ship belonging to the Company in India, while on the other hand, I have employed the whole tonnage which the Port of Calcutta could furnish since the month of December, to carry to the Port of London, nearly the whole of the goods of individuals, which had been tendered for exportation previous to that month, over and above the 3,000 tons which the Company is bound by law to furnish.

The finances of the Government of Madras have improved in a still greater proportion than those of Bengal. At that

Presidency they have opened a loan, under which they have been enabled to raise a large supply. The great augmentation of the resources of Fort St. George, under the subsidiary treaties of Hyderabad and Seringapatam, and the partition treaty of Mysore, together with the improvements in the revenues of Tanjore and of the country of the Polygars will render the finances of that Presidency an object of the highest consideration. It may also be expected that industry, population and manufacture, and all the sources of public and private credit will take a new spring in our possessions on the Peninsula of India, in consequence of our increased security in that quarter.

To these causes of progressive prosperity, it is reasonable to add the benefits which cannot fail to accrue from the extension, to that part of our empire of the system of judicature and revenue, under which these provinces have attained so eminent a degree of opulence and internal tranquillity.

I trust that the 8 per cent loan now opened in Bengal, will be rapidly filled, and will enable me to provide for all the services stated in my several estimates; I expect hereafter to be able to borrow money at 8 per cent under the former system of repayment of the public securities according to priority of date.

Notwithstanding these favourable expectations, I am of opinion, that the surplus revenue of India is not likely to afford any considerable or certain resource. The increasing magnitude of our empire in India, and the continual expansion of every branch of our numerous and complicated interests must preclude any considerable reduction of our permanent charges civil, military, or commercial. More cannot be hoped from the utmost exertion of vigilance, integrity and ability in any persons to whom the government of this empire may hereafter be entrusted than to check, by a seasonable and diligent system of revision, that tendency to excess and abuse which is the inherent vice of all great establishments. On the other hand, it is my decided opinion, that the growing resources of India will keep pace with the demands upon them.

With respect to the resource which you expect to derive in India from bills upon the East India Company under the plan of remittance, the prosperous state of public credit in

England and in India will co-operate to render that resource of little avail. The state of the public funds in England will diminish the desire of remitting private fortunes to England from India in proportion to the increase of the public prosperity at home, and the high degree of security which our Indian Empire has acquired by the success of the late war against Tippoo Sultaun, has inspired so general a confidence in the stability of the British power in India, that individuals will think their capital equally safe in India, where it will certainly be more productive than in England,

These circumstances, added to the vast increase of the export of goods from India to England will probably detain much capital in this country, and retard the operation of any plan of remittance which could be devised.

Private merchants, for commercial purposes, will always offer more advantageous terms than the Company ; and in time of public prosperity the bills of individuals of undoubted capital will be received by many in preference to bills drawn on the Company on terms less favourable.

The same causes will naturally tend to maintain, if not to increase the present high rate of exchange upon bills on England ; and while the natural and current rate of exchange shall be so much higher (as it is at present) than that allowed by the plan of remittance through the Company, it is not to be expected, that individuals will resort to that plan to such an extent as shall furnish any important financial resource.

COMMERCE.—That the export of British manufactures to India, under proper regulations, might be extended to the amount of a considerable resource, I entertain no doubt, but I must observe, that before such an effect can be expected an entire reform must take place in the conduct of the East India Company's exports to India.

The leading points which require minute and diligent care in the management of this branch of the Company's affairs appear to me to be, first, that the goods should be of the first quality ; secondly, that they should be invoiced at a reasonable and just price ; and thirdly, that they should be assorted in a manner suitable to this market, and conformably to the indents sent from hence.

Under the present system the quality of the goods is fre-

quently defective ; for the two last years the invoice price has been considerably increased without any correspondent improvement in the quality of the goods, and the assortments have been injudicious and contrary to the indents sent from hence by those officers who are best acquainted with the nature of the market.

As connected with this subject, in one point of view, I desire to call your particular attention to the defective and unserviceable state of the arms annually exported to India for the use of our troops. This is a disgraceful evil, and of a most pernicious tendency. I am apprehensive that the whole system of the Company's exports to India is rendered subservient to private interests at the expense of the public.

Mr. Pitt's Bill for the reduction of the duties upon imports from India has grievously disappointed the expectation of the commercial part of the community. The duty imposed by that bill upon the *Sugars, particularly on the coarser sort,* is much too high; and the object of inviting the trade of India to the Port of London, will not, I fear, be effected by the general scale of duties adopted in that bill.

INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION OF BENGAL.—The increasing arrears of the land revenue of Bengal occupied my attention immediately after my arrival in India.

After full consideration I passed a law for the purpose of remedying the increasing evil* of accumulating balances. The beneficial effects of it have already been felt to so great an extent as to warrant a confident expectation that the stipulated income will hereafter be paid with great regularity.

My judgment and experience coincide entirely with your opinion, that the system adopted by Lord Cornwallis has proved and must continue to prove a fruitful source of happiness, wealth, industry, and population to this flourishing country. That system, however, has still to encounter some avowed and many secret enemies ; nor have its benefits been yet fully realized, it has not been carried into execution with cordiality, zeal, and energy proportioned to its merits ; it has received no aid of collateral institutions calculated to furnish a supply of men properly qualified to fill the several stations of judicature and revenue ; nor has a due and impartial se-

* Regulation No. VII., 1799.

lection been uniformly made of the persons best qualified in the actual state of the service to fill such stations as have progressively become vacant; nor has the administration of justice throughout the provinces been superintended with a sufficient degree of vigilance and care.

I have nearly matured a plan with a view to these salutary objects. The principal measures on which it will be founded will be, first, the institution of a Court of Sudder Dewannee and Nizamut Adawlut distinct from the council; but of which the Chief Justice shall be capable of sitting in council, if appointed from home to a seat in council. The province of this new Court shall be, not only to receive and judge appeals, but also to superintend the administration of justice and the general state of police in all the inferior courts, branches and departments of the judicial institutions.

It is my intention to constitute this court of those persons who bore a principal share in framing the system so happily adopted by Lord Cornwallis. Their talents, integrity, and experience, as well as the peculiar propriety and dignity of their manners render them the fittest to hold this distinguished station, to which it is my intention to annex the highest rank which the law enables me to grant.

The Chief Justice of this new court may hereafter become a member of the Council, in which event he will still continue to preside in the court. In the meanwhile I wish to be empowered by law to give a rank to the Chief Justice of the Sudder Dewanee and Nizamut Adawlut, which shall place him as nearly as possible on a level with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Judicature.

2nd. The institution of a College or University at Calcutta in which the Writers shall be subject to the rules of collegiate discipline for the first two or three years subsequent to their arrival; and shall study the languages, history, laws, manners, and customs of India, the laws enacted by the Governor-General in Council, and such rudiments of the laws of England as are necessary to enable the judges throughout these possessions to administer the laws of India in the spirit of the British constitution.

3rd. I propose to pass regulations subjecting all persons appointed to offices of the judicature or revenue to public examination in the several branches of knowledge requisite

in their respective stations, before they shall be entitled to receive the emoluments of the office to which they may have been appointed.

4th. In the several stations of revenue and judicature throughout the provinces many public officers are to be found avowedly incompetent to the due discharge of their duties. Some from ignorance, natural incapacity or fixed habits of indolence and dissipation, others from age and infirmity. Such persons have been suffered to retain their stations under the orders of the Court of Directors, prohibiting the grant of pensions of retreat to the civil service. This prohibition is contrary to true principles of economy. The inevitable operation of it has been to fix incapable persons in stations requiring efficiency; and the loss sustained by their negligencies or errors infinitely overbalances the expense of providing for them at the public charge. The application of this prohibition to persons who have grown old or infirm in the public service is illiberal and cruel, as well as impolitic. On the other hand it may, perhaps, be questioned whether those whose ignorance, natural inability, or other defects disqualify them for the public service, can be entitled to any compensation from the state which has already supported them at a considerable expense, under the presumption of their sufficiency to discharge the duties for which they receive emolument.

But viewing the actual state of the civil service at this Presidency, I know that many persons do not, and never will, render justice to the public in the stations which they now hold, although it would appear an act of great harshness and rigour to remove these persons, without making some provision for them. Their number is not very considerable, it bears no proportion to the mischief occasioned by their evil administration, and by the dangerous example which their conduct affords to the younger branches of the service. My intention, therefore, is (without waiting for orders from home) to remove all persons of any of the descriptions to which I have adverted *from efficient office*; and to provide for them by adequate pensions for life, payable to their agents in India on the condition of their returning to England. The present allowance to the Company's servants out of employment being payable only to such as reside in India would not answer the purpose proposed.

Among the servants now out of employment, but residing in Bengal, few, if any, are qualified for efficient office; the amount of the pensions to be paid under the new plan must bear a just proportion to the period of service as well as to the offices actually enjoyed at the period of removal, it will be for the Government at home to consider whether any permanent plan of pension for civil servants retiring from the service in India shall hereafter be adopted. The measure which I propose to carry into effect, is more immediately applicable to the actual state of the civil service in India; but the principles on which it is grounded may furnish the foundation of a permanent system, which shall for ever secure this Government against the evils of inefficiency, ignorance, and negligence in the subordinate branches of the executive administration.

TAXATION.—The accounts which you will have received this year of the revenue on salt will be highly satisfactory to you, and you will have observed with peculiar pleasure that the revenue arising from the sale of Opium has been completely restored by the improved system of agency, by the extreme care applied to the manufacture of the drug, by the due proportion now preserved between the quantity manufactured and the current demand, and by the measure which I have uniformly carried into effect of publicly destroying all such opium as had been declared to be adulterated. The produce of the two last sales of opium (which included the whole annual quantity for the last season) has exceeded that of the most favourable sales of that drug ever experienced in Bengal, the nett profit to the Company on the two sales in December, 1799, and February, 1800, having amounted to more than 23 lacs of rupees (£287,500 sterling).* I have little doubt that this branch of revenue will continue to flourish under the same judicious system, vigilantly administered. The public service is greatly indebted to Mr. Fleming, second Member of the Medical Board, for his careful inspection of the opium, as well as for his various suggestions by which the manufacture has been placed under improved regulations.

You will observe with great satisfaction the considerable increase which has taken place in the Government customs

* Estimating the rupee at 2s. 6d., its then current value.—[ED.]

at Calcutta since my arrival in India. This is to be attributed entirely to increased care and vigilance in the business of the custom house. The customs were placed for some time under the management of Mr. Haldane, a Member of the Board of Trade, who was principally aided by a young gentleman of the name of Twining, in restoring order to the business of the Custom-house. Mr. Twining has distinguished himself very much in this transaction; he is at present too young in the service to be placed in the enjoyment of a salary adequate to his merits, but I shall take the first practicable opportunity of promoting him; in the meanwhile I have appointed Mr. Dashwood to the collection of the customs. I can rely on his diligence and integrity, and Mr. Twining will act under him.

It is necessary to observe that the right of the Governor-General in Council to raise the duties on goods in the Port of Calcutta is questioned by the lawyers here, in the present indefinite state of our powers of legislation.

An improvement of the tax upon Spirituous Liquors and intoxicating Drugs is now under my consideration, and I have little doubt that this branch of the revenue may be much increased. But here again I feel myself embarrassed by the anomalous constitution of this government. Under the construction given to the laws for the government of the British possessions, it is a received doctrine, that the Governor-General in Council cannot legislate for the town of Calcutta. Therefore the capital City of this empire must be exempt from the operation of any law imposing additional duties on the articles above mentioned, unless I can contrive to pass such a law under the pretext of an improvement of the duties appropriated to the support of the police. I am disposed to hope that sources of just and moderate taxation may be discovered on other articles of general consumption; but this measure must be adopted gradually and with great caution. I must here also observe, that although Calcutta must necessarily be the place of the greatest consumption, as well as that where any new tax would be less sensibly felt than in the country, the supposed restrictions of the law, and the strange conflict of authorities between the Supreme Court of Judicature and the Government, preclude the possibility of my applying any system of taxation on articles of

general consumption to the town of Calcutta. I trust you will, without delay, relieve this government from a predicament so embarrassing.

POLICE.—The Police of Calcutta is now in a deplorable condition, and if speedy measures be not adopted the town will soon relapse into its ancient state of filth and unhealthiness, and will again become fatal to European constitutions. It is my intention immediately to proceed to improve the drains and roads, to widen the streets and avenues, and clear away the jungles, and remove the tanks and other nuisances situated in the neighbourhood of the town. These improvements will necessarily occasion expense; but it is an expense which the Company must incur, or forfeit every title to the character of a wise and munificent sovereign. In aid of this expense it would be just to levy an assessment on the inhabitants of Calcutta; but I have already stated that measure to be impracticable in the limited state of my powers. Various other regulations of police are requisite for the preservation of the peace and order of the town; even these I shall find it difficult to enforce until my right to legislate for Calcutta shall be rendered indisputable by act of parliament.

OUDE.—Of the two general heads, under which you have stated the objects of your anxiety, with regard to the situation of Oude, I trust that the second is now nearly accomplished; namely, the substitution of an efficient military force under the Company's authority, in place of the Nabob Vizier's dangerous and undisciplined army. This reform has not been effected without great reluctance on the part of the Vizier, whose character has been displayed on this occasion in the genuine colours of Asiatic treachery and falsehood. I have nothing to hope from any other quality in his Excellency's mind, excepting his acknowledged pusillanimity, which I flatter myself will induce him to submit to the introduction of such a portion of the British authority into the management of his country, as is indispensably necessary to the just and pure administration of the Government; to the accurate collection and economical expenditure of his revenues; and to the relief of his people from the extortion, cruelty and oppression, under which they now suffer. I shall hereafter submit to you a detailed view of my proceedings in Oude; at present

it may be sufficient to say, that I consider the reform of the Vizier's military establishment to be far advanced, and that in consequence of the success of that preliminary step, I entertain a sanguine hope of being able to carry the same spirit of reform with vigour and effect into every other branch of his affairs.

GOVERNMENT OF FORT ST. GEORGE.—I am happy to be able to express my entire concurrence, in your opinion, with regard to the progressive improvement of the administration of affairs at Fort St. George; and I have no doubt that the same system will continue to be pursued by Lord Clive and by the persons who now constitute his advisers at that Presidency. My long residence at Fort St. George, and the cordiality, temper, and honour of Lord Clive have completely identified the two Governments, and I find no more difficulty in governing our extensive possessions on the coast, with all our recent acquisitions of territory and influence, than in regulating any of the collectorships in Bengal. You will observe, by the public proceedings, that I have lately transmitted to Fort St. George detailed orders for introducing into the possessions under the immediate Government of that Presidency, the same system of internal administration, under which these provinces have so happily flourished. I entertain no doubt, that, under the present Government at Fort St. George, my orders will be carried into effect with the utmost degree of honesty, alacrity, and zeal. The execution, however, of those orders must necessarily be imperfect unless accompanied by the application to the civil service at Fort St. George, not only of all those subsidiary improvements still requisite in Bengal, but of other remedies more peculiarly demanded by the state of the service at Fort St. George. My present inclination is to render the Court of Sudder Dewanee and Nizamut Adawlut in Bengal the Supreme Court of Appeal from all the Company's possessions, and to vest in it the general superintendence of the administration of justice and the regulation of police throughout the British empire in India. This arrangement appears to be well calculated to secure uniformity, consistency, and purity in the conduct of all the subordinate courts of justice, and in every institution of police. I do not apprehend that it will be necessary or expedient to establish any intermediate

Court of Appeal at Fort St. George between the Sudder Dewanee Adawlut in Bengal, and the ordinary Courts of Circuit and Appeal, to be instituted on the coast of Coromandel. I am also inclined to think that the writers destined for Fort St. George may advantageously pass the two first years of their residence in India at the University of Calcutta; where proper professors may be established for their instruction in the languages peculiar to the territories subject to the immediate Government of Fort St. George.

The adoption of a plan for pensioning public officers incapable of service is required at least as much at Fort St. George as in Bengal. But the peculiar evil now inherent in the constitution of the service at Fort St. George is not only unknown in Bengal, but directly contrary to the fundamental principle on which Lord Cornwallis rested all his plans for amending and purifying the administration of affairs in these provinces. He prohibited all indirect and secret emoluments, and all mixture in pursuits of commerce, or of other affairs incompatible with a due attention to the public service; and he established the allowances of the public officers on so liberal a scale as might enable them not merely to subsist during the period of their public labours, but to realize, with due economy, a competent provision after a moderate period of service.

This system is not founded on any principle exclusively applicable to the characters, habits, or interests of the public servants in Bengal. It is founded in a just and correct knowledge of mankind, for no proposition can be more self-evident, or of more universal application, than that the best security against the temptation of illicit profit, is to annex liberal emolument to honest labour. It is, therefore, difficult to conceive on what ground an expectation can be formed, that the public service at Fort St. George should be as pure and correct as that in Bengal; while the civil servants of Fort St. George shall be permitted to mix in pursuits foreign to their public duties; and while the general scale of the allowances at Fort St. George shall remain so low as to preclude those prospects of honest profit deemed necessary in Bengal for securing the integrity of the public servants. I am aware that this remark does not apply with so much force to the commercial as to other branches of the Company's

service at Fort St. George. Some of the commercial allowances have been increased at that Presidency, on the very principle of rendering them so ample as to preclude the temptation of irregular profit; and yet the irresistible application of the same principle to other branches of the service at the same Presidency has never been admitted in practice, however it may have been acknowledged in argument. For it can never be supposed that the Company can deliberately deem it to be a more incumbent duty of Government to secure the honest discharge of its commercial concerns, than to preserve its revenues from peculation, and the administration of its laws from corruption and oppression. It is possible that the limited and precarious condition of the revenues of the Presidency of Fort St. George, and its state of insecurity during the existence of the contiguous hostile power in Mysore, may have retarded the due consideration of this subject. But in the present increased, and, I trust, progressive state of the prosperity and security of that valuable possession, no such obstacle exists to a reform urgently demanded by every principle of humanity, policy, and justice.

I am convinced that the continuance of the present inadequate allowances of the public servants at Fort St. George would prove an insuperable bar to the improvement of the revenues, and to the due administration of justice in that part of our Empire. At present the public servants at Fort St. George, in most of the offices, can find no alternative but poverty or corruption. Is it the part of wisdom or honour in any Government to reduce its servants to such an alternative? During my residence at Fort St. George a most respectable member of the Board of Revenue, Mr. Harrington, resigned his seat at the Board because his salary did not afford him the hope of providing a competent maintenance for his family at the expiration of his service; and he entered into a Commercial House of Agency, withdrawing from the Company's service talents, integrity, and zeal, which had proved highly useful, and might have been exerted with increased benefit to their affairs. I know that Mr. Cockburne, (whose abilities, knowledge, and integrity, are not surpassed by any person in India,) entertains similar intentions of retiring from the Company's service. And

it must be evident to your comprehensive view and long experience of public affairs that this evil will be aggravated in proportion to the increased magnitude and importance of the interests entrusted to the management of the public servants at Fort St. George; and that ultimately a service so defective must be deserted by all who are not disposed to take advantage of its abuses.

The consideration of all these circumstances has induced me to call Lord Clive's particular attention to the scale of allowances at Fort St. George; and it is my intention to accompany the institution of the new Courts of Judicature at that Presidency by a general revision of the salaries of their civil service; the result of which will, I trust, enable me to place all the allowances on a proper level.

The delay attendant upon the expectation of orders from home and the urgent pressure of the evil will, I trust, sufficiently justify my determination to apply, with all practicable despatch, such a remedy as shall appear to my judgment to promise the most speedy, beneficial, and permanent effect.

I entertain little doubt that the revenues, under the management of the Government of Fort St. George, will be considerably improved in all their branches; and that the additional expense of providing for the important objects stated in the preceding paragraphs will be far overbalanced by the consequent amelioration of all our resources in that quarter.

CARNATIC.—The double Government of the Carnatic is a difficulty which continues to present the most serious and alarming obstacles to every attempt at reform. The expectation of favourable opportunities of negociation with the Nabob of Arcot, and of the effects of conciliation and attention towards him will, I am convinced, be ever disappointed by the event. You recollect with what sanguine hopes I looked forward to the result of measures adopted in a spirit of mildness and persuasion, but I have found them entirely vain and fruitless; nor can I cherish the slightest ray of hope that such a course can ever prove successful, during the life of the present Nabob. His Highness is surrounded by European advisers of the most dangerous and profligate character, whose interests are deeply involved in the perpetuation of the abuses of his Government, and who (amongst other

means of perverting his Councils) labour to inspire him with the notion of a distinction of interests and powers between the Royal Government and that constituted by Act of Parliament for the administration of the British Empire in India. In all his conversations and correspondence, he studiously distinguishes his Majesty's Government from that of the Court of Directors; uniformly treating the latter with disrespect, and even with ridicule and contempt. In my last conversation with his Highness he plainly declared to me that he considered his Majesty to be his father, friend, ally, and protector, but that the Court of Directors desired to "obtain his country any how."

The principles of this distinction are encouraged in his Highness's mind by the letters and embassies which have occasionally reached him from his Majesty through channels not only unconnected but avowedly at variance with the British Government in India. All such letters and embassies have the most pernicious tendency to withdraw the confidence and respect of the natives from the governments in India, and to fix their attention on his Majesty's naval or military officers, or such persons (of whatever character) as may accidentally be the bearers of his letters. The frequent letters which his Highness the Nabob receives from his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales greatly aggravate the same evil; and it is with the utmost concern that I feel myself bound by my public duty to request that you will take an opportunity of representing to his Royal Highness that his correspondence with the Nabob of the Carnatic has produced an effect entirely contrary to his Royal Highness's wishes, and has been highly injurious to the public service in India.

Few, if any, of the Company's servants at Madras are now directly engaged in the intrigues of his Highness's Durbar. The principal and most mischievous agents and counsellors of his Highness are to be found among persons who have been the bearers of letters to his Highness from England, and among the attorneys and low practitioners of the law, who notoriously conduct his Highness's correspondence with the Government. Nor can I entertain any expectation that the newly established Judicature at Madras, under its present constitution, will in any degree assist the Government in repressing the intrigues and corruption of the Durbar. My

experience during my residence at Fort St. George leads me to believe that the powers of the Court of the Recorder will prove entirely inadequate to the detection and punishment of the usurious and corrupt practices which that Court was intended to repress, while the establishment of such a Court will tend to confirm the audacity of the tribe of pettyfoggers which now infests the Carnatic, and governs the Nabob's Durbar. I confess that I cannot concur with you in ascribing the purity of the service in Bengal to the influence of the Supreme Court of Judicature at Calcutta. The most corrupt period in the history of Bengal, or perhaps in that of any of our foreign establishments, is to be dated from the institution of the Supreme Court to the arrival of Lord Cornwallis, a period of time, during a considerable portion of which that Court exercised its powers to their utmost possible extent. The purity of Lord Cornwallis's personal example, and the integrity and wisdom of his institutions, the increase of the regular and avowed public allowances, the separation of the legislative, judicial, and executive powers of the Government, and the consequent subjection of the Government itself to the controul of its own laws, were the real foundations of the reform at this Presidency. This constitution was the source, and its operation has been the security, of that reform; neither the design nor the execution of the amended system of administration in Bengal was in any degree aided by the co-operation, influence, or example of the Supreme Court. During the administrations of Lord Cornwallis, and of Lord Teignmouth, the Supreme Court teemed with abuses of every description, and would have afforded a much fitter subject than an instrument of reform. Respectable and honourable as the person is who now presides in that Court, and eminent as his public services have been in the detection and remedy of the abuses abetted by his predecessors, I cannot discover in what manner the influence or authority of the Supreme Court now operate to preserve the purity of the service of Government.

The public servants look exclusively to the person in whose hands the Government resides, and to the practical result of that constitution which he is bound to administer. Under that constitution he possesses ample powers of reward and punishment; and the due exercise of those powers consti-

tutes the vital principle of the public service, and the sole spring from which the purity or corruption of the subordinate officers must ever flow. The responsibility of the Governor-General in Council to the Government at home, and the conspicuous station in which he is placed, sufficiently secure the due exercise of his arduous functions.

The Supreme Court possesses no power of rewarding the public servants, and with respect to their punishment, it can never proceed vigorously or efficaciously without the co-operation of Government; even with that co-operation, the powers of the Supreme Court must be limited by the difficulties of obtaining legal proof of malversation; and even where such proofs can be obtained, the species of punishment which the Supreme Court can inflict can neither be so speedy nor so formidable to the public servants as the powers of suspension and subsequent prosecution at home vested in the Government. Whenever punishment in the form of public prosecution may become requisite, I am convinced that it would be much more effectually inflicted, if the prosecution were always to be instituted in England. With regard to petty cases of abuse every useful purpose would be answered by a tribunal, independent of the Government, but placed towards it in the relation of a mere interpreter of the laws of England, modified by such as may be enacted by the Governor-General in Council.

The supposed controul of the Supreme Court over the person of the Governor-General never can be exercised without occasioning a convulsion in the Government; it is, therefore, either useless, or dangerous, and every trace of it ought to be abolished. The extreme cases in which the crimes of the Governor-General may require the controul of a superior authority, cannot be provided against in India without the application of a remedy infinitely more perilous than the supposed evil; the existence of which is scarcely within the verge of possibility. The remedy of such cases should be left on the same ground as it stands on in Ireland with relation to the possible personal crimes of the chief Governor exercising the sovereign executive power. No power in India should appear to be co-ordinate with the Government, and still less to rival or to control it.

I shall hereafter address you more in detail on the present constitution of the Supreme Court of Judicature, (particularly on such parts of it as have proved practical impediments to the exercise of the control of this government over its own native officers, civil and military and native subjects ; (but it would have been uncandid in me to pass without notice a passage in your correspondence, relating to so important a subject, in which I have the misfortune not to concur in your opinion.

I cannot conclude this subject without adding my cordial testimony in favour of the moderation, discretion and propriety with which the present Court (under the direction of Sir John Anstruther) has uniformly exercised its powers, not only without a symptom of jealousy, but with every possible attention to the dignity, vigour and efficacy of the government ; but a power radically dangerous ought not to find protection in the temporary forbearance of those hands in which it is vested.

The duty of communicating to you without reserve, my sentiments on the subject of the utility of the Supreme Court of Judicature, has led me to digress from the actual state of the Carnatic.

I am thoroughly convinced, that no effectual remedy can ever be applied to the evils which afflict that country, without obtaining from the Nabob powers at least as extensive as those vested in the Company by the late treaty of Tanjore. At the death of the present Nabob, such a treaty might easily be obtained from his successor, (if after that event it should be thought advisable to admit any nominal sovereign of the Carnatic, excepting the Company.) A young man resides at Chepauk, who is treated by the Nabob as his Highness's son. This young man is certainly the son of a dancing woman, who was received for some time in his Highness's house ; and the Nabob declares himself to be the father. Numerous legitimate descendants of Wallajah are in existence. The whole question of the succession will therefore be completely open to the decision of the Company, upon the decease of the present Nabob. The inclination of my opinion is, that the most advisable settlement would be, to place Oindut ul Omra's supposed son on the Musnud, under a

treaty similar to that which was lately concluded with the Rajah of Tanjore, it will however, be expedient that you should immediately consider whether it might not be a more effectual arrangement to provide liberally for every branch of the descendants of Wallajah and Omdut ul Omra, and to vest even the nominal sovereignty of the Carnatic in the Company.

On this subject I request your immediate instructions; which you will frame with reference to the following most important and interesting considerations.

During the whole course of the late war with Tippoo Sultan, the conduct of all the Nabob's officers without exception, amounted nearly to positive hostility in every part of his territories through which the British army, or that of the Nizam marched, or even in which supplies were ordered to be procured or collected for their use. When complaints were stated to his Highness he promised redress, but never afforded it in any instance.

I was compelled to seize the persons of some of his principal officers, and to bring them down to Fort St. George, from districts in which our force was not sufficiently considerable to furnish an effectual check to their treasonable practices. In all districts so circumstanced his Highness's officers did not scruple to proceed to open violence for the purpose of obstructing our supplies.

During this arduous crisis, his Highness frequently endeavoured to anticipate my complaints by alleging pretended grievances to justify the conduct of his officers, but upon examination his Highness's complaints uniformly appeared to be utterly devoid of foundation.

At the most critical period of our military preparations, when every European and native at Madras, emulated each other in aiding the public service by loan and contribution, his Highness could not be induced to advance, even on account of his acknowledged debts, any assistance to the public treasury. He indeed, with much reluctance, under the apprehension of a cessation of all friendly intercourse between him and me, engaged to advance a sum on account of his new cavalry debt; but after the most solemn protestations of punctuality, he broke his faith with every circumstance of infamy and dishonour, at a moment when this viola-

tion of his engagements might have proved fatal to the progress of the army; if I had suffered myself to be so far the dupe of his repeated assurances, as to have relied in any degree on their performance for any pecuniary supply of the troops in the field.

During the whole of this period, I have every reason to be confident that his Highness possessed the ready means of satisfying a much more considerable demand, than I had deemed it expedient to make upon him.

It was perfectly evident during the progress of our success, that his Highness derived no satisfaction from the triumph of our arms ; and it is remarkable that he never appeared in public at the celebration of any of the rejoicings occasioned by the glorious termination of the war.

Whatever suspicions of his Highness's personal disaffection to the British Government might have been warranted by all these combined circumstances, I was rather disposed to attribute them to the weakness of his government, or to the corruption and intrigues of his advisers than to any spirit of positive treachery in his own disposition ; but the records of the late Tippoo Sultaun, which fell into our hands after the capture of Seringapatam, have furnished me with the most authentic and indisputable evidence that a secret correspondence of a nature the most hostile to the British power, was opened with Tippoo Sultaun by the late Nabob Wallajah towards the close of his life, through the agency of Omdut ul Omra the present Nabob.

Omdut ul Omra appears to have been extremely zealous and forward in the conduct of this secret intercourse during the life of his father, and no question can be entertained that the late Nabob, as a principal, and Omdut ul Omra as an agent, were guilty of a flagrant violation of the treaty of 1792 ; as well as of the fundamental principle of their connection with the Company. Omdut ul Omra was a party to the treaty of 1792, and on that circumstance founds all his present rights. Sufficient proof appears that Omdut ul Omra, after his accession, manifested a disposition to maintain the correspondence commenced by his father through him ; and I entertain no doubt that his objects in that correspondence were of the same hostile and treacherous character, as they had been previous to the death of his father. The proof arising from

written documents of his overt acts of hostility since his accession, is not so full and distinct as that which relates to his former agency. But this defect may be supplied by oral testimony, as all the necessary witnesses are alive and in our hands.

No doubt exists in my mind, that the British Government would now be completely justified, in depriving the Nabob of all power over his country, and reducing him to the state of a mere pensioner.

The only questions which remain for decision are the time of carrying this measure into execution, and the amount of the provision to be made for the Nabob, for his descendants, and for those of Wallajah. As soon as you shall have received this letter, I request you to despatch an express to me with your opinion, although mine is so decided, that I shall not wait for the communication of yours, if the season should appear to me to be favourable for the great measure which is now become indispensable on every principle of justice and policy.

TANJORE.—With respect to Tanjore, the treaty which I framed previous to my departure from Fort St. George, and which has since been carried into effect by Lord Clive, will, I trust, place the administration of the affairs of that country on an improved foundation. The difficulties which I encountered in obtaining a correct and consistent account of Tanjore, are scarcely to be described or imagined.

After a most tedious enquiry, I brought the several contending parties to a fair discussion (or rather to a bitter contest) in my presence; and after an argument which lasted three or four days, I proceeded to review the whole case in a regular manner, adverting to every fact and argument on both sides of the question. At length the contending parties unanimously concurred in the expediency and justice of the treaty, in the form in which it has been concluded.

A question will arise with respect to the unregistered debt of the late Rajah of Tanjore. I am inclined to believe that some branches of that debt, as well as that of the unconsolidated debt of the Nabob of the Carnatic, are at least as well entitled to consideration as any part of the debt sanctioned by parliament. The subject merits your attention. I shall not feel myself at liberty to act upon it without orders from

home; but I am satisfied that you will find some cases of great hardship among many rather deserving prosecution than payment.

CIRCARS.—The Northern Circars, according to the report of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George, are now in a state to receive the same principles of government, with some local modifications, which have been applied to Bengal. The new settlement now about to be introduced upon the coast, will therefore include that vast tract of country. It may be convenient to observe to you in this place that my determination to render the new settlement of the land revenue on the coast perpetual, without previous reference to the Court of Directors was founded on intelligence from Mr. Cockburne that the terror of such a reference would render all settlement impracticable, and above all would entirely frustrate the sale of the Havelly Lands.

MALABAR.—The condition of the coast of Malabar, has been so entirely changed by the conquest of Mysore, that the principles stated in your despatches to the Government of Bombay, and in General Stuart's letters to you, are no longer applicable to the actual circumstances of that district. The conquest of Mysore will, I trust, enable us to settle Malabar and Canara on a systematic and durable plan of government. The subject is now under my consideration. One principle however, I am persuaded will appear as evident and incontrovertible to your mind as it does to mine; that whatever may be our ultimate determination with respect to the power of the several Rajahs, it must appear to flow from the generosity, justice and power of the British Government; and not to be derived from a timid submission to the refractory spirit of any rebellious tributary.

COMMUNICATION WITH ENGLAND.—If the war with France should be protracted, and Buonaparte continue at the head of affairs, I am persuaded that some attempt will be made by France against our Indian empire. A regular monthly despatch overland from London to India will, in that event, be of the utmost importance. Indeed, under any circumstances, a speedy and certain communication between England and India, appears to me to be an object in which the interests of both countries are deeply involved. My opinion is, that, in addition to the despatch overland, monthly

packets should be established to sail regularly both from Europe and India. They might carry small cargoes and passengers, which, with the profits of postage on letters, would more than defray their expence.

In reviewing your correspondence, I have not thought it necessary to return any particular replies to your several letters of recommendation. The receipt of them is noted in the annexed memorandum. Being in possession of your principles with respect to recommendations, I do not think any further explanation necessary.

I remain, my dear Sir, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXX.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Honourable Lord Clive

MY LORD,

Fort St. George, March 26th, 1800.

Having at present under my consideration the state of our relations with the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, and the whole tenour of his conduct towards the British Government, I shall soon be prepared to communicate to your Lordship the final result of my determination on these important subjects. In the mean while, the possibility of the sudden contingency of his Highness's death, renders it expedient that I should state to your Lordship, in an official form, the opinions and directions which I communicated to you verbally during my residence at Fort St. George, for your Lordship's guidance in the event of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra's death.

Although the treaty of 1792 was concluded in the name and on behalf of the Nabob Wallajah, and *of his successors*, no obligation of that treaty binds the Company to place, or to support, on the Musnud, any individual of the family (even if any should be nominated by the reigning Nabob) whose pretensions to the succession may be actually disputed, or may appear questionable.

Various rumours exist relative to the birth of the person of whom the Nabob Omdut ul Omra declares himself to be the father. It is, however, certain that the mother of this young man is of low origin; and that she was never married

to the Nabob. It is reasonable to believe, that the succession of this young man would be felt as an injury to the rights of the late Ameer's son, by all who might think favourably of the latter's title: and all such persons would undoubtedly use every practicable effort to defeat such a succession.

Under these circumstances, neither party could claim our support under the existing treaties: and in determining to whom that support shall be granted, we are at liberty to consider the security of the British interests in the Carnatic, the general prosperity of the country, and the happiness of its inhabitants, as the primary objects of our right and duty.

On this principle, it is manifest, that, from the candidate whom we may resolve to raise to the Musnud, we may justly require the most ample pledges for the effectual remedy of the various evils which now afflict the Carnatic.

For this purpose, the successor of Omdut ul Omra must be required to surrender to the Company, in the most absolute manner, the civil and military administration of the Carnatic; not retaining possession of a single fortress, nor maintaining any armed force, under any pretext whatever. No other arrangement would be adequate to the attainment of the indispensable objects which have been stated.

The general principles of the late treaty with the Rajah of Tanjore may be made the model of the agreement to be concluded with the successor of Omdut ul Omra. Such modifications of that treaty, as may be rendered necessary by a variation of circumstances, will readily suggest themselves to your Lordship's mind. The article relative to forts and military establishments, noticed in the preceding paragraph, will admit of no modification. The amount of the provision to be made for the support of the succeeding Nabob, and of the other branches of the family of the late Wallajah, should be regulated with reference to the numbers and rank of the persons to be maintained, and on a scale of reasonable liberality.

Although the elevation of the supposed son of Omdut ul Omra to the Musnud would probably be disagreeable to the principal Mussulmans in the Carnatic, I am of opinion that he might be rendered a better instrument for the accomplishment of the salutary ends proposed, than the son of the late Ameer could be expected to prove. Whenever, therefore,

the death of the present Nabob may take place, your Lordship will place the young man, who passes for his Highness's son, on the vacant Musnud, previously requiring his consent to the conditions generally described in this despatch; unless any objection to this disposition should occur to your Lordship's mind; in which event, your Lordship will be so good as to state your objections to me immediately after the receipt of this letter.

If the Nabob's supposed son should refuse or delay to subscribe to those conditions within twenty-four hours from the present Nabob's death, you will then give the son of the late Ameer the option of the succession on the same terms. If he also should reject the necessary conditions, your Lordship will immediately proceed to establish the Company's authority in the completest manner throughout the Carnatic; and you will suspend all further negotiation on the subject of the succession until the receipt of instructions from the Governor-General in Council.

I am not aware that the Ameer has left more than one son. In the event of his male offspring being more numerous, your Lordship will consider these directions as applicable only to his eldest son; and you will not treat with any younger branch of his family.

Your Lordship will bear in mind the expediency of making a reasonable provision, in any of the cases supposed, for the Nabob's family, and for all natives of distinction and character, as well as for indigent families, at present dependent on the service or bounty of the Nabob of the Carnatic. Any arrangements which may be necessary for this purpose should take place, if possible, in the same instant with the establishment of the Company's authority throughout the country.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXXI.

Sir W. Sidney Smith to the Earl of Mornington.

Tigre off Alexandria, April 5th, 1800.

MY LORD,

[Received 21st of June.]

It is my duty to give your Lordship the earliest information that hostilities recommenced between the French and Ottoman armies in Egypt on the 20th ultimo, as it is probable the knowledge of this event will decide your Lordship to continue in the execution of any plan of co-operation you might have formed towards driving this French army out of Egypt by force, that mode seeming to be the only one practicable under the change of circumstances which has taken place since the signature of the convention for the evacuation. This change has been occasioned by the notification made by Lord Keith, Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's ships in the Mediterranean, to General Kleber of the only conditions under which the return of the French army to France would be allowed, and which the veteran troops composing it refused to listen to. General Kleber readily acquiesced to my proposition, to open new conferences on the subject, and let things remain in suspense till the answer to my despatches notifying the convention should come from London. The Grand Vizier was very liberal on the subject, as General Kleber informs me, in his letter, acquiescing to my proposition for a conference, and as appears from his Highness's letter to me, but the impatience of the Turkish troops to enter Cairo, from which they were only five miles distant, occasioned the rejection of the French General's demand of a delay in the evacuation of the citadel, proportionate to the interval of time there might be previous to the arrival of the consent of the British Government to the free passage of the French army as settled by the convention. General Kleber, in consequence, notified his intention to renew hostilities, and attacked the Vizier's advanced posts on the morning of the 20th ultimo. The circumstances and result of this battle, if it can be so called, are detailed in a letter sent by Mr. Morier open through me to your Lordship. I retarded the evil day as long as I could by negotiation, and the conclusion of a treaty of evacuation in the only possible way in which it could

be brought about. The lamentations of the malcontents of the French army, (forming the evacuation party), or their reasoning in opposition to the colonist party, not being to be considered as any proof of their inability to hold out against us ; in fact, the inefficiency of the Turkish force is so much more absolute, that I am apprehensive of the consequences of this defeat placing things in a much worse position than they were at the beginning of the campaign. The Grand Vizier cannot be said to have an army with him at present, and the only chance there is of preventing the total annihilation of his remaining force is, the desperation to which a portion of his forces may be driven from apprehension of re-crossing the desert, which may induce them to make a stand among the last villages on the edge of the cultivated country near Bel-beis, the dislodging them from which will be no easy matter, considering the Turkish mode of fighting. This is but a slender hope, but I am endeavouring, all in my power, to realize it by sending a supply of powder to the Vizier, and by such other co-operation as my very limited means enables me to employ on the coast. I expect the theatre of naval war will be transferred hither by the natural propensity of Buonaparte to support his favourite " colony," and his desire to prove to this army that he has not deserted them entirely. Twenty-two ships of the line were ready for sea at Brest the latter end of December. The combined fleet will amount to 48, and from the circumstances of the preparations making at Carthagena for the reception of a fleet, it is conjectured that their destination is the Mediterranean. This circumstance may be an additional inducement to your Lordship to turn your attention this way, and to employ a little of that energy and prowess which has so well established our military reputation in India towards changing the contempt in which the French hold our army, into that respect they affect to give exclusively to our navy, but which opportunity will ever (as it has done in the Mysore) prove to be equally due to both.

I have the honour to be,
with the utmost respect, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servant,
W. SIDNEY SMITH.

No. LXXII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Honourable Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, April 7th, 1800.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship copies, in Persian, of various extracts from letters and other papers found in the Palace of Seringapatam. The Persian documents are accompanied by translations in English; and the Persian copies, as well as the translations, are attested by the Persian translator of this Government, whose report to me on the contents of these important papers, and of the other documents which accompany this letter, is annexed to this despatch.*

The embarrassments opposed by the Nabob Omdut ul Omra's officers to the collection and movement of our supplies, during the last war with Tippoo Sultaun, repeatedly called for my interposition during my residence at Fort St. George, and induced considerable doubts in my mind of his Highness's fidelity to the fundamental principle of his engagements with the Company. In the last council which I had the honour to hold at Fort St. George, previous to my departure from that Presidency, your Lordship may recollect that I stated my suspicions, that both the Nabobs Wallajah and Omdut ul Omra, had been engaged in a secret correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun since the peace of 1792. Those suspicions were founded on a cursory view of one of the documents composing the series of papers now transmitted to your Lordship. The subject has since engaged my most serious attention. Several of the most important of these papers have recently reached my hands, and a deliberate consideration of the evidence resulting from the whole of these documents has not only confirmed, in the most unquestionable manner, my suspicions of the existence of a secret correspondence between the personages already named, but satisfied my judgment that its objects, on the part of the

* These documents are voluminous: they completely convict the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, and his father the late Nabob Wallajah, of a breach of the alliance subsisting between them and the Company; and of forming an intimate connection with Tippoo Sultaun, directly adverse to the British interests in India.—[ED.]

Nabobs Walajah and Omdut ul Omra, and especially of the latter, was of the most hostile tendency to the British interests.

The report of the Persian translator* on the nature of these papers is drawn with so much ability, and so accurately detailed, that I do not judge it necessary, at present, to enter into a more particular comment upon them. I shall hereafter, however, review the whole subject. The object of the present letter is solely to convey to your Lordship my instructions with regard to the measures necessary to effect a more full discovery of all the circumstances of this extraordinary transaction, as well as to secure the British interests in the Carnatic against any possible consequences to be apprehended from the disaffection of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, during the interval of the requisite enquiry into his conduct.

The proofs arising from the papers would certainly be sufficient to justify the British Government in depriving that faithless and ungrateful prince of all means of rendering any part of the resources of the territories which he holds under the protection of the Company, subservient to the further violation of his engagements, and to the prosecution of his desperate purposes of treachery and ingratitude. But it will be more consistent with the character of the British Government to regulate its proceedings by a regard to its own dignity and systematic moderation, than by the standard of his Highness's crimes. It is, therefore, my intention to proceed to a deliberate enquiry, founded on such further written documents as we may be able to obtain at Seringapatam, as well as on the oral testimony of the principal persons concerned in this correspondence. This enquiry must be concluded previous to the adoption of those arrangements which, I am persuaded, must be the ultimate consequence of a just investigation of this transaction.

With these sentiments, I request your Lordship to lose no time after the receipt of this despatch, in examining the several witnesses, of whom a list is annexed, and in directing Lieutenant-Colonel Close to make such further enquiries as he can prosecute, and to furnish your Lordship with such written and oral testimony as he may be enabled to obtain at Seringapatam.

* See Appendix.

I have annexed to this despatch a memorandum, which may serve to assist your Lordship in the conduct of the intended enquiry. I refer you to that paper, as containing a summary view of my ideas with regard to the mode of regulating the examination of the several witnesses. I cannot, however, relinquish this part of the subject without recommending to your Lordship's most serious attention the necessity of enquiring with the utmost degree of accuracy into the conduct of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, subsequent to the date of the letter N, received at Seringapatam on the 8th of January, 1797; and to trace his correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun, down to the period of our preparations for the last war, throughout the season of these preparations, and throughout the campaign which ensued.

I am persuaded that your Lordship, and all the public officers employed under your orders in the conduct of this examination, will advert to the great importance of observing the strictest secrecy until the period of its final close, and of the arrival of my instructions, founded on your Lordship's report to me of the evidence collected by you.

I request you to forward the result of your enquiries to me by an express vessel (to be engaged immediately for this purpose), and in duplicate over land, in order that my ultimate instructions may be transmitted to you with the least possible delay.

The result of the enquiry directed by this despatch will probably render it my duty to deprive the Nabob Omdut ul Omra of the civil and military government of the Carnatic, under such modifications and regulations as may be deemed expedient to secure the safety of our interests in that valuable possession, with the least practicable degree of pressure on his Highness's feelings. If this despatch had contained a positive instruction to your Lordship to assume the Government of the Carnatic without delay, I apprehend that the necessary preparations for carrying that measure into effect must have occupied a more considerable space of time than will now be required for the proposed enquiry, and for the communication of my judgment upon it, although it is my wish to delay the actual assumption of his Highness's Government until that enquiry shall be completed, I deem it necessary to authorise your Lordship to proceed immediately

to make every arrangement preparatory to that measure, which now appears to me to have become inevitable. In addition to these powers, my confidence in your Lordship's discretion, and my sense of the extreme peril to which the disaffection of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra may eventually expose the Carnatic, induce me to furnish your Lordship with a general authority of assuming his Highness's civil and military government, and of taking any such further steps as the exigency of the circumstances on the spot may appear to your Lordship to require. In such a posture of affairs, it is impossible to frame any rule from which the pressure of the moment might not demand a departure. I shall, therefore, content myself with apprising your Lordship of my anxious desire to avoid the extremity of assuming the government of the Carnatic previous to the completion of the enquiry, and to the arrival of my final instructions after the result of that enquiry shall have been communicated to me. I cannot foresee any event of less importance than the strong probability of an hostile invasion, or of internal commotion, either in the Carnatic or in Mysore, which could render it necessary for your Lordship to assume the country without previous reference to me. You will, however, understand the intention of this despatch to be, to give you a discretionary power of acting according to your deliberate view of the necessity of the case before you.

Your Lordship will concur with me in opinion, that the disclosure made by the annexed documents, of the disaffection of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, supersedes the necessity of any further consideration of the state of the Company's connection with that prince, under the orders lately conveyed by the Honourable Court of Directors to your Lordship in council. While those orders were under my consideration, a combination of fortunate circumstances revealed that correspondence, which at once furnishes an explanation of the perverse spirit of his Highness's councils, since his accession to the Musnud, and demands the application of the sole effectual remedy for the evils which those councils have brought upon his people.

Although the accompanying, as well as the present instructions, to your Lordship, have been read and approved in the Secret Department, by the Governor-General in council, at

Fort William, I have deemed it expedient to transmit this despatch to your Lordship, in the present form, instead of addressing it to your Lordship in council.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXXIII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right. Hon. Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 10th April, 1800.

I have the honour to enclose for your Lordship's information an extract of a letter from the Resident at Hyderabad, communicating to me a proposition made by Azim ul Omra, for granting to the Company an assignment of certain districts, belonging to his Highness the Nizam, as a fund for the payment of the regiment of cavalry recently added to the subsidiary force stationed in his Highness's dominions.

The principle of this proposal is perfectly conformable to my wishes; but the local position of the particular districts offered by Azim ul Omra, would render the management of them extremely inconvenient, if not absolutely impracticable, to the Company's servants. The proposal, therefore, cannot be accepted in its present form.

The Resident at Hyderabad, however, thinking it probable that Azim ul Omra might be induced to assign to us, for the purpose stated, districts more convenient in point of situation, I have directed the Resident to consult your Lordship's opinion with respect to this point; and I have authorized him to treat with the minister for the assignment of such districts as shall be approved by your Lordship, stipulating, however, that the management of the same shall be exclusively and absolutely vested in the Company, without reserving any power of interference for his Highness the Nizam's government.

It may be proper to apprise your Lordship, that I shall be well satisfied to commute the whole amount of the subsidy payable by his Highness the Nizam, for an equivalent assignment of territory contiguous to the Carnatic; and I shall be

glad to receive your Lordship's sentiments with regard to the districts which it would be most expedient to demand in the case supposed, as well with a view to considerations of military advantage, as to those of revenue.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXXIV.

The Earl of Mornington to the Hon. Jonathan Duncan.

SIR,

Fort William, April 16th, 1800.

Previous to your departure from Bombay for the settlement of the affairs of Surat, under my instructions in council of the 10th March last, it appears to me of essential importance, that I should express to you my sentiments with regard to the powers of government which the public interests require you to exercise during your absence from the Presidency of Bombay.

It must be presumed that the Legislature of Great Britain had foreseen that public affairs might frequently demand the presence of the governors of Fort St. George and Bombay, in parts of the territories immediately subject to those respective Presidencies, but remote from the ordinary seat of government.

No special provision, however, has been made by law, for the administration of the government in the absence of the Governor on such occasions, although ample provision has been made for the case of the Governor-General proceeding to Fort St. George or Bombay. It may be inferred, therefore, to have been the intention of the Legislature, that, whenever the public interest might require the presence of the Governors of Fort St. George or Bombay, at any places within the limits of their governments, but remote from the established seat of Government, the Governors should exercise all the powers vested in them by law when in council at the Presidency, as far as circumstances might admit.

Supposing the Legislature not to have adverted to the case in question, it cannot be imagined to have been their intention, that the Governors of those Presidencies should

not quit the seat of their respective governments whenever the public interests might demand their presence in some distant part of the territories immediately subject to their authority.

Until some legislative provisions shall have been made for the case of the temporary absence of the Governors of the different presidencies within the limits of their respective governments, I have no hesitation in declaring it to be my opinion, that it is consistent with the spirit of the law, as well as essential to the public interests, that the Governors respectively should, on such occasions, exercise the same powers as when in council at the Presidency, as far as circumstances may admit.

While the Governors of Fort St. George or Bombay remain within the limits of their governments, it is evident that the members of the respective councils possess no powers distinct from the Governor, and that they are incompetent to perform any act of government otherwise than in his presence, and even otherwise than with his assent in every case excepting judicial proceedings, and those particularly specified in the Act of Parliament.

If, therefore, the necessity of the occasional absence of the Governor from the Presidency be admitted, either the general administration of the affairs of the Government must be suspended during his absence, or he must exercise, under his separate responsibility, to the extent which circumstances may require, all the powers which are vested in him by law when in council at the Presidency, afterwards recording his acts in council.

The legal incompetency of the council to exercise any portion of the public authority independently of the Governor, is not more evident than the expediency of limiting the exercise of the powers of government, in the case under consideration, to the Governor's hands, and of precluding the members of council, in the absence of the Governor, from exercising any such independent authority. The Governor, by law, under all circumstances, is responsible for the administration of the affairs of the Government. He is not only authorized, but bound to act on his separate opinion distinct from that of the council in all cases of deliberate difference on subjects of importance. A deference to the opinions of the members of council, or an inclination to conciliate their

cooperation in the general system of the government, will not justify the Governor in any departure from his own conscientious judgment in any matter affecting the public interests; for the letter and spirit of the law have rendered it not only his right, but his duty to act on his own separate judgment, wherever, in cases of magnitude, it shall be clearly and decisively different from that of the council. If the Governor should submit his opinion to that of the council, he alone is, and ought to be, responsible for the consequences of any act done under such circumstances. The power of acting separately is an active trust in the hands of the Governor, and he must be responsible, not only for its abusive exercise, but for suffering it to lie dormant whenever the public service requires it to be called forth. As long as this responsibility attaches to the Governor, he ought to retain all the powers necessary to the discharge of his duties. Were these powers to devolve to the council during the absence of the Governor, in the case supposed, it is evident that they might be employed during that period, to the subversion of the general system of measures which the Governor might have established.

It is, therefore, my opinion, that during your residence at Surat, no measure of importance should be taken by the members of council at Bombay without your previous sanction, where the case may be such as to admit of the delay of a reference to you; and that all appointments to offices should proceed directly from yourself in the same manner as if you were present at the seat of government.

I also recommend that you direct copies of all the papers of importance to be forwarded to you by the most expeditious conveyance, and that you issue such orders on the subject of them, as you may think proper, under your own separate responsibility.

The members of the council may conduct the ordinary details of government during your absence, and their acts, as well as your own, may be regularly recorded in council on your return to the Presidency.

It is almost superfluous to add, that these suggestions are founded entirely on general principles. I entertain the highest opinion of the zeal and integrity of the members of your council, and I am confident, that, on all occasions, they will manifest the greatest readiness to promote the public interests,

and to maintain the honour, efficiency, and vigour of your government. But it is my duty to furnish you with a permanent rule for the guidance of your conduct, applicable to all future times and contingencies; I have, therefore, stated the principles of the constitution of your Government, without reference to the personal characters of the members of your present council.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXXV.

*Extract of a Letter from the Earl of Mornington, to the Right Hon.
Henry Dundas.*

29th April, 1800.

I understand that if the reserved part of the prize taken at Seringapatam, consisting of stores and ordnance, should come into the possession of the Company, it is their intention to grant the whole to the army, reserving a hundred thousand pounds to be hereafter granted to me.* I am satisfied, that

* *Extract of a Letter from Mr. Dundas to the Earl of Mornington, dated Wimbledon, 4th November, 1799.*

If the booty taken at Seringapatam, had amounted to a sum so large, as to render it improper to give it to the army, or if you had not promised it to them, my intention was it should be burthened with a large sum to be granted by His Majesty at your disposal. It would appear however, by your last private letter to me of the 7th June, that the amount of that booty was no more than what you had thought it right to promise to the army.

In the despatch which goes out with this conveyance from the Secret Committee, respecting the booty to be given to the army, your Lordship will observe an order given to ascertain the value of the military stores captured at Seringapatam, and to report it to the Court of Directors for further instructions. It has not been customary for the Court of Directors to pay for stores of that kind taken by their arms, and they will not be very willing even in this instance to commence the practice. They will however be induced to do it, but it will be done under the reserve of one hundred thousand pounds, to be at their own disposal, and after what I have stated in this letter, your Lordship will easily guess why that reserve should be made. *I have spoke on the subject to the Chairman and Deputy and they enter warmly into my suggestions.* In some shape or other, the

upon full reflection, you will perceive, that the acceptance of such a grant, would place me in a very humiliating situation with respect to the army.

The army would feel, that I had been rewarded at their expence, and they would view the transaction with aggravated jealousy, and perhaps contempt of my character, when they recollect the effort which I made in the face of their prejudices and popularity, to reserve these very stores, for the ostensible purpose of saving the rights of the crown.

It would be said, that my view in the transaction had been personal and ungenerous, and I should lose all influence and consideration with the military branch of the service. But, independent of any question of my character, or of the dignity and vigour of my government, I should be miserable, if I could ever feel, that I had been enriched at the expence of those, who must ever be the objects of my affection, admiration and gratitude, and who are justly entitled to the exclusive enjoyment of all, that a munificent king, and an admiring country can bestow.

If therefore the independence of my family were at stake (which thank God ! it is not) I never could consent to establish it on an arrangement injurious to the conquerors of Mysore. Even the appearance of such an arrangement must affect my character ; and I therefore trust, that if my services should appear to merit a pecuniary reward from the Company, your friendship will be employed to direct their liberality through some channel wholly unconnected with the prize taken by the army.

idea must be carried into execution ; I certainly much prefer the ways I have hinted at, because in those ways, it will come in one sum, whereas in any other mode it must be by instalments from the new acquired territories, which is more tedious and progressive in its effect, and on that account less valuable.

No. LXXVI.

Extract of a Letter from the Earl of Mornington to Mr. Pitt.

Fort William, 29th April, 1800.

The fund from which it appears that this grant is to proceed, will render it impossible for me to accept it.

It seems to be intended to make the sum a charge on the military stores taken at Seringapatam. This arrangement will have the appearance, if not the substance of depriving the army of a part of their prize for the purpose of enriching me. I am convinced you will at once feel the invidious and degrading situation in which this would place me towards that most gallant army. If the real effect of this measure be actually to deprive the army of a sum which would otherwise be divided amongst them, I can never consent to be rewarded at their expence, but even the appearance of such an arrangement would absolutely preclude my acceptance of any grant however otherwise acceptable.

I hope Mr. Dundas will have perceived the force of this objection, and will not compel me to refuse the reward offered by the Company. At least, I trust, that if you have not already anticipated this view of the subject, you will feel the justice of my sentiments when stated, and you will exonerate me from the suspicion of caprice or fastidiousness, when I shall refuse the liberal grant in question.*

No. LXXVII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Hon. Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, May 3rd 1800.

In obedience to the orders of the House of Commons, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of its resolutions passed on the 4th of October, 1799.†

It is a matter of sincere satisfaction to me, to congratulate

* For further information on this subject, see letter from Mr. Dundas, 26th September, 1800, and Resolutions of the East India Company, 15th January, 1801.

† See Vol. I. p. 633.

your Lordship on the just sense expressed by the House of Commons, of the eminent services rendered by you to your country in promoting the success of the late glorious war in Mysore.

On this occasion, I cannot refrain from renewing to your Lordship, the cordial assurance of those sentiments of gratitude and respect, which your zeal, honour and assiduous exertions impressed on my mind during the whole period of that arduous conjuncture.

Entertaining the most implicit confidence in the continuance of the same happy spirit of unanimity and concord, which has animated the proceedings of Fort William and Fort St. George, since the hour of your Lordship's arrival in India, the distinguished honour conferred on me by these resolutions has received an additional value in my estimation, from the reflection, that your Lordship's name has been united with mine in the high reward bestowed by the Commons of Great Britain on our joint labours in the public service. Under the progressive operation of such an honourable union, cemented by a mutual sense of public duty, encouraged by the applause of our country, and rewarded by the highest distinctions to which generous ambition can aspire, I trust, that, during the future course of our administration, the empire founded by your Lordship's illustrious Father will acquire additional stability, prosperity and splendour.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

with great regard and esteem,
your Lordship's most obedient, and faithful Servant,

MORNINGTON.

No. LXXVIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, 9th June, 1800.

In the 10th paragraph of my letter to your Honourable Committee of the 25th January, 1800.* I intimated my determination to expel the Pychy Rajah from WynAAD, and eventually to punish the contumacy of that chieftain in the most signal and exemplary manner.

In consequence of this necessary determination the requisite military preparations were made in Mysore, with a degree of vigour and promptitude highly creditable to the government of Fort St. George, and to the officer commanding in Mysore, and under circumstances which afford a striking example of the powerful military resources of that valuable possession. It was judged expedient that the operations from Mysore should be combined with the movement of a respectable detachment from the army of Bombay on the coast of Malabar. But in consequence of the inadequate state of equipment of the troops in Malabar, it was found impracticable to move the proposed detachment within the period of the proper season. This disappointment on the side of Malabar has led to the necessity of postponing the intended expedition; but it will be resumed at a convenient season of the year, if the expected submission of the Pychy Rajah to the orders of the British Government should not happily preclude the necessity of any measure of coercion.

I am concerned to inform your honourable Committee that in consequence of the unaccountable and criminal negligence of the officer stationed in the strong fortress of Jemalabad in Canara, that place was surprised on the of April last, by a body of men stated to be composed principally of deserters from the new levies in Canara. The motive of this rash and apparently fruitless enterprise on the part of those who executed it, is at present as unintelligible, as the neglect of our officers is incredible. The lower fortress was almost immediately recovered by a detachment of our troops in Canara; and I have no doubt, that the adventurers who have

* See page 197.

seized the upper fortress, have already been compelled to surrender at discretion.

The disgraceful surprise of this fortress, combined with other circumstances in the civil and military administration of Malabar, has led me to a serious consideration of the necessity of adopting effectual means for strengthening the hands of your Government in that quarter. I most earnestly request your honourable Committee to adopt immediate measures for a formal annexation of the provinces of Canara and Malabar to the Government of Fort St. George.

Since the date of my last letter to your honourable Committee symptoms of a spirit of revolt have appeared among some of the Polygars in those parts of Mysore, which in the partition of that country were assigned to the Nizam and to the Rajah. The only insurgent in Mysore proper of sufficient importance to be specified is the Polygar of Bullam, who has already been compelled to abandon the open country and to take refuge in the jungles. His complete submission to the authority of the Rajah cannot long be delayed.

The disturbances which have taken place in the countries recently acquired by our ally the Nizam, are to be imputed principally if not exclusively to the abusive and weak administration of his Highness's Government. While these districts remained under the temporary management of Purneah, (the dewan of Mysore) his prudent and conciliatory conduct maintained them in a state of sufficient tranquillity and order. The transfer of these districts to the management of his Highness the Nizam, had been made but a few weeks when the extortion and imbecility of his officers provoked and encouraged the revolt of some of the Polygars. These inconsiderable commotions however, cannot prove embarrassing for any long period of time; nor should I have called your attention to them in the present despatch, had they not appeared to derive a temporary importance from the position recently taken by the adventurer Dhoondia Jee Waug.

Your Honourable Committee will recollect, that this person escaped from destruction in August, 1799, in consequence of the respect manifested by the British troops to the frontier of the Mahratta state.* Dhoondia Jee then entered into the

* See p. 116.

service of the Rajah of Kholapore. After some time had elapsed, he either abandoned the cause of the Rajah of Kholapore, or was dismissed by him from his service. Dhoondia Jee then assembling a few desperate followers, began to levy contributions on the territories of the Peishwa and of the Nizam.

According to the usual progress of such predatory armies in Hindostan, his force has received great augmentations within the last two months; and by the latest accounts he had a position from whence he equally menaced Shawnoor (Savanore) in the Peishwa's territories, the south-western districts of the Nizam, and the frontier of Mysore.

The desperate and enterprising character of this malefactor renders it necessary to check his further progress, although his army appears to be extremely defective in regard to discipline and to every quality of an effective force. A respectable army has been assembled in Mysore for the purpose of observing his motions; and as the Peishwa is not less interested than the British Government in the punishment of Dhoondia Jee, I have every reason to believe, that his Highness will contribute to this necessary object whatever assistance the distracted state of his own affairs will permit. I have however thought it expedient under the actual state of circumstances, and on the ground of the intimate connection subsisting between the two States, to authorize our troops in Mysore to pursue Dhoondia Jee Waug eventually into the territories of the Mahratta State. It is probable, that the Peishwa has actually granted his formal permission for this purpose; but in any event, I am satisfied that the conduct which I have empowered the commanding officer in Mysore to adopt towards the predatory force of Dhoondia Jee will not excite dissatisfaction at the Court of Poonah.

In every other respect the situation of Mysore is highly favourable and prosperous; the sources of revenue have been considerably improved under the prudent and able management of the Dewan, aided by the talents, zeal and experience of Lieutenant-Colonel Close. The young Rajah took possession of his new palace, erected on the site of that inhabited by his ancestors on the 15th of May last.

In the recently conquered districts subject to the immediate authority of the Company, the most happy prospect appears

of a revenue far exceeding the amount stated in the schedules annexed to the treaty of Mysore.*

The conquest of Mysore required a revision of our political relations with the principal powers of the Decan; this despatch cannot contain a detailed and connected account of the view which I have taken of this extensive and important subject, but I am desirous to avail myself of an early opportunity, to submit to your judgment the general tenor of the principles by which my conduct has been regulated. The only native powers of importance now remaining in India, independent of the British protection, are the confederate empire of the Mahratta States, the Rajah of Berar and Scindia, considered either as distinct powers, or in their feudatory relations to that empire. The restless character of the Mahratta nations, the advantages presented by the local position of some of those states to the future intrigues of France, and the existing establishment of many French officers in the service of Scindia, concurred to render it a measure of indispensable precaution, either to acquire by negociation and arrangement, an ascendancy in the councils of the Mahratta empire, or to unite ourselves in a defensive alliance with those powers, which form a barrier between our territories and those of the Mahrattas; but it appeared to be still more desirable to frame a system of political connection which should combine the advantages of each alternative, and which while it afforded the means of preserving a powerful barrier against the Mahratta States, should facilitate the formation of more intimate relations with that empire, and should open a prospect of stability to those relations when formed.

This system was the foundation of the policy of the treaty of Mysore, which contains the basis on which I proposed to found a further extension and improvement of our alliance with the Nizam, and a similar alliance with the Peishwa. My despatch in council to the Honourable Court of Directors, under date the 18th of January, 1800, † has apprized your Honourable Committee of the circumstances which have hitherto prevented the success of my proposals at the Court of Poonah. This disappointment enforced the expediency

* See page 30.

† See page 174.

of strengthening the ties which already unite us to the Nizam's Government, and nearly identify the interests of his Highness with those of the British empire in India.

A considerable proportion of the military establishment of Fort St. George is now maintained at the expense of the Nizam. The security of the resources which supply this important contribution is an object of common concern to both states. In addition to this consideration, the Nizam's dominions constitute the only barrier between us and the Mahrattas on the side either of Mysore or of the Carnatic. The conquest of the Nizam's dominions by the Mahrattas would at once elevate that aspiring nation to a considerable eminence of power, and establish a formidable and dangerous rival in the place of a dependant absolutely devoted to our interests.

With these sentiments I have recently opened a negotiation with his Highness the Nizam, and the Resident at Hyderabad has actually concluded a treaty with his Highness on terms which not only provide for a considerable augmentation of the existing subsidiary force, but stipulate provisionally for the substitution of such territorial cessions to the Company in place of the subsidiary payments as would give us the complete possession of the whole of the countries held by the late Tippoo Sultaun previous to the peace of Seringapatam in 1792, with the exception of the districts ceded on that occasion to the Peishwa. This desirable arrangement would establish in the Company's hands a territorial revenue which in the course of a few years of wise and prudent management would render their pecuniary and military resources in the Peninsula of India superior to those possessed at any time by Hyder Ali or Tippoo Sultaun. For the territories placed under the nominal sovereignty of the Rajah of Mysore, by the subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam constitute substantially an integral part of our dominion.

At the conclusion of the war it might have appeared advantageous to have obtained such a cession of territory from the Nizam even at the expense of a considerable pecuniary compensation, or of the cession of an equivalent territory in some other quarter of our possessions. But in that critical conjuncture it would have been dangerous to have opened any question which might have led to discussions of a delicate and difficult nature, and which might have delayed the

final settlement of our conquests. I was confident that the season could not be remote when we might obtain, with the goodwill of the Nizam, by a commutation of the subsidy, the same advantages of an augmentation of our territory and a completion of our boundary in Mysore without any cession of territory, or pecuniary payment on our part; and with the additional benefit of establishing permanent security for the discharge of the expense of the troops employed for his Highness's protection.

The principle of the treaty concluded by the Resident at Hyderabad on this basis is highly advantageous, but as the concessions to the Company which it contains are not expressed with sufficient accuracy; and as some of its stipulations are either improper or useless; my intention is to propose to the Nizam, instead of the treaty which he has executed an improved draft, which, while it shall offer to his Highness the full protection of the Company against any aggression, shall secure to the Company, without ambiguity, the just equivalent which we are entitled to demand for such a guarantee. For although it seems scarcely possible to imagine a case in which it would not be our positive interest to repel any attack on the dominions of the Nizam, it is equally the interest of his Highness to provide for the certainty of our aid, and to augment our means of furnishing it. On the other hand the abuses of his Highness's government rendered those territorial possessions nearly unproductive in his hands, although they may be expected to prove highly valuable under our management. The advantages of the commutation of the subsidy will therefore be considerable, if not equal, to both parties.

As my proposed draft of a treaty will not vary essentially in the leading points from that already executed by the Nizam: and, as I am satisfied that both his Highness and Azim ul Omra justly appreciate the advantages of the general basis of the engagement, I entertain sanguine expectations that the alterations which I mean to propose in several of the articles will be readily accepted by his Highness.

Your Honourable Committee is already apprized that since my arrival in India it has been an unceasing object of my attention to establish such a connection with the Court of Poonah as should enable the British Government to influence

all its foreign relations. You are also informed that I originally proposed with confident hopes of success to accomplish this most desirable arrangement by the restoration of the Peishwa's legitimate authority, and the establishment at Poonah of a large British subsidiary force. Hitherto, either the capricious temper of Baajy Rao, or some remains of the characteristic jealousy of the nation with regard to foreign relations have frustrated my objects and views. The actual state of the Mahratta power appears extremely favourable to their prosecution and success, while the importance of accomplishing them is greatly increased.

To fix the peace of India on foundations of the utmost stability, and to preclude any intrusion of the French, it is necessary only that the British Government should draw the Mahratta power under its protection.

Under this impression, I have lately renewed my endeavours to engage Baajy Rao to place himself under the friendship of the Company's Government. Upon a full consideration of the practical difficulties which obstruct a direct interchange of confidential sentiments between the Peishwa and the British Resident at Poonah, I have determined to conduct the negotiation through the Court of Hyderabad, to which the Peishwa has recently made overtures of a promising appearance. The Nizam has a deep interest in the success of this negotiation, and possesses facilities of communication with Baajy Rao which we cannot acquire.

Various important documents relative to a perfidious and dangerous correspondence which subsisted between the late Tippoo Sultaun and the Nabobs Walajah and Omdut ul Omra, have been brought under the view of your Honourable Committee. An examination of those documents has taken place, but not to the extent, or exactly in the manner desired. It was found that some of the persons proposed to be examined were dead, or placed beyond the immediate reach of the Commissioners. Notwithstanding the insufficiency of the examination, and the gross prevarication and manifest falsehood of some of the witnesses examined, evidence has appeared to satisfy my judgment that an intrigue of a nature hostile to the British interests had been carried on between Tippoo Sultaun, Walajah, and Omdut ul Omra. It is also incontrovertibly established, that Omdut ul Omra employed

or framed, with a view to employ, in his correspondence with the late Tippoo Sultaun, the cypher transmitted to your Honourable Committee. No confirmed proof yet appears that Omdut ul Omra carried on such a correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun, subsequently to the death of the Nabob Wallajah. His concern, however, in such a correspondence, during the lifetime of his father, constitutes, according to a fair and reasonable construction of the spirit of the alliance between the Company and the Nabob of the Carnatic, a violation of the treaty of 1792, for which he is no less responsible (considering the share which he exercised in the direction of his father's government), than he would have been for the same conduct, if pursued during his own immediate administration.

My attention is now directed to the measures proper to be adopted with respect to the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, under the view in which his criminality is placed by the oral evidence collected. I am already satisfied that a due regard to our safety renders it indispensably necessary that we should obtain some more certain pledges of the fidelity of Omdut ul Omra than we now possess. The precise nature or extent of the additional security to be demanded from him will be arranged between Lord Clive and me, and I will advise your Honourable Committee of the result.

I have great satisfaction in informing your Honourable Committee that the reform of the Nabob Vizier's military establishments has proceeded in regular progress, without any material opposition or difficulty, although with many symptoms of dissatisfaction on the part of his Excellency, and of the most turbulent class of his troops. The augmentation of the Company's troops in Oude has, at the same time, nearly reached the amount originally proposed. The additional subsidy payable by his Excellency, when the augmentation of the troops shall be completed, will amount, in consequence, to about fifty lacs of rupees annually; while the new levies raised to supply the place of the troops to be stationed in Oude, have been hitherto confined to two regiments of native cavalry, and two regiments of native infantry, including in the latter the Bengal volunteers who served in the late war, and are now on their return to these provinces from the

Carnatic. I trust that no further augmentation of your native troops under this Presidency will be found necessary.

Having so far succeeded in effecting a radical reform of the military establishment of the Nabob of Oude, I propose to take into consideration, without delay, the means of introducing such improvements into the civil administration of his Excellency's affairs as have been long necessary to the security of our interests in that country, and to the prosperity and happiness of the people. The reduction of the Vizier's troops, and the augmentation of the Company's army, cannot be deemed more than partial remedies of the existing evils until the resources of the state shall have been improved and secured by the establishment of a just and vigorous system of government.

My latest accounts of Zemaun Shah are perfectly favourable to the prosecution of my views in Oude. He continued at Candahar; menaced on the one hand by the preparations which Baba Khan has made for advancing to Khorasan, and embarrassed on the other by domestic troubles, which appear to have amounted to formidable disturbances of his government. Under these circumstances it seems impossible that Zemaun Shah should be enabled to disturb the tranquillity of Hindostan in the course of the ensuing winter. After that period, the situation of Oude will, I trust, be so improved, as to place the security of that province beyond the reach of danger from any attempt either of Zemaun Shah, or of any other foreign power.

I have the honour to inform your Honourable Committee that the Rajah of Napaul arrived at Benares on the 18th ultimo, having judged it necessary to seek refuge in the Company's territories, from the designs which he supposed to be entertained by his disaffected subjects against his person. This Rajah had formally abdicated the government (about eighteen months before his flight) in favour of an infant son; but had continued to interfere occasionally in the direction of affairs. It appears that he had ultimately resumed the whole administration of the Government, and had exercised it with a degree of rigour which had excited a general spirit of revolt.

I have directed my agent at Benares to manifest to the

Rajah every possible mark of respect and attention; and I entertain considerable expectations that I shall be enabled to improve this occurrence to the attainment of such a degree of influence in the Government of Napaul, as may open the prospect of establishing a commercial intercourse with that country, mutually beneficial to both states.

Captain Hill returned from his mission to Aracan in the month of April last. He was soon after followed by an ambassador from thence, in pursuance of orders from the king of Ava. I have lately dismissed this ambassador with such explanations and assurances with regard to the emigrants from Aracan, as I trust will satisfy the Court of Ava, and contribute to maintain the harmony subsisting between the two governments.

I have the honour to be,

Honourable Sirs,

With the greatest respect,

Your most obedient and faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.*

No. LXXIX.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,

Fort William, June 15th, 1800.

I have received your despatch, No. 79, dated the 20th ult., transmitting to me the treaty executed on the same day by his Highness the Nizam, and by you. I have also received your letters, numbered and dated as noted in the margin.†

The Persian translator regularly laid before me translations of the several reports (dated and noted in the margin)‡ which you had received from the Moonsee Azeez Oollah, of his conferences with Azim ul Omra during the course of the negotiation.

* The Earl of Mornington was created Marquess Wellesley on the 20th of December, 1799.

† No. 80, 23rd of May; No. 81, 25th of May; No. 82, 26th of May; No. 83, 29th of May; No. 84, 31st of May.

‡ April 26th, 28th, and 29th. May, the 3rd, 7th, 10th, 12th, 14th, 15th, and 17th.

You have assigned the necessity of despatch to justify this mode of communicating to me the progress of the treaty; admitting such a mode of communication to have been the most expeditious, it has produced considerable inconvenience by leaving me in ignorance and doubt with respect to various important points of the negotiation. Your observations and explanations, transmitted in the usual manner, would have enabled me to form a more accurate judgment of the real temper of the Court of Hyderabad, with regard to the present treaty, than can be founded on the unconnected, incomplete, and unexplained materials now before me.

Defective as those materials are, they are sufficient to prove that you have not stated to the Court of Hyderabad, with adequate force, the great advantages which his Highness the Nizam would derive from the proposed alliance; and that you have conceded to Azim ul Omra with more facility than was prudent, a point which has long and justly constituted the object of his most anxious desire and solicitation.

Being fully apprized of the importance justly attached by the Court of Hyderabad to a general defensive alliance with the Company, against all enemies, I had foreseen the earnestness of the Nizam to obtain such an engagement, and accordingly I had authorized you eventually to yield to his Highness's wishes. But you were not empowered to concede this important benefit unconditionally, or without obtaining a just equivalent. You were empowered to concede it if the concession should appear likely to secure in return the consent of his Highness to the whole, or to any, of those articles, which, under the project of a limited guarantee, I had authorized you to suspend.

But the treaty which you have concluded concedes to his Highness the Nizam the full benefit of the general guarantee without securing to the Company any of those advantages, (the augmentation of the subsidiary force excepted,) the whole of which I had declared necessary to constitute a reasonable equivalent for a limited defensive engagement.

It appears, by the conferences between Azim ul Omra and Moonshee Azeez Oollah, that the Court of Hyderabad sincerely intends to commute the subsidy for a territorial grant to the Company; and the territory to be ceded to the Company is generally described in the fifth article of the treaty.

But the fourth article of the treaty expressly reserves to the Nizam the option of discharging the subsidy either from his treasury, or by an assignment of territory, according to his Highness's pleasure; and in your letter of the 26th of May you admit, that the Court of Hyderabad actually understands the concluding clause of the fourth article, to empower the Nizam to exercise this option whenever his Highness shall think proper. Under such an engagement, if the ratifications of the treaty had been exchanged, his Highness would be at liberty to declare his determination to discharge the subsidy regularly in money, and the territorial grant might be at once avoided. His Highness, under the indefinite terms of the fourth and fifth articles, would also possess full power to modify the grant of territory by any qualifications or conditions which he might prescribe, either with respect to its duration, to the nature or extent of the authority to be exercised by the Company within the assigned districts, or to any other point affecting the stability or efficiency of the assignment.

The proposition for the territorial grant originated with Azim ul Omra, and was received by you with judicious reserve and caution. The manner in which this proposition was introduced by the Minister, as well as the actual state of the countries intended to be assigned, induce me to believe the Court of Hyderabad to be sincerely disposed, and even secretly anxious for a commutation of the subsidy. But my conjecture may be erroneous; and in a matter of such importance nothing should be left to conjecture, or to the precarious will of the Court of Hyderabad. If the Nizam, upon the ratification of the treaty should declare his resolution to discharge the subsidy in money, and should refuse to cede the countries to be assigned, in the complete and absolute manner indispensably necessary to their proper arrangement, the Company would stand pledged to the general guarantee without having acquired any equivalent benefit or compensation.

It is evident, therefore, that, by this treaty, the Court of Hyderabad would secure all its objects, while the situation of the Company would be rather injured than improved. For, if it be admitted that the augmentation of the subsidiary force would add in some degree to our political consideration

in the Deccan, as the additional troops furnished by the British Government would require to be replaced by new levies, the arrangement would be productive of no pecuniary relief or advantage to the Company; and the security for the regular discharge of the subsidy would become more precarious in proportion to the increased amount of the subsidiary payments. The treasury of his Highness would be subjected to increased embarrassment; or, if territory should be assigned, the cession might be burthened by conditions absolutely precluding such a system of management as must be adopted to render the assigned revenues equal to the maintenance of the troops. Any expression in the grant calculated to raise a doubt of its permanence, or to limit the power of the Company's internal Government of the countries, or to favour the Nizam's right of resumption, would evidently prevent us from concluding any settlement worthy of our character, or advantageous to our interests.

In paragraph four of your despatch, of the 26th of May, you plainly admit that the Court of Hyderabad understands the fourth and fifth articles to have secured to the Nizam an arbitrary right of resuming the districts subsequently to the intended assignment, and you endeavour to remove this insurmountable objection to these articles by alleging your construction of their exposition to be different from that maintained by the Nizam and his Ministers. It is painful to me to be compelled to remark, that your argument in this paragraph is founded on principles incompatible with the maintenance of public faith, and exploded by the wisdom, justice, and integrity of the law of nations. To introduce ambiguous phrases into formal instruments designed to constitute the basis of public obligations between great States, is a practice repugnant to the policy, honour, and dignity of the British nation. The perspicuity of our expressions in all acts of obligation upon our national faith should be as manifest as the superiority of our power. If it were possible for me to afford my countenance to a contrary system, common discretion would preclude me from such a course in the present case, when you distinctly avow, that the ambiguous phrases on which you propose to rest the future claim of the British Government against its ally, are at this moment, previously to the ratification of the treaty, construed by that

ally in a sense directly contradictory to that which you desire to maintain. Your further arguments on the article under consideration serve only to prove that the Nizam might be embarrassed in the exercise of the right which he intended to reserve to himself. If your reasoning on this part of the question be admitted, the result would be not an amicable, firm alliance, founded on clear, distinct, and indisputable principles, but an ill defined state of perpetual jealousy, controversy, and animosity, of doubtful claims, and of incompatible rights.

When I received Azim ul Omra's draft of a treaty, it was my intention to have examined separately each article of that extravagant project. I have already expressed my animadversions on several of his propositions; I shall now consider such principles only of that project as have been adopted with or without modification in your treaty, upon the several articles of which I now proceed to state my ideas.

The general tenour of the preamble to the treaty received from you is perfectly conformable to my views: the terms of it appear susceptible of improvement. A draft of the preamble, which I should prefer, accompanies this letter in English and Persian.*

Article 1. The first article requires no remark.

Article 2. This article is principally objectionable on account of its unqualified spirit of hostility. If the contracting parties should have just grounds to apprehend an attack on their territories, or on those of their allies and dependants, it would be reasonable and necessary, that they should prepare to repel it. But such preparations are not to be occasioned by every trivial dispute on the borders, or by every desultory, and perhaps unauthorized, depredation of armies, whose licentiousness and rapacity are the necessary consequences of defective discipline and irregular pay. Still less would it be either prudent or justifiable to resort to arms whenever (according to the words of the treaty) any act shall be committed "incompatible with friendship and good understanding." In your letter, No. 80, you have anticipated this objection, and endeavoured to diminish its force.

It is the essence of a defensive alliance, that a sincere de-

* See Appendix.

sire to avoid an appeal to arms should constitute its most prominent feature. But this article is entirely silent with respect to the propriety of employing any endeavour to adjust subsisting differences by measures of amicable explanation and discussion. From the first mention of aggression, the article proceeds directly to stipulate for punishment and war.

Article 3. No material objection exists to the expression, and none to the principle, of this article.

Articles 4 and 5. These articles must be considered together.

It appears, by your letter, No. 80, that the amount of subsidy fixed for the cavalry belonging to the subsidiary force is inadequate to the expense of those troops; it is not stated how this deficiency was occasioned; but I cannot suppose his Highness the Nizam to be disposed to avail himself of any error of calculation which subjects the Company to pecuniary loss. In adjusting the amount of the general subsidy, you might, therefore, have corrected any error of account which had occurred in the original settlement. This point will be of no consequence, under the arrangement which I mean to propose for the full and permanent satisfaction of the Company's claims on account of subsidy.

The further discussion of this point will be unnecessary in the event of the Nizam's acquiescence in my proposed arrangement. But the considerations here suggested, as well as those arising from the insufficiency of the cavalry subsidy, constitute powerful arguments, and may be advantageously urged in support of the main article of that arrangement, by which I have stipulated for the absolute cession in perpetuity of the whole of his Highness's acquisitions from Mysore in the two last wars,* adding some modifications with relation to exchanges of territory for the convenience of the respective frontiers of the two States.

The revenues of the countries acquired by the Nizam, under the treaty of 1792, are acknowledged to be greatly injured, and I have no satisfactory grounds for believing that those of the districts, acquired by his Highness under the Treaty of Mysore, are now equal to the amount stated in the

* As proposed by the Resident; the original included only the Nizam's acquisitions in 1792.

schedules of that treaty. It appears to be highly probable that the resources of the countries in question have materially declined since those countries came into the possession of his Highness. They have been ravaged by various insurgents; and it is to be feared that they have been managed on principles which must impair their future prosperity, whatever immediate advantage may have been extracted from those unhappy districts by their rapacious governors and managers.

Article 6. Requires no remark.

Articles 7 and 8. These articles require to be considered together. Notwithstanding the observations stated in your letter, No. 80, these articles require alteration.

The specification of the force to be furnished by the Nizam at the commencement of hostilities, for the purpose of immediate operations with the Company's subsidiary troops, is extremely proper and necessary; but the terms of the seventh article imply, that this specification is to define the full extent of the Nizam's exertions, in point of force, during the whole course of the supposed hostilities, with the single qualification stated in the eighth article. The seventh article is objectionable in this respect. The specification of the local limits in the seventh article, within which his Highness shall be bound to co-operate against the common enemy, is not expressed with sufficient accuracy.

These articles proceed on the presumption, that the Company is as likely as the Nizam to be attacked by an enemy; but this supposition is manifestly contrary to reason and probability. The Nizam, in every view, is more exposed to hostile aggression from various quarters, as well as less able to repel it than the Company. The eventual exertions of the Nizam against the common enemy should not in any case be limited, either with respect to the amount of troops, or to the theatre of the war. A fair view of the nature and objects of the proposed alliance must demonstrate the justice and reason of requiring that the Nizam, in every case of war, should employ his utmost efforts against the enemy. The Company cannot in policy, and will not in practice, contract the scale of their operations in the event of hostilities, whether directed against their own territories, or against those of the Nizam. This limitation of the number of troops to be employed might

be reasonable if the Nizam's interest, in the issue of any supposed contest could be deemed remote, or temporary, or doubtful. But no contest can occur in which the Company shall be deeply engaged without involving the existence of the Nizam's kingdom; the probability is, that, in every case, his Highness would be the first object of attack.

For these reasons, while I consider it to be proper to specify the number and description of his Highness's troops, which shall be furnished immediately, at the commencement of war, to act in concert with the subsidiary force, I deem it to be necessary that his Highness should also be bound, in every case of hostility, to employ his utmost efforts (if required by the nature of the war) against the common enemy.

It may not be useless to observe in this place, that, even if the seat of war should be on the other side, (as the treaty expresses it,) or to the northward of the Nurbudda, it is not probable that any junction of the Nizam's forces with those of the Company in Hindostan proper, would ever be expedient or requisite. In such case, a powerful diversion by his Highness, which would not lead his troops beyond the Nurbudda, would, perhaps, be the most useful operation in which they could be employed.

Article 9. This article merits my entire approbation; it requires, however, a slight alteration in the expression. You have rendered a considerable service to the Company's interests in India in establishing, by treaty, a right to the use of the Brinjarries of the Deccan in time of war.

Article 10. This article is likewise highly satisfactory to me. It is, however, necessary to observe, (and it may be proper to apprise the Nizam and Azim ul Omra) that I consider the operation of this article to prohibit any correspondence with any of the dependants of the Honourable Company, excepting with the knowledge and consent of the British Government. The intercourse at present maintained by the Court of Hyderabad with the Rajah of Travancore, the Nabob of Arcot, and other dependants of the Company, would necessarily cease from the period when this article shall take effect. But whatever may be the issue of the depending negotiation, I think it proper to direct you to insist on the immediate discontinuance of the correspondence occasionally maintained between his Highness the Nizam and the

allies or dependants of the Company, described in this paragraph.

Article 11. I consider this article to be of the greatest value and importance; it certainly counteracts in a considerable degree many of the objectionable parts of the treaty. It does not, however, remove the objections which apply to the 4th and 5th articles.

Articles 12 and 13. The provisions of these articles are properly of a secret nature, and ought to have constituted separate articles. It would have been sufficient in the body of the treaty, if the contracting parties had declared their disposition to admit the Peishwa and Ragojee Bhooslah to the benefits of the alliance, on such conditions as might hereafter be mutually concerted.

Article 14. This article requires no remark.

On the separate articles of the treaty I must generally remark, that you have not discussed them with Azim ul Omra in a manner suitable to their great importance, nor have you availed yourself of a proper extent of the valuable concessions which they convey to the Nizam.

Article 1. The engagement comprehended in this article relative to the Zemindars of Shorapoor and Gulwal, and to the Nabob of Kurnool, is rendered extremely delicate by the tributary relation of those chieftains to the Marhattas' government, as well as to the Nizam; on this account we have hitherto uniformly refused to permit the Company's troops to assist the Nizam in coercing those chieftains. The proposed defensive alliance with the Nizam does not require our unconditional departure from this principle. At the period of negotiating the Treaty of Hyderabad, Azim ul Omra laboured with equal assiduity to accomplish an object so important to the interest of his Sovereign. At that time I refused the concession, not because I saw any considerable objection to its principle, but because it was of too much importance to be granted gratuitously to his Highness, and because I wished to reserve so great a favour for an occasion, when I might be able to derive from it a proper return of advantage to the Company. This occasion is now arrived, and it is reasonable to require a return correspondent with the magnitude of the object.

I entirely approve the clause introduced into this article, by

which the British Government is authorised to investigate and to determine the merits of all disputes arising between the Court of Hyderabad and the tributaries in question.

Article 2. Nothing can be more repugnant to the true spirit of a defensive alliance than the terms of this article; they also indicate a distrust of the justice and honour of the Company's Government, which ought to have been repelled in the first instance.

I entertain no views of conquest upon the territories of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or of any other native power of India, I cannot, therefore, consent to a formal arrangement for the division of spoils which I have no wish to acquire. If Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or any other power, after the conclusion of defensive engagements between the Company and the Nizam, should be guilty of any unprovoked aggression against either party, and war should appear inevitable, in concerting the operations to be undertaken against the aggressor, the allied states may proceed with propriety to adjust the division of such conquests, as might appear attainable during the progress of hostilities, and convenient to be retained at the conclusion of peace.

It is evident from the 11th article of Azim ul Omra's project, that no rational principles were consulted by him in the plan of partition which he had imagined. It may, therefore, be proper plainly to apprise Azim ul Omra, if he should appear dissatisfied with my modification of this article, that I can never consent to regulate the division of our eventual conquests or acquisitions by any other standard, than the actual share of expense and exertion in military operations which each contracting party shall have contributed towards such conquests or acquisitions.

Article 3. The stipulations of this article belong properly to a separate and secret engagement. But it does not appear necessary that the Company and the Nizam should concert by any formal previous instrument, the conditions on which they will admit the Peishwa and the Rajah of Berar to the benefits of the proposed defensive alliance. My mind, however, being satisfied with respect to the general terms on which it would be expedient to admit those powers to the alliance, I am not unwilling to gratify the Nizam by recognizing the specific terms of the eventual admission of the Peishwa and the Rajah

of Berar to the proposed treaty in the form desired by his Highness.

The review which I have taken of the several articles of the treaty in question, must have convinced you that I cannot ratify it without departing from many leading principles of the policy, interest, and reputation of the British Government. The copy of the treaty transmitted to me is accordingly returned to you, in order that it may be regularly cancelled, together with the counterpart, which you have delivered to his Highness.

Notwithstanding my determination not to ratify this treaty, the discussions which it has produced, and even your conclusion of it under all the circumstances of the case, have contributed to lay the foundation of extensive improvements in our connection with the Court of Hyderabad. In the progress of the negotiation, many important points have been gained for the Company, many inveterate prejudices injurious to our interests in the Deccan, have either been absolutely destroyed or considerably weakened, and the whole scope of the extravagant and absurd policy of Azim ul Omra and of his Court, has been disclosed. In this view of the subject, I consider you to have rendered essential service to the British interests at the Court of the Nizam; and, although in this despatch I have animadverted on some of the principles which you have stated, as well as on some passages in the management of the negotiation, I am happy to be able to express my general approbation of your conduct in this important transaction. The animadversions contained in this despatch are not intended to operate as a censure on your proceedings, but to furnish you and your successors in the Residency at the Court of the Nizam, with rules for your guidance on any similar occasion.

My anxiety to conclude a general defensive alliance with the Nizam, on reasonable conditions, continues unabated; and I now transmit to you in English and Persian the draft of such a treaty* with his Highness, as you are at liberty to execute immediately on the part of the Company.

I entertain a sanguine expectation that the observations which I have made on the treaty concluded by you, will

* See Appendix.

enable you to reconcile the Court of Hyderabad to my rejection of that treaty. I am equally confident that the explanations and remarks with which I shall now accompany the treaty herewith transmitted to you, will afford you the means of convincing the Nizam and Azim ul Omra, that the true interests of his Highness require their immediate acceptance of this engagement.

In the new treaty a very material object of the Court of Hyderabad is more distinctly and more effectually secured than in the treaty already executed by the Nizam. A long period of time must elapse before the territory which I require as a security for the subsidiary payments can become equal to their discharge, it is even doubtful whether the produce of the countries required will ever exceed, in any considerable degree, the amount of the subsidy. If the nett revenues of the districts specified in the new treaty, should, hereafter, exceed the charges of the subsidiary force, or if the present nominal revenue of those districts (a revenue which, under the management of his Highness's officers, never has been realized, and under the same management never can be rendered more productive), should be realized under a more wise and prudent system, enforced by the abilities, experience, and integrity of the Company's officers, it would be reasonable that the increased resources of those countries, now verging to ruin, should be turned to the advantage of that power, under whose happy auspices the improvement had been carried into effect. The augmented revenue might justly be claimed by the Company on various grounds.

1st. Because the Company must suffer immediate pecuniary loss and embarrassment by the commutation of the subsidy in the actual declining condition of the districts to be ceded.

2ndly. Because the expenses incident to the Company's system of management far exceed those incurred by the Nizam's administration; consequently, the probable amount of the surplus which may be realized by the Company, is not to be estimated by the standard of charges usually authorized by his Highness's Government.

3rdly. Because an acknowledgment is due to the Company for the inestimable advantages of protection and security acquired by the Nizam under the general guarantee. In this respect the benefits of the treaty cannot be deemed reciprocal.

The Nizam's present hazard far exceeds that of the Company; and even in the event of an attack upon our possessions, his Highness could not assist us with means of defence bearing any proportion to those with which we should furnish him in a similar exigency.

4thly. Because in the event of an attack being made on the Nizam, the expenses of the Company, over and above those of maintaining the subsidiary force, would far exceed any charge which could fall upon his Highness in the event of any attack being made on the Company's dominions.

5thly. Because this treaty grants to the Nizam without any specified equivalent, the new and extraordinary benefit of the Company's aid in repressing the refractory spirit of such tributaries and dependants as owe a mixed allegiance to him and to the Mahrattas. In this view it may justly be expected that the resources of the territories retained in his Highness's hands may be improved to an amount proportioned to any excess in the produce of the countries to be ceded to the Company.

But whatever view may be taken of this subject by the Court of Hyderabad, it is my determination not to grant the Nizam the complete protection and support which he solicits, on any conditions less advantageous to the Company than those comprehended in the new treaty. I accordingly direct you not to admit any alteration in that treaty, which shall affect any of its principles; mere verbal alterations you are at liberty to receive.

You will not press the Nizam to accept this new treaty with any appearance of solicitude or earnestness. You will confine yourself to a distinct explanation of the reasons which have compelled me to refuse my ratification of your treaty; and to such an illustration of the articles of the new engagement, as this despatch will enable you to furnish. You will then leave the whole subject to the calm and deliberate decision of the Nizam.

In the course of the late negotiation for the purpose of undervaluing the separate and limited guarantee against Scindiah, Azim ul Omra affected to consider the Company to be already engaged to protect the Nizam against any attack from Scindiah, because during the course of the late war I had declared my determination to support his High-

ness against such an attack. The weakness of this argument ought to have been instantly and plainly exposed; for which purpose a distinct statement of facts would have been sufficient. With a similar view of depreciating the value of a guarantee against the Mahratta Empire, Azim ul Omra may affect to suppose me to be at present prepared to force the arbitration of the British Government upon the Peishwa; any such insinuations or errors on the part of the Court of Hyderabad must be repelled or corrected, as being equally at variance with the true intent and meaning of the Treaty of Hyderabad, and detrimental to the favourable issue of the present negociation. The Court of Hyderabad must be sensible of the powerful advantages which it would derive from the general guarantee; but it is absolutely necessary to convince Azim ul Omra and his Highness, that I am equally well apprised of its great importance and value to the Nizam, that I know the precise nature and extent of our obligation under subsisting treaties to interpose between his Highness and his enemies; that I will not suffer that obligation to be stretched beyond its just extent; and that I will not wantonly sacrifice the equivalent due to the Company in return for the new and important concession of the general guarantee.

I now proceed to furnish you with such observations on the different articles of the new treaty, as appear to be necessary.

Title and Preamble. The alterations which I have made in the title and preamble of your treaty are so inconsiderable as to require no observation.

Article 1. This article agrees in substance with your first article, but it contains the important addition which declares the friends and enemies of either party to be the friends and enemies of both. This declaration is contained in a subsequent article of your treaty, but it is not quite so distinctly expressed nor inserted in its proper place.

Article 2. This article is substantially the same as the 2nd article of your treaty. The Nizam in effect acquires by this article all that he would gain by your treaty. The observations contained in the 15th paragraph of this despatch will sufficiently explain to you the necessity of moderating the hostile tenor of your second article.

Article 3. This article requires no remark.

Article 4 requires no remark.

Article 5. No other effectual or satisfactory security than an absolute assignment of territory can be given by the Nizam for the regular payment of the subsidy. The present resources of his country cannot be expected to improve without an entire change in the system of his Highness's government. Of such a change no prospect appears. The difficulty experienced in obtaining a punctual discharge of the existing subsidy will be greatly increased by an augmentation of the subsidiary force, and the risk of failure in the funds necessary to the punctual payment, and consequently to the discipline of the troops, would also be proportionately aggravated.

I have always desired that the subsidy should be secured by a territorial assignment, although the punctuality with which the Court of Hyderabad has hitherto discharged the subsidiary payments has precluded any ground of serious complaint, and any demand from the Company's Government of the security stipulated by the Treaty of Hyderabad; I am of opinion that until the pecuniary payments shall be actually commuted for territory, the punctual realisation of the subsidy must ever be extremely precarious.

This consideration involves the security of an important branch of our resources, as well as the continuance of that harmony now subsisting between the British Government and the Nizam. No event could produce discussions of a more invidious nature at the Court of Hyderabad than a failure in the regular payment of our subsidiary troops. These apprehensions are so deeply impressed on my mind, that, if all prospect of the proposed general defensive alliance were closed, I should be disposed to accept even an inadequate territory in exchange for the subsidy, rather than leave that resource to depend on the defective government of the Nizam, and on the fluctuating state of his Highness's finances. Adverting, however, to the great and positive benefits presented to the Nizam by the proposed treaty, and to the increase of expense which it must necessarily bring upon the Company, the British Government is entitled to require such an equivalent as shall not only preclude any pecuniary loss on account of subsidy, but in some degree defray the ex-

extraordinary charges of defending his Highness's country against all enemies.

It may be reasonably apprehended, on a just consideration of the nominal value of the districts required by this article, of the evil government under which they have so long suffered, and of the refractory spirit prevailing in a great proportion of those countries, that their actual produce, deducting all charges of management, will, for a long tract of time, prove unequal to the discharge of the subsidy; and until the nett receipts from the country shall be sufficient for the payment of the troops, the Company must provide the necessary funds for this purpose, a circumstance which cannot fail to subject their government to considerable temporary inconvenience.*

The 5th article suggests no further observations which have not been anticipated in preceding paragraphs of this despatch.

It is unnecessary to state the obvious objections which exist to the extension of our frontier beyond the Toombud-dra in the direction of Kopul, Gugunder Ghurr, &c. No reasonable objection can be made by the Nizam to the exchanges stipulated by this article. It is, however, necessary in this place to apprise you of the full extent of my views in this proposition.

If we should acquire the territory specified in the 5th article, our line of frontier and our barrier against any sudden incursions of hostile cavalry in that quarter will require, that all the country situated to the southward of the Toombuddra and of the Kistna should be annexed to the Company's possessions. This cession would include, besides Kurnool, the

* Nominal value of the territory ceded to the Nizam in 1792, canterai pagodas 13,16,666, at 3 Arcot rupees per cant. pag. is 39,50,000

Nominal value of the territory acquired by the Nizam under the Treaty of Mysore, including the Peishcush of Kurnool, cant. pagodas, 7,13,304, at 3 Arcot rupees per C.P. . . . 21.39.912

	Total . . .	60,89,912
Sudsidy under the proposed treaty exclusive of Cavalry deficiency	39,42,800	
Difference, Arcot rupees	21,47,112	

districts of Adoni and Ghazipore or Nundiaul. At present I am ignorant of the value of these districts, and consequently of the proportion which it bears to the revenue of the countries to the northward of the Toombuddra. The possession of the whole line of country to the southward of the Kistna and Toombuddra is so essential to the security and compact form of our general frontier, that, although the districts to the northward should be found more productive than those to the southward of the rivers, I should be willing to cede the former for Adoni and Ghazipore.

The revenues of Adoni, &c, may, however, exceed those of the districts which I propose to offer in exchange, and the Court of Hyderabad may object to the cession of Adoni and Ghazipore, and particularly of Adoni. Whatever may be the difference of value between those districts it would not be a greater concession than the Company can justly claim in return for the effectual protection afforded by the general guarantee of the Nizam's dominions as well as for other advantages already enumerated in this despatch. You will urge this argument with the utmost assiduity, but if it should not be admitted, I would rather provide an equivalent for the amount of the differences of revenue in some other quarter than relinquish the proposed line of frontier. You will exert your utmost efforts to obtain this line on the principles already stated.

Article 5. This object however, is not absolutely indispensable; if you should find that the aversion of the Court of Hyderabad to the arrangement now suggested, is likely to endanger the success of the whole treaty, you will relinquish this point until a more favourable conjuncture shall arise, and you will content yourself with obtaining an equivalent for the districts to the northward of the Toombuddra in some other part of his Highness's country contiguous to the Company's possessions.

Article 6. You are at liberty either to agitate and decide the question of the exchanges previous to the conclusion of the treaty, or to defer that question until the treaty shall have been executed. My wish however, is, to bring the greatest possible proportion of this extensive arrangement to a definite conclusion by this treaty.

Article 7. This article requires no explanation. I have

already stated the indispensable necessity of assigning districts in perpetuity, to be placed under the exclusive management and authority of the East India Company. If the subsidy were a mere temporary charge upon the funds of the Nizam, the perpetual assignment of territory would be objectionable; but, as the subsidy is a fixed and permanent charge, the funds for its liquidation should be of the same nature; nor would the honour or dignity of his Highness's government be in any degree compromised by such an arrangement.

Article 8. The principal design of this article is to close for ever, all questions of account between the Company and the Nizam with regard to the subsidiary force; and to suggest the solid reasons which ought to induce his Highness to consent to this arrangement. The cession will appear both advantageous and honourable, when his Highness shall reflect, that the dominions proposed for cession were acquired principally by the aid of the British arms; that, after the cession, his Highness will possess the same extent of country which he held previous to the war of 1790-1; that he will be enabled, without any pressure upon his finances, to command the services of a large British force; and finally, that he will be effectually protected against all future encroachments of the Mahrattas.

Article 9. The necessity of this article is obvious; its omission in your treaty proceeded from the operation of the objectionable clause at the close of your 4th article. If the new treaty should be accepted by the Nizam, you will communicate a copy of it by express to Lord Clive, and you will concert with his Lordship the time and mode of assuming on behalf of the Company, the districts to be ceded. The object of the clause at the close of this article, is to guard the assigned countries from the depredations of the Nizam's officers in the interval between the date of the treaty, and the actual assumption of the countries by the officers of the Company.

Article 10. This article requires no explanation. It suggests however, an arrangement of considerable weight to strengthen the probability, that, deducting all necessary charges, the surplus revenue of the ceded districts will scarcely prove equivalent to the subsidy. The establishments and garrisons which it would be indispensably necessary for the Company

to maintain in some of these forts, and particularly in Gurrumcondah, Gooty, Ganjecottah, &c. would occasion a considerable expense to the British Government.

Article 11. It may be necessary to remark on this article, that it is not intended, in every supposable case, that the Nizam should continue to pay the whole of the subsidy, until the Company's officers shall have obtained complete possession of the ceded countries. It must necessarily happen, that some districts will be evacuated by his Highness's officers at an earlier period than others ; and it is also possible, that some of the Polygars of those districts may oppose a temporary resistance to the introduction of the Company's authority. In the former case, a regular account shall be opened with the Nizam ; and he shall be credited for the revenues of every district from the date of its actual delivery to the Company. In the latter case, the resistance of the Polygars shall not operate to the prejudice of the Nizam, and his Highness's responsibility for a proportional part of the subsidy, shall cease from the day on which the disturbed districts respectively shall be delivered to the Company by his Highness's officers.

Article 12. The first clause of this article is indispensable in a treaty designed, not to lay the foundation of future war, but to guard to the utmost extent of human precaution, against the return of that calamity. No reasonable objection can be urged against this clause by the Court of Hyderabad.

For the reasons assigned in the 26th, 27th and 28th paragraphs of this despatch, the unlimited exertions of the Nizam in the common cause must be secured, with a view to the case supposed.

Article 13. This is the 9th article of your treaty, with a slight verbal alteration. I repeat my approbation of your prudence in securing by treaty the right of the British Government to the exertions of the Court of Hyderabad, in points so essential to the success of military operations, as the timely collection of Brinjarries, and the establishment of magazines of grain.

Article 14. Requires no remark, being nearly the same as the 6th article of your treaty.

Article 15. The only observation suggested by this article has been anticipated in the 31st paragraph of this despatch.

Article 16th. This is the same as the 11th article of your treaty, of which I have already expressed my entire approbation.

Article 17. In the 36th paragraph of this despatch, I have stated my sentiments with regard to the importance of the concession, required by the Nizam in the 1st of your separate articles; it is reasonable that some return should be made by his Highness. The stipulations of this article ought to be deemed unobjectionable by the Court of Hyderabad. The maintenance of good order and tranquillity in the ceded districts can never be an object of indifference to the Nizam's Government; and the present article binds the Company to afford his Highness similar assistance whenever he may require it.

It is not intended by this article, that the subsidiary force, or any part of it, should be permanently employed in the protection of the ceded countries, or permanently stationed in any of the forts comprehended within the limits of those districts. In the event of any insurrection of the Polygars, or of the sudden incursion of an enemy, which the ordinary military force stationed in that part of the Company's territory may not be sufficient to check, it is proposed, that a division of the subsidiary troops, although stationed within his Highness's frontier, should be at the command of the Company, until the British Government may be enabled to dispense with its services.

Article 18. This article comprehends as much as appears to me necessary or proper to be stated in a public treaty, on the subject of your 12th and 13th articles.

Article 19. This article is entirely conformable to the general spirit of the treaty. It has no tendency to weaken any of the stipulations framed, with a view to the case of any aggression on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. If the Nizam should accept the treaty, you will ascertain as soon as possible, and report to me the conditions on which his Highness would be disposed to admit Dowlut Rao Scindiah to be a party to the proposed alliance. At a proper season, I shall communicate to you for the information of his Highness, those conditions which I should demand from Scindiah on the part of the Company.

Article 20. You are authorized by this article to declare

the treaty to be complete, whenever it shall have been executed by you and the Nizam; and to act upon it accordingly without delay, in the same manner as if I had formally ratified it in council. I think it necessary however to repeat, that you are empowered to make no other than mere verbal alterations in my draft, that no departure from the substance of any one of the articles can be admitted, and that your power of verbal alteration is confined strictly to cases of absolute necessity.

Separate Articles. I have consented to annex these separate articles to the treaty solely with a view to the gratification of the Nizam's wishes. It is necessary that you should signify these sentiments to his Highness, and inform him, that the conditions on which the Peishwa and Rhagojee Bhooslah should be admitted to the present alliance, appear to me to be more proper subjects of verbal discussion and arrangement between his Highness and the British Government, than of a solemn adjustment by treaty.

Article 1.—Clause 1. The Nizam is not entitled by this clause to more, on the part of the Company, than a just arbitration between his Highness and the Peishwa, founded on the basis of the treaty of Mahr. Azim ul Omra has repeatedly declared that nothing more is desired by his court. To expect more from the British Government would be an injury to its honour and justice. The Peishwa may possibly advance just claims on the Nizam, entirely unconnected with the provisions of the treaty of Mhar. Such claims may be compromised through the amicable endeavours of the British Government; but if any just claim of the Court of Poonah on that of Hyderabad should be clearly established, we can neither deny, nor resist it. The Nizam desires that it should be an express condition of the admission of the Peishwa to the alliance, and the restoration of his authority in the Mahratta empire that he should previously renounce for ever, all claims of Choute on the territories of the Nizam, and should fulfil all the stipulations of the treaty of Mhar. But if the Peishwa shall consent to an adjustment of all his claims of every description on the basis of that treaty, his Highness the Nizam will obtain all that can reasonably be required.

Article 1.—Clause 2. The 3rd separate article of your treaty

provided solely for the satisfaction to be given by the Peishwa to the Nizam; but the Company also will be justified in demanding from the Peishwa, a just return to them for the services to be rendered by their interposition in the affairs of the Mahratta empire. This clause requires no further observation.

Article 1.—Clause 3. This stipulation requires no remark.

It is sufficiently manifest, that the acquiescence of the Peishwa in this stipulation is indispensably necessary, to enable the Company to restore and maintain his Highness's authority. This stipulation is also essential to the permanent security of the Nizam; the establishment of a British subsidiary force at Poonah, will for ever preclude all disturbance of the Nizam's possessions by that restless Court; and will contribute materially to the preservation of general tranquillity.

Article 2.—Clause 1. The general tenor of the observations applied to the 1st and 2nd clauses of the 1st separate article, is equally applicable to this clause. If the Rajah of Berar shall accept the present proposal, the Nizam may be assured the British Government will render strict justice to his Highness's rights.

Article 2.—Clause 2. I have not judged it necessary or expedient to disclose more explicitly on the present occasion, the precise nature of my objects at the Court of Nagpoor.

You are already apprized however, by my instructions to the Resident at that court, of their general tendency. I wish Rha-gojee Bhooslah to accept a permanent subsidiary force from the Company. Such an arrangement would prove his most effectual security against Dowlut Rao Scindiah. I also wish to obtain the province of Cuttak, either by a territorial assignment from the Rajah in exchange for subsidy, or by an agreement between the Rajah and the Company for a reasonable equivalent from the Company, either in money or territory. The Court of Hyderabad possesses the means of promoting the success of my views, in respect to the acquisition of Cuttak, and I therefore desire you to pay the most particular attention to this object; and to avail yourself of the earliest possible occasion of ascertaining the sentiments and disposition of Azim ul Omra on the subject.

The possessions of the Nizam in Berar would probably constitute an ample equivalent, with regard to revenue for

Cuttak. You will direct your observation to this suggestion, and you will consider the means of inducing the Court of Hyderabad to exchange the territory in question for Cuttak, with a view to the transfer of the latter to the Company: the cession to Rhagojee Bhooslah, of Elichpoor and of the other districts of Berar now occupied by the Nizam, would evidently conduce more than any other possible arrangement, to the establishment and preservation of harmony between those two powers; and would probably secure from the Rajah of Berar a renunciation of all claims of Choute on the dominions of the Nizam. It is generally understood, that the nett revenue derived by the Court of Nagpoor from the province of Cuttak, constitutes an inconsiderable branch of Rhagojee Bhooslah's resources.

Secret—Article 3. Any detailed article, stipulating rules for the division of eventual conquests is irreconcilable to the spirit and object of this treaty. I cannot consent to any such article; and even in the expressions of the article now under consideration, I have made a concession to the Court of Hyderabad, to which it cannot assert any actual right.

It is hardly necessary to apprise you, that the latitude allowed you with regard to verbal alterations to be eventually admitted in the public articles of this treaty, must be exercised with peculiar reserve and caution in respect to the secret and separate articles.

I shall transmit to you with all practical despatch, a draft of a treaty of commerce to be proposed to the Court of Hyderabad.* The unaccountable indisposition manifested by that court to entertain this subject, has suggested to me the expediency of separating it entirely from the treaty of alliance, and of opening a distinct commercial negociation. The repugnance of the Nizam to this measure may, I trust, be overcome, since my propositions will not only secure to his Highness a perfect reciprocity of advantages, but also the free use of a sea-port, and the protection of the British flag. To these concessions it is my intention to add, as a present from the Company to his Highness, a vessel of considerable burden completely equipped.

The artifice employed by Azim ul Omra, (and stated in

* See Appendix.

your letter No. 84, dated the 31st of May,) for the purpose of anticipating the advantages of the depending treaty, is suitable to his temper and genius. You will omit no exertion to frustrate the mischievous effects of this unworthy attempt. He must be distinctly informed, that whenever the treaty now proposed shall be finally concluded, Colonel Palmer will be instructed to declare explicitly to the Peishwa and to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that the British Government from the period of that formal notification, will consider any unprovoked aggression against the Nizam, as an aggression against the Company; and accordingly, if the Nizam should execute the treaty, you will communicate the event to the Resident of Poonah, together with a copy of this despatch, and of the treaty, and you will inform him, that it is my order that he should make the proper notifications to the Peishwa and Scindiah, according to the tenor of this paragraph. You will explain to him that he is not authorized to communicate to the Peishwa and Scindiah any other articles of this treaty, than the 1st, 2nd, 16th, 18th and 19th articles. Azim ul Omra must also be apprized, that I will not suffer the slightest deception to be practised on this important subject; and that I have already adopted effectual measures for the purpose of removing the false impression which his unauthorized and unwarrantable communication to the Peishwa's vakeels was evidently calculated to produce. You will take this occasion of signifying distinctly to Azim ul Omra, that no engagements whatever are to be presumed to be finally concluded, merely because the British Resident has expressed his consent to them, especially when the Resident has declared any doubts of obtaining the final ratification of the Governor-General in council. While the Resident's public acts are declared by him, to be exactly conformable to his instructions, a confidence may justly be entertained that no alteration will be made by the supreme authority of the government which he represents. Under any other circumstances, the direct sanction of the Governor-General in council is absolutely requisite to give valid effect to every public instrument.

If you should have reason to suppose, that the Court of Hyderabad will reject the treaty now offered by my authority, you will communicate your opinion to the Resident at Poonah,

and you will desire him without delay, to declare to the Peishwa and to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in the most explicit and public manner, that the political relations subsisting between the Company and his Highness the Nizam, remain on the basis of the treaty of 1798, and have suffered no alteration whatever.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

WELLESLEY.

No. LXXX.

Sir Sidney Smith to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Ottoman Camp, Jaffa, June 27th, 1800.

I have considered it my duty, as the military commander, immediately opposed to the French force, whose progress, it was expected, would affect the British possessions in India to keep your Lordship constantly well informed of their motions and powers, but Mr. Morier, Secretary to his Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, having informed me that it was in his instructions to correspond with your Lordship, and his situation in the camp of his Highness the Vizier enabling him to inform you of those details which were more immediately interesting to you to know, I have not thought it necessary to extend my correspondence with India of late, beyond my communication with the Admiral commanding his Majesty's ships in the Red Sea, and Colonel Murray, whom I have placed in correspondence with such of the Ottoman officers as are immediately near him. Mr. Morier will have written to your Lordship on the projected operations, but observing that he expresses more confidence in the military means of the Turks than in my opinion they are entitled to; I hope I may be allowed, without presumption, considering my experience of them to differ with that gentleman, having no sort of confidence that they can ever prevail against the French, or indeed that, after the checks they have met with, they can ever be brought to face the French army again, even if the Turkish Ministry should recover from the impression of French superiority, which has succeeded the misplaced con-

tempt they had, or pretended to have, for their opponents, so as to venture to give an order to that effect. The Turkish troops may do real service as light troops on the flanks of regular European battalions, supported by European artillery; but alone they can do nothing; and the repeated defeats they have met with so discourages the country that the Government may be induced to close with the friendly overtures of the French from a sense of inability to do otherwise, particularly if the combined fleets again make their appearance in the Mediterranean. We may thus see the little they can do turned against us, and improved by the French, unless we expel the latter from Egypt, before they take fresh root, and make new establishments and connections under their present leader, Abdalla Menou, the successor of General Kleber, whose public profession of the Mahomedan religion gives him the same right of command over the Turks as the Beys of Egypt, or indeed any of those who fill the first offices of the empire, and who have risen to them from being Christian slaves. General Kleber had made a fresh offer to carry through his measure of evacuation the moment it should become practicable; but the atrocious assassination of that liberal man, and the succession of a renegado, the chief of the Colonist party, at the moment of the notification being made that the convention was ratified by our Government, throws things back into a worse state than they were at first, and the only chance we now have of the evacuation taking place is, the aversion of the majority of the army to remain in a climate so little congenial to the temperament and habits of Frenchmen, merely to realize the speculation of the Colonists or the gigantic projects of Buonaparte, who they know would rather sacrifice the whole of them thereto than see them return to France, to increase the number of the discontented there. Their present leader, Abdalla Menou, has not their confidence, therefore it is not likely he will be able to realize what it appears, however, probable he will attempt; he is the only officer who has embraced the Mahomedan religion; and the soldiers (whether those who have no religion at all, or the *bon paysan*, who has not forgot what the curate of his village taught him) look with contempt or indignation on their General going barefoot into a mosque to kiss the pavement, among the stupid herd they despise as ene-

mies, and care not to court as friends; still, however, the worst is to be guarded against, and I watch closely for any symptoms of a movement to the eastward, of which I have none as yet; it is the facility alone which awakens my attention, and induces me to call your Lordship's to it; and, perhaps, the best bar to any such project would be to give them so much occupation in Egypt, on all sides, as to render such a movement, should they make it the appearance of a flight before a superior force, rather than a pursuit of the Vizier. To this end I have written to Murad Bey, in concert with his Highness, to prevent that indefatigable Chief from prolonging his truce with the French till it becomes a peace, or till they have brought over his remaining Mamelukes to them. I have met the advances of the other Beys in the Ottoman camp, who look to English liberality to interpose in case the usual policy of the Osmanlis should intend to sacrifice them; and I must say, in justice to the Vizier, that I have found his Highness well disposed to listen to the suggestion of European policy; admitting that all who are not against us in this question of the recovery of Egypt are for us, and should be encouraged to become active agents. I have written to Lord Keith, who at present holds Genoa closely blockaded by sea, while the Austrians do the same by land, to point out the necessity which has arisen for the British troops originally destined for Egypt coming up before the winter, his Lordship having informed me there are 6,000 at Mahon. This situation of things may decide your Lordship to reinforce Colonel Murray, and thus the French may be completely surrounded, and an efficient protection afforded to such of them as may be inclined to surrender, which no circumstances can induce them to do to Turks, whose cruelty and perfidy are a bar to all capitulations on any other terms than those of the convention. Neither could I have required them to lay down their arms, had we been the superior force, without the power or the means of affording them such protection, at a time when I knew that a most perfidious and atrocious plan existed of "inflicting punishment and exercising the most consummate vengeance on them," as was officially notified to me at the same time that all right of interference to prevent the execution of such a cruel and faithless project was withdrawn from me. Thanks to the liberality

of our Government, I am now authorized to secure the faithful observance of the engagements contracted with the enemy, and to avert the execution of that design. Kleber, in the offer he made soon after the battle, to abide by this convention whenever the obstacles to its execution were removed, said, he should require some "modifications," dictated by the change of circumstances. General Menou, who does not feel himself firmly seated in the command which has devolved to him, has answered my letter, announcing the ratification of our Government by a reference to the Consuls at Paris, while he talks of advantages for the republic, which, in my mind, amounts to a refusal to execute the conditions Kleber was satisfied with. The impatience of his army may oblige him to close with my second overture, which was on its way to Cairo when his letter, dated the 20th of June, came to me, meanwhile I am going off to Alexandria, there to continue the blockade, and keep up a demonstration of attack on that quarter till one can really be effected. It is necessary for us, at the same time, to keep a sharp look out to the northward, lest the French and Spanish fleets combined should again slip by ours, and go direct to the Dardanelles, which afford no very formidable defence to that passage, in which case the ferment in the capital would paralyze every effort of Government, and Constantinople would become the fulcrum of a new revolutionary lever, which Buonaparte, I know, projects to employ against your Lordship's Government. Lord Keith writes me word this combined fleet in Brest is thirty-six sail of the line, independent of what Cadiz and Cartagena may furnish; it has 17,000 troops on board, and its destination is said to be Ireland, Portugal, or Alexandria. Ireland is too tranquil since the union has gone through both houses there, for it to be worth Buonaparte's while to sacrifice a fleet to that object. Portugal does not afford any great temptation, and Alexandria has no harbour for a fleet. While the navy of Turkey, the realization of a favourite scheme, and the indirect relief of the Egyptian army, offer him an increase of power, a gratification to his pride, and a justification of his desertion, all which are become of such absolute necessity to him, that he must turn his views where these advantages are to be found. The season will suit such an operation in September, when the Equinoctial gales drive our fleets in, and

offer a fair N. W. wind to Gibraltar, and from thence a fair S. W. one, all the way up to Constantinople. This is a project which just suits the genius of Buonaparte, and I propose great pleasure to myself, in thwarting his views by anticipation, and by opposing the means of resistance when the time may come. The evil is as yet far removed from your Lordship. I look, however, with confidence to your meeting it more than half way, as you did in the Mysore, thereby enabling us to keep the minds of the people of this country awake to our power, to protect or punish them as they may deserve; at present they need our protection, they look to us for it, and they ought not to be disappointed, lest they should look elsewhere. The opinion of the inhabitants is, as may well be supposed, from all circumstances of tradition, as well as recent events, much more in our favour than in that of the Atheistical French. The appearance of a British force in the Red Sea has had every good effect already, but Colonel Murray does not appear to have more than force enough to keep Cosseir; I wish he may be able to do that, for then the Sheriff of Mecca will be on our side, to keep the corn trade open, which is necessary to the existence of Arabia; and we have an entrance into Egypt by which we may get hold of the Nile, and render Cairo equally dependent without striking a stroke more than we chuse. The difficulties of a second expedition to the Cataracts being such as past experience will prevent the French army ever attempting, in any force, even if they could spare the men. One of the greatest difficulties is the climate, which is very unfavourable to Europeans; I should hope, however, less so to those who have been seasoned by an Indian campaign. General Desaix assured me that, of 3,000 men he had with him, 800 (himself, for the time, among the number) became blind in a three days' march, and the dépôt being attacked, the hospital was obliged to defend itself by one man that could see, being placed to direct the fire of a squad, who could not; this is such a serious evil, that I think it necessary to send your Lordship what has been written on it by the Physician of the army of Egypt, who, by so much as he was ever the decided and open opponent of Buonaparte, I must consider as the friend of mankind. This man and I, as your Lordship sees by his note on the title page, are agreed to prevent useless evil and make war,

(what it ought to be between civilized nations,) a fair contest for great political objects towards the amelioration of human society, and not for the diminution of the species. If this sentiment had been more general, we should not now be combining new military operations for the recovery of Egypt, or the security of the Ottoman Empire, for we had obtained the former, and the latter was secured from future similar expeditions by the return of the halt, the blind, and the dissatisfied to France, to deter others from coming. Europe took fright at the idea of the return of the rest, although it left us to fight them daily with inefficient means. We were told to disarm them, although we were the inferior force; and we were told too, officially, to allow Turkish policy to take its course, although its nature is at once repugnant to our sentiments as men of honour, and its success cannot be productive of any great result worthy of Englishmen to be concerned in. Ashes and bones (in which their own are the most numerous) having been the only fruits of their sanguinary violence in Cairo, when left to themselves.

I have the honour to be,
 with sincere respect and esteem,
 your Lordship's faithful and most humble Servant,

W. SIDNEY SMITH.

No. LXXXI.

Mr. Morier to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Grand Vizier's Camp, Jaffa, June 28th, 1800.

I have the honour to enclose, for your Lordship's information, the copies of my last instructions (accompanying the determination of Government on the convention of El Arish) from Lord Elgin. That circumstance was immediately communicated to the French Commander-in-Chief, whose answer to Sir Sidney Smith I have the honour to enclose. It speaks for itself, and shuts the door, for the present, against all idea of the evacuation on those terms. Much is it to be regretted, that, under the present circumstances, the inability of the Turks is such, that I despair of their driving the enemy out by force, without the assistance of European troops. Kleber's

successor is decidedly of the Colonist party, he professes Mussulmanism, and is the man who protested against the convention, and gave in his resignation in consequence. From those circumstances we may augur, that he will do his utmost to maintain the country.

It was in contemplation to send land forces to Egypt from England, and I believe that the idea is not given up. If so, what may not we hope from the exertions on this side, combined with those of the victorious bands from India. England would then complete the glorious work begun at Aboukir.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect, my Lord,
Your Excellency's most obedient, humble Servant,

J. P. MORIER.

No. LXXXII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

Bombay, July 2nd, 1800.

I have been favoured with your letter dated the 24th of May.

The jurisdiction of the court of the Recorder of Bombay arises from the statute and letters patent by which that court is constituted. All questions, therefore, with respect to its jurisdiction must be determined according to the true meaning and construction of that statute, and of those letters patent, and not by reference to the authority exercised by the supreme court here in similar cases. The determination of those questions belongs, in the first instance, to the court of the Recorder itself, and ultimately to his Majesty in Council as a court of appeal.

For your satisfaction, however, and for the purpose of assisting your judgment in framing regulations for the administration of justice in Surat, I shall state the following cases, in which the provincial courts of judicature and magistrates of Bengal exercise jurisdiction over British subjects resident in the Mofussil, whether they are or are not in the civil or military service of his Majesty or of the Honourable the English East India Company.

The magistrates of the several Zillahs and Cities are all appointed justices of the peace, by commissions issued according to the provisions for that purpose, contained in the statute of the 33rd of his present Majesty, ch. 52; and in that capacity, as well as under the orders and regulations of this government, they are bound to receive any charges that may be preferred to them for murder, or for any other crime against British subjects, either in or out of the service of his Majesty or of the Company; and, if the charges made be of sufficient magnitude, and if the evidence adduced appear to the magistrate sufficient to support them, they are also bound to apprehend such British subjects, and to send them to Calcutta in safe custody, to be proceeded against in the usual manner in the supreme court of judicature.

The provincial courts do not exercise any jurisdiction whatever over the civil and military servants of his Majesty and of the East India Company, in civil cases, where the claim is of a private nature.

But all the civil servants of the Company employed in the collection of every branch of the public revenue, the provision of the Company's investment, and the manufacture of salt, are amenable to the courts of civil judicature for their official acts, and for all claims which may be made on them, connected with those acts under the several rules prescribed in the printed regulations.

The regulation which renders British subjects, not in the service of his Majesty or of the East India Company, amenable to the courts of the districts in which they are permitted to reside for claims of a private nature, made on them by natives not exceeding five hundred rupees has not been extended to the servants of his Majesty or of the Company, and I entertain considerable doubts of the policy of subjecting them to the jurisdiction of the provincial courts for such demands.

I shall hereafter acquaint you with my sentiments as to the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the mayor's court over that class of the inhabitants of Surat denominated the "servants and dependants of the English factory at Surat;" at all events, that jurisdiction, as now transferred to the court of the Recorder, cannot attach on the great body of the inhabitants, who were before subject to the immediate autho-

rity of the Nabob of Surat, and who are now become amenable to the authority of the British Government under the late treaty with that Nabob. The court of the Recorder will not, I conclude, make any attempt to exercise jurisdiction over this description of persons; but, if any such attempt shall be made you will direct the law officers of your Government to oppose it; and, in case of a determination against them, to appeal to his Majesty in council; and, in the interval, the necessary precautions must be taken to prevent the exercise of any jurisdiction by the court of Recorder over the city of Surat which might disturb the unity of the Government of that City, and distract the allegiance of the inhabitants.

I request that you will be pleased to order more full enquiries to be made as to the grounds of the jurisdiction, which, in the cases above mentioned, has been heretofore exercised by the mayor's court at Surat, and that you will communicate to me the result. And I request also that you will transmit to me a copy of the opinion recently delivered by your attorney at Bombay respecting the jurisdiction of the Recorder's Court within the ancient limits of the factory of Tellicherry.

With regard to natives actually and bona fide in the civil or military service of the Company, and of British subjects whose habitations are not within the local limits of Calcutta, they are amenable exclusively to the jurisdiction of the provincial courts, in all matters of inheritance, or succession to goods or lands, and in all matters of dealing or contract, which are of a civil nature only, and which do not come within the description of torts or trespasses occasioned by violence or wrong. In criminal cases, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over natives of that description, provided the offence be committed in Bengal, Behar, and Orissa; and I am informed, that formerly, this jurisdiction was here conceived by some of the judges, to be exclusive. The opinion of the present judges, however, is said to be different, and now I have little reason to doubt that the determination of the Supreme Court would be, that the provincial courts have a concurrent jurisdiction over such natives. In fact, therefore, the prosecutor appears to have an option of resorting to the Supreme Court or to the Provincial Courts; and, in the

present state of this country, every purpose which the legislature could have had in view, in rendering persons of the description in question amenable at all to the Supreme Court may be attained by this construction of the law, at the same time that it obviates the ruinous consequences with regard to the authority of the Government as well as the highly inconvenient, and often very oppressive effects on the parties themselves, which would result from holding the offenders to be exclusively amenable to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

I consider these principles to be equally applicable to natives in the service of the Company on your establishment, both at Surat, and in every other part of the territories subject to your government out of the local limits of Bombay.

Subjects of all foreign States, whether Indian or European, residing at Surat, are on the same footing, and subject to the same jurisdiction with the natives themselves, who compose the great body of the inhabitants of Surat.

The Armenians and other Christians resident there, are also on the same footing and subject to the same jurisdiction with the natives who compose the great body of the inhabitants of Surat.

The jurisdiction of the Courts of British Law established by the Acts of Parliament and Royal Charters over persons who are not British subjects, does not at all depend on the religion of such persons, but on their residence within the limits of the local jurisdiction of the respective Courts, or on their being in the service of the Company, or of persons who are British subjects. The Supreme Court does not claim or exercise any jurisdiction over Armenians or native Christians residing out of the limits of the Town of Calcutta.

The Supreme Court does not exercise any jurisdiction over natives residing within the ancient limits of the factories of Chittagong, Cossimbazar, Lukipoor or Patna, on account of their residence, or for any cause whatever, except such as render other natives residing in any other parts of the British Territories, out of the Town of Calcutta subject to its jurisdiction.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. LXXXIII.

*General Koehler to the Marquess Wellesley.*Camp of the Grand Vizier, Jaffa in Syria,
9th July, 1800.

[Received 20th February, 1801.]

Having just arrived at the Camp of his Highness the Grand Vizier with a detachment of his Majesty's troops to assist in the prosecution of the war against the enemy in Egypt, I am charged by Mr. Morier, just returned to Constantinople, to have the honour to correspond with your Lordship on the military and political state of affairs in this quarter, I in consequence take the liberty of informing your Lordship that by the late answer from the French General Menou, successor to General Kleber, all further attempts at terminating hostilities in this quarter by means of negotiations are entirely precluded. He has declared that he will maintain the possession of Egypt against every opponent, even were he to remain alone, and has completely disavowed the powers of Kleber to treat for the evacuation of Egypt, by declaring that every negotiation for that purpose must be referred to the French Government. His Highness the Grand Vizier appears to be very well satisfied with this determination, and equally determined to prosecute hostilities with the utmost vigour, to compel them to solicit a capitulation upon more reasonable terms than those which they had lately surprised from him.

The Vizier seems really to be in earnest. Great quantities of ordnance and military stores arrive daily, indeed the means which he already has at his disposal I look upon to be sufficient to perform the service required, if they possessed the knowledge of employing them with advantage. I wish it may be in our power to render them some assistance in that respect, they appear at present well disposed to attend to our suggestions; but much is to be done to bring them into tolerable order, and to make them adopt indispensable regulations of service.

Your Lordship has, I believe, been informed that his Ex-

cellency the Captain Pasha is at sea with a formidable squadron, and that Sir Sidney Smith has joined him with the ships and vessels under his command. To cut off all communication with France, and multiplied attacks upon the Coast of Egypt, I have understood to be the objects of this combined squadron.

A diversion in Upper Egypt by troops from India, by the way of Cosseir, or any other points would facilitate the operations to be carried on from hence, and might be reinforced by detachments from this army ; but I think it my duty to advertise your Lordship that great caution is necessary with regard to Murad Bey, who is affirmed to be gained over to the enemy, and with his Mamelukes at present encamped with them near Cairo ; but this information is likewise liable to caution, as it is founded upon a report made by an officer sent to Cairo by Sir Sidney Smith, who had it from the enemy ; but both the Vizier and Ibrahim Bey, the rival of Murad Bey, who is at present encamped here, declare they can depend upon him ; they may, or may not be deceived by him ; information from an enemy is always suspicious.

The enemy are said to have at present, in Egypt, 15,000 French troops, and 10,000 Greeks and Copts that they have raised and disciplined. They are likewise said to be making every disposition of defence, and have great confidence of success ; but this, I believe to be overcharged. It is likewise the result of the information as above ; but even so, from so great an extent of country to occupy and defend, and so many places to garrison which cannot be neglected ; the active force liable to be opposed upon any given point must be very small—not more than six or eight thousand men.

Our error hitherto has been partial and insulated attacks ; should we once be fortunate enough to combine our operations so as to attack, at the same time, at such distant places as along the Coast of Egypt from Alexandria to Damietta from Upper Egypt threatening Cairo, and by the army of the Vizier along the Frontier, from Damietta to Suez, it would be almost impossible for the enemy not to be so dispersed as to be weak everywhere, or to neglect one or the other of those points, which would be enabled to make a great progress, and facilitate the operations of the others.

This is the plan; I have it in contemplation to propose to the Vizier, and to assist, with his Majesty's troops under my orders, in the execution of.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,
My Lord,

Your Excellency's most obedient humble Servant,
GEO. FREDERICK KOEHLER.
Brigadier-General in command, &c.

No. LXXXIV.

The Marquess Wellesley to his Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier.

SIR,

Fort William, July 9th, 1800.

The tenour of the advices from Lieut.-Colonel Murray, dated Mocha, 1st of June, 1800, combined with other considerations which I shall have the honour to state to your Excellency on a future occasion, confirms me in opinion that it is inexpedient, at this period, to prosecute the intended expedition to Batavia.

I therefore request your Excellency to discontinue all preparations for that expedition, and I take the liberty of recommending to your Excellency, in the most earnest manner, to remain in these seas, with as many of his Majesty's ships as you may find it practicable to collect together, with a view to the defence of the Coasts of India against any attempt which may be made by France from Europe, or eventually for the purpose of frustrating any designs which she may have formed of assisting General Kleber in Egypt by the co-operation of a naval force in the Red Sea.

I have now under my consideration the possibility and expediency of sending a military force from India to Egypt by the Red Sea; and I shall hereafter have the honour to communicate to your Excellency the result of my opinion on that difficult and embarrassing question.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. LXXXV.

The Governor-General in Council to the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, July 9th, 1800.

The great pressure of the numerous and important duties now performed immediately by the Governor-General in Council, has induced us to take a review of the constitution of the Government-General, considered as the supreme authority in India.

It has been his Lordship's object in this review to determine what duties now executed immediately by the Governor-General in Council ought still to be performed by him; what duties ought to be delegated to other establishments, and lastly to make a permanent provision for the due discharge of those duties which the Governor-General in Council must necessarily retain, as well as of those which it has been deemed advisable he should relinquish.

In the discussion of these important questions we have not hesitated to consider the extensive and valuable possessions to the government of which the Company have succeeded, as a great Empire. To view those possessions in any other light, must, we are persuaded, always lead to the most erroneous conclusions as to the principles of policy by which they ought to be governed.

The early administration of the Company succeeded to the despotic power of the native princes.

Those princes, as in other despotic governments, united in their own persons the whole legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the State, and exercised them according to the dictates of their own discretion.

No form of Government could be so ill adapted to these countries when they became dependent possessions of the British Empire, subject to be governed by persons occasionally deputed from the Mother Country.

Experience of the evils attendant on this form of Government conducted by a delegated British administration, led to

the modelling of the Government of Bengal, on principles drawn from the British constitution.

A distribution of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the state, analogous to that which forms the basis of the British Constitution, was made the foundation of the new constitution of the Government of Bengal.

Considerations, however, arising out of the nature of our situation in this country demanded that these fundamental principles of the British Constitution should be introduced with a variety of modifications.

The lines between these three authorities were distinctly drawn, but it was obviously necessary that the Governor-General in Council should exercise exclusively the entire legislative authority.

But at the same time that we excluded our native subjects from all participation in the legislative authority, abundant security was afforded to them, that the exercise of that authority would always be directed to their happiness and benefit.

The confirmation of their ancient laws in all matters connected with their religious prejudices, or their domestic relations, formed one of the first acts of the Governor-General in Council under the new constitution.

Provision was also made for ascertaining the sense which the people might entertain of the laws and regulations enacted for the government of the country, by the authority given to the judges of all the Courts of Judicature to propose such general or local laws as, from their intercourse with the natives in the administration of justice, might appear to them necessary to promote the public happiness and prosperity.

As an effectual security against every abuse of the legislative power vested in the Governor-General in Council, it was made a fundamental principle of the new constitution, that he shall print and publish every legislative Act in a form which renders him responsible to his country for the unjust or unwise exercise of that power.

The executive authority was of necessity also exclusively vested in the Governor-General in Council.

No check can be imposed on the Governor-General in

Council in the exercise of this authority in the regulation of our connection with the foreign States of India. But as our own interest, and that of our subjects with regard to those connections are necessarily the same, they have the best security that the most effectual means will always be taken to protect the country from foreign enemies.

With regard to all acts of the executive power as they relate to the internal government of the country, the people possess the same security against any infringement by this power of the rights and principles which have been granted to them by the laws, as is enjoyed under the British Constitution.

It was judged advisable, however, to restrict the controul over the executive authority to cases actually provided for by the regulations. But as legislative provisions are made for all cases not included in the existing laws as such cases arise, the discretionary power which the Governor-General in council may now exercise in cases of that nature, must in progress of time entirely cease.

As constituting the Courts of Sudder Dewanny Adawlut and the Nizamut, or the chief civil or criminal Courts, the Governor-General in council also exercises a large portion of the judicial power.

The reasons which originally occasioned the continuance of the entire legislative and executive authority in the Governor-General in council, are obviously of a permanent nature.

There is no change in our situation in this country, which can be supposed, in which it would be expedient to admit any part of our native subjects to participate in the legislative authority with the Governor-General in council.

The same principle applies to the executive authority of the Governor-General in council, as far as regards the relations of the British possessions with foreign states. It can never be expedient that our native subjects should be allowed to interfere in those relations, or that any local restrictions should be imposed on the Governor-General in council, in the conduct of them.

With regard to the executive authority of the Governor-General in council, as as far as relates to the internal government of the country, this authority can only be vested in

him. But the nature of our situation affords additional reasons for subjecting the executive authority in this branch gradually to the complete controul of the law, in the same manner as that authority is restricted by the laws of the British constitution.

While our political security demands that the entire legislative and executive authority should continue to be vested exclusively in the Governor-General in council agreeably to the principles of the existing constitution : it is at the same time a satisfaction to know, that under the checks which are imposed on the Governor-General in council in the exercise of these powers, the union of them in his hands, (notwithstanding the objections to which this union may be liable in theory) is perfectly compatible with the ends of good government.

There are no circumstances however connected with our political situation in this country, which require that the Governor-General in council should continue to exercise any portion of the judicial authority.

It is equally necessary to the happiness of the people, to the prosperity of the country, and to the stability of the British Government, that such laws as the Governor-General in council may sanction in his legislative capacity, should be administered with ability, integrity, impartiality and expedition.

All the provisions made by the British constitution for precluding the legislative and the executive powers of the state, from any interference in the administration of the laws, are not only applicable to the government of this country, but, if it were possible, demand to be strengthened.

An efficient controul may be exercised from England over the conduct of the Governor-General in council, in his legislative capacity. But no effectual controul can be exercised over him in the administration of the laws, and he may render the laws altogether nugatory by abuses, omissions, or delays in their administration.

It is essentially necessary that the security of private rights and property should be rendered altogether independent of the characters of those who may be occasionally placed at the head of your affairs in this country. This however, can never be the case, while the Governor-General in council who

makes the law, and whose acts in his executive capacity, as well as those of the long train of officers who exercise authority under him in that capacity also, constitute the chief courts which controul the general administration of justice.

No inconvenience can arise from divesting the Governor-General in council of all immediate interference in the administration of the laws, while he has the power of altering at his pleasure the law itself.

These objections to the exercise of any judicial power by the Governor-General in council, are founded on general and established principles of government; but other considerations render this duty incompatible with the proper functions of the Governor-General in council.

The administration of justice in open court, is one of the principal securities for its due administration.

The constant appearance of the Governor-General in council in an open court of justice would be incompatible with that dignity which, to render him competent to the conduct of the government, it is essentially necessary that the person invested with the supreme executive and legislative power should maintain, not only in the estimation of the people immediately subject to his government, but also of the foreign powers.

The presence of the Governor-General in council in open court, would prevent the pleading of causes with becoming freedom. No native pleader would venture to contest his opinions, and the will of the Governor-General, and not the law would be considered as the rule of decision.

As the Governor-General must necessarily be often unacquainted with the languages of the country, this circumstance alone would render it impracticable for him to preside at trials in open court, unless it should be determined that the trials should be conducted in English, and by English pleaders.

In consequence of these circumstances, the Courts of Suder Dewanny Adawlut, and Nizamut Adawlut are held in the council chamber. Neither the parties nor their pleaders are in any cases present. The proceedings are translated into English, and read to the members of the Court who pass their decision, which the register records.

The necessity of making these translations constitutes the chief cause of the delay in the decision of the causes which

are brought before the chief civil and criminal courts. The translations cannot however be dispensed with for the reasons above stated. They are also requisite for record and transmission to England, as they now constitute the only check on the Governor-General in council in the administration of the law; but for these considerations, no translations of the proceedings on trials would be necessary.

But there is another object, unconnected with any of the above considerations, which is of itself sufficient to establish the necessity of divesting the Governor-General in council of the judicial authority now exercised by him.

A conscientious discharge of the duties of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, and the Nizamut Adawlut, would of itself occupy the whole time of the Governor-General in council.

The proper duties of these courts are not confined to the determination of the causes which are brought before them. It is also their duty to superintend the conduct of all the other courts, to watch over the general police of the country, and to frame for the consideration of the Governor-General in council, new laws as cases may arise demanding further legislative provisions.

When your Honourable Court shall advert to the extent of your dominions, to their population, to their growing prosperity, and to the consequent multiplied concerns of individuals, it will at once be evident that it is physically impossible that the Governor-General in council can ever dedicate that time and attention to the duties of these courts, which must necessarily be requisite for their due discharge.

It is impossible to have the benefit of a regular and systematic government without numerous laws, and for the due administration of those laws, the necessary establishments must be provided.

Of the value of a system of government founded on these principles as connected with your permanent interests, a competent judgment may be formed by a comparison of the present state of your territories in Bengal, with that of your ancient possessions on the coast of Coromandel, as described in the able report of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George, forwarded to your Honourable Court by this despatch.

These considerations have induced us to determine, under the sanction of the clause of the act, of the year

of the reign of his present Majesty, that the Governor-General, and the members of council shall not constitute the Court of Sudder Dewanny Adawlut in future, but that distinct judges shall be appointed to preside in that court, with all the powers and authorities now exercised by the Governor-General and the members of council, as the judges of that court.

We have also determined, that the same judges shall constitute the Court of Nizamut Adawlut, with all the powers now exercised by the Governor-General and the members of council, as judges of that court.

The adoption of this arrangement will establish the prosperity of your dominions in Bengal, on the most solid foundations. Your Honourable Court will yourselves be able to exercise the most effectual controul over the Governor-General in council in his legislative capacity, as his acts printed and published come under your revision. His executive authority as far as regards the internal government, will be subject to the controul of the laws, and the due administration of the laws, will be secured by the courts appointed to administer them being rendered entirely distinct, both from the executive and legislative authority, at the same time that the conduct of the judges of the superior courts, will be subject to the most vigilant controul on the part of the executive power.

The necessity of divesting the Governor-General in council of the exercise of any judicial authority at some future period was foreseen at the first establishment of the present constitution. It will accordingly appear, that throughout the code of regulations the powers of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut and the Nizamut Adawlut are so framed, as to admit of these courts being at any time constituted in the manner now proposed. But the cautious spirit which will be found to pervade every part of that constitution, wisely left these judicial powers to be exercised by the Governor-General in council, until circumstances should dictate the necessity of his relinquishing them.

The establishment of the new Courts of Sudder Dewanny Adawlut and Nizamut Adawlut, providing for the discharge of the judicial duties now exercised by the Governor-General in council, the only point connected with the subject of this

address which remains to be considered, is the permanent provision to be made for enabling the Governor-General in council to execute the legislative and executive duties which are still to be performed by him.

The duties of the Governor-General in council in his legislative capacity, are first, the framing of such laws or regulations as may occur to him to be necessary for improving the internal government of the country. Secondly, the consideration of such laws or regulations as may be proposed to him by any of the Courts of Judicature, or other authorities empowered to propose regulations.

In a despotic government the will of the ruling power stands in the place of law; but when it becomes the fundamental principle of a government, to be guided by written and defined laws, every case which occurs, for which no provision is made, and every defect discovered in the existing laws, calls for the interposition of the legislative authority.

Numerous cases now demand that interposition; but it is unavoidably withheld, from the various avocations of the Governor-General in council, rendering it impossible to give his attention to the several cases, or defects, or to make the necessary legislative provisions for them.

The superintendance of this important duty, on the due performance of which depend the happiness of the people, the extent of your resources, and the stability of your empire, will in future devolve chiefly on the new Court of Sudder Dewanny Adawlut and Nizamut. It will be the province of the Governor-General in council to determine on the expediency of adopting the regulations which may be submitted to him by these courts, or by the other authorities empowered to propose regulations.

The duties of the Governor-General in council in his executive capacity consist of—first, his duties as exercising the executive authority of the government of the British possessions in India. Secondly, his duties as the chief representative of the Company in India, in their commercial capacity.

The first mentioned duties must be considered, as they relate to the conduct of the relations between the British power in India, and Foreign States; and secondly, as they are connected with the internal government of your own possessions.

The glorious termination of the late war in Mysore, and the events which preceded it, have not only widely extended your political relations, but have established the ascendancy of the British power over all the States of India.

The maintenance of this ascendancy, necessarily demands the constant and vigilant attention of the Governor-General in council.

The public records afford abundant testimony, how great a proportion of the time of the Governor-General in council must necessarily be occupied by this most important duty.

The executive duties of the Governor-General in council as connected with the internal government of the British possessions of Bengal, comprise the management of the public revenue, the superintendance of the general finances of India, the regulation of the army, and the infinite variety of miscellaneous business which falls under the cognizance of the executive authority in every government.

The general controul exercised by the Governor-General in council over the civil and military affairs of the subordinate governments, forms another important branch of these executive duties.

The two subordinate governments may be considered with relation to the supreme government as dependant states. The nature of the controul exercised over those governments, corresponds in many material respects, with that exercised by the Crown, with regard to the American and West Indian possessions.

It is essential that this controul should be extended to all matters in any respect connected with the unity, strength and stability of the British power in India.

The various questions arising out of the settlement of our recent conquests, of our connection with the dependent power established in Mysore, and lastly, the introduction of the constitution of the internal Government of Bengal, into the British territories, subject to the Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, demand at present a more than ordinary attention of the Governor-General in council, to the affairs of those governments.

Another branch of the duties of the Governor-General in council in his executive capacity, is the superintendance of

the subordinate settlements, and of our acquisitions from the French and the Dutch.

As the chief representative of the Company in their commercial capacity the Governor-General in council has the immediate superintendance of their commercial concerns in Bengal, and exercises a general control over the provision of the investment at the other presidencies, including a considerable degree of attention to their affairs in China.

The establishment attached to the Governor-General in council in his legislative and executive capacity, for the conduct of these various and important duties under circumstances peculiarly arduous and critical, has hitherto consisted of a secretary, and four sub-secretaries. The assistants under these officers are necessarily incompetent to afford them any effectual aid, in their more important duties.

From the constitution of these offices of sub-secretary, these offices were not acceptable to persons of any pretensions in the respective departments, either from their rank in the service, or from their talents. They have accordingly for the most part been filled by junior servants, necessarily incompetent to afford any efficient assistance in the execution of the duties of government.

It is of the greatest importance to the public interests, that the establishments of the several departments immediately connected with the legislative and executive capacity of the Governor-General in council should be so constituted, as to ensure at the head of the respective departments, the assistance of men of ability, integrity and experience, competent to the due conduct of the ordinary duties of the government.

Establishments so constituted, will form a great check to negligence or misrule; at the same time, that they will always be powerful instruments in the hands of those who are zealous in the promotion of the public interests.

The Governor-General in council therefore determined to make the situations of the public officers, who are to be his instruments for the conduct of the government of the British possessions in India, offices of high honour, and of the first emolument.

This was the only mode of enabling the Governor-General in council to command the services of men of the first talents and ability, in the respective departments.

As connected with the principle of relieving the Governor-General in council from all unnecessary labour of detail, our attention has been drawn to the number of papers which it has been the practice for the Governor-General in council to attest with his own signature. Much of the time of the Governor-General in council is occupied unnecessarily in the signature of these papers, and the despatch of the public business is often considerably impeded in obtaining his signature to them.

We have accordingly determined, that all public papers shall be authenticated by the signature of the secretary to the department. From this general rule however, we have of course excepted our addresses to your honourable Court, and to the subordinate Presidencies and all other papers, to which considerations of respect to superior authority, or other circumstances, may render it proper that the signatures of the Governor-General in council should be affixed. Conformably to this determination, your honourable Court will find the sets of the public proceedings which are transmitted to you, attested by the secretaries of the respective departments, by order of the Governor-General in council, instead of being signed by the Governor-General and the members of council.

In this review of the constitution of the supreme Government of the Company's possessions in India, it could not escape the Governor-General in council, that the wisest system of government will but imperfectly answer its ends, unless means are at the same time taken for providing persons duly qualified for the conduct of the system.

It would be useless to enter into any argument to prove that the same general qualifications necessary for the first political, judicial, financial and commercial stations in Europe, are equally requisite for the due discharge of the duties of similar situations in India.

Your honourable Court can yourselves form an adequate judgment how far your servants are in general competent to discharge these high offices. You know at what age they are sent from England, and what are at that period their qualifications for the offices to which they are destined. You are also apprized how far the occupations on which the first years of their residence in India are employed, are calculated to give them these qualifications.

Your servants are nominated to the highest stations of civil government, without any test of their possessing the requisite qualifications for the discharge of the functions of these offices. No such test could now indeed be required, none having been prescribed, and no means having been afforded to individuals of acquiring the necessary qualifications for public stations.

In consequence of this serious defect in the system of your government, it has been the practice to transfer your servants from one line of the service to another, with little regard to the qualifications for the offices for which they have been selected. No imputation attaches in this respect to your governments. Among those from whom the selection was to be made, there could not possibly exist any material ground of preference.

It is far from our intention in these observations to reflect on the general talents, character, or integrity of your servants on this establishment. Whatever may be their deficiencies, they are not ascribable to themselves, but to the nature of the service. Great exertions indeed have been made by individuals, and it affords matter of astonishment, that under such disadvantages they should have acquitted themselves with so much ability and success, in situations which in Europe are to be attained only by regular and systematic education and laborious exertions.

It is obvious that an education exclusively European or Indian, would not qualify your servants for the situations which they are destined to fill. The foundation of their education must be laid in England, and it must be completed systematically after their arrival in India.

The Governor-General in council has, therefore, determined to found an establishment at this Presidency, of the nature of a collegiate institution, for the purpose of enabling the servants of the Company to perfect themselves in those acquirements, which form the necessary qualifications for the different lines of the service, in which they may choose to engage. It is our intention that the junior servants shall be attached to this institution for a certain period after their arrival, instead of being employed in the unprofitable occupation of transcribing papers, and abandoned to the dictates of their own discretion, both with regard to their morals and acquirements.

An institution of this description will ensure a succession of men, equal to the support of the great interests of the Company, and of the British nation in India.

The above observations with regard to the education and qualifications of your civil servants in Bengal, for the conduct of civil government apply with equal force to your servants under the other Presidencies. Under our instructions to Fort St. George, of the 31st December last, and the orders which we have it in contemplation to issue to Bombay, the civil servants on those establishments will be shortly called upon to exercise the same important functions, as the civil servants on Bengal.

Whether it will be advisable to bring the junior servants attached to the Establishments of Fort St. George and Bombay to Bengal in the first instance, in order to enable them to acquire the necessary qualifications here, or to found institutions for the purpose at those Presidencies, is a question which will demand further consideration.

When the details of the plan of the intended institution shall have been arranged, we shall lose no time in forwarding it to your honourable Court. As it cannot fail to redound equally to the honour and happiness of the civil servants, as well as to promote the solid and substantial interests of the Company, and of the nation, we feel the strongest conviction that it will meet your approbation.

As connected with the subject of forming the characters of your servants, we cannot omit to notice the state of your religious establishments in this country.

The sentiments which have occurred to the Governor-General regarding these establishments, will hereafter form the subject of a separate address to your honourable Court from his Lordship.

It is of the last importance to the stability of the British power in India, that these establishments should be placed on the most respectable footing. Such establishments will cherish in the minds of the servants of the Company, a sense of moral duty, and teach those who fill important stations, that the great public duties which they are called upon to execute in India, are not of a less sacred nature than the duties of similar situations in their own country. In proportion as persons holding such situations are brought to entertain

these high and worthy notions of their functions, and to consider themselves as more especially accountable to that Being, whose instruments they are in the government of a large portion of the human race, in the same degree will they discharge their duties with zeal, diligence and integrity.

We feel that it would not only be impolitic, but highly immoral to suppose that Providence has admitted of the establishment of the British power over the finest provinces of India, with any other view than that of its being conducive to the happiness of the people, as well as to our national advantage.

In proportion as the policy and conduct of the British Government shall correspond with these beneficent intentions, we are persuaded that its power will acquire increasing stability.

Impressed with a deep sense of the justice and wisdom of these principles, we are confident that it will always be equally for the interests of the Company, and of the British nation, that they should constitute the basis of the system of our Indian Government; and that consistently with the considerations of a well regulated economy, we ought never to withhold that portion of the resources derived from these valuable possessions, which may be found indispensably necessary for dispensing to them the invaluable blessings of civil order and good government.

We have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY and COUNCIL.

No. LXXXVI.

The Governor-General's Notes with respect to the foundation of a College at Fort William.

Fort William, 10th July, 1800.

The British possessions in India now constitute one of the most extensive and populous empires in the world. The immediate administration of the government of the various provinces and nations composing this empire is principally confided to the European civil servants of the East India Company. Those provinces, namely, Bengal, Behar, Orissa, and Benares, the Company's Jaghire in the Carnatic, the

northern Circars, the Baramahal, and other districts ceded by the peace of Seringapatam, in 1792, which are under the more immediate and direct administration of the European civil servants of the Company, are acknowledged to form the most opulent and flourishing parts of India ; in which property, life, civil order, and religious liberty are more secure, and the people enjoy a larger portion of the benefits of good government, than any other country in this quarter of the globe. The duty and policy of the British Government in India therefore require, that the system of confiding the immediate exercise of every branch and department of the government to Europeans, educated in its own service, and subject to its own direct control, should be diffused as widely as possible, as well with a view to the stability of our own interests, as to the happiness and welfare of our native subjects. This principle formed the basis of the wise and benevolent system introduced by Lord Cornwallis, for the improvement of the internal government of the provinces immediately subject to the Presidency of Bengal,

In proportion to the extension of this beneficial system, the duties of the European civil servants of the East India Company are become of greater magnitude and importance, the denominations of writer, factor, and merchant, by which the several classes of the civil service are still distinguished, are now utterly inapplicable to the nature and extent of the duties discharged, and of the occupations pursued by the civil servants of the Company.

To dispense justice to millions of people of various languages, manners, usages and religions ; to administer a vast and complicated system of revenue throughout districts equal in extent to some of the most considerable kingdoms in Europe ; to maintain civil order in one of the most populous and litigious regions of the world ; these are now the duties of the larger proportion of the civil servants of the Company. The senior merchants composing the five Courts of Circuit and Appeal under the Presidency of Bengal exercise in each of those Courts a jurisdiction of greater local extent, applicable to a larger population, and occupied in the determination of causes infinitely more intricate and numerous than that of any regularly constituted courts of justice in any part of Europe. The senior or junior merchants, employed in the

several magistracies and Zillah Courts, the writers or factors filling the stations of registers and assistants to the several courts and magistrates, exercise in different degrees, functions of a nature, either purely judicial, or intimately connected with the administration of the police, and with the maintenance of the peace and good order of their respective districts. Commercial or mercantile knowledge, is not only unnecessary throughout every branch of the judicial department, but those civil servants who are invested with the powers of magistracy, or attached to the judicial department in any ministerial capacity, although bearing the denomination of merchants, factors or writers, are bound by law, and by the solemn obligation of an oath, to abstain from every commercial and mercantile pursuit; the mercantile title which they bear, not only affords no description of their duty, but is entirely at variance with it.

The pleadings in the several courts, and all important judicial transactions, are conducted in the native languages. The law which the Company's judges are bound to administer throughout the country is not the law of England, but that law to which the natives had long been accustomed under their former sovereigns, tempered and mitigated by the voluminous regulations of the Governor-General in council, as well as by the general spirit of the British constitution. These observations are sufficient to prove, that no more arduous or complicated duties of magistracy exist in the world, no qualifications more various, or more comprehensive, can be imagined than those which are required from every British subject, who enters the seat of judgment within the limits of the Company's empire in India.

To the administration of the revenue, many of the preceding observations will apply with equal force; the merchants, factors and writers, employed in this department also, are bound by law to abjure the mercantile denomination appropriated to their respective classes in the Company's service; nor is it possible for a collector of the revenue, or for any civil servant employed under him, to discharge his duty with common justice, either to the state, or to the people, unless he shall be conversant in the language, manners, and usages of the country; and in the general principles of the law, as administered in the several courts of justice. In ad-

dition to the ordinary judicial and executive functions of the Judges, Magistrates, and Collectors, the Judges and Magistrates occasionally act in the capacity of Governors of their respective districts, employing the military, and exercising other extensive powers. The Judges, Magistrates, and Collectors, are also respectively required by law to propose, from time to time, to the Governor-General in Council, such amendments of the existing laws, or such new laws as may appear to them to be necessary for the welfare and good government of their respective districts. In this view the civil servants employed in the departments of Judicature and Revenue, constitute a species of subordinate legislative council to the Governor-General in Council, and also form a channel of communication, by which the Government ought to be enabled, at all times, to ascertain the wants and wishes of the people. The remarks applied to these two main branches of the civil service, namely, those of Judicature and Revenue, are at least equally forcible in their application to those branches which may be described under the general terms of the Political and Financial Departments, comprehending the offices of Chief Secretary, the various stations in the Secretary's office, in the Treasury, in the office of Accountant-General, together with all the public officers employed in conducting the current business at the seat of Government. To these must be added the Diplomatic branch, including the Secretary in the political department, and the several residencies at the Courts of our dependent and tributary Princes, or of other native powers of India.

It is certainly desirable, that all these stations should be filled by the civil servants of the Company: it is equally evident, that qualifications are required in each of these stations, either wholly foreign to commercial habits, or far exceeding the limits of a commercial education.

Even that department of this empire, which is denominated exclusively commercial, requires knowledge and habits different, in a considerable degree, from those which form the mercantile character in Europe; nor can the Company's investment ever be conducted with the greatest possible advantage and honour to themselves, or with adequate justice to their subjects, unless their commercial agents shall possess many of the qualifications of statesmen, enumerated in the

preceding observations. The manufacturers, and other industrious classes, whose productive labour is the source of the investment, bear so great a proportion to the total population of the Company's dominions, that the general happiness and prosperity of the country must essentially depend on the conduct of the commercial servants employed in providing the investment: their conduct cannot be answerable to such a charge, unless they shall be conversant in the native languages, and in the customs and manners of the people, as well as in the laws by which the country is governed. The peace, order, and welfare of whole provinces may be materially affected by the malversations, or even by the ignorance and errors of a commercial resident, whose management touches the dearest and most valuable interests, and enters into the domestic concerns of numerous bodies of people, active and acute from habitual industry, and jealous of any act of power injurious to their properties, or contrary to their prejudices and customs.

The Civil servants of the English East India Company, therefore, can no longer be considered as the agents of a commercial concern. They are, in fact, the ministers and officers of a powerful sovereign; they must now be viewed in that capacity, with reference, not to their nominal, but to their real occupations. They are required to discharge the functions of Magistrates, Judges, Ambassadors, and Governors of provinces, in all the complicated and extensive relations of those sacred trusts and exalted stations, and under peculiar circumstances, which greatly enhance the solemnity of every public obligation, and aggravate the difficulty of every public charge. Their duties are those of statesmen in every other part of the world, with no other characteristic differences than the obstacles opposed by an unfavourable climate, by a foreign language, by the peculiar usages and laws of India, and by the manners of its inhabitants. Their studies, the discipline of their education, their habits of life, their manners and morals should, therefore, be so ordered and regulated as to establish a just conformity between their personal consideration, and the dignity and importance of their public stations, and to maintain a sufficient correspondence between their qualifications and their duties. Their education should be founded in a general

knowledge of those branches of literature and science which form the basis of the education of persons destined to similar occupations in Europe. To this foundation should be added an intimate acquaintance with the history, languages, customs and manners of the people of India, with the Mahomedan and Hindoo codes of law and religion, and with the political and commercial interests and relations of Great Britain in Asia. They should be regularly instructed in the principles and system which constitute the foundation of that wise code of regulations and laws enacted by the Governor-General in Council for the purpose of securing to the people of this empire the benefit of the ancient and accustomed laws of the country, administered in the spirit of the British constitution. They should be well informed of the true and sound principles of the British constitution, and sufficiently grounded in the general principles of ethics, civil jurisprudence, the law of nations, and general history, in order that they may be enabled to discriminate the characteristic differences of the several codes of law administered within the British Empire in India, and practically to combine the spirit of each in the dispensation of justice, and in the maintenance of order and good government. Finally, their early habits should be so formed, as to establish in their minds such solid foundations of industry, prudence, integrity, and religion, as should effectually guard them against those temptations and corruptions with which the nature of this climate, and the peculiar depravity of the people of India, will surround and assail them in every station, especially upon their first arrival in India. The early discipline of the service should be calculated to counteract the defects of the climate and the vices of the people, and to form a natural barrier against habitual indolence, dissipation, and licentious indulgence; the spirit of emulation, in honourable and useful pursuits, should be kindled and kept alive by the continual prospect of distinction, and reward, of profit, and honour; nor should any precaution be relaxed in India, which is deemed necessary in England, to furnish a sufficient supply of men qualified to fill the high offices of the State with credit to themselves and with advantage to the public. Without such a constant succession of men in the several branches and departments of this Government, the wisdom and benevolence of the law must prove vain

and inefficient. Whatever course and system of discipline and study may be deemed requisite in England to secure an abundant and pure source for the efficient supply of the public service, the peculiar nature of our establishments in the East, (so far from admitting any relaxation of those wise and salutary rules and restraints,) demands that they should be enforced with a degree of additional vigilance and care, proportioned to the aggravated difficulties of the civil service, and to the numerous hazards surrounding the entrance of public life in India.

It is unnecessary to enter into any examination of facts to prove, that no system of education, study, or discipline, now exists, either in Europe or in India, founded on the principles, or directed to the objects described in the preceding pages; but it may be useful in this place to review the course through which the junior civil servants of the East India Company now enter upon the important duties of their respective stations, to consider to what degree they now possess or can attain any means of qualifying themselves sufficiently for those stations, and to examine whether the great body of the civil servants of the East India Company, at any of the Presidencies, can now be deemed competent to discharge their arduous and comprehensive trusts in a manner correspondent to the interests and honour of the British name in India, or to the prosperity and happiness of our native subjects.

The age at which the writers usually arrive in India is from sixteen to eighteen; their parents or friends in England, from a variety of considerations, are naturally desirous, not only to accelerate the appointment at home, but to despatch the young man to India at the earliest possible period. Some of these young men have been educated with an express view to the civil service in India, on principles utterly erroneous, and inapplicable to its actual condition; conformably to this error, they have received a limited education, confined principally to commercial knowledge, and in no degree extended to those liberal studies which constitute the basis of education at public schools in England. Even this limited course of study is interrupted at the early period of fifteen or seventeen years.

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demonstrate the absolute insufficiency of this class of young men to execute the duties of any station whatever in the civil service of the Company beyond the menial, laborious, unwholesome and unprofitable duty of a mere copying-clerk. Those who have received the benefits of a better education, have the misfortune to find the course of their studies prematurely interrupted at the critical period when its utility is first felt, and before they have been enabled to secure the fruits of early application.

Both descriptions of young men, those whose education has been originally erroneous and defective, and those, the early promise of whose studies has been unseasonably broken, once arrived in India, are equally precluded from the means, either of commencing a new and judicious course of study, adapted to their new situation, or of prosecuting that course which had been prematurely interrupted. Not only no encouragement is offered by the present constitution and practice of the civil service to any such pursuits, but difficulties and obstacles are presented by both, which render it nearly impossible for any young man, whatever may be his disposition, to pursue any systematic plan of study, either with a view to remedy the defects, or to improve the advantages of his former education.

On the arrival of the writers in India, they are either stationed in the interior of the country, or employed in some office at the Presidency.

If stationed in the interior of the country, they are placed in situations which require a knowledge of the language and customs of the natives; or of the regulations and laws; or of the general principles of jurisprudence; or of the details of the established system of revenue; or of the nature of the Company's investment; or of many of these branches of information combined. In all these branches of knowledge, the young writers are totally uninformed. They are consequently unequal to their prescribed duties. In some cases, their superior in office experiencing no benefit from their services, leaves them unemployed. In this state many devote their time to those luxuries and enjoyments which their situation enables them to command, without making any effort to qualify themselves for the important stations to which they are destined. They remain sunk in indolence, until, from

their station in the service, they succeed to offices of high public trust.

Positive incapacity is the necessary result of these pernicious habits of inaction; the principles of public integrity are endangered, and the successful administration of the whole Government exposed to hazard. This has been the unhappy course of many, who have conceived an early disgust in provincial stations against business, to which they have found themselves unequal, and who have been abandoned to the effects of despondency and sloth.

Even the young men whose dispositions are the most promising, if stationed in the interior of the country at an early period after their arrival in India, labour under great disadvantages. They also find themselves unequal to such duties as require an acquaintance with the languages, or with the branches of knowledge already described. If intensely employed in the subordinate details of office, they are absolutely precluded from reviving any former acquirements, or from establishing those foundations of useful knowledge indispensably necessary to enable them hereafter to execute the duties of important stations with ability and credit. Harassed with the ungrateful task of transcribing papers and accounts, or with other equally fatiguing and fruitless labours of a copying-clerk or index-maker, their pursuit of useful knowledge cannot be systematic; their studies must be desultory and irregular, and their attention to any definite pursuit is still more distracted by the uncertainty of the nature of those employments to which they may hereafter be nominated. No course of study having been pointed out by public institution, no selection prescribed by authority of the branches of knowledge appropriated to each department and class of the service, diligence is lost for want of a guide, and the most industrious are discouraged by the apprehension, that their studies may prove fruitless, and may frustrate instead of promoting their advancement in the public service.

When their rank in the service has entitled them to succeed to offices of importance, the current duties of those offices necessarily engross their whole attention. It is then too late to revert to any systematic plan of study with a view to acquire those qualifications, of which, in the ordinary discharge of their official functions, they feel the hourly want.

If, at this late season, they should make an effort to acquire knowledge, it must be sought by the interruption of their current business, to the detriment of the public interests, and to the inconvenience or injury of the individuals subject to their authority.

With respect to the young men attached to offices at the Presidency, their duty consists chiefly in transcribing papers. This duty, if pursued with the utmost diligence and assiduity, affords little knowledge of public affairs, is often prejudicial to health, and would be better performed by any native or Portuguese writer. They attain no distinct knowledge of the public records; because they pursue no regular course of reading, examining, or comparing the documents which compose those records; they have, indeed, scarcely time to understand and digest those papers which they are employed to transcribe; their acquaintance even with the current affairs of the Government must be limited and partial, and must rather tend to confuse than to instruct their minds. At the expiration of the period, during which they usually remain in these situations at the Presidency, their knowledge of public business is necessarily superficial and incorrect. Having had little intercourse with the natives, these young men are in general extremely deficient in the knowledge of the language of the country. In the meanwhile their close and laborious application to the hourly business of transcribing papers has been an insuperable obstacle to their advancement in any other branch of knowledge, and at the close of two or three years, they have lost the fruits of their European studies, without having gained any useful knowledge of Asiatic literature or business. Those whose dispositions lead them to idleness and dissipation, find greater temptations to indulgence and extravagance at the Presidency than in the provinces; many instances occur in which they fall into irretrievable courses of gaming and vice, and totally destroy their health and fortunes. Some succeed, in the ordinary progress of the service, to employments, in which their incapacity or misconduct becomes conspicuous to the natives, disgraceful to themselves and to the British name, and injurious to the State.

All these descriptions of young men, upon their first arrival in India, are now exposed to a disadvantage, the most

perilous which can be encountered at an early period of life. Once landed in India, their studies, manners, morals, expenses or conduct are no longer subject to any degree of regulation or direction. No system is established for their guidance, improvement, or restraint; no authority has been constituted with either the duty or power of enforcing any such system; and they are abandoned, at the age of sixteen or eighteen, with affluent incomes to pursue their own inclinations, without the superintendence or control of parent, guardian, or master, often without a friend to advise or admonish, or even to instruct them in the ordinary details and modes of an Indian life.

The practice of consigning the young writers to the care of friends resident in India, affords no adequate remedy to this evil. Those friends are often incompetent to the arduous and delicate task imposed upon them; and it frequently happens that they may be so far removed from the spot at which the young man may be stationed by the Government, that years may elapse before he may have been able even to see the persons appointed by his European friends to superintend his introduction into India.

In earlier periods of our establishment, when the annual incomes of the civil servants were of a more fluctuating nature, and derived from sources more vague and indefinite, the tables of the senior servants were usually open to those recently arrived from Europe; and the young writers, upon their first landing in India, were frequently admitted and domiciliated in the families established at the Presidency or in the provinces.

The objections to this loose and irregular system are numerous and obvious. Without entering upon that topic, it is sufficient to observe, that the definite and regular sources of profit, established in the civil service by Lord Cornwallis, have occasioned a material alteration in the economy of every private family among the civil servants.

Incomes being limited and ascertained, and no other source of emolument now existing beyond the annual savings from the regulated salaries, the tables of the civil servants can no longer be open to receive the numerous body of writers annually arriving from Europe; still less can these young men be generally admitted to reside habitually in families of which

the annual expenses are now necessarily restrained within certain and regular bounds.

Many of the young men, on their first arrival, are, therefore, compelled to support the expense of a table; the result of this necessity is obvious, and forms one leading cause of expense and dissipation.

Under all these early disadvantages, without rule or system to direct their studies; without any prescribed object of useful pursuit connected with future reward, emolument, or distinction; without any guide to regulate, or authority to control their conduct, or to form, improve, or preserve their morals; it is highly creditable to the individual characters of the civil servants of the East India Company, that so many instances have occurred in various branches and departments of the civil service at all the Presidencies, of persons who have discharged their public duties with considerable respect and honour.

It has been justly observed, that all the merits of the civil servants are to be ascribed to their own characters, talents, and exertions, while their defects must be imputed to the constitution and practice of the service, which have not been accommodated to the progressive changes of our situation in India, and have not kept pace with the growth of this empire, or with the increasing extent and importance of the functions and duties of the civil servants.

The study and acquisition of the languages have, however, been extended in Bengal, and the general knowledge and qualifications of the civil servants have been improved. The proportion of the civil servants in Bengal, who have made a considerable progress towards the attainment of the qualifications requisite in their several stations, appears great, and even astonishing, when viewed with relation to the early disadvantages, embarrassments, and defects of the civil service. But this proportion will appear very different when compared with the exigencies of the State, with the magnitude of these provinces, and with the total number of the civil servants, which must supply the succession to the great offices of the Government. It must be admitted that the great body of the civil servants in Bengal is not at present sufficiently qualified to discharge the duties of the several arduous stations in the administration of this empire; and that it is peculiarly

deficient in the judicial, fiscal, financial, and political branches of the Government.

The state of the civil services of Madras and Bombay is still more defective than that of Bengal. Various causes have concurred to aggravate, in an extreme degree, at both those Presidencies all the defects existing in the civil service of Bengal, while many circumstances peculiar to those Presidencies have favoured the growth of evils at present unknown in this. The condition of the writers, on their first arrival at either of the subordinate Presidencies, is still more destitute, and more exposed to hazard, than at Calcutta.

The study or acquisition of the languages, and of other necessary attainments, has not been extended in the civil service at Madras or Bombay to any considerable degree. To this remark, eminent and meritorious individual exceptions exist in the civil service at both subordinate Presidencies; but those exceptions are not sufficiently numerous to constitute a general rule. But whatever may be the actual condition of the civil service in its superior classes at any of the Presidencies, if the arduous duties of that service have been justly defined in the preceding pages, if the qualifications requisite for their discharge have been truly described, if the neglected and exposed condition of the early stages of the service has not been exaggerated, it must be admitted, that those stages of the service require additional safeguards, and a more effectual protection. The extraordinary exertions of individual diligence, the partial success of singular talents, or of peculiar prudence and virtue, constitute no rational foundation of a public institution, which should rest on general comprehensive and uniform principles. If the actual state of the higher classes of the civil service were such as to justify a confidence in the general competency of the civil servants to meet the exigencies of their duty, the necessity of correcting the evils stated in the preceding pages would still remain, unless the facts alleged could be disproved. It would still be a duty incumbent on the Government to remove any obstacles tending to embarrass or retard the progress of their servants in attaining the qualifications necessary for their respective stations. The Government is not released from this duty by the extraordinary, or even general exertion of those servants to surmount the early difficulties of the first

stages of the service. If the good Government of this empire be the primary duty of its sovereign, it must ever be a leading branch of that duty to facilitate to the public officers and ministers the means of qualifying themselves for their respective functions. The efficiency of the service cannot wisely or conscientiously be left to depend on the success of individual or accidental merit, struggling against the defects of established institutions. A due administration of our affairs can alone be secured by the constant effect of public institutions, operating in a regular and uninterrupted course upon the various characters, talents, and acquirements of individuals. The nature of our establishments should furnish fixed and systematic encouragement to animate, to facilitate, to reward the progress of industry and virtue; and fixed and systematic discipline, to repress and correct the excesses of contrary dispositions.

From these remarks may be deduced the indispensable necessity of providing some effectual and speedy remedy for the defects in the education of the young men destined to the civil service in India. The nature of that remedy will afford matter of serious discussion.

It may, however, be useful, previously to that discussion, to advert to a general topic of argument, which may possibly be adduced to disprove the necessity of any new institution for the improvement of the civil service of the East India Company. It may be contended, that this service, through a long period of years, and in the course of various changes and chances, has always furnished men equal to the exigency of the occasion; that servants of the Company have never been wanting to conduct to a happy issue the numerous revolutions which have taken place in the affairs of the Company in India; and that these eminent personages have ultimately fixed the British empire in India on the most solid foundations of glory, wealth, and power. Why, therefore, should we apprehend, that this source, hitherto so fruitful and furnishing so abundant a supply of virtue and talents, will fail in the present age, and prove insufficient to the actual demands of our interests in this quarter of the globe? The answer to this topic of argument is obvious. Extraordinary combinations of human affairs, wars, revolutions, and all those unusual events which form the marked features and promi-

inent characters of the history of mankind, naturally disclose talents and exertions adapted to such emergencies. That the civil or military service of the East India Company has supplied persons calculated to meet all the wonderful revolutions of affairs in India, is a circumstance not to be attributed to the original or peculiar constitution of either service at any period of time. That constitution has undergone repeated alterations at the suggestion, and under the direction of the great characters which it has produced; and it has still been found answerable to every new crisis of an extraordinary nature. But it must never be forgotten, that the successive efforts of those eminent personages, and the final result of various revolutions and wars, have imposed upon the East India Company the arduous and sacred trust of governing an extensive and populous empire. It is true that this empire must be maintained in some of its relations by the same spirit of enterprize and boldness which acquired it. But duty, policy and honour require that it should not be administered as a temporary and precarious acquisition, as an empire conquered by prosperous adventure, and extended by fortunate accident, of which the tenure is as uncertain as the original conquest and successive extension were extraordinary; it must be considered as a sacred trust, and a permanent possession. In this view its internal Government demands a constant, steady, and regular supply of qualifications, in no degree similar to those which distinguished the early periods of our establishment in India, and laid the first foundations of our empire. The stability of that empire, whose magnitude is the accumulated result of former enterprize, activity and resolution, must be secured by the durable principles of internal order; by a pure, upright, and uniform administration of justice; by a prudent and temperate system of revenue; by the encouragement and protection of industry, agriculture, manufacture and commerce; by a careful and judicious management of every branch of financial resource; and by the maintenance of a just, firm, and moderate policy towards the native powers of India. To maintain and uphold such a system in all its parts, we shall require a succession of able magistrates, wise and honest judges, and skilful statesmen, properly qualified to conduct the ordinary movements of the great machine of Government.

The military establishments of this empire form no part of the subject of the present enquiry. It may be sufficient to observe in this place, that their extent, and the spirit in which they require to be governed, must correspond with the magnitude of the empire, and with the general character of our civil policy. In the civil service, we must now seek, not the instruments by which kingdoms are overthrown, revolutions accomplished, or wars conducted, but an inexhaustible supply of useful knowledge, cultivated talents, and well ordered and disciplined morals. These are the necessary instruments of a wise and well regulated Government. These are the genuine and unfailing means of cultivating and improving the arts of peace; of diffusing affluence and happiness, willing obedience, and grateful attachment over every region and district of this vast empire; and of dispensing to every class and description of our subjects the permanent benefits of secure property, protected life, undisturbed order, and inviolate religion. It is not the nature of these inestimable blessings to spring from a turbid source, or to flow in a contracted and irregular channel.

The early education of the civil servants of the East India Company is the source from which will ultimately be derived the happiness or misery of our native subjects; and the stability of our Government will bear a due proportion to its wisdom, liberality, and justice.

From the preceding discussion, it appears, that the actual state of the Company's civil service in India is far removed from perfection or efficiency, and that the cause of this defect is to be found principally, if not exclusively, in the defective education of the junior civil servants, and in the insufficient discipline of the early stages of the service. The facts, which have been reviewed in the course of this discussion, furnish the main principles on which an improved system of education and discipline may be founded with a view to secure the important ends of such an institution.

The defects of the present condition of the civil service may be comprised under the following heads:

First, An erroneous system of education in Europe confined to commercial and mercantile studies.

Secondly, The premature interruption of a course of study judiciously commenced in Europe.

Thirdly, The exposed and destitute condition of young men on their first arrival in India, and the want of a systematic guidance and established authority to regulate and control their moral and religious conduct in the early stages of the service.

Fourthly, The want of a similar system and authority to prescribe and enforce a regular course of study, under which the young men upon their arrival in India might be enabled to correct the errors, or to pursue and confirm the advantages of their European education, and to attain a knowledge of the languages, laws, usages and customs of India, together with such other branches of knowledge, as are requisite to qualify them for their several stations.

Fifthly, The want of such regulations as shall establish a necessary and inviolable connection between promotion in the civil service, and the possession of those qualifications requisite for the due discharge of the several civil stations.

It is obvious, that an education exclusively European, or Indian, would not afford an adequate remedy for such of these defects, as relate to the morals and studies of the East India Company's servants, and would not qualify them for the discharge of duties of a mixed and complicated nature, involving the combined principles of Asiatic and European policy and government. Their education must therefore be of a mixed nature, its foundation must be judiciously laid in England, and the superstructure systematically completed in India.

An important question may arise, with respect to the proportion of time to be employed in that part of the education of the junior civil servants, which should be appropriated to England; and completed previously to their departure for India. It may be contended, that many of the enumerated evils may be precluded by not allowing the writers to proceed to India until they shall have reached a more advanced age, than that at which they now usually embark, and by requiring them to undergo examinations in England, for the purpose of ascertaining their proficiency in the branches of knowledge necessary to the discharge of their duties in India.

To this arrangement various objections of a private, but most important nature, will arise in the mind of every parent, who may have destined his children for India. To attain any considerable proficiency in the course of education and

study described in this paper, must necessarily require the detention of the student in Europe to the age of 20 or 22 years; many parents could not defray the expence of such an education in England, even if the other means of prosecuting it now existed, or could hereafter be provided at any school or college at home.

Other objections of a private nature might be stated against this plan; but those which are founded on public considerations appear to be absolutely insurmountable. It is a fundamental principle of policy in the British Establishments in the East Indies, that the views of the servants of the Company should terminate in the prospect of returning to England, there to enjoy the emoluments arising from a due course of active and honourable service in India.

Were the civil servants, instead of leaving England at the age of sixteen or seventeen, to be detained until the age of twenty or two-and-twenty; a great proportion of them must abandon all hope of returning with a moderate competence to their native country.

Remaining in England to this advanced age, many would form habits and connections at home, not to be relinquished at that period of life without great reluctance; and few would accommodate themselves with readiness and facility to the habits, regulations and discipline of the service in India.

While these causes would render the civil servants intractable instruments in the hands of the Government of India, the regular progress through the service would also be retarded. Twenty-five years may be taken as the period within which a civil servant may regularly acquire, with proper habits of economy, an independent fortune in India. Upon this calculation, before the most successful could hope to be in a situation to return to England, they would have attained an age, when many of the powerful affections and inducements, which now attract the servants of the Company to return to their native country, would be greatly weakened if not entirely extinguished.

At that age, many from necessity, and many probably from choice, would establish themselves permanently in India. It is unnecessary to detail the evil consequences which would result to the British interests in India, were such an habit to become general in the civil service.

Detention in England to the age of twenty or twenty-two years would certainly afford the writers an opportunity of advancing their knowledge in the necessary branches of European study; but within that period of time, even in those branches, it could scarcely be completed; especially in the important sciences of general ethics and jurisprudence (for how few understandings are equal to such a course of study previously to the age of twenty,) and it would be entirely defective in the essential point of connecting the principles of those sciences with the laws of India, and with the manners and usages of its inhabitants. No establishment formed in England could give a correct* practical knowledge of the languages, laws and customs of India, of the peculiar habits and genius of the people, of their mode of transacting business, and of the characteristic features of their vices or virtues. These most essential acquirements would, therefore, remain to be attained after the arrival of the student in India, at an age when the study of languages is attended with additional difficulties, when any prescribed course of study, when any systematic discipline, or regular restraint becomes irksome, if not intolerable. As the East India Company's servants would arrive in India at a period of life too far advanced to admit of subjection to any system of public discipline or control, they must necessarily be left to the dictates of their own discretion with regard to whatever part of their knowledge had been left incomplete in Europe.

The wants and expenses of individuals arriving in India at the age of twenty or twenty-two years would greatly exceed the scale of the public allowances to the junior servants. At this age no restraint could be applied in India to their moral conduct, for the purpose of protecting them against the peculiar depravities incident to the climate, and to the character of the natives.

From the early age at which the writers are now usually sent to India, opportunity is afforded to the government on the spot of obtaining a knowledge of the characters of individuals, before they become eligible to stations of trust and importance. Of this advantage the government would be in a great

* Sir W. Jones was not intelligible to the natives of India, when he arrived at Calcutta, in any of the oriental languages.

degree deprived, if the East India Company's servants were all detained in England until the age of twenty or twenty-two, this inconvenience would prove nearly an insurmountable impediment to the important and necessary rule of selecting for public office, those best qualified to discharge its duties with propriety and effect.

The junior civil servants must, therefore, continue to embark for India at the age of fifteen or sixteen, that they may be tractable instruments in the hands of the government of the country; that their morals and habits may be duly formed and protected by proper safeguards against the peculiar nature of the vices and characteristic dangers of Indian society; that they may be enabled to pass through the service before the vigour of life has ceased, and to return with a competent fortune to Europe, while the affections and attachments which bind them to their native country, continue to operate with full force; and lastly, that they may possess regular, seasonable and certain means of attaining the peculiar qualifications necessary for their stations.

Under all these circumstances, the most deliberate and assiduous examination of all the important questions considered in this paper, determined the Governor-General to found a Collegiate Institution at Fort William, by the annexed regulation.*

This regulation comprises all the fundamental principles of the Institution. The detailed statutes for the internal discipline and good government of the College will be framed gradually as circumstances may require.

A common table and apartments are to be provided in the College, for all the civil servants who may be attached to the establishment.

The benefits of the establishment are extended to the junior civil servants of Fort St. George and Bombay, who will be directed to proceed to Fort William as soon as the accommodations requisite for their reception shall have been provided.

This arrangement appeared in every respect preferable to the establishment of Colleges at both, or either of those Presidencies. Independently of the considerations of expense

* See the Regulation annexed, No. I.

and other objections and impediments to the foundation of such Institutions at Fort St. George and Bombay, it is of essential importance, that the education of all the civil servants of the Company should be uniform, and should be conducted under the immediate superintendance of that authority, which is primarily responsible for the government of the whole of the British possessions in India; and which must consequently be most competent to judge of the nature and principles of the education which may be most expedient for the public interests.

It may be expected, that the operation of this part of the new institution will ultimately extinguish all local jealousies and prejudices among the several Presidencies; the political, moral, and religious principles of all the British Establishments in India, will then be derived directly from one common source; the civil service of Bengal is unquestionably further advanced in every useful acquisition, and in every respect more regular and correct, than that of either of the subordinate Presidencies; no more speedy or efficacious mode can be devised of diffusing throughout India, the laudable spirit of the service of Bengal, and of extending the benefit of improvements, which, under the new institution, may be expected to make a rapid progress at the seat of the Supreme Government, than by rendering Fort William the centre of the education and discipline of the junior civil servants in India.

Provision is made for admitting to the benefits of the Institution civil servants of a longer standing than three years (on their making application for that purpose) under such regulations as may be deemed advisable. The Institution may prove highly beneficial to many servants of this description; as many of them will be received on the establishment, as its funds and other considerations may admit.

Provision is also made for extending the benefits of the Institution to as many of the junior military servants, as it may be found practicable to admit from all the Presidencies. Essential benefits will result to the British armies in India, from the annual introduction of a number of young men, well versed in the languages with which every officer, but particularly those belonging to the native corps, ought to be acquainted. It is also of most essential importance to the

army in India, that it should be composed of officers attached by regular instruction, and disciplined habits, to the principles of morality, good order, and subordination.

Further regulations are in the contemplation of the Governor-General, for the education of the cadets destined for the army in India, which will be connected intimately with the present foundation.

It cannot be denied that, during the convulsions with which the doctrines of the French Revolution have agitated the Continent of Europe, erroneous principles of the same dangerous tendency had reached the minds of some individuals in the civil and military service of the Company in India; and the state, as well of political, as of religious opinions, had been in some degree unsettled. The progress of this mischief would at all times be aided by the defective and irregular education of the writers and cadets; an Institution tending to fix and establish sound and correct principles of religion and government in their minds at an early period of life, is the best security which can be provided for the stability of the British power in India. The letter of the Court of Directors,* under date the 25th of May, 1798, has been constantly present to the Governor-General's mind; it is satisfactory to know, after the fullest consideration, that many apprehensions stated in that letter, appear to have been conceived with more force than is required by the actual state of any of the settlements in India.

But among other important advantages of the new Institution, it will provide the most effectual and permanent remedy against the evils, (as far as they existed) which it was the object of the orders of the Honourable Court of the 25th of May, 1798, to correct.

The situation of the junior servants on their early arrival in India, has been fully described in this paper. Under the new Institution, they will be immediately received by the provost, (a clergyman of the church of England;) they will be provided with apartments in the College, and with a common table; consequently they will be removed from the danger of profusion, extravagance and excess. Every part of their private conduct, their expenses, their connections, their

* See Appendix.

manners and morals will be subject to the notice of the provost, and principal officers of the College, and (through the collegiate authorities) of the government itself.

While attached to the Institution, the junior servants will have the most ample means afforded to them of completing the European branch of their education, or of correcting its defects ; of acquiring whatever local knowledge may be necessary for that department of the service, in which, (after mature reflection on their own inclinations, acquisitions and talents) they may determine to engage ; of forming their manners and of fixing their principles on the solid foundations of virtue and religion.

The acquirements, abilities, and moral character of every civil servant may be ascertained before he can be eligible to a public station ; and every selection of persons for high and important offices may be made under a moral certainty, that the public expectation cannot be disappointed.

The twenty-fourth clause of the Regulation will afford the foundation of a law which may at all times secure the civil service against the effects of the possible partiality or ignorance of any government.

It is intended that the allowance of every civil servant of less than three years standing, being a student in the College, should be brought to one standard of 300 rupees per month, without any allowance for a Moonshy.

As a table and apartments will be provided for the students, this allowance will place them in a better situation than any writer of the same standing now enjoys. With these advantages, under the control of the official authorities of the College, and with the benefit of their advice and admonition, aided by statutes for the prevention of extravagance and debt, it may be hoped that many young men will adopt early habits of economy, and will lay the foundations of honest independence at a much earlier period than is now practicable. This advantage will be considerable in every view, in no one more than as it will tend to contract the period of each servant's residence in India, to give a nearer prospect of return to England, and to keep that desirable object more constantly in view.

The discipline of the College will be as moderate as may be consistent with the ends of the institution. It will impose no

harsh or humiliating restraint, and will be formed on principles combining the discipline of the Universities in England with that of the Royal Military Academies of France and of other European monarchies.

It may be expected that the great majority of young men on their arrival in India, will eagerly embrace the opportunities afforded to them by this institution of laying the foundations of private character, of public reputation, and of early independence. It cannot be supposed that many will be so insensible to their own honour and interests, and so destitute of every liberal feeling and sentiment as not to prefer the proposed course of studies in the College to the menial labour imposed upon them of transcribing papers in an office where in the nature of their duty, they are levelled with the native and Portuguese clerks, although infinitely inferior in its execution.

Those young men who may not at the first view discover all the advantages to be derived from the institution, will soon improve by the example and communications of others. If any individuals should continue insensible to the calls of public duty, and of private reputation, (and it is of importance that persons of this description should be known before an opportunity has been afforded to them of injuring the public interests, by their vices and defects,) the public good will demand that they should be punished by neglect and exclusion from employment. Considering the liberal manner in which the servants of the Company are rewarded for their services, the public may justly insist on submission to whatever regulations may be prescribed by this Institution.

The incitements to exertion being as powerful as the consequences of contrary habits will be ruinous, instances of gross neglect or contumacy will rarely occur. In this respect the institution possesses peculiar advantages, and it will become a powerful instrument in the hands of the Government in India, which will be enabled thereby to bring the general character of the servants of the Company to such a standard of perfection as the public interests require. To every other inducement, which any Collegiate Institution in the world can supply for the encouragement of diligence, will be added the immediate view of official promotion, increase of fortune, and distinction in the public service.

If it be asked whether it be proper that the whole time of the junior servants, for the first three years of their residence in India, should be devoted to study in the College, and that the Company should lose the benefit of their services during that period, while the junior servants receive a salary?

It may be enquired, on the other hand, what is now the occupation of the civil servants for the first three years after their arrival in India, what benefit the Company now derives from the services of the junior servants during that period, and what, in general, are now the characters and qualifications of those servants at the expiration of that period?

To all these questions sufficient answers have been given in the preceding pages.

Further details respecting the nature of the Institution will be forwarded officially to the Court of Directors at an early period.

The reasons which induced the Governor-General to found the College without any previous reference to England were these;—His conviction of the great immediate benefit to be derived from the early commencement even of the partial operation of the plan.

His experience of the great advantages which had been already derived by many of the young men from their attendance on Mr. Gilchrist,* in consequence of the first experiment made on a contracted scale with a view to a more extended institution.

His anxiety to impart to the very promising young men arrived from Europe within the last three years, a share of the advantages described in this paper, and his solicitude to superintend the foundation of the Institution, and to accelerate and witness its first effects.

This Institution will be best appreciated by every affectionate parent in the hour of separation from his child, destined to the public service in India. Let any parent (especially if he has himself passed through the Company's service in India) declare, whether the prospect of this Institution has aggravated or mitigated the solicitude of that painful hour—whether it has raised additional doubts and fears, or in-

* See Report annexed (No. 2.)

spired a more lively hope of the honourable and prosperous service, of the early and fortunate return of his child?

With regard to the funds for defraying the expense of the Institution, the Governor-General does not intend, without the sanction of the Honourable Court of Directors, to subject the Company to any expense on account of the Institution, beyond that which has already received their sanction independently of the Institution.

The Honourable Court have authorized this Government to purchase the Writers' buildings, if they can be obtained on advantageous terms. These buildings cannot be obtained on such terms; nor can they be advantageously converted to the final purposes of the Institution. A sum equal to the just value of the buildings, or to the rent now paid for them, will be applied towards the purchase of a proper spot of ground, and to the buildings requisite for the College.

The ground proposed to be employed is situated on the Garden Reach, where three or four of the present gardens will be laid together, a new road formed, and a large space of ground cleared and drained. This arrangement will improve the general health of the neighbourhood of Calcutta, as well as afford ample room for every accommodation required for the use of the College, or for the health of the students.

The expenses of the institution will be defrayed by a small contribution from all the civil servants in India, to be deducted from their salaries. This resource will probably be sufficient for all present purposes, with the addition of the fund now applied to the Moonshy's allowance, and of the profits to be derived from a new arrangement of the Government printing-press.

The Governor-General has not deemed it proper, in the first instance, to subject the Company to any additional expense on account of the Institution. The Honourable Court of Directors, will, however, reflect, that the Institution is calculated to extend the blessings of good government to the many millions of people whom Providence has subjected to our dominion, to perpetuate the immense advantages now derived by the Company from their possessions in India, and to establish the British Empire in India on the solid foundations of ability, integrity, virtue, and religion. The approved liberality of the Honourable Court will therefore certainly be

manifested towards this institution to an extent commensurate with its importance.

It would produce a most salutary impression in India if the Court, immediately on receiving this Regulation, were to order the Governor-General in Council to endow the College with an annual rent-charge on the revenues of Bengal, and issue a similar order to the Governor in Council at Fort St. George with respect to the revenue of Mysore; leaving the amount of the endowment, on each fund, to the Governor-General in Council.

All those who feel any concern in the support of the British Interests in India, and especially those whose fortunes have been acquired in the service of the Company, or whose connections may now or hereafter look to this service for advancement, will undoubtedly contribute to the support of this institution. Under the auspices of the Court, it is hoped that a large sum might be raised by subscription in Europe. The Governor-General considered the College at Fort William to be the most becoming public monument which the East India Company could raise to commemorate the conquest of Mysore. He has accordingly dated the law for the foundation of the College on the 4th of May, 1800, the first anniversary of the reduction of Seringapatam.

The early attention of the Governor-General will be directed to the Mahomedan College founded at Calcutta, and to the Hindoo College established at Benares. In the disorders which preceded the fall of the Mogul Empire and the British conquests in India, all the public institutions calculated to promote education and good morals were neglected, and at length entirely discontinued. The institutions at Calcutta and Benares may be made the means of aiding the study of the laws and languages in the College at Fort William, as well as of correcting the defective moral principles too generally prevalent among the natives of India.

An establishment of Moonshies and native teachers of the languages under the control of the collegiate officers at Fort William will be attached to the new College, and the young men will be supplied from this establishment, instead of being left (as at present) to exercise their own discretion in hiring such Moonshies as they can find in Calcutta or in the provinces.

These arrangements respecting the native Colleges, while they contribute to the happiness of our native subjects, will qualify them to form a more just estimate of the mild and benevolent spirit of the British Government.

In selecting the Garden Reach for the site of the building for the New College, two objects were in the contemplation of the Governor-General; first, that the ordinary residence of the students should be so near that of the Governor-General as that he may have the constant means of superintending the whole system and discipline of the Institution. The distance of fifteen or sixteen miles, in this climate, would often embarrass the communication.

Secondly. That the College should be removed to some distance from the Town of Calcutta. The principle of this object is sufficiently intelligible without further explanation; it is, however, desirable that the College should not be so remote from Calcutta as to preclude the young men from all intercourse with the society of that city. Advantages may be derived from a regulated intercourse with the higher classes of that society. The Garden Reach combines these advantages, with many others of space and accommodation. The situation of the Writers' buildings is objectionable on account of their being placed in the centre of the town. Nor would it have been practicable in that situation (even if the Writers' buildings could have been purchased on reasonable terms) to have obtained an area of ground sufficiently spacious for the new building.

As it will require a considerable time before the new buildings in Garden Reach can be completed, it is intended in the meanwhile to continue to occupy the Writers' buildings, and to hire such additional buildings in the neighbourhood as may be required for the temporary accommodation of the students and officers of the College, for the library, the dining-hall, the lecture-rooms, and other purposes. It will be necessary to make some considerable purchases of books for the foundation of the library. The Governor-General will effect whatever purchases can be made with economy and advantage in India. Lists of books will be transmitted to England by an early opportunity, with a view to such purchases as it may be necessary to make in Europe; and the Governor-General entertains no doubt that the Court of

Directors will contribute liberally towards such purchases. That part of the library of the late Tippoo Sultaun, which was presented by the army to the Court of Directors, is lately arrived in Bengal. The Governor-General strongly recommends that the Oriental manuscripts composing this collection should be deposited in the library of the College at Fort William; and it is his intention to retain the manuscripts accordingly, until he shall receive the orders of the Court upon the subject. He will transmit lists of the collection by the first opportunity.

It is obvious that these manuscripts may be rendered highly useful to the purposes of the new Institution, and that much more public advantage can be derived from them in the library of the College at Fort William, than can possibly be expected from depositing them in London.

Such of the manuscripts as may appear to be merely valuable as curiosities may be transmitted to England by an early opportunity.

It is the intention of the Governor-General that the first term of the College should be opened in the course of the month of November; and the lectures on several of the languages, it is hoped, be commenced in the course of the ensuing winter.

With the aid of such temporary arrangements as may be immediately made, it is expected that many other branches of the Institution may be brought into immediate operation, particularly those which relate to the expenses, morals, and general studies of the young men. Fortunately for the objects of the Institution, the Governor-General has found, at Calcutta, two Clergymen of the Church of England, eminently qualified to discharge the duties of Provost and Vice-Provost. To the former office he has appointed Mr. Brown, the Company's first Chaplain; and to the latter Mr. Buchanan. Mr. Brown's character must be well known in England, and particularly so to some Members of the Court of Directors; it is in every respect, such as to satisfy the Governor-General that his views in this nomination will not be disappointed. He has also formed the highest expectations from the abilities, learning, temper, and morals of Mr. Buchanan, whose character is well known in England, particularly to Dr. Por-

teus, Bishop of London, and to Dr. Milner, Master of Queen's College, in the University of Cambridge.

With respect to the Professorships, those which relate to the languages will be best filled in India; and the Governor-General entertains little doubt, that he shall soon be able to fill them permanently, in an efficient manner. In the meanwhile, the most laudable zeal has been manifested by such persons in the civil and military service, as are competent to assist the Governor-General in making a temporary provision for the discharge of the duties of these Professorships. The persons properly qualified to fill certain of the other Professorships must be sought in Europe. The Institution will be so framed as to offer strong inducements to such persons, and the Governor-General will endeavour, at the earliest possible period, to secure the assistance of talents, learning, and morals from Europe, adapted to the great purposes of this institution. It may be useful to observe, in this place, that the Professors and native Moonshies or teachers will be prohibited from instructing any other persons than the students of the College. The object of this regulation is to prevent European parents, resident in India, from attempting to commence or to complete, by means of the new institution, the regular education of their children in India. It is an obviously necessary principle of policy to encourage the present practice of sending children, born in India of European parents, at an early age, to Europe for education.

The Governor-General means to recommend that the Court of Directors should hereafter nominate all persons destined for the civil service, at any of the Presidencies in India, to be students of the College at Fort William. To each studentship (as has already been observed) will be annexed a monthly salary of 300 rupees, together with apartments and a common table. It will be for the Honourable Court to decide whether the ultimate destination of the student to the Civil Establishment of Bengal, Fort St. George, or Bombay, shall be specified in the original appointment to the studentship at the College of Fort William, it would certainly be more advantageous to the public service, that no such appointment should be made in England, and that the ultimate destination of each student should be determined in

India under the authority of the Government on the spot, according to the inclinations and acquirements of the students respectively. The improved state of the Civil Service at Fort St. George, and the indispensable necessity of introducing the same improvements into the service at Bombay, will speedily render the Civil Service at each of those Presidencies no less advantageous and respectable than that of Bengal.

The Governor-General highly applauds the wisdom of the late order of the Court regulating the rank of the cadets for the artillery according to the period of time when they may be respectively reported to be qualified for commissions under the institutions of the Academy at Woolwich. It would be a most beneficial regulation to declare that the rank of all students appointed to the College of Fort William, in the same season, should be regulated according to their respective progress in the prescribed studies of the College, and to the public testimonials of their respective merit, established according to the discipline and institutions of the College.

If the Court of Directors should approve the principles and objects of this Institution, and should accordingly order the Governor-General to endow it with a rent-charge upon the land revenue of Bengal and Mysore, it would be a gracious act to relieve the Civil Service in India from the tax which the Governor-General intends to impose on the public salaries for the support of the College. The tax will indeed be very light, but the Court of Directors may probably be of opinion that such an Institution as the present ought to be supported, rather by the munificence of the Sovereign of the country than by any diminution, however inconsiderable, of the established allowances of the public officers.

No. LXXXVII.

Fort William, July 10th, 1800.

Regulation for the foundation of a College at Fort William in Bengal, and for the better instruction of the Junior Civil Servants of the Honourable the English East India Company in the important duties belonging to the several arduous stations to which the said Junior Civil Servants may be respectively destined in the administration of justice, and in the general Government of the British Empire in India.—Passed by the Governor-General in Council, on the 10th July, 1800; corresponding with the 28th Assar, 1207, Bengal era; the 4th Sacun, 1207, Fussily; the 28th Assar, 1207, Willaity; the 4th Sawun, 1857, Sumbut; and the 17th Suffer, 1215, Higeree;—But by his Lordship's special order, bearing date on the 4th May, 1800, being the first anniversary of the glorious and decisive victory obtained by the British arms at Seringapatam, the capital of the Kingdom of Mysore.

Whereas it hath pleased the Divine Providence to favour the counsels and arms of Great Britain in India with a continued course of prosperity and glory; and whereas, by the victorious issue of several successive wars, and by the happy result of a just, wise, and moderate system of policy, extensive territories in Hindostan, and in the Deccan, have been subjected to the dominion of Great Britain, and under the government of the Honourable the English East India Company, in process of time a great and powerful empire has been founded, comprehending many populous and opulent provinces, and various nations, differing in religious persuasions, in language, manners, and habits, and respectively accustomed to be governed according to peculiar usages, doctrines, and laws; and whereas the sacred duty, true interest, honour, and policy of the British nation require, that effectual provision should be made at all times for the good government of the British empire in India, and for the prosperity and happiness of the people inhabiting the same; and many wise and salutary regulations have accordingly been enacted from time to time by the Governor-General in Council with the benevolent intent and purpose of administering to the said people their own laws, usages, and customs, in the mild and benignant spirit of the British constitution; and whereas it is indispensably necessary with a view to secure the due

execution and administration of the said wise, salutary, and benevolent regulations in all time to come, as well as of such regulations and laws as may hereafter be enacted by the Governor-General in Council, that the civil servants of the Honourable the English East India Company exercising high and important functions in the government of India, should be properly qualified to discharge the arduous duties of their respective offices and stations; should be sufficiently instructed in the general principles of literature and science; and should possess a competent knowledge, as well of the laws, government, and constitution of Great Britain, as of the several native languages of Hindostan and the Deccan, and of the laws, usages, and customs of the provinces which the said civil servants respectively may be appointed to govern; and whereas the early interruption in Europe of the education and studies of the persons destined for the civil service of the Honourable the English East India Company precludes them from acquiring, previously to their arrival in India, a sufficient foundation in the general principles of literature and science, or a competent knowledge of the laws, government, and constitution of Great Britain; and many qualifications essential to the proper discharge of the arduous and important duties of the civil service in India, cannot be fully attained otherwise than by a regular course of education and study in India, conducted under the superintendence, direction, and control of the supreme authority of the government of these possessions; and whereas no public institution now exists in India, under which the junior servants appointed at an early period of life to the civil service of the Honourable the English East India Company, can attain the necessary means of qualifying themselves for the high and arduous trusts to which they are respectively destined; and no system of discipline or education has been established in India for the purpose of directing and regulating the studies of the said junior servants, or of guiding their conduct upon their first arrival in India, or of forming, improving, or preserving their morals, or of encouraging them to maintain the honour of the British name in India by a regular and orderly course of industry, prudence, integrity, and religion; The most noble Richard Marquess Wellesley, Knight of the illustrious Order of Saint Patrick, &c. &c., Governor-General in

Council, deeming the establishment of such an institution, and system of discipline, education, and study, to be requisite for the good government and stability of the British empire in India, and for the maintenance of the interests and honour of the Honourable the English East India Company, his Lordship in Council hath therefore enacted as follows.

II. A college is hereby founded at Fort William in Bengal for the better instruction of the junior civil servants of the Company, in such branches of literature, science, and knowledge, as may be deemed necessary to qualify them for the discharge of the duties of the different offices constituted for the administration of the government of the British possessions in the East Indies.

III. A suitable building shall be erected for the college, containing apartments for the superior officers, for the students, for a library, and for such other purposes as may be found necessary.

IV. The Governor-General shall be the patron and visitor of the college.

V. The members of the Supreme Council, and the judges of the sudder dewanny adawlut, and of the nizamut adawlut, shall be the governors of the college.

VI. The Governor-General in Council shall be trustee for the management of the funds of the college, and shall regularly submit his proceedings in that capacity to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

VII. The Comptrolling Committee of Treasury shall be treasurers of the college.

VIII. The Accountant-General, and the Civil Auditor, shall be respectively accountant, and auditor of accounts, of the college.

IX. The Advocate-General, and the Honourable Company's standing Counsel, shall be the law officers of the college.

X. The immediate government of the college shall be vested in a Provost and Vice-Provost, and such other officers as the patron and visitor shall think proper to appoint, with such salaries as he shall deem expedient. The Provost, Vice-Provost, and all other officers of the college, shall be removable at the discretion of the patron and visitor.

XI. The Provost shall always be a clergyman of the church of England, as established by law.

XII. Every proceeding and act of the Patron and Visitor shall be submitted to the Honourable the Court of Directors, and shall be subjected to their pleasure.

XIII. The primary duties of the Provost shall be to receive the junior civil servants on their first arrival at Fort William; to superintend and regulate their general morals and conduct; to assist them with his advice and admonition; and to instruct and confirm them in the principles of the Christian religion, according to the doctrine, discipline, and rites of the church of England, as established by law.

XIV. The Patron and Visitor shall establish such professorships, with such endowments as shall be judged proper.

XV. Professorships shall be established as soon as may be practicable, and regular courses of lectures commenced, in the following branches of literature, science, and knowledge:

Languages.—Arabic, Persian, Shanscrit, Hindoostanee, Bengal, Telinga, Mahratta, Tamul, Canara; Mahomedan law, Hindoo law, ethics, civil jurisprudence, and the law of nations; English law; the regulations and laws enacted by the Governor-General in Council, or by the Governors in Council at Fort St. George and Bombay respectively, for the civil government of the British territories in India; political œconomy, and particularly the commercial institutions and interests of the East India Company; geography and mathematics; modern languages of Europe; Greek, Latin, and English classics; general history, antient and modern; the history and antiquities of Hindoostan and the Deccan; natural history; botany, chemistry, and astronomy.

XVI. The Patron and Visitor may authorize the same professor to read lectures in more than one of the enumerated branches of study, and may at any time unite, or separate any of the said professorships, or may found additional professorships in such other branches of study as may appear necessary.

XVII. The Provost and Vice-Provost, after having remained in the government of the college for the complete period of seven years, and any professor, after having read lectures in the college for the complete period of seven years, or of twenty-eight terms, and after having respectively re-

ceived, under the hand and seal of the Patron and Visitor, a testimonial of good conduct during that period of time, shall be entitled to an annual pension for life, to be paid either in Europe or in India, according to the option of the party. The pension shall in no case be less than one-third of the annual salary received by such Provost or Vice-Provost respectively during his continuance in the government of the college, or by any such Professor, during the period of his regular lectures. The pension may in any case be increased at the discretion of the Patron and Visitor.

XVIII. All the civil servants of the Company who may be hereafter appointed on the establishment of the Presidency of Bengal, shall be attached to the college for the first three years after their arrival in Bengal, and during that period of time, the prescribed studies in the college shall constitute their sole public duty.

XIX. All the civil servants now on the establishment of the Presidency of Bengal, whose residence in Bengal shall not have exceeded the term of three years, shall be immediately attached to the college for the term of three years from the date of this regulation.

XX. Any of the junior civil servants of the Company in India, whether belonging to the establishment of this Presidency, or to that of Fort St. George, or of Bombay, may be admitted to the benefits of the institution by order of the Governor-General in Council, for such term, and under such regulations, as may be deemed advisable.

XXI. Any of the junior military servants of the Company in India, whether belonging to the establishment of this Presidency, or to that of Fort St. George, or of Bombay, may be admitted to the benefits of the institution, by order of the Governor-General in Council, for such term, and under such regulations, as may be deemed advisable.

XXII. In the college at Fort William, four terms shall be observed in each year; the duration of each term shall be two months. Four vacations shall also be established in each year; the duration of each vacation shall be one month.

XXIII. Two public examinations shall be holden annually, and prizes and honorary rewards shall be publicly distributed by the Provost, in the presence of the Patron and Governors, to such students as shall appear to merit them.

XXIV. Degrees shall be established, and shall be rendered requisite qualifications for certain offices in the civil governments of Bengal, Fort St. George, and Bombay; and promotion in the civil service shall be the necessary result of merit publicly approved, according to the discipline and institutions of the college.

XXV. Statutes shall be framed by the Provost of the college, under the superintendence of the Governors of the college, respecting the internal regulation, discipline, and government of the college; but no statute shall be enforced until it shall have been sanctioned by the Patron and Visitor. The statutes so sanctioned shall be printed according to a form to be prescribed by the Patron and Visitor.

XXVI. The Patron and Visitor shall be empowered, at all times of his sole and exclusive authority, to amend or abrogate any existing statute, or to enact any new statute for the regulation, discipline, and government of the college.

XXVII. A regular statement of all salaries, appointments, or removals of the officers of the college, shall be submitted by the Patron and Visitor of the college at the expiration of each term, to the Governor-General in Council, and by the Governor-General in Council to the Honourable the Court of Directors; printed copies of all statutes enacted by the Patron and Visitor shall also be submitted to the Governor-General in Council, and to the Honourable the Court of Directors, at the same periods of time, and in the same manner.*

No. LXXXVIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

July 13th, 1800.

The representations which I have lately received from Fort St. George, relative to the reduced state of his Majesty's regiments of infantry serving at that Presidency, have suggested such serious considerations to my mind, as render it my indispensable duty to direct your immediate and unremitting attention to this most important subject.

* For the statutes of the College, see Appendix.

It would be superfluous to detail in a letter to you, the reasons which demonstrate that the security of our interests in India require the European force, which may be deemed necessary for the different establishments in India, to be maintained as complete and efficient as possible. The total number of European troops to be maintained for the general service of India, may admit of a variety of opinions. My own judgment is, that the augmentation of our European force should always bear a due proportion to the increased value and extent of our possessions in India; since in every arduous crisis we must principally depend, for the preservation of those possessions on our European troops. If, therefore, previous to the late war in Mysore, the European establishment in India did not exceed the requisite proportion, that establishment must be deemed inadequate to our present extended dominions, as well as to the increase which it has been unavoidably necessary to make in the native part of our Indian army. Considerations of prudence as well as of military convenience demand, that every augmentation of our native troops in India should be accompanied by a due augmentation of our European force, artillery as well as infantry. The conquest of Mysore, by diminishing our danger in India from the native powers, may appear to diminish the necessity of augmenting our European force; but if the extension of our dominions, and of our alliances has rendered an increase of our native force indispensable, the same reasons demand a proportionate augmentation of the European part of the army. In addition to these considerations it must be observed that, while the war in Europe shall continue, our empire in India must constantly be exposed to the attempts of the French, although that danger also is certainly much diminished by the fall of Tippoo Sultaun.

It is unnecessary to observe to you, that no augmentation of our European force has taken place since the late war in Mysore. But I desire to call your particular observation to the alarming condition of our European force in India since that period. The casualties of the several corps have necessarily been numerous, and the supply of recruits from Europe has either totally ceased, or been extremely inconsiderable. The number of his Majesty's regiments of infantry in India, continues indeed to be the same; but instead of consisting

of 1,200 rank and file, according to the establishment, those employed under the Presidency of Fort St. George, are stated to be reduced to an average of about 500 rank and file fit for duty. The regiments belonging to the establishment of Bombay, and those on the Island of Ceylon are also very incomplete. His Majesty's three regiments of infantry at this Presidency do not exceed 2,400 rank and file, or about 800 men each. The Company's European artillery are everywhere extremely weak. The fixed establishment of this corps is defective at all the Presidencies; and the numbers wanting to complete even that defective establishment are now so considerable, that I intend without delay to reduce one of the Company's European regiments in Bengal, for the purpose of augmenting the artillery of this Presidency, and I shall probably carry into effect a similar measure at Fort St. George and Bombay.

From a statement which I have received from the Commander-in-Chief it appears that the sixteen King's Regiments of Infantry now in India, consisted on the 1st of May, 1800, of about 11,000 rank and file; the deficiencies amounting to above 8,000 men. The Company's four European Regiments may be reckoned at 2,500 rank and file; the Swiss Regiment De Meuron at about 600, making the total European infantry in India, King's and Company's, about 14,000 rank and file.

But as these numbers include the sick, from this amount must be deducted at least one fourth in calculating the numbers now ready for service, which would leave the total number of Europeans actually able to take the field in the British empire in India, about 10,500 men.

This European force is far inferior to the strength of that which ought to be constantly maintained in India, in a condition for field service. In Bengal alone 6,000 European infantry should always be ready for active duty; and the establishment of Bengal, in order to be enabled at all times to furnish such a disposable force, ought to consist at least of eight regiments of the present nominal strength, or 1,200 rank and file each.

Eight thousand European infantry should always be ready for service on the Coast of Coromandel including Mysore; and at least 4,000 for the service of Ceylon and Bombay, and the Coasts of Canara and Malabar. To furnish 12,000 efficient

men for these different points would require an establishment of at least 20,000 rank and file.

I would therefore propose that the European infantry for India should be fixed at twenty-five regiments of the present establishment of strength 1,200, (making altogether 30,000 rank and file) which number, according to past experience would be requisite in order at all times to furnish a force of 18,000 men for field service. This calculation however, supposes an improved degree of attention to the regular supply of recruits from Europe.

The whole of this European infantry should consist of King's troops; and the Company's European regiments in Bengal, at Fort St. George and Bombay, should be converted into artillery as far as the men might be found serviceable in that branch of the army. The remainder might either be drafted into his Majesty's regiments, or returned to Europe.

I am not of opinion that it will be necessary that the European regiments of the Company, which I propose to be reduced, shall be replaced by new regiments of native infantry raised merely for that purpose. The course of our subsidiary engagements, and the extension of dominion to which they are likely to lead, by means of the commutation of subsidy for territory, will necessarily require some increase of the native infantry, and consequently afford sufficient means of disposing of the officers belonging to the reduced European corps. But whatever augmentation of the native infantry may hereafter be requisite on account of our new subsidiary engagements, and the augmentation of our territorial resources. You will observe that the expense will not prove any additional burthen to the Company, but will be defrayed either in money or cession of territory by the state, for whose service or protection the additional troops shall have been raised.

An augmentation of our European cavalry in India is scarcely less necessary than that of our infantry. I am of opinion that we ought to maintain at least eight complete regiments of dragoons. Of the additional regiments, two should be stationed in the Peninsula of India, and two in the province of Oude.

I have already stated the alarming deficiency of our artillery throughout India; and the expedient to which I intend to

resort for the remedy of this serious evil. But the best remedy which I may be enabled to apply will be insufficient, on account of the great deficiency of officers of artillery; some companies have now no more than one commissioned officer doing duty with them. This deficiency proceeds in a great measure, from the original inadequacy of the establishment in point of commissioned officers; and partly from the neglect of a regular supply of cadets. Of the establishment of officers, defective as it is, nearly one-third are either on furlough, or employed in staff offices which preclude them from the performance of regimental duty. One additional subaltern at least should be posted to every company of artillery; and I most particularly request your attention to the necessity of sending out to India without delay, both an ample supply of private artillery men, and of cadets for the artillery corps.

As connected with the subject of artillery, I beg leave to call your particular attention to the declining state of the foundery at Fort William, which, owing to the ignorance of those in charge of that department, is no longer able to supply the ordnance required for the use of this, and of the other Presidencies. This failure has made it necessary that we should apply to England for a supply of field ordnance, and I earnestly entreat you to adopt the requisite measures for enforcing a complete compliance with the Indent of the military board for this purpose. I also most particularly recommend to your immediate consideration the absolute necessity of sending as soon as possible to Bengal one or more scientific persons properly qualified to conduct the foundery at Fort William, this is an evil which requires the most serious attention, and the most prompt remedy.

Believe me, my dear Sir,
with the greatest regard and esteem, ever
Yours most faithfully,

WELLESLEY.

No. LXXXIX.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Chairman of the Honourable Court of Directors.

SIR,

Fort William, August 18th, 1800.

I have the honour to transmit to you the copy of a law,* which I have passed for the better instruction of the junior civil servants of the Company, in the arduous duties of their respective stations in India; I also enclose an extract from my notes,† explanatory of the grounds and objects of the law in question.

Although this communication cannot be considered strictly official; and although it is my intention to forward a regular official despatch to the Court of Directors by an early conveyance, I am anxious that they should receive the earliest possible intelligence of the nature of the institution, which I have founded at Calcutta. I, therefore, request you to have the goodness to communicate the enclosed papers to the members of the Court; to the copy of the law and of my notes, I have added a copy of the Report of the Committee, appointed to examine the young gentlemen, who had been directed to attend Mr. Gilchrist's lectures in the Hindostanee language.

The early support of the Court of Directors will tend to give animation and spirit to the new Institution.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

P.S. Lord Wellesley requests that the Chairman of the Court of Directors will have the goodness to transmit a copy of the "Extract of the Governor-General's Notes," to Lord Cornwallis, and another to Lord Teignmouth.

* See p. 356.

† See p. 325.

No. XC.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, August 23rd, 1800.

I have had under my consideration Mr. Secretary Webbe's letter of the 5th instant in the secret department to the chief secretary of this Government, together with the enclosure which accompanied it.

I think it expedient to furnish your Lordship with my directions on the points referred to me by order of your Lordship in Council, in the form of a separate official despatch to you.

I concur in opinion with the honourable Colonel Wellesley, that the power and success obtained by Dhoondia since his repulse in 1799, are to be principally, if not entirely attributed to the contests which have arisen between the Mahratta Chiefs on the southern frontier of the Mahratta State. If we could always direct the conduct of those Chiefs, their concord would be well calculated to prevent the return of any danger or alarm, either from Dhoondia, or from any adventurer of a similar description on that part of the frontier.

But the practicability of effecting a permanent or sincere reconciliation between the Chiefs in question is doubtful, and it is evident that a precarious or fallacious reconciliation could not produce the advantages which were in Colonel Wellesley's contemplation.

If a sincere concord between these Chiefs could be attained, its general policy would be questionable; such a pacification might conduce to the temporary security and tranquillity of Mysore; but in the rapid succession of revolutions in the Mahratta Empire, the reconciliation of the Chiefs now contending in the southern part of that Empire might ultimately tend to consolidate a power in that quarter, which, singly or combined, either with Dhoondia, or with some adventurer of a similar description, might hereafter become an established and perpetual source of disquietude and vexation to the frontier of Mysore, and might produce mischiefs of

a more permanent nature than can be apprehended from the desultory efforts of any vagrant adventurer.

Independently of these considerations, your Lordship has justly observed, that in the actual state of affairs at Poonah, we must regulate our proceedings in regard to the measures suggested by Colonel Wellesley with a view to the probable course of events in that quarter. My latest advices from Colonel Palmer indicate an approaching crisis of a nature which may demand our speedy and active interference in support of the just authority of the Peishwa. It is probable that I may receive an early and urgent application for that purpose from the Peishwa himself. In such an event, it may become necessary for a large proportion of the troops under the command of Colonel Wellesley to proceed (in concert with those of the Nizam, and with a detachment from Bombay,) towards Poonah. The intermediate motions of Colonel Wellesley must be guided with a view to this probable contingency.

The necessity of guarding against the revival of Dhoondia's rebellion, and against the possibility of other commotions on the frontier, render it advisable that Colonel Wellesley should continue to occupy the Mahratta territory, and to hold several posts from which he has expelled Dhoondia's forces until all reasonable apprehension of further disturbances shall have been removed. In either of two possible events, it would be wise and just to proceed still further:—first, the flight of Baagy Rao from Poonah; second, the seizure of his Highness's person by Dowlut Rao Scindia. In either of these cases, Colonel Wellesley's secure establishment, within the Mahratta frontier, would facilitate his advance towards Poonah, whenever he might receive my orders to that effect, conveyed through your Lordship, or directly from Fort William through Hyderabad.

I, therefore, request your Lordship to inform Colonel Wellesley, without delay, that on his receiving authentic and unquestionable intelligence either of the flight or imprisonment of Baagy Rao (unless some obstacle should exist from the position of Dhoondia or some other force), the British army is directed and authorised to take immediate possession, in the name, and on the behalf, of the Peishwa, of all the country as far as the Bank of the Kistna. Colonel Wellesley will

also summons, in the name of the Peishwa, such forts and strong places within the limits described as it shall be judged expedient for the British troops to occupy. Colonel Wellesley will endeavour to obtain possession of all such forts or strong places in a peaceable and amicable manner, and he will not seize them by force unless the security of the British army, and the success of its ultimate movements should appear to require such an operation, or unless any such place should be actually in the possession of troops belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindia, or notoriously in his interests.

If Colonel Wellesley should engage in the operations described and authorized in the foregoing paragraph, he will take care to satisfy the inhabitants of the country that the British Government entertain no other view in them than the restoration of the Peishwa's lawful authority.

A difficulty arises with respect to the revenues of the countries proposed to be eventually occupied by the British troops. The pretensions of the sons of Purseram Bhow to the possessions of those countries cannot be deemed valid in opposition to the authority of the Peishwa, by whom those chieftains were lately deprived of the Government of the districts in question. It is possible that Baagy Rao may have been compelled by Scindia to adopt this measure; but circumstances render it sufficiently probable that the act of deprivation, if it did not originate with the Peishwa, received his cordial concurrence. Baagy Rao may naturally be supposed to be hostile to the aggrandizement of a son of Purseram Bhow.

On the other hand, the family of Purseram Bhow probably possesses considerable influence and authority in the countries which it had governed. Probably, therefore, some member of that family would be the best instrument which could be employed to draw forth the resources of the country for the use and benefit of our army.

It would, therefore, be desirable that Colonel Palmer should so far succeed in the negotiation recommended to his attention by Colonel Wellesley, on behalf of the family of the late Purseram Bhow, as to obtain for them the temporary charge of the districts in question. But I apprehend that Baagy Rao will not consent even to that partial arrangement. In the event of Baagy Rao's imprisonment, the per-

sons already empowered by a secret Commission to act for him during his confinement, might possibly entertain more favourable dispositions.

Under these circumstances, I rely on the discretion of Colonel Wellesley, to make the best practicable arrangement for the countries to be eventually occupied by his army. If he should judge it to be indispensably necessary to commit those countries to the provisional charge of Purseram Bhow's sons, such a measure will increase the difficulty of convincing the country at large, and especially the real adherents of Baagy Rao, that we are acting solely for the benefit of the Peishwa. In this situation Colonel Wellesley will feel the increased necessity of employing every other exertion for the purpose of removing any doubt of the sincere disposition of the British Government to act effectually on the behalf of Baagy Rao.

In whatever hands the temporary Government of the countries in question may be placed, Colonel Wellesley will demand from that authority such supplies of money and provisions as may be requisite and attainable for the use of the army.

The Rajah of Kolapoore is suspected to have connected himself with Dowlut Rao Scindia; it is, therefore, necessary that Colonel Wellesley should be extremely circumspect in any transactions with that Rajah.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. XCI.

Sir John Anstruther to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR LORD,

Benares, 31st August, 1800.

I am very much obliged to you for yours of the 21st instant, which I only received this day, it having gone on to Allahabad.

It gave me much pleasure to hear of the Colonel's success, which will put an end to even the seeds of war in the Peninsula; and the conclusion of your commutation treaty will give a solidity and security to the British power in the

Deccan it never has known, and, but for you, probably never would have known. It will not only furnish a boundary not to be passed by a native force, but it places our connection with the Nizam upon a basis not to be shaken, either by jealousy or folly ; the seeds of interference with his Government are destroyed, and all chance of failure of subsidy taken away, nothing will remain that can occasion either dispute or discontent.

But this measure, when coupled with a treaty with the Rajah of Tanjore, already executed, and one, I hope, nearly so with the Nabob, will place the government of the coast upon a footing which must loudly call for Mr. Dundas's immediate interference. It is too important for the present form of Government, and must be placed more immediately under the Government-General.

Upon the whole I have been much pleased and benefited by my trip, which extended to Allahabad, and was much delighted to find prosperity and security through all the country making the most rapid advances, and cultivation increasing beyond expectation. But you have done much more towards it than you are aware of; the constant change of plan and system in the collection of the revenues had impressed the minds of the people with ideas of the instability of any system whatever. Nor could they be convinced that the perpetual settlement ever would take place: they said that it was introduced by Lord Cornwallis, and would last while Sir J. Shore staid, as he was at the board when it began ; but that a new Governor would arrive with a new project. The reasoning was not ill founded, but when they found a new Governor of great name, power, and authority confirming the settlement at the end of the decennial one, they were perfectly satisfied ; and since that period the cultivation, particularly in Bahar and Benares, probably lower assessed than Bengal, has been astonishing. Benares is a garden ; I can compare the country from Buxar to Mirzapore to nothing but a fine English park, which has been ploughed up, and the owner, not to spoil the view from his house, has bestowed unusual pains on the cultivation. From Mirzapore to Allahabad, I went by dawk ; nearly thirty miles of the road lay through the Vizier's dominions ; the difference is not to be described ; the country is a desert, but the

remains of cultivation visible: villages only to be distinguished by the rising grounds, covered with broken bricks, formed of their ruins. Desolation cannot be more strongly painted; but I am told here that the effect of disbanding the troops is, in many places, already felt; people having a soldiery to protect, and not to plunder them, begin to return to their fields. What would not that country be under British Government?

I am very much pleased with the report of the examination, it must do great good, and I am sure you are right to place the College out of town; discipline can only be enforced in such a situation; but I wish you may be able to fill it up on the very extended plan of education you propose. It has, however, the advantage of your being able to execute it by degrees; and as you find persons qualified to fill the stations and execute their duties for it, it would be better to delay establishing a Professorship than fill it with an indifferent teacher at the outset.

The Europe news, for which I beg you to accept my best thanks, is upon the whole, good; and I hope, on my return, to find your brother with you, and that he brings with him such marks of the approbation of your country as are satisfactory to you and your friends; but if you go on as you are now going, you will leave her no adequate marks of gratitude to bestow.

Yours ever affectionately,

J. ANSTRUTHER.

No. XCII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, September 6th, 1800.

The question respecting the persons, represented by Lieut.-Colonel Close, to have emigrated from the territories of the Nizam to those of the Rajah of Mysore, is rendered delicate by the stipulations of some of our treaties with the Nizam, and by a false principle of policy adopted by the British Governments in India.

The oppressive and capricious character of the native Governments of India, and the frequent convulsions to which they are exposed, tend to produce a disposition to emigrate among the different classes of their subjects. It is natural that

the native governments in all their negotiations with us should endeavour to avert this necessary effect of their own internal mismanagement, by raising every possible obstacle to the emigration of their subjects. From these considerations have originated all those stipulations in our several treaties with the native powers, which provide for the mutual surrender or expulsion of fugitives from the respective dominions of the contracting parties.

The British Government appear to have entered into these engagements with a facility, justifiable on no other principle than a persuasion, that such stipulations were not less necessary or advantageous to our interests, than to those of the other contracting parties. Even in cases where the obligations of treaty have been doubtful, our practice has been usually governed by the same apparent persuasion; without any absolute necessity, we have frequently refused protection to the subjects of contiguous states, flying from oppression, with the apparent policy of discouraging by such examples, any similar attempts of our own subjects.

In former periods of our history, under all the original defects, abuses and corruptions of our first establishments in India, such a policy might possibly be requisite to prevent the depopulation of our own dominions; but in the present improved state of our civil administration in India, and with the prospect of a progressive reform in the whole system of our internal government, we have no common interest with the contiguous native powers in restraining the emigration of such as may desire to pass the boundaries of our respective frontiers. The opulent and industrious classes of the Company's subjects can have no inducement to renounce the protection of the British Government, or to abandon the only spot in Asia where the rights of property are respected, or where the person of the subject is guarded by the law. On the other hand, the same class of inhabitants among the nations contiguous to our possessions will be disposed to seek our protection, and to obtain an establishment within our dominions, in proportion to the security enjoined under our government contrasted with the precarious condition of life, liberty and property under the best administrations of the surrounding states. It is, therefore, evident that any stipulation of treaty, or established practice tending to restrain emigration on our

frontier cannot operate with reciprocal advantage to our interests, but must tend to the positive injury of the Company's dominions by discouraging the introduction of new settlers within our provinces; and consequently by repressing the growth of population and wealth. No departure from clear and unambiguous engagements of treaty can be justified under this pretence. In all such cases we must be content to correct the state of our public obligations, as occasions shall offer, by the necessary alteration of our defective treaties. But in future all our engagements with the native governments must be framed with a view to avoid the fundamental error of our former policy. It would, however, in the meanwhile be contrary to every principle of wisdom to persevere in the practice of conforming in doubtful cases of treaty to the views of our allies, by surrendering, or expelling from our territories any emigrants whom our allies may demand, under whatever character or description.

In all cases not clearly provided for by any existing treaty, or by the established usage of friendly and civilized states, nothing more can be justly expected, nothing more should be hereafter conceded, than a candid examination of the alleged pretension. For this purpose every claim of a nature in any degree doubtful, must be accompanied by the explanations and evidence necessary to an equitable decision of its merits. As it will be in the power of our allies, and of every contiguous state to examine and decide our occasional reclamations of fugitive subjects in the same manner, no reasonable objection can be urged against our mode of proceeding.

In the case reported by Lieut.-Colonel Close, in his letter of the 24th of January, 1800, there does not appear to have been even a plausible ground for the demand made by the manager of Pencoondah. The cases cannot frequently occur, in which it would be proper or necessary for the British Government to proceed to the length of *seizing* and *delivering up* the fugitive subjects of a neighbouring state. Murderers, notorious robbers or banditti, and deserters from the army constitute perhaps the only descriptions of persons against whom such extreme measures ought ever to be taken by our government at the requisition of a foreign power. In the present instance, the requisition is not suggested by any colour of reason; adverting to the very recent acquisition of the district of

Pencoondah by the Nizam, it is not probable that his Highness's officers should have had any just claim on the ryots and merchants which can require measures to be adopted by the Government of Mysore, for the purpose of compelling those persons to render satisfaction to the Nizam's Government; with still less justice could the Rajah of Mysore be called upon to refuse a settlement to those persons, or to deliver them into the hands of the Nizam.

Under all these circumstances, the answer which Lieut.-Colonel Close directed to be returned to the application of the Nizam's manager was extremely proper. The negotiations which have been depending at Hyderabad, leading to the cession of Pencoondah and the neighbouring districts, have rendered any instructions on this subject unnecessary, as far as the particular case appeared to be immediately concerned; but if either the same application should be repeated, or if any similar demand should hereafter be made, either by the officers of the Nizam, or by those of the Mahratta Government, the principles stated in these paragraphs will suggest to your Lordship the nature of your reply.

The question arising from the case of borderers holding malguzari lands under each of the contiguous governments, and residing occasionally within either frontier, is of considerable difficulty; and as I understand that it frequently occurs, it is to be wished that an effectual exclusion of the inconvenience could be accomplished.

Perhaps it would be practicable with this view, to compel all the Company's ryots, and those of the Rajah of Mysore, to make their option between their allegiance to the contiguous states, and either to quit the Company's or Rajah's territories, or to sell or relinquish, within a certain period of time whatever landed property or benefits they may now possess in any adjoining foreign state. I shall be glad to receive your Lordship's sentiments with respect to this suggestion.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. XCIII.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Dundas to the Marquess Wellesley, dated Wimbledon, 26th September, 1800.

I trouble you with these few additional lines on the subject of the intended pecuniary grant in your favour, by the East India Company. The fact is, that in truth the army were considered to have got as much as any army ought to get in the way of pecuniary reward, but when it could be accompanied at the same time with a reward bestowed on the conduct of the first civil servant in India, the objection was a good deal removed. Under these circumstances your feelings are somewhat embarrassing; but I acknowledge with great frankness, that they are natural and honourable on your part, and I shall certainly turn my thoughts to some mode of suggestion to the Company, by which they may make good their intentions to you, without mixing them with any thing that can injure your feelings.

No. XCIV.

The Marquess of Wellesley to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

SIRS,

Fort William, September 30th, 1800.

Having deemed it to be my duty to revert during the present season to my plan of the 5th of October, 1798,* for the encouragement of the private trade between India, and the Port of London, I now have the honour to submit to your Honourable Court, a view of the urgent considerations which have determined me to adopt this temporary arrangement for the current year, and to add the reasons which induce me to hope that your honourable Court will speedily confirm my proceedings by a permanent system of regulation, founded on similar principles.

I entertained a confident expectation, that I should have received at an early period of the season the sanction of your honourable Court for reverting to the plan of October, 1798, or for adopting some arrangement equally calculated to facilitate and encourage the private trade between India and

* See Appendix.

England; but I have been disappointed in my expectation of receiving an early and seasonable notification of your final commands; and the usual season for exportation from this port to Europe, is already opening under such circumstances as absolutely compel me to adopt a resolution, which my duty and inclination would have induced me to delay.

The employment of ships built in India, between this port and that of London, is no longer merely a question of expediency, or of liberal commercial policy; the deficiency of the tonnage expected from Europe reduces me to the absolute necessity of providing a large proportion of Indian tonnage, for the service of the present season, in order to secure the conveyance of the heavy articles of your investment, and to fulfil your legal obligations. The only question, on which I retain the power of exercising a free judgment with relation to this subject, is confined to the mode of obtaining the necessary tonnage for these indispensable purposes.

In forming my decision on this question, it was also necessary to consider what provision should be made for the conveyance to the Port of London of such goods, as might be provided during the current season by private British merchants resident in India, beyond the amount of the statutable tonnage of 3,000 tons; and by what regulation the exportation of such goods should be governed. The importance and urgency of both these considerations were greatly enhanced by the actual state of the foreign trade of this port.

The nature of the case appeared to me to limit my decision to an option between the regulation observed in the season 1799—1800, (conformably to the orders of your honourable Court of the 25th of May, 1798,) and the plan contained in the advertisement, published by the Board of Trade under my orders on the 5th of October, 1798.

I have carefully compared the principles, objects, policy, and practical operation of both systems, and I now have the honour to lay before your honourable Court the result of that comparison.

The orders of your honourable Court of the 25th of May, 1798, were framed with a view of facilitating and encouraging the private trade between India and England. The primary objects of those orders were to protect the merchants, not being proprietors of ships, against any undue enhancement of

the price of freight by the proprietors of ships, and to prevent persons, being proprietors of ships, and also merchants, from trading to greater advantage than such merchants as might not unite both capacities.

Your orders of the 25th of May, 1798, were considered by the merchants, for whose benefit they were intended, (particularly by the proprietors of heavy goods) to be extremely prejudicial to their interests.

Those orders were received with equal dissatisfaction by the proprietors of ships, who manifested the greatest reluctance to let their ships unconditionally to the Company, although the rate of freight allowed for the ships was comparatively high.

The proprietors of ships, and the freighters (possessing no property in ships) considered it to be for their mutual advantage, that they should be left to make their arrangements with each other; both parties appearing equally adverse to the intervention of the Company's agency.

Under the plan contained in the advertisement of the 5th of October, 1798, the proprietors of ships were enabled to make a more perfect assortment of the cargoes; to load their ships in the most advantageous and expeditious manner; to despatch them at the most favourable periods of the season; and to prevent the loss, which (under the plan adopted in conformity to your orders of the 25th of May, 1798,) the proprietors of ships sustain by unavoidably delays in the adjustment of accounts, and in the payment of the freight by the Company in England.

The proprietors of ships were enabled, under the plan of October, 1798, to afford the freight at a reduced rate, at the same time that they derived a greater profit on that rate than on the higher rates of freight fixed by the Governor-General in Council in 1799-1800, in conformity to your orders of the 25th of May, 1798.

To the merchant who is not proprietor of a ship, the plan contained in the advertisement of the 5th of October, 1798, affords the most important advantages. He obtains a considerable reduction in the rate of freight; he is enabled to settle his engagements with the proprietor of the ship previously to the purchase of goods; to purchase such goods as may be advantageously invested under the existing rates of freight;

and to regulate every consignment and draft according to the quantity of the tonnage engaged, to the period of despatching the goods from India, and to that of their expected arrival in England.

The merchant is embarrassed, if compelled, under any modification, to depend on the Company for tonnage, for the arrangement of the rates of freight, or for the distribution of the cargo. He can neither be secure of the requisite quantity of tonnage, nor of the time of despatching his goods from India, nor of the ship on which they may be laden, nor of the mode in which they may be distributed; and his trade is burthened with an expensive rate of freight, which deprives him of all reasonable expectation of profit.

The quantity of tonnage (exclusive of the goods sent in the privileges of the commanders and officers of ships) annually occupied by private goods, shipped from this Presidency alone, in the several years elapsed subsequent to the Act of Parliament in 1793, is stated in the following account:—

Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
1794-5 . 2,473	1796-7 . 4,659	1798-9 . 6,223
1795-6 . 5,346	1797-8 . 3,787	1799-1800 . 7,748

The correspondence of the Board of Trade with the Governor-General in Council on the subject of the provision of tonnage has been submitted to the consideration of your honourable Court. The reports of that Board, with the documents annexed to them, afford abundant proof, that a much larger quantity of private goods would have been shipped for England during the seasons enumerated in the preceding account (particularly during the year 1799-1800) if adequate encouragement had been extended to the navigation and commerce of your dominions in ships built in the ports of India, and if the British merchants resident in India had been assured of permanent indulgence to their trade with the port of London.

Upon an average of the six years specified in the preceding account, about 5,000 tons of private goods from Bengal alone were annually exported to England; the amount, therefore, of the private goods exported from Bengal alone, during that period of time, has exceeded by 2,000 tons annually the amount of the tonnage allotted by law for all India. It is to

be observed, that a considerable portion of the total amount of these 5,000 tons was annually furnished by ships built in India.

Exclusively of two ships recently engaged, and provided with cargoes, to the amount of 1,500 tons, the port of Calcutta now contains above 10,000 tons of shipping, built in India, of a description calculated for the conveyance of cargoes to England. This tonnage has already been tendered, and is actually at command for that purpose.

From the preceding statement, and from the correspondence of the Governor-General in Council with the Board of Trade, it is evident, that the wise policy which dictated the clauses of the Act of Parliament, passed in 1793, with respect to the trade of private merchants between India and England, has been to a great degree frustrated by the insufficiency of the tonnage furnished from England, and by the unavoidable expense and inconvenience attending the terms and manner of its provision.

From the quantity of private tonnage now at command in the port of Calcutta, and from the state of perfection which the art of ship-building has already attained in Bengal, (promising a still more rapid progress, and supported by abundant and increasing supplies of timber,) it is certain that this port will always be able to furnish tonnage to whatever extent may be required for conveying to the port of London the trade of the private British merchants of Bengal.

The considerable amount of tonnage occupied by private goods from Bengal in the year 1795-6, 1798-9, and 1799-1800, compared with the amount occupied by goods of a similar description in the years 1794-5, 1796-7, and 1797-8, affords a satisfactory proof that the permission granted to individuals of providing their own tonnage was equally favourable to the interest of the proprietors and to that of the freighters of the ships.

This conclusion is not affected by the large quantity of goods shipped in 1799-1800, under the arrangement made in conformity to your orders of the 25th of May, 1798; for it is well known, that, under a confident expectation of enjoying the continued advantages of the plan of 1798, the merchants had considerably extended their provision of goods for the European markets. Many from necessity, others from mo-

tives of respect to the laws, shipped their goods on the tonnage provided by the Government, while others disposed of their goods to the numerous foreign agents then employed in the port of Calcutta.

The quantity of private goods shipped for England in 1799-1800, affords, therefore, an incontrovertible proof of the eagerness and alacrity with which the British merchants resident in Bengal provided goods, with a view to embrace the expected opportunity of conveying their trade to London on terms of advantage; but no argument can justly be drawn from the same circumstance to prove that the continuance of the regulation adopted in 1799-1800 would afford adequate encouragement to the private trade between India and England.

The preceding considerations satisfied me that the plan of hiring ships, on the part of the Company, and of re-letting them to the proprietors of ships, leaving the proprietors of ships and the merchants at liberty to settle the terms of freight, is more advantageous both to the proprietors and freighters of ships, than the arrangement adopted under your orders of the 25th of May, 1798.

In your letter of the 25th of May, 1798, your Honourable Court appears to have intimated an opinion that persons uniting the capacities of proprietors and freighters of ships may trade from Bengal to the port of London, to greater advantage than merchants possessing no property in ships. It appears to me that the difference between the actual charge incurred by merchants being proprietors of ships, on account of the freight of their goods sent to England in their own ships, and the rate of freight paid by merchants not being proprietors of ships, cannot be deemed a profit derived by the proprietor of a ship on his goods. No person will employ any part of his capital in the purchase of property in ships without the prospect of deriving an adequate profit on the capital so invested. I am satisfied that it would not be practicable for the proprietors of ships in this port to maintain an effectual combination for the establishment of enhanced rates of freight; unless such a combination should be maintained, it is to be presumed that the profits of the proprietors of ships on their capitals invested in ships will never exceed, on an average, a reasonable advantage on the amount

of those capitals after defraying all the expenses of their ships. This profit must, therefore, be deemed entirely distinct from the profit which the proprietors of ships may derive on their goods conveyed to England in their own ships; and consequently the proprietors of ships cannot be supposed to possess in the general course and conduct of their trade, in the purchase, transportation or sale of their goods, any material advantage over merchants who are not proprietors of ships.

Various additional arguments, involving consequences of a more complicated and comprehensive description, appeared to me to demand, not only that I should recur without delay to the plan of the 5th of October, 1798, but that I should respectfully represent to your honourable Court, in the most distinct terms, my decided and conscientious conviction, that the permanent establishment of a systematic intercourse between the ports of India and that of London, regulated by principles similar to those adopted by this Government in October, 1798, is become indispensable to the united and inseparable interests of the Company and of the nation in India.

Under the beneficial influence of the British Government in India, combined with the increased demand both in Europe and in America for Indian commodities, the produce and manufactures of the British territories in India have increased to an extent far exceeding the amount which the capital applicable to the purchase of the Company's investment can embrace.

The wise policy, the just pretensions, and the increasing commercial resources and political power of Great Britain in India, claim for her subjects the largest attainable share in the valuable and extensive commerce of such articles of Indian produce and manufacture as are necessarily excluded from the Company's investments.

A large proportion of this valuable trade is already in the possession of foreign nations; and unless means be immediately adopted for depriving those nations of the undue share which they have obtained in that trade, the most serious consequences are to be apprehended to the combined interests of the English East India Company and of the British nation.

The British merchants at this Presidency not having ob-

tained the expected permission to freight their ships to the port of London in the last year, agreeably to the plan adopted in October, 1798; goods to a large amount, originally intended for the port of London, were sold to foreigners in the port of Calcutta, and thus diverted to the channel of the foreign trade.

The nature and extent of that trade have undergone a particular investigation. From the accompanying statements your honourable Court will observe, that the trade of America and Portugal with the port of Calcutta alone in 1799-1800, amounted,—

In Imports, 81,81,005 sicca rupees; in Exports, 71,30,372 sicca rupees. Being an increase in 1799-1800 of the trade carried on in ships bearing American and Portuguese colours, compared with the average of that trade in the three preceding years,—

In Imports, 63,98,678 sicca rupees; in Exports, 43,92,768 sicca rupees.

On the other hand, the imports of the British subjects in the year 1799-1800 amounted only to 47,87,101 sicca rupees, and the exports to 67,66,649 sicca rupees.

Of the trade carried on in foreign bottoms with the other ports in India, from Europe and America, I possess no sufficiently accurate information. It is, however, known to be conducted on a very extensive scale.

In the present season, the trade conveyed in foreign bottoms, if left unrestrained, promises to increase beyond even the rapid progress of last year. From the accompanying statement, your honourable Court will observe, that the port of Calcutta at this early period of the season contains about 8,500 tons of shipping under American, Portuguese, and Danish colours.

I possess no means of forming an accurate estimate of that proportion of the foreign trade from India to Europe, and to America, which is supported by capital actually belonging to the nations, under whose flags the ships are navigated.

It appears, however, from the statements prepared by the reporter of external commerce, that less than one-fourth of the funds imported by the Americans in 1799-1800, for the purchase of their investments, was brought from America. Of the bullion £200,000 was imported from London, and the remainder from other parts of Europe and from the Island of

Madeira. I have not been able to ascertain the proportion of British capital employed in the trade between India and Portugal. Admitting the whole capital employed in the foreign trade with India to belong to the nations under whose flags the ships are navigated, the undue proportion which they have obtained of that trade, to the injury of the British merchants, demands the most serious attention.

The trade conveyed in the foreign ships is conducted with all the advantages of a comparatively low rate of freight; of strict economy in the management of the concern; and of voyages and returns of extraordinary expedition and celerity. The voyage from America to Calcutta is frequently performed in less than four months. In the last season several American ships disposed of their imports, purchased their cargo for exportation, and left the port within twenty-five, and some within twenty, days from the date of their arrival.

Under all the existing impediments, and under the uncertainty which has hitherto embarrassed the trade of the British merchant in India, it is impossible that his goods can reach the markets of the continent of Europe through the channel of the public sales in England, at so low a price as the goods conveyed directly from India to the same markets in foreign bottoms. The Company's sales in England must necessarily be affected by the quantity of Indian goods passing into the markets of the continent of Europe through the channel of the foreign trade, and the profits of the private British merchant, whose goods are disposed of at the Company's sales, must be proportionably diminished.

Although the voyage by which the produce of India is conveyed in foreign ships to Europe may occasionally be circuitous, the superior advantages, enumerated in the preceding paragraphs, enable the proprietors of the goods to dispose of them at a lower price than that for which the same descriptions of goods can be brought to the continental markets of Europe, if exported from India by British merchants under the heavy freight,* and other incumbrances to which their trade is at present subject.

* The Portuguese and Americans pay only one per cent. on Indian produce imported and re-exported. By the Warehousing Act lately passed in Great Britain, calicoes pay $2\frac{1}{2}$, and muslins $7\frac{1}{2}$, per cent. on the sales,

It must ever be impracticable, if it were justifiable or politic, by any restrictions or penalties on the trade of the British subjects, to prevent the increasing produce and manufactures of India from being conveyed to the markets in Europe, where a demand for such articles shall exist. Such restrictions tend to throw the trade into the hands of foreign nations, and to enable them to supply the markets of Europe on terms which must equally affect the Company's sales in England. If the same goods which now pass to the continent of Europe, through foreign hands, were brought to the Company's sales in England, the effect on the general price of articles exposed to sale at the Company's warehouses would be less prejudicial than that now experienced from the sale of those goods in the markets on the continent of Europe. The Company and the private British merchant would equally feel the advantage in the improvement of the general sales in England, and the private trade of India would become a fertile source of wealth and strength to the British nation, instead of contributing to the opulence and aggrandizement of foreign powers.

The interests of the Company, and of the British nation, are undivided and inseparable with relation to this important question. Every principle of justice and policy demands the extension of the utmost practicable facility to the British merchants in India, for the export from India to the port of London, of the largest possible proportion of the manufactures and produce of India, not required for the Company's investment. Such advantageous terms of freight and such other benefits should be opened to the British merchants in India as should not only remove every inducement to conduct the trade through foreign channels, but should enable the British merchants in India to enter into a competition in the markets of Europe with merchants trading in goods of similar produce or manufacture provided by foreign capital.

To foreigners the indulgence may safely be extended of

if sold for exportation. All other goods (excepting cotton, spices, bullion, &c., diamonds, precious stones, which pay no duties) pay two per cent. exclusive of the convoy duty, payable by the Importers. A reduction of those duties in England is absolutely necessary to complete the system of drawing the private trade of India to the port of London.

purchasing, with their own capital, such part of the manufactures or produce of India, calculated for the European or American markets, as may not be embraced by the capital employed in the purchase of the Company's investment and of the cargoes of the British merchants resident in India.

It is, however, doubtful whether* foreign nations would be able to retain any considerable proportion of the trade from India to Europe, were the British merchants in India permitted to avail themselves of their superior means of drawing the whole of the trade to England. Their local knowledge, added to all the advantages necessarily derived from a constant residence on the spot, must always enable them to command a supply of goods, of a better quality, and at a cheaper rate, than foreign merchants can obtain. In the conveyance of Indian goods to Europe rests the foreign merchant's sole advantage over the British. The superior facility which the foreign merchant enjoys in this respect gives him so decided a command over the trade, that he is enabled not only to outbid the British merchant in India, but also to undersell him in the markets of Europe.

Were the British merchants in India permitted to provide their own tonnage as occasion might require, every reason exists to justify a belief that they would soon possess themselves of nearly the whole of the private export trade from India to Europe, and would render London the universal mart for the manufactures and produce of Asia.

If the capital of the merchants in India, and the remittance of the fortunes of individuals, should not supply funds sufficient for the conduct of the whole private export trade from India to Europe, no dangerous consequences could result from applying to this branch of commerce capital drawn directly from the British empire in Europe.

* The Americans obtain Indian goods so much cheaper by a direct intercourse with India than they could through the circuitous route of Europe, that they will probably continue to deal largely even on their own capital with India. It is now the ordinary practice of the Americans, under the last treaty of commerce, to ship cargoes in India for America, to touch at some port in America, and without transhipping or unloading the goods in America to proceed directly to Europe, and to dispose of their Indian cargo in an European port. This practice is unquestionably contrary to the treaty of commerce with America.

Beneficial consequences of the utmost importance would certainly result to the British empire in India from any considerable increase of its active capital, which is known not to bear a just proportion to the productive powers of the country.

The necessary effect of such an increase of active capital in India would be to augment the produce and manufactures of your dominions to the full extent of any possible demand. The high rate of interest on money applied to mercantile purposes, and the charge of the public debt would consequently be diminished in India, while every source, both of public and private credit would be proportionably improved. No possibility appears of any injurious consequences resulting to the British Empire in Europe from an event so advantageous to India. It cannot be supposed that the private trade of India will ever absorb any portion of British capital which can find more advantageous employment at home. If any portion of British capital be now employed in the American, or Portuguese, or Danish trade with India, the general interests of Great Britain will unquestionably be promoted by inviting, under increased advantages, the application of the same funds to the trade of the private British merchants resident within the Company's dominions.

From whatever source the capital of the private British trade in India might be derived, the goods would be obtained in India under the same wise, humane, and salutary regulations now enforced with respect to the provision of every article of produce or manufacture in this country, either by the Company or by private merchants ; Great Britain would enjoy all the advantages of that trade which is now a source of increasing wealth and strength to foreign nations, and which tends ultimately to introduce foreign intrigue, to establish foreign influence, and to aggrandize foreign power in India.

It would be equally unjust and impolitic to extend any facility to the trade of the British merchants in India, by sacrificing or hazarding the Company's rights and privileges ; by injuring its commercial interests ; by admitting an indiscriminate and unrestrained commercial intercourse between England and India ; or by departing from any of the fundamental principles of policy, which now govern the British establishments in India.

It may be urged, that if a considerable proportion of the

goods now exported from India to the Continent of Europe by foreigners, were to be imported into England by the British merchants in India, under rates of freight more advantageous than those now paid by the Company, the demand for the Company's goods would be reduced, and the value of the Company's goods would be impaired.

It has already been observed that the public sales of East India goods in England must necessarily be affected by the aggregate quantity of those goods sold in the continental markets of Europe; and that the effect on the sales in England, would probably be less prejudicial and could not be more so, if a larger proportion of the goods provided in India for the European markets should be imported into England, and sold in the first instance at the Company's sales.

The long establishment of the Company's factories in India, the skill of its servants regularly educated for the conduct of those factories, the habitual confidence of the manufacturers in the good faith and integrity of the Company have secured to the Company so decided a superiority in the provision of the most valuable articles of piece-goods and raw silk, that no private merchant by any practicable reduction of freight can be enabled to rival the Company in these important articles of its investment.

In the first purchase of sugar and other gruff goods, the trade of the private British merchant has more nearly reached that of the Company; nor will the Company ever be able to trade advantageously in these articles, unless the Government in India shall resort to ships built in India, for the conveyance of such goods; the valuable branches of your investment will, it is supposed, be always conveyed with more advantage in your regular ships.

If the British merchants should be permitted to employ ships built in India under the plan of October, 1798, the Company's gruff goods may also be conveyed to England in ships of a similar description, at rates of freight equally advantageous with those paid by the private merchants. The Company will, therefore, derive a considerable benefit in this branch of trade, from encouraging the trade of the private British merchants in India;* at present neither the Company

* The probable saving to the Company in the present season by the

nor the private British merchants can rival foreigners in the markets of Europe in the less valuable articles of Indian produce and manufactures.

It is now evident that the extra tonnage engaged in England by the Company for the service of India can never be rendered a practicable channel through which the British private trade of India can contend with foreign adventure. This observation necessarily applies with more force to the regular ships of the Company, although experience has proved those ships to be admirably calculated for the conveyance of the Company's valuable investment.

The plan contained in the advertisement of the 5th of October, 1798, affords to the British merchants, every necessary facility for the conduct of the private trade from India to England, while the important principles of the trade and government of India are preserved from hazard, and sufficient precautions are provided against all the dangers justly apprehended from an unrestricted commercial intercourse between England and India.

The essential object of preventing the resort to India of persons unlicensed by the Company is not affected. The powers of the Government in India over unlicensed persons remain in full vigour and efficiency. No goods or passengers can be received in the private ships either in India or in England, without the sanction of the Company or of its government; the voyage to England and the return to India, are required to be performed under the instructions and control of the same authority; and as the proprietors of the ships, the commanders and officers; the seamen, (mostly natives of India) and all the persons concerned in the immediate conduct of the trade, are subject to the authority of the British Government in India, it is always in the power of the Company and of its government, to prevent the perversion of an intercourse thus regulated between India and England to any sinister purposes endangering the rights and privileges of the Company, or the interests of the British Empire.

Omitting the difference in the rate of freight, these considerations alone are sufficient to recommend the employment of ships built in India in the private trade between India and

conveyance of their gruff goods in ships built in India may amount to £20,000.

Great Britain. Over private ships furnished from England the Company and their government in India, could not exercise an equally efficient control.

It is remarkable that the principle which has hitherto regulated the commercial intercourse between India and England has actually occasioned the very evils which it was intended to avert.

The operation of this erroneous principle has forced the trade between India and Europe from a channel, in which it could have been controlled and regulated without difficulty, into the hands of foreign nations, where it cannot, without considerable difficulty be subjected to any degree of controul, regulation, or restraint: the same mistaken policy has filled the Ports of India with the ships of foreign nations, has enabled those nations to rival the Company both in Europe and in India in many articles of its export and import trade, has invited from Europe and America adventurers of every description; and, by the number and activity of these foreign agents, has menaced the foundations of your commercial and political interests throughout every part of Asia, and even within your own dominions.

If the extension of additional indulgences to the British merchant necessarily involved the admission of numerous British adventurers into India, the wisdom of your honourable Court could not fail to remark that your Government can always with less difficulty control the operations of British, than those of foreign agents; while the danger to be apprehended from the views and designs of foreigners of every description must ever be greater than any which can probably arise from an increased resort of British subjects, under such limitations and restraints as your wisdom may frame, and the vigilance of your government in India may be enabled to enforce.

But it does not appear probable that any increase of the private British trade of India would necessarily produce a proportional augmentation in the number of British agents resorting to your dominions. The British merchants now resident in India being equal to the conduct of much more extensive concerns, and likely to be employed by persons engaged in commercial concerns at home, who might easily conduct their operations with India through those British subjects actually established within your dominions.

On the other hand foreigners generally deal directly with

the natives, or with foreign houses of agency, the number of these houses (in consequence of the war) is now inconsiderable ; the increase of foreign adventurers will, therefore, be a necessary consequence of any considerable increase of the trade in foreign hands. Foreign ships also, being necessarily exempt from the control of the British Government in Europe, offer to every emissary of the enemy, and to every dangerous political adventurer, an easy entrance into India. In proportion to the increased resort of foreign ships to our ports in India, foreign intrigue will find a more ready channel of admission. It is a well known fact, that those to whom your permission and license to visit India have been refused usually resort to foreign ships, and thus evade your authority. The same channel is also always open to afford refuge and the means of escape to every public defaulter and delinquent from the authority of your government in India.

It is impossible to check the resort of the ships of foreign nations to India, by any other regulation than by rendering the trade unprofitable to foreign adventure. This effect cannot be accomplished otherwise than by enabling the British merchants in India to undersell foreigners in the markets of Europe. A system, which, under due regulation, shall afford to the British merchants in India, the greatest practicable facility of conveying their trade to England, instead of endangering the stability of the trade and power of the Company, and of the nation in India, will, therefore, constitute the most solid basis of security for the preservation of both.

The preceding observations may, I trust, satisfy your honourable Court, that the principles of the plan of the 5th of October, 1798, combine the requisite indulgence to the private trade, with the indispensable precautions necessary for securing your interests in India.

It is not my duty to enter into any detailed discussion of the objections urged by the ship-builders in England, against the admission of ships built in India, to a participation in the trade from India to the port of London ; it may not however be useless to add some remarks on this part of the subject.

Experience having proved that tonnage cannot be furnished from England, on terms which would enable the British merchants in India to rival foreigners in the trade between India and Europe, the exclusion of ships built in India from

the port of London would not increase the number of British ships hitherto engaged in the Indian trade, in any proportion which could materially benefit the ship-builders in England. This measure, therefore, without any proportional benefit to the ship-builders in England, would perpetuate and aggravate the evils now experienced from the restraints imposed on the private trade between India and England; on the other hand, by admitting ships built in India to partake of the trade to England, the ship-builders and other artists, manufacturers, and traders in England will reap all the benefits arising from the large sums expended in the repair of the numerous ships annually resorting to England from the ports of India. Other interests connected with the building of ships in England will also derive the profit resulting from the great demand for the articles necessary in the construction and outfit of the ships built in the ports of India; the fact being established, that many of those articles must necessarily be brought from England.

On their return to India, these ships from the moderation of their rates of freight will afford a most advantageous mode of conveyance for such of the manufactures of the British empire in Europe, as may be demanded in India; consequently the facilities granted to the private trade, and to the ships built in India will serve to encourage the exportation of British manufactures to Asia, to whatever extent the demand may be enlarged.

I have thus carefully revised the plan contained in the advertisement of October, 1798, for the encouragement of the trade of the British merchants resident in India with England; I have compared that plan with the arrangement adopted under the orders of your honourable Court of the 25th of May, 1798; I have considered the probable effects of any future attempt to provide for the conveyance of the private trade of India to the port of London, either in the Company's regular ships, or in extra ships hired in England; and I have adverted to the comparative practical operation of the systems adopted by this government in the years 1798, 1799, and 1800, as it appears on the accounts of the exports and imports of the port of Calcutta in each of those years; I have also submitted to your examination a combined view of the motives which induce me to revert to the plan of

October, 1798, for the present season, and to form an anxious expectation, that my conduct in this proceeding may meet with your approbation and countenance, and may become the foundation of an improved and durable system of intercourse between India and England under the sanction of your authority.

The rapid growth of the foreign trade during the last season, urgently demanded the immediate interference of your government on the spot. The number of foreign ships actually in the port of Calcutta, the alacrity, enterprize and skill of the foreign agents now assiduously employed in providing cargoes, and the necessary inaction and languor of the British private trade, embarrassed by the restraints of the existing law, created a serious apprehension in my mind, that any further delay in the decision of this momentous question might occasion evils, of which the remedy might hereafter become considerably difficult, if not absolutely impracticable. The unrestrained progress of the foreign trade in the present season, added to its great increase during the last, might have established its predominance over the private trade of British subjects to an extent, which no future regulation might have proved sufficient to limit or restrain. The difficulty of diverting this lucrative commerce from the channel into which it had been forced, would naturally be aggravated in proportion to the length of time during which the trade should continue to flow in that course.

Under these serious impressions, and convinced that a prompt decision was demanded with a degree of exigency equal to the importance of the question at issue, I directed the accompanying notice* to be published at Fort William, on the 19th instant, and I ordered the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, to publish correspondent advertisements at those Presidencies with such modifications, as local circumstances may render indispensably necessary.

It will rest with your honourable Court to determine, whether this plan shall be rendered permanent. A temporary restraint is now applied to the progress of the foreign trade in India, during the present season; and a temporary encouragement is granted, for the same period of time to that of

* See Appendix.

British subjects resident within your dominions, ample time is thus afforded for the deliberate formation of your final judgment; the result of which I shall await with a respectful, but confident hope, that your wisdom may approve and perpetuate the policy which dictated my orders of the 5th of October, 1798, and of the 19th of September, 1800; and that your liberality may confirm to all the interests affected by this important measure, the lasting enjoyment of those commercial and political advantages, which it has been my constant endeavour, under your countenance and favor, to cultivate, to improve, and to extend.

I have the honor to be, honourable Sirs,

with the greatest respect,

Your most obedient and faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.

No. XCV.

The Marquess Wellesley to Hugh Inglis, Esq. Chairman of the Court of Directors.

DEAR SIR,

Fort William, October 6th, 1800.

I trust you will establish the monthly packet over land from London, and also monthly vessels of intelligence, which might carry small cargoes, passengers, and letters; the expense would be defrayed by the passage-money, postage, and sale of the cargoes, which might consist of such perishable articles, as are in daily demand in India; I have no doubt that individuals in England or in India would readily contract to furnish such packets, exonerating the Company from all expense, and taking the profits of the vessels and cargoes. The object is of the utmost importance; in the present year I was nearly *seven months* without receiving one line of authentic intelligence from England. My distress and anxiety of mind were scarcely supportable. Speedy, authentic, and regular intelligence from Europe is essential to the conduct of the trade and government of this empire. If the sources of information be obstructed, no conscientious man can undertake this weighty charge. The fundamental principles of policy on which rest our establishments in India, require frequent communication with England; the British subjects in India should never find any difficulty in maintaining that

intercourse with their native country, which tends to preserve their attachments, to keep alive their affections, and to bring the remembrance of *home* constantly to their minds. I could urge innumerable topics on this subject, which I feel to be of great importance. In India the regular establishment of the monthly post overland, and the return of the monthly packets by sea, would afford the government at home, as well as the parents and connections of all British subjects employed or resident in India, regular and quick intelligence of the state of public affairs, and of all private interests in the East. We might then hope to receive both in England and India respectively, constant advices of the date of three months and-a-half, or four months at the latest.

Believe me, dear Sir,

Your faithful and obedient Servant,
WELLESLEY.

No. XCVI.

The Marquess Wellesley to His Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier.

SIR,

Fort William, 13th October, 1800.

I am deeply concerned to inform your Excellency, that the Honourable Company's ship Kent, was captured on the 7th instant, off the Sand Heads, by the French privateer La Confiance, commanded by M. Surcouff, after an action which lasted about an hour and three-quarters; and in which the Kent had eleven killed, (including Captain Rivington the commander) and forty-four wounded.

M. Surcouff ultimately overcame the Kent by boarding that ship. He is stated to have sustained considerable damage during the action from the fire of the Kent, which mounted eighteen pounders.

The Kent was laden principally with marine stores.

It is the opinion of the second officer, and of the purser of the Kent, whom I have personally examined, that the Kent being very deep in the water, and a dull sailer, her progress to the Mauritius (to which place it is concluded she will immediately be despatched,) is likely to be extremely slow; and consequently that a strong probability exists, that any vessel would overtake her who should pursue her even at the

distance of several days, subsequent to her departure from the Sand Heads.

It is uncertain whether the Confiance remains in company with the Kent, or whether the Confiance is still in a condition to persevere in her cruize. Her loss during the action is supposed to amount to about thirty men killed and wounded.

I have directed Captain Canning in the Nonsuch, to proceed in pursuit of the enemy; but as Captain Canning was on the point of sailing in charge of several ships, it is uncertain whether my orders will reach him in time.

I think it necessary to inform your Excellency, that the party of the enemy which boarded the Kent, (consisting, it is said, of 100 Europeans and 50 Caffres,) was guilty of the most savage acts of wanton and brutal cruelty; having cut down numbers of defenceless and unresisting persons, and after death disfigured the bodies of the slain in the most barbarous and shocking manner. Their treatment of the unfortunate survivors of the crew and passengers, who were put on board of an Arab vessel in the most destitute condition, (not excepting even the ladies) was equally inhuman, and contrary to every principle by which the evils of war have hitherto been mitigated among the civilized part of mankind.

The design of the present despatch is to suggest for your Excellency's consideration, whether it might not be proper, that your Excellency should detach one of the vessels under your command in such a direction, as may afford the best chance of falling into the track of the Kent, and of the Confiance, should she have proceeded with her prize towards the Mauritius.

Having no doubt that your Excellency will concur with me in opinion, that it is of the utmost importance to retake the Kent, I also beg leave to submit to your Excellency, whether it may not be expedient to detach one of his Majesty's vessels to the Isle of France, for the express purpose of intercepting her before she shall have entered that port.

It is supposed by the officers of the Kent, whom I have examined, that the Confiance with her prize, would be enabled to quit the Sand Heads on the 8th instant.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. XCVII.

Minute by the Governor-General.

Fort William, 20th October, 1800.

The Governor-General acquaints the Board, that he directed the Town-Major to take such steps as might be necessary for furnishing the subaltern officers and cadets, who were captured on the Kent Indiaman with quarters, as also with a common table until such time as they might be otherwise provided.

The urgent distress and destitute condition of these unfortunate gentlemen demand the immediate interposition of government.

These gentlemen have lost whatever property of any kind they had brought with them from Europe. Many of them had already suffered considerable loss by the fire on board the Queen, which they had in some degree repaired at a greatly enhanced expense at St. Salvador, when by a second calamity at the mouth of this river, they were plundered of every article in their possession; many of them are destined for the establishment of Madras, and one for that of Bombay. They have arrived in the river all without property of any description, and many without a friend or connection in this settlement to relieve their distress. In addition to these calamities, some of them are severely wounded.

To offer a mere advance on account of pay, or allowances, to persons in such a situation, would be to propose an inadequate temporary alleviation of their present misery, at the certain sacrifice of their future comfort, and with the melancholy prospect of aggravated embarrassment. The stoppage of their future pay or allowances, with a view to the repayment of any such advance, (however gradual the operation of refunding might be,) would necessarily reduce them to borrow money from individuals, and would ultimately plunge them into inextricable ruin; the effect of such an arrangement on so large a proportion of the younger branch of the Company's military service, must be highly injurious to the interest of the public, as well as disgraceful to the honour and humanity of the British Government in the eyes of all its native subjects.

The Governor-General, therefore, deems it to be his duty to afford immediate relief to these sufferers, in such a manner as shall provide in some degree for their permanent comfort, and shall enable them to avoid the necessity of future embarrassment; with this view, his Lordship has referred to the practice established in his Majesty's service, the spirit of which appears to be justly applicable to the case now under consideration, since it is difficult to distinguish from losses incurred on actual service, the losses sustained by officers captured by the enemy in time of war, during the course of a voyage from Europe to India, undertaken for the purpose of joining their respective corps, or of being immediately posted at the different stations of the Company's army.

The Governor-General therefore proposes, that a gratuity or compensation for the loss of their baggage, and other property equal to 60*l.*, (the estimated value of the personal baggage of a subaltern officer, according to his Majesty's regulations) shall be granted to each of the subaltern officers of his Majesty's and the Company's regiments, to each of the cadets, to the medical gentlemen, and also to Mr. R. Davies, veterinary surgeon of his Majesty's 27th regiment of Dragoons.

This sum is certainly very unequal to the actual losses of each individual, and quite insufficient for the purpose of enabling them to renew many indispensable articles of equipment. The Governor-General however, has adopted the preceding principle of relief, as affording some degree of aid to the unfortunate sufferers, whose cases are now under his Lordship's consideration, and at the same time precluding the establishment of any precedent which might hereafter encourage unreasonable demands upon government. Circumstances of peculiar hardship may however occur, to warrant a deviation from the general rule, and to induce the Governor-General in council either to afford full and immediate relief, or to refer the case to the favourable consideration of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

As the gratuity alone, would not be sufficient in many of the cases of distress to afford the necessary relief, either with a view to the present or future situation of the objects of his Lordship's attention, the Governor-General proposes, that an advance of two months pay, and half batta shall be made

to such of the subaltern officers and cadets, who were captured in the Kent, as may apply for advances to that amount. These advances will be deducted from their future pay and batta.

WELLESLEY.

No. XCVIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to his Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier.

SIR,

Fort William, October 22nd, 1800.

I have the honour to enclose for your Excellency's information a copy of the advices which I received on the 15th instant from the Resident at Bussorah. The result of the late events in Europe has probably been an immediate peace between France and Austria. It is not, however, equally probable that peace will speedily be concluded between Great Britain and France. If the war on the continent has ceased, and if hostilities should have continued between Great Britain and France, it is reasonable to suppose, that the enemy has prepared to make, with the least practicable delay, a vigorous effort to relieve the French army in Egypt, and that this effort may either be accompanied or speedily followed by an attack upon our possessions in India.

The renewed spirit and enterprizing genius of Buonaparte will naturally lead him to commence his operations with a view to either or both these objects at the earliest practicable period of time. Experience warrants an expectation that he will not lose a moment in availing himself of the actual advantages of his situation; and it is certain, that any naval armament which he might be enabled to despatch from France in the past months of July, August, and September, 1800, might reach the Red Sea, or the western coast of India, during the approaching season.

On the other hand, the probability increases every hour of a demand from his Majesty's Ministers upon the British Government in India, and upon your Excellency, to co-operate with a force, to be employed in the Mediterranean, for the expulsion of the French from Egypt. A considerable British force has been collected at Minorca, originally, perhaps, with

a view to an attempt on the southern coasts of France. That design, however, (if it was ever entertained,) has probably been relinquished in consequence of the late events on the continent of Europe. In the event of a separate peace between Austria and France, and of the continuance of hostilities between Great Britain and France, it is not improbable that the troops assembled at Minorca may be employed in concert with the Turkish army, against the French in Egypt. In such an event, an expedition from India might prove essentially useful by creating a diversion on the side of Upper Egypt; and the tenor of my private despatches from the Earl of Elgin tends to confirm the probability, that the unfavourable alteration which has taken place in the state of the war with France will induce his Majesty's Ministers to require an expedition from India to Egypt in the only manner in which such an operation could be undertaken with any prospect of advantage; namely, by combining it with a powerful attack from the side of the Mediterranean. It may be expected that any such requisition from his Majesty's Ministers may reach me in the first week in November, and that they will expect the fleets and armies of India to be ready to act against Egypt during the approaching season.

The preceding statement will have explained to your Excellency my reasons for apprehending that the naval and military strength of India is likely to be required, either for the purposes of defensive or offensive operations on the western side of the Peninsula between the ensuing months of December and March; and your Excellency's judgment and experience in the interests of the British empire in India will form a correct estimate of the magnitude of the danger which we may be called upon to repel, and of the urgent necessity of placing our force in such a condition, and in such a station, as shall enable us to act with promptitude and effect whenever the expected exigency shall arise.

After the fullest consideration of these circumstances, I am decidedly of opinion, that the British Government of India would not be justified in undertaking or prosecuting any expedition, the necessary effect of which must be to remove the strength of your Excellency's squadron to any considerable distance to the eastward for any long period of time. The same objection applies, in a certain degree, to the de-

tachment of any part of our military force in the present conjuncture for the purposes of any foreign conquest unconnected with an increase of our means of defence against the probable point of danger. This objection applies most powerfully to any detachment of our European force; the whole disposable amount of which throughout India does not at this time amount to ten thousand men.

If the expedition to Batavia should be prosecuted, even under the most favourable circumstances, your Excellency, with the strength of your squadron, could scarcely reach the western side of India sooner than the commencement of the month of February or the close of the month of January, 1801, and the troops employed in concert with his Majesty's ships would necessarily be detained at Batavia for a much longer period of time.

It is, therefore, with considerable reluctance, and under an irresistible conviction of the necessity of preparing to meet the emergencies which I have described, that I find myself compelled to suspend a second time the final execution of his Majesty's commands respecting Batavia; and to request your Excellency's assistance in carrying into effect a system of operations adapted to the new and alarming crisis of affairs. Your Excellency will not fail to observe the extreme difficulty of my situation: without any official or private information from his Majesty's Ministers, I am left to conjecture their intentions respecting Egypt from such imperfect advices as have been transmitted to me by the Earl of Elgin, and from my own view of the general state of political events. On the other hand, the declared anxiety of his Majesty's Ministers to obtain possession of Batavia, and the forward state of the expedition prepared for that purpose strongly inclined me to persevere in an undertaking which promised such advantage, and which had been so auspiciously commenced; but the pursuit of any foreign conquest, however easy or advantageous, must always yield to the necessity of self-defence. The further suspension of the measures commenced against Batavia will not render the prosecution of that expedition less practicable at a future period, while the absence of our fleet and of any part of our disposable European force in any of the probable cases which I have supposed might be fatal to our existence in India. I must, therefore, request your Ex-

cellency to consider the expedition to Batavia to be postponed to a more favourable opportunity.

Having decided this important point, it becomes my duty to submit to your Excellency's consideration a general view of the plan which appears to me most eligible for the purpose of enabling us to act offensively or defensively as the case may require, to frustrate any attempt of the French, either for the relief of their army in Egypt, or for the disturbance of our possessions in India, and to answer the expected demand of his Majesty's Ministers for our co-operation in Egypt during the approaching season.

With a view to meet all these cases as they may arise, it appears to me desirable to concentrate the strength of your Excellency's squadron, together with the largest disposable force of Europeans, which my limited means will enable me to spare, at some point from which they may be ready to issue with promptitude and facility either to the western coasts of the peninsula of India or to the Red Sea, or to any other quarter which the enemy may menace during the north-eastern monsoon. The general security of our possessions in India will be further promoted if the station chosen for your Excellency's fleet and for the proposed military force, should be central in its relation to the whole British empire in India, and should be a point at all times valuable and important to our interests, and necessary to be maintained against any assault of the enemy. After much attention to the subject, Trincomalé appears to me, under every aspect of the question, to be the most eligible station for the immediate rendezvous of the strength of your Excellency's squadron and of the force which I propose to assemble. It appears further necessary that the military force to be assembled should be provided with transports and camp equipage, and should be ready to move, under the convoy of your Excellency's squadron, wherever the service might require its presence. The force which I propose to collect at Trincomalé will consist of about 2,000* Europeans from his Majesty's infantry; to these I shall add a corps of native volunteer infantry from Bengal, and a suitable proportion of field ordnance.

I have reason to expect that I shall be enabled to assemble

* 10th regiment, 19th do. 80th do. infantry.

this force at Trincomalé on or before the middle of the month of December; and it is my intention that it should be commanded by Colonel Wellesley, and that Colonel Champagné should be the second in command. Colonel Wellesley has already received my orders to proceed to Trincomalé.

My earnest request to your Excellency is, that you will proceed to Trincomalé without delay, where Colonel Wellesley will, I trust, be prepared to meet you, to concert with you such plans of operation as may appear best suited to the purposes of the armament, and to aid you by every exertion within his power.

Your Excellency will either abandon the blockade of Batavia, or provide means for continuing it, according to your view of all the circumstances of our situation, and of the various objects stated in this despatch, and in that which accompanies it under the same date.

I expect that the troops and stores to be sent from hence will be ready to proceed to sea by the middle of November; and it is my intention to apprise Captain Malcolm, of his Majesty's ship *Suffolk*, of the change which circumstances have compelled me to make in my measures, and to request him to convoy the transports with the troops to Trincomalé instead of Prince of Wales' Island.

I request that your Excellency will give the necessary orders for the return of the two companies of his Majesty's 12th regiment (embarked on board of Captain Ball's squadron) to Madras by the earliest opportunity.

Although my opinion is, that a part of the European force to be employed in concert with your Excellency's squadron, will be most conveniently conveyed to the point of actual service on board his Majesty's ships, I have judged it to be expedient to engage transports sufficient for the conveyance of the whole European and native force to be assembled at Trincomalé, together with their necessary provisions and supplies. Your Excellency and Colonel Wellesley will determine on the spot what proportion of the European troops can be conveniently accommodated on board his Majesty's ships.

I have the honour to enclose for your Excellency's information a copy of a letter which I despatched to Rear-Admiral Blankett on the 16th instant, in consequence of the recent

accounts from Europe and Egypt. If your Excellency should agree in opinion with me regarding the expediency of Admiral Blankett's squadron being reinforced, with a view to the possibility of the French attempting to introduce a naval force into the Red Sea, I trust that you will adopt the necessary measures for reinforcing Admiral Blankett as early in the season as possible. I am aware that the state of your Excellency's squadron does not admit of your detaching any considerable force to the Red Sea consistently with providing for the general security of these extensive seas; but I am firmly persuaded that your Excellency's public zeal will prompt you to make every practicable exertion in the present conjuncture.

Your Excellency may be assured that I shall employ every possible effort to provide for the protection of the Sand Heads and of the northern part of the Bay of Bengal against the enemy's cruizers, and that I shall direct the Government of Bombay to adopt similar measures for the defence of the trade on that side of India, with a view to enable your Excellency to concentrate your force with more facility for the urgent and important purposes of offensive or defensive operations on an extended scale. I shall also direct the Governments of Bombay and Fort St. George to hold in readiness a considerable number of transports and a proportionable quantity of provisions and supplies for the purpose of moving towards any requisite point of attack or defence such a body of troops as it may be practicable to spare from the internal purposes of those respective Presidencies.

I think it necessary to inform your Excellency that I have apprized the Government of the Cape of Good Hope by the *Princess Mary* packet, now under despatch, of the state of affairs in India, and that I have requested his Excellency the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope to reinforce the King's army in India by the addition of two regiments of infantry to be landed at Goa or Bombay. I have also suggested to Sir Roger Curtis the expediency of reinforcing your Excellency's squadron by as many frigates as he can spare.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. XCIX.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Sir George Yonge, K.B.
Governor of the Cape of Good Hope.*

SIR,

Fort William, October 24th, 1800.

I have received from Constantinople and Aleppo the most unfavourable accounts of the successes of the French on the continent of Europe, as well as of the progress of their establishment in Egypt.

In this state of affairs it is my duty to request your Excellency, in the most earnest manner, to despatch to India, with the least practicable delay, as considerable a reinforcement of European infantry as it shall be possible for you to spare from the defence of the colony under your Excellency's Government. If the view which I have formed of the probable intentions of France in the future progress of the war against Great Britain be correct, the colony of the Cape of Good Hope is not likely to be the point of attack; and consequently it will not be exposed to any immediate danger by a diminution of its present garrison. Under these circumstances, I flatter myself that your Excellency will be enabled to send two regiments of infantry to India without incurring any considerable hazard during the period which must elapse before those corps can be replaced from England.

The great utility of the Cape of Good Hope is to serve as an outpost to our Indian empire, and a dépôt, from which seasoned troops may suddenly be drawn for the defence of our possessions in the East in any emergency which may arise. This advantage was derived from the Cape in an eminent degree during the war with Tippoo Sultaun, and I am satisfied that, under your Excellency's administration, the military resources of the Cape of Good Hope will always be applied with the utmost alacrity and judgment to their true object—the preservation of our empire in the East.

It is my wish that the European force which your Excellency may furnish in consequence of the present application, should be embarked for the coast of Malabar: to touch in the first instance at Goa, and to be landed there or elsewhere on that coast, as the state of affairs, at the period of their

arrival, shall require; with a view to this arrangement, the necessary orders will be transmitted to Goa. If, however, the transports with the troops from the Cape should not reach the coast of Malabar until the season shall have been too far advanced to admit of their landing either at Goa or at any other place on the coast of Malabar, it will be proper that they should, in that case, proceed directly to Bombay, unless the naval and military officers in charge of the reinforcements should previously receive instructions directing the troops to a different destination.

Your Excellency will necessarily feel the expediency of composing the reinforcements which you may despatch to India, in consequence of this letter, of the most seasoned regiments now at the Cape; the usual course of the service has been to season the King's troops in the climate of the Cape for eventual use in India. Under this system part of the force which I received from the Earl of Macartney was immediately employed in active service, and was distinguished in the siege and assault of Seringapatam.

Your Excellency will probably judge it expedient to despatch an express to Europe for the purpose of obtaining immediate reinforcements for your garrison; and I shall not fail to urge the necessity of affording you assistance, without delay, by despatching to his Majesty's Ministers an express overland, and by sea.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
 with great regard and esteem,
 Your Excellency's most obedient
 and faithful Servant,
 WELLESLEY.

No. C.

The Marquess Wellesley to Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Curtis, commanding His Majesty's Squadron at the Cape of Good Hope.

SIR,

Fort William, Oct. 24th, 1800.

Although I have not had the honour to receive any intimation from your Excellency of your safe arrival at the Cape of Good Hope, I have had the satisfaction to learn that

event through other channels, and I accordingly beg leave to congratulate your Excellency on the occasion.

A constant and unreserved correspondence on every question affecting the mutual interests of India and the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, subsisted between the Earl of Macartney, the late Sir Hugh Christian and me. Sir Hugh Christian constantly advised me by every opportunity of the strength, condition, and distribution of the squadron under his command. This intercourse was productive of important benefits to the public service ; and I am persuaded that your Excellency, adverting to the intimate connection of the relative interests of the British possessions in India, and of our establishments at the Cape of Good Hope will concur with me in cultivating a similar correspondence, and in employing every endeavour by mutual exertions to promote the prosperity of the general cause.

It has been my duty to request his Excellency the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope to despatch to India with the least practicable delay, the largest military force which he may be able to spare. I hope it will be in his Excellency's power to furnish two regiments of infantry ; and that your Excellency will have no difficulty in affording the necessary convoy to the transports employed in conveying the troops in question to India. I have intimated to Sir George Yonge, that it is desirable, that the troops should proceed directly to Goa ; but that, if the season should be too far advanced at the period of their arrival on the Coast of Malabar, it will be proper to land them at Bombay.

In addition to the necessary convoy for the military reinforcements, I trust it will be in your Excellency's power to reinforce Vice-Admiral Rainier's squadron, which I beg leave to state to you is particularly deficient in frigates ; your Excellency will render a great service to the British Empire in India by contributing any aid to this deficient branch of the naval service in these seas.

In proceeding towards India, or to the Red Sea, a French Squadron must probably touch, either at the Spanish Settlements on the Eastern Coast of South America, or at the Mauritius. It is not impossible that such a squadron would find it necessary to touch at both places. I am satisfied that your Excellency's approved vigilance and judgment will be

exercised in observing both these points, and in applying your force either to intercept the enemy on their voyage, or to reinforce Rear-Admiral Blankett (who proceeds up the Red Sea in the month of November next) or Vice-Admiral Rainier on the Coast of Malabar, or at Trincomalé, as the case may appear to require. I am also confident that your Excellency will give Vice-Admiral Rainier and me the earliest possible intimation of the movements of the enemy and of your own; and I flatter myself that you will from time to time apprise us of the general state and distribution of your squadron.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the signals now in use at the Isle of France, which I have lately procured, and believe to be correct; it may probably be found useful to your Excellency if you should happen not to possess the same information.

It appears highly probable, with a view to all her objects in Egypt and India that France may endeavour at an early season to throw a strong reinforcement into the Isle of France. Recent information leads me to believe that such a design is entertained by the enemy. Its success would certainly aggravate, in a great degree, the danger of our Indian Empire. I therefore feel it to be my duty, in the most earnest manner, to recommend to your Excellency to take immediate measures for establishing the most strict and effectual blockade of the Ports of the Isle of France, which your naval force will permit, until you shall receive further advices from me; and I request your Excellency to apprise Vice-Admiral Rainier and me by every favourable opportunity of the state of any such blockade, of its probable duration, and of its effect on the enemy's force and conduct, as well as of all such information as you may be enabled to collect respecting the internal strength and defences of the Isle of France. I have the honour to transmit a copy of a note which has been furnished to me relative to the most eligible plan for maintaining a blockade of the Ports of the Isle of France. The note was given to me by a very intelligent navigator, who has lately passed a month on the island. In the strictest confidence and with the fullest reliance on your Excellency's acknowledged discretion and secresy, I apprise you that my views are likely to be directed eventually to the

reduction of the Isle of France. It is possible that I may make the attempt in the course of the month of January, 1801, or of the ensuing month of May. In the first case, I cannot hope for further assistance from your Excellency, than that you should send the most considerable force which you can spare to cruize off the Island or blockade its ports, at the earliest possible season; and if success should attend my enterprize in the month of January, the naval defence of the Island will be delivered over to your Excellency's squadron. Should the attempt from India be postponed until the month of May, your Excellency will hear from me again, and in either case, you will render a most essential service by blockading the Ports of the island according to the suggestion which I have recommended to your attention, and by despatching frequent advices to Vice-Admiral Rainier, and to me.

Your Excellency will probably observe, that my requisition for a reinforcement of troops from the Cape is connected with my eventual design against the Isle of France. But as I am satisfied that that design can be best executed directly from India, and that any attempt to obtain a co-operation of troops from the Cape would be subject to much difficulty, and would perhaps only serve to disclose a plan of which the success must principally depend on sudden and secret execution, I have resolved to make no communication whatever to the Government at the Cape of my intentions in the present stage of my design; nor is any person in India acquainted with them, excepting Vice-Admiral Rainier and my brother Colonel Wellesley, who will be employed, if I should determine to carry my plan into effect. The subordinate governments of India will not be apprized of my views, unless an armament should hereafter depart for the Mauritius from Trincomalé, where I am now assembling a large force, as a central position for the general naval and military defence of this empire. This force will eventually be applicable to various objects, according to the change of circumstances and events. One of these objects may be the reduction of the Isle of France, which I know to have been in a state absolutely defenceless in the month of August.

Your Excellency, I am persuaded, will not suffer this most secret and confidential communication to transpire beyond

your own breast, and I am satisfied that you will contribute every effort of your talents, experience, and public zeal to aid my views, if it should appear to me expedient to prosecute the undertaking to which I have referred in this despatch.

Vague surmises and conjectures will always arise in the public mind, whenever any military or naval preparation shall appear to occupy the attention of Government, and possibly such may reach your Excellency with regard to the present armament in India; but you may be assured that its real objects are only known to those whom I have named, and are precisely such as I have intimated.

I have the honour to be,
with great respect and consideration,
Sir, your Excellency's most obedient
and faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.

Note—enclosed in the above letter, to his Excellency Sir Roger Curtis :

Two frigates, or a ship of the Line, to cruize off Port Bourbon between the latitude of 21° and 20° 50'.

Two frigates, or a ship of the Line and one frigate, to cruize off Port Louis, by no means to the westward of the Port.

No. CI.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, 25th October, 1800.

The despatches of the *Princess Mary* were finally closed on the 6th instant, and that vessel was on the point of sailing when the appearance of the enemy's privateers at the mouth of the river rendered it necessary to postpone her departure until a vessel could be armed to afford convoy to her and to the *Anna*.

The detention of the packet enables me to inform you that on the 15th instant I received the most alarming accounts from Bussorah and Constantinople of the progress of the French both in Egypt and on the Continent of Europe.

The impression made on mind by these accounts, and the measures which I have adopted in consequence of this unfavourable change in the state of affairs will appear in the enclosed copies of my despatches to Vice-Admiral Rainier, Rear-Admiral Blankett, Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Curtis, and Sir George Yonge.* It would occasion considerable detention of the packet were I to delay her departure until I could add to these documents copies of the instructions which I have despatched to the Governments of Fort St. George, Bombay, and Ceylon, in consequence of the plan of measures which I have framed with a view to meet the approaching exigency. The tenor of my letters to Vice-Admiral Rainier will afford you a sufficiently accurate knowledge of the general scope of those instructions.

The most pressing object of the present despatch is to impress you with the urgent and indispensable necessity of augmenting, without an hour's delay, our European force in India to the extent demanded by the situation of this Empire.

In my letter of the 13th of July, 1800,† I represented to you, in the most urgent and anxious terms, the perilous weakness of the European force in India, and I earnestly entreated you to complete it with all practicable expedition, to the extent of twenty-five efficient regiments of infantry, and eight regiments of dragoons. If the war between Great Britain and France should continue, the late events in Europe and Egypt sufficiently indicate that the theatre of action will be transferred to India and Egypt; the necessity, therefore, of an early augmentation of the European army, in India to the extent proposed in my despatch of the 13th of July is not only become more urgent, but the increased probability of an active war in this quarter of the globe requires an augmentation beyond the amount proposed in that despatch.

My immediate wish is, that you should complete the corps in India to the strength proposed in my despatch of the 13th of July, without delay, and at the same time that you should

* The letters to Admiral Rainier and Curtis, and to Sir G. Yonge will convey the views detailed in the other letters mentioned by the Governor-General.—ED.

† See p. 361.

embark for the Cape of Good Hope as large a reinforcement as possible, instructing the Government of the Cape to comply promptly with every requisition which I may at any time make for troops from that Colony.

You will recollect that in the event of my succeeding during the ensuing months of January or May, in my design against the Mauritius, a considerable body of Europeans will be required to garrison that island. Such a deduction from the European force necessary for the protection of our Indian Empire has not entered into any of the estimates which I have hitherto formed on this subject; and consequently the reinforcements to be sent to India should be calculated with a view to the probable additional demand of a strong garrison for the Isle of France, and of another for Batavia since the reduction of Batavia would necessarily follow that of Mauritius. The garrison of Mauritius ought not to be less than two thousand Europeans, nor that of Batavia than one thousand.

An early and extensive augmentation both of our naval and military force in India is further necessary with a view to the conquest of the Philippine Islands, which certainly ought to be undertaken with the least possible delay, especially if the theatre of the war should be likely to be transferred from Europe to this quarter of the globe. France is reported to have opened a negotiation with Spain a few years past, for the exchange of the Philippine Islands, and it may be reasonably supposed that she has not relinquished her views upon those valuable possessions, which, in the hands of the French, would prove the destruction of our trade with China. But even if this object should not be entertained, our naval force requires immediate augmentation, especially in the department of frigates. Without a considerable increase of the number of our frigates, the protection of the trade of India against privateers, or rather pirates, will become impracticable. The reduction of Mauritius would indeed destroy the present resort and haunt of the most formidable force of piracy in these seas; but other stations might possibly be substituted by the indefatigable activity and enterprize of French, American, Danish and Irish adventurers. The capture of the *Kent* will, I trust, induce Lord Spencer to condescend to pay some attention to my urgent entreaty, stated in a

letter written to him soon after my arrival in India. In that letter I declared my opinion, that an insult offered to the British flag at the mouth of the Ganges ought not to be felt with less indignation than an insult offered at the mouth of the Thames. In this sentiment I know you will concur with me, but unless you act upon it with resolution and system, the audacity of the enemy will increase in the Indian Seas, the confidence of our native subjects in our naval superiority will be extinguished, and the trade, both of individuals and of the Company, will be materially interrupted, if not seriously injured.

Believe me, my dear Sir,

your's, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, 26th October, 1800.

I have the pleasure to congratulate you on the final conclusion of my treaty with the Nizam, of which the substance has already been communicated to you. A copy of the treaty is forwarded from Captain Kirkpatrick overland, by this despatch, to the Secret Committee. The treaty does not seem to require much explanation; but I shall soon transmit a full discussion of its principles and objects. The boundaries of our empire in the Peninsula are now, the Tumbuddra, the Kistna, and the Sea. I must repeat in the most earnest manner, my anxious recommendation of Captain Kirkpatrick for some distinguished mark of his Majesty's favour.

WELLESLEY.

No. CIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Fort William, November 5th, 1800.

The enclosed copies of my despatches to Vice-Admiral Rainier, and to Sir Roger Curtis* will afford you a general

* See pages 399, 406.

view of the nature of the command to which I have appointed you; as well as of the various objects to which the force to be assembled at Trincomalé may be applicable, according to the state of circumstances and events towards the close of the month of December.

In order to assist you in the consideration of these despatches, I will, in this place, shortly recapitulate the general purport of my orders and intentions.

First, In consequence of the state of the war in Europe, and of the strength of the French power in Egypt, I have determined to suspend the intended expedition against Batavia.

Secondly, I have ordered the force noted in the margin,* to assemble at Trincomalé, where I trust it will be collected by the middle of December, and I have desired the Admiral to repair to the same station with the strength of his squadron.

Thirdly, This force is to be applied to either of the following objects if required.

To proceed up the Red Sea, in order to co-operate with the British force, which may be employed in Egypt from the side of the Mediterranean.

To proceed to any point which the French may menace in India, especially on the western side of the Peninsula. The Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, are ordered to hold in readiness whatever troops they can spare, to act in concert with the force assembled at Trincomalé, either in Egypt or in any part of India, and the forces holden in readiness at each of those Presidencies respectively, will be subject to your command, and will repair to such position, as you may eventually point out with a view to either of the stated objects.

Fourthly, Intelligence which I have received has satisfied me, that a blow might now be struck with every prospect of success against the Isle of France. If the state of my accounts from Europe and Egypt should leave me at liberty to make such an attempt at the close of the month of December,

* The King's 10th, 19th, and 80th, regiments of foot. Bengal volunteers, 1 battalion consisting of 1000 firelocks. Artillery from Bengal 38 Europeans (exclusive of commanding officers) and 46 Golandauzes. The remaining proportion of artillery to be furnished from Ceylon.

my anxious wish is, that you should proceed on, or about the 25th of December, from Trincomalé directly to the Isle of France, and carry into execution the plan contained in the papers enclosed in my letter B of this date,* provided you and the Admiral, after full consideration, should judge the plan to be practicable, with the means which I can enable you to command, and within the period of the season stated in the plan.

The enclosure of this letter, and of my letter B of this date, contain such ample details as to require no farther explanation from me; you will meet the Admiral and Mr. Stokes at Trincomalé; in the meanwhile I shall furnish you with such information as I possess respecting the expedition formerly projected against the Isle of France, directing your attention to the various changes of circumstances which appear to me to favour the plan of Mr. Stokes; and also stating such observations as occur to me on the general principles of that plan. The particular details of the project involve many questions purely naval or military, on which the Admiral and you must be more competent to decide.

It is necessary to apprise you, that I have observed the strictest secrecy with regard to my views against the Isle of France. I have not communicated them even to Lord Clive. If I should judge it advisable to disclose them to him, I will give you timely notice.

Ever my dear Arthur,

Yours most affectionately,

WELLESLEY.

No. CIV.

From Lord Elgin to the Marquess Wellesley.

Constantinople, November 11th, 1800.

MY DEAR LORD, [Received 20th February, 1801.]

At the moment of my Brother's setting out, a messenger from England has brought me the communication of government having ordered Sir R. Abercrombie, and Lord Keith, to undertake seriously the conquest of Egypt. I have ex-

* They are very voluminous, and as the expedition did not take place during Lord Wellesley's government, their insertion is not absolutely requisite.

tracted for you, the substance of the principal paper sent me. And most sincerely do I now trust you may have executed your plan of sending a force into the Red Sea, the co-operation of which will be so beneficial to the operations from the Mediterranean.

Believe me, ever, in great haste,
My dear Lord,
Yours most faithfully,
ELGIN.

Extracted from an Extract of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Sir Ralph Abercrombie, October, 1800.

Sir Ralph Abercrombie is ordered (in concert with the commanding naval officer at Gibraltar) to complete all the troop ships, and coppered transports, for the purpose of conveying 15000 infantry to the Coast of Egypt.

He is to make the best of his way up the Mediterranean, and proceed to such port as shall be named the rendezvous, either on the Coast of Syria, Cyprus, Rhodes, or Candia, to procure refreshments, and to concert on the plans of operation with such officers as the Porte may appoint for that service.

The first material point appears to be the reduction of Alexandria, and the occupation of the other ports of Egypt on the Mediterranean.

Supposing these posts secured, it is thought expedient that he should move forward into the country, and open a passage for such forces as the Turks may wish to send that way, to co-operate with their main body in Syria. This is to be determined by Sir R. Abercrombie's more accurate knowledge of the country.

As the French soldiers are supposed to wish to return home, Alexandria is to be summoned, and an offer made to the garrison to return to France, on condition of not serving till exchanged. The same offer is to be made to the French Commander-in-Chief as soon as the Coast is secured; and in case he refuses, it is to be made as public as possible to the enemy's troops.

As it is known that the French Government has sent positive orders to the Commander-in-Chief to maintain himself in Egypt; in order to ensure the success of this British force, 5,000 men are ordered to co-operate from India, and to possess themselves of the French posts on the Red Sea.

(*Enclosure to Lord Elgin's Letter, 11th November, 1800.*)

Mr. Wickham to the Right Hon. Lord Grenville.

MY LORD,

CREMS-MUNSTER, 13th November, 1800.

I have received certain information from Paris, that an expedition is now preparing at Brest, and nearly ready to sail for the Islands of France and Bourbon.* It is to be composed of several ships of war and frigates, and is to be commanded by Admiral Villaret Joyeuse, and Mr. Magon is to sail with it, who is appointed Governor of these colonies, and Commissary-General for the affairs of India. Both are furnished with their commissions, and I am given to understand that they are detained only on account of the want of money, necessary for the carrying such an enterprize into effect, and the difficulty and danger of clearing the Bay of Biscay, in the present station of the British fleets.

I have not been able to learn the extent of the force to be sent out, but I am inclined to think, that it is intended to be considerable.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WILLIAM WICKHAM.

No. CV.

The Marquess Wellesley to The Hon. Frederick North.

MY DEAR NORTH,

FORT WILLIAM, November 28th, 1800.

I have this moment received your official despatch of the 22nd October, and I lose not a moment in acknowledging it in this private form, for the purpose of urging you in the most earnest manner, to avoid by all possible means, any rupture with the Court of Candy. You will perceive by my late communication to you, the great importance, and indeed absolute necessity, of our guarding against every circumstance which may in any degree tend to embarrass the general measures of defence, which are of such indispensable urgency in the present exigency; I wish you, therefore, for the present, to suspend all your views at Candy, and to look to no other object than the speedy completion of the armament ordered to assemble at Trincomaleé.

I am, &c.

WELLESLEY.

* The Marquess Wellesley had not of course received this intelligence when he stated to Admirals Rainier and Curtis [see p. 399.] his views respecting the intentions of the enemy.—ED.

No. CVI.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 1st December, 1800.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship, a copy of a letter from Sir Sidney Smith, to Mr. Manesty, dated the 12th of September, and extract of a letter from Mr. Tooke, the agent of the Company at Constantinople, to Mr. Harford Jones, dated the 18th of September, enclosing copy of a letter from Lord Minto to Mr. Tooke, dated the 2nd of September, 1800.

These advices were brought by an overland despatch, which reached Fort William this morning, and although they may have been forwarded to your Lordship from Bombay, I think it advisable to transmit copies of them by this despatch.

The intelligence contained in these advices, affords every ground of belief, that a renewal of hostilities between the Emperor of Germany, and the French Government has taken place; while on the other hand it appears probable, that during the continuance of the renewed war, the Emperor of Germany may have opened negotiations for a peace, on terms to which Great Britain cannot accede. These circumstances added to the state of the French power in Egypt, demand with additional urgency the execution of the measure communicated to your Lordship in my late despatches.

But the event to which I particularly desire to call your Lordship's attention, is the capture of the two Danish frigates as stated in Lord Minto's letter, which under all the circumstances of the case, appears to me to indicate a probability of an early rupture between England and Denmark. In the event of hostilities taking place, it will be of the greatest importance that we should be prepared to act with promptitude and effect against the Danish power in India.

With a view to this event, I request that your Lordship will be pleased to take with all practicable secrecy, such measures as may appear to you best calculated to enable you to possess yourself of the Danish settlement of Tranquebar, at the first moment after you shall have received authentic ad-

vices from Europe of a rupture with Denmark, and in such a case, I request your Lordship to act instantaneously without waiting for any reference to me.

In the interval, it would be advisable as soon as possible, to carry into effect the measure which your Lordship knows to have been long in contemplation of establishing a resident at Tranquebar, for the purpose of observing the motions and intrigues of the French and Danes. I request your Lordship to select a proper person for that purpose, and to furnish him with credentials; referring to my authority, as well as to that of your Lordship's government, you will direct the resident at Tranquebar to correspond immediately with me, as well as with your Lordship; and you will fix his appointments on such a scale as may appear to your Lordship to be proper.

I also request that your Lordship will immediately transmit a copy of this letter with the papers which accompany it, to Vice-Admiral Rainier, and suggest to his Excellency the importance of directing a vigilant attention to the settlement of Tranquebar, and also of taking such measures as may appear best calculated for defeating any attempts which the numerous ships, and extensive commerce of the Danes in India, may eventually enable that nation to make against the British trade or settlements in the Indian, and the Chinese Seas.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CVII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-Colonel Close, Resident in Mysore.

SIR,

Fort William, December 24th, 1800.

Although I have not troubled you with any letter for some time past, you will easily believe that my attention has constantly been fixed on the affairs of Mysore, and on the prosperity of your administration of the important trust, which I confided to you, upon the conclusion of the subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam. Nearly a year and-a-half has now elapsed since you took charge of your arduous office, and it is with

the utmost degree of satisfaction that I declare every succeeding month to have furnished me with additional proof of the happiness of my choice in selecting you to fill a station, which affords the most ample field for the display of your various talents, and is equal in importance to any station in India, with the single exception of the governments.

The object of this letter is merely to convey to you, the cordial expressions of my approbation and gratitude; the state of affairs in Mysore does not appear to me to call for any particular instruction from me at present. The Dewan, under your direction, seems to pursue the wisest and most benevolent course for the promotion of industry and opulence, the protection of property, and the maintenance of internal tranquillity and order in Mysore. The external security of the northern and north western frontier, has been greatly strengthened by the successful termination of Colonel Wellesley's rapid and brilliant campaign, and by the great accession of territory which we have lately derived from the new and important treaty with the Nizam. Whenever an effectual plan can be pursued in Malabar for the settlement of that country, I trust that the empire subjected to the Government of Fort St. George, will become the rival of this, in revenue and resources of every description.

I sincerely hope that the state of your health (which I have been concerned to hear was lately deranged) may long enable you to assist in forwarding the great work of consolidating and improving our valuable interests in the Peninsula. You may always rely on my most zealous encouragement, and you shall learn the details of my sentiments on all occasions, which may appear to require my assistance and advice.

I have long entertained the hope of being able to visit Mysore, in the month of February, or March next, and to pass the hot season in that pleasant climate. I have not yet abandoned this plan, although my final determination has been delayed by the unaccountable delay in my brother Henry's return from Europe. If I should visit Mysore, my wish would be to pass the hot season between Bangalore and Seringapatam, principally at the former place.

Believe me, dear Sir,
with great regard and respect,
Your most faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.

No. CVIII.

At a General Court of Proprietors, held on the 15th of January, 1801.

The Chairman acquainted the Court, that, the Court of Directors, having had under their consideration the important services rendered to the Company by their present Governor-General, the most noble the Marquess Wellesley, they have resolved, that his Lordship be requested to accept an annuity of £5,000; and which resolution, in conformity to the 19th Section of the 6th Chapter of the Bye Laws, he offers for the approbation of this Court.

The same was read as entered on the proceedings of the Court of Directors of the 10th ultimo, being as follows; viz.

"The Court, taking into consideration the important services rendered to the East India Company by their present Governor-General, the most noble the Marquess Wellesley; the political wisdom and foresight which distinguished his conduct in negotiating and concluding a Treaty with the Soubah of Deccan, whereby a body of 14,000 men, commanded by 124 French officers, was completely disbanded, and the officers made prisoners, thereby removing the cause of great political apprehension, and leaving the army of his Highness at full liberty to act in conjunction with his British allies in the subsequent conquest of Mysore; the zeal and alacrity shewn by his Lordship in proceeding to the coast of Coromandel to forward the equipment of the army, which afterwards effected that glorious achievement, which not only terminated in the destruction of a most implacable enemy, but by which the Company also acquired a very large addition of territorial revenue; the great ability, energy, firmness, and decision displayed by him during the whole of the negotiation with the late Tippoo Sultaun, and the able manner in which the Subsidiary Treaty with the Rajah of Mysore was concluded.

"Resolved, unanimously, that in reward for such eminent services, his Lordship be requested to accept an annuity of £5,000, to issue out of the territorial revenues in India, for the term of twenty years, provided the Company's exclusive

trade shall so long continue, and the territorial revenue shall so long remain in possession of the Company, to commence from the 1st of September, 1798, being the day on which the before mentioned Treaty with the Soubah of Deccan was concluded, and that the same be paid to his Lordship, his Executors, Administrators or Assigns, for the term aforesaid."

The Court taking into consideration the foregoing resolution of the Court of Directors,

It was moved, and on the question being put,

Resolved, that this Court entirely coincide with the sentiments of the Court of Directors as expressed in their resolution now under consideration, bearing date the 10th ultimo, and agree to the proposition therein contained, as a proper testimony of the high sense they entertain of the extraordinary merits and most eminent services rendered by the most noble the Marquess Wellesley to this Company.

No. CIX.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lt.-Col. William Scott, Resident at Lucknow.

SIR,

Fort William, January 22nd, 1801.

1. Having reviewed the series of your correspondence since the commencement of the reform of his Excellency the Vizier's military establishments, my attention has been particularly directed to the declaration made by his Excellency in his letter to you of the 29th of Jummad us Sani, relative to a probability of a failure on his Excellency's part, in providing the necessary funds for the regular payment of the additional troops furnished within the last year for the defence of his Excellency's dominions.

2. If the alarming crisis be now approaching in which his Excellency can no longer fulfil his public engagements to the Company, this calamity must be imputed principally to his Excellency's neglect of my repeated advice and earnest representations. The course of your correspondence manifests that the exertion of his Excellency in the reform of his

own useless, dangerous, and expensive military establishments, especially of his cavalry, has by no means kept pace with my efforts, to place the security of his Excellency's person and government beyond the reach of foreign and domestic danger. The augmented charges arising from the additional British force specified in the despatch to you from the Secretary in the Secret Department of the 5th of November, 1799, would have been amply provided for by the amount of the reductions which might have been effected in his Excellency's establishment, if his Excellency had vigorously and cordially co-operated with me in the salutary and economical measure of disbanding his own undisciplined, licentious, and disaffected troops.

3. I am perfectly satisfied that every exertion has been employed by you to accelerate the execution of my orders, and that his Excellency's systematic counteraction is the sole cause of the delays which have arisen; his Excellency having, to my knowledge, used every means within his power to frustrate the progress of a reform which he himself had invited, and which he had declared to be indispensable to the security of his person, and to the prosperity of his dominions.

4. The natural consequences of such a policy on the part of the Vizier are now necessarily felt by his Excellency; and it is now become the duty of the British Government to interpose effectually for the protection of his interests, as well as those of the Company, which are menaced with common and speedy destruction by the rapid decline of the general resources of his Excellency's dominions.

5. The Vizier is already apprized that I have long lamented the various defects of the system by which the affairs of his Excellency's Government are administered. Conscious of the same defects, his Excellency has repeatedly expressed a wish to correct them by the assistance of the British Government. I have never been indifferent to his Excellency's wishes on this subject, or insensible of the urgent necessity of an effectual change in the administration of the affairs of Oude; but circumstances, well known to you, have hitherto prevented me from executing all the dictates of my duty with respect to that distressed country, and have compelled me to limit my efforts to a partial reform of his Excellency's military

establishments ; providing for the security of his Excellency's dominions and government to the extent of furnishing an efficient and respectable force for their defence and support, and of commencing a proportionate reduction in his Excellency's military establishments.

6. It was always evident that these precautions must prove fruitless if the defects in the civil administration of Oude should be suffered progressively to impair the fundamental resources of the state. The continuance of the present system for a much longer period of time will not only render his Excellency unable to discharge the subsidy on account of the additional troops, but will exhaust the resources of the country to such a degree as to preclude the possibility of realizing the former subsidy.

7. The causes of this increasing defalcation of revenue are manifest, and daily acquire new strength. Had the territories of Oude been subject to the frequent or occasional devastations of an enemy, had they been visited by unfavourable seasons, or by other calamities which impair the public prosperity, the rapid decline of the Vizier's revenues might be imputed to other causes than a defective administration ; but no such calamitous visitations have afflicted the province of Oude, while, in consequence of the protection which it derives from the presence of the British forces, it has been maintained, together with all the Company's possessions on this side of India in the uninterrupted enjoyment of peace. A defective administration of the government is, therefore, the only cause which can have produced so marked a difference between the state of his Excellency's dominions and that of the contiguous territories of the Company. While the territories of the Company have been advancing progressively during the last ten years in prosperity, population, and opulence, the dominions of the Vizier, although enjoying equal advantages of tranquillity and security, have rapidly and progressively declined.

8. The operation of these evils has not commenced with the government of Saadut Ali ; they necessarily flow from the system of administration which existed at the period of his Excellency's accession to the Musnud. But none of these evils have been diminished under his Excellency's govern-

ment; on the contrary, their daily increase and aggravation are notorious, and must be progressive, to the utter ruin of the resources of Oude, unless the vicious system of the native administration of the country be immediately abandoned. In place of inveterate and growing abuses must be substituted a wise and benevolent plan of government, calculated to inspire the people with confidence in the security of property and of life; to encourage industry; to protect the fruits of honest labour; and to establish order and submission to the just authority of the State, on the solid foundations of gratitude for benefits received, and expectation of continual security.

9. The Vizier must now be prepared for the active and decided interference of the British Government in the affairs of his country. His Excellency has repeatedly complained to me, and to the British Resident at his Court, of the ruinous condition of the internal government of Oude; he has repeatedly and earnestly solicited my direct interference, and has declared such interference to be indispensably necessary for the purpose of effecting a complete reform in his affairs. In the month of November, 1799, his Excellency was so convinced of the incurable defects of his government and of his own utter inability to administer it, that he signified to me, in the most formal manner, his deliberate determination to descend from the Musnud, and to return into private life. He solemnly avowed (not in a moment of temporary anxiety and vexation, but after the most deliberate reflection) "that his mind was utterly withdrawn from the government of a people who were neither pleased with him nor he with them, and with whose evil dispositions, enmity, disobedience, and negligence he was completely disgusted. This resolution, so deliberately adopted, was suddenly abandoned, but the cause of so sudden a change in his Excellency's resolution cannot, unfortunately, be traced to any improvement in the general administration of his affairs, to any augmentation of his means of conducting the Government, or to the consequent establishment of reciprocal confidence and attachment between his Excellency and his people. Could any other fact be alleged to favour such an inference it would be totally precluded by his Excellency's recent statement of the condition of his revenues, and by recent and aggravated symptoms

of the most alarming disaffection towards his person and government.

10. His Excellency's life has been lately attempted under circumstances of the most formidable description. Active and general support has been afforded by his subjects to the impostor who lately assumed the name of Vizier Ali; and the acknowledged temper of his Excellency's people, combined with the state of his government, exposes his situation every hour to increased anxiety, embarrassment, and hazard.

11. Having maturely considered these circumstances with the attention and deliberation which the importance of the subject requires, I am satisfied that no effectual security can be provided against the ruin of the province of Oude, until the exclusive management of the civil and military government of that country shall be transferred to the Company, under suitable provisions for the maintenance of his Excellency and of his family. No other remedy can effect any considerable improvement in the resources of the state, or can ultimately secure its external safety and internal peace.

12. Under this conviction, and with a view to the preservation of the common interests of the Company and of the Vizier, I have determined to propose to his Excellency a new treaty and arrangement similar to that concluded in November, 1799, between the Company and his Highness the Rajah of Tanjore; and also conformable to the plan of the treaty proposed to his Excellency by me, in my letter of the 9th of February, 1800, at the period of his Excellency's proposed abdication of the Government. A copy of the treaty with the Rajah of Tanjore is enclosed; I desire that you will frame from the articles of that treaty, and from the treaty submitted to the Vizier in the month of December, 1799, the plan of such an arrangement, as, while it shall effectually secure all the political benefits described in the eighth paragraph of this despatch, shall also consult, as far as may be compatible with that primary object, the inclinations and prejudices of the Vizier. Having framed such a treaty, you will submit it to his Excellency, and at the same time you will earnestly exhort him to consider the propositions contained in the new arrangement with calm and dispassionate deliberation.

13. If his Excellency should manifest a disposition to adopt the general frame of the proposed arrangement, but should appear desirous of introducing any particular modifications into the proposed treaty, you will receive whatever propositions his Excellency may offer for that purpose, and you will communicate them to me without delay, adding such observations as may occur to you for my further information.

14. On the other hand, if his Excellency should unfortunately be persuaded by the interested councils of evil advisers absolutely to reject the proposed treaty, you will then proceed to inform his Excellency in firm, but respectful language, that the funds for the regular payment of the subsidy to the full extent of the augmented force must be placed, without a moment of delay, beyond the hazard of failure.

15. For this purpose you will require his Excellency to make a cession to the Company in perpetual sovereignty of such a portion of his territories as shall be fully adequate, in their present impoverished condition, to defray those indispensable charges. This cession must be framed upon the same principle which has formed the basis of the late treaty between his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Company, by which his Highness has ceded to the Company in full sovereignty, a country rated at the annual revenue of sixty-two lacs of rupees in commutation for a subsidy of about forty lacs of rupees.

16. With respect to the countries to be ceded, it is sufficiently evident that no other portion of the Vizier's dominions possesses so many political advantages as would be derived to the Company from the possession of the Doab. The cession of that province, including the tribute from Furruckabad, must therefore be required in the first instance. In selecting the other districts which may be necessary (after deducting the charges of collection) to complete the amount of the augmented subsidy it will be advisable to regulate the demand in such a manner as shall place the Vizier beyond the reach of foreign connections and foreign dangers. For this purpose the new possessions of the Company should be so arranged as to surround whatever territory may remain to his Excellency. With this view, the country to be required, in addition to the Doab, must be Rohilcund. The cession of

these two provinces may be made with less violence to the pride and prejudices of the Vizier, inasmuch as they were actually added to the possessions of his family by the British arms. In this respect the arrangement proposed to the Vizier is similar to that concluded with the Nizam. The greater part of the countries ceded to the Company by the Nizam having been originally acquired from the power of Mysore by the assistance of the Company.

17. If the present produce of these two provinces, after deducting the charges of collection, should be deemed unequal to the amount of subsidy to be defrayed, the deficiency must be sought in the countries bordering on the district of Juanpoor; and for this purpose either Azimghur or Goruckpoor, or both, must be required.

18. Under such an arrangement, the territories which would remain to the Vizier would probably be sufficiently protected by the position which the Company's troops would necessarily occupy for the defence of the ceded countries; and no division of military force would be required for the express purpose of protecting the Vizier's territory. The continuance, however, of a regiment of native infantry at Lucknow might be expedient as a protection to the person of the Vizier, and a security for the peace of the City. If at any time the state of his Excellency's remaining territories should require the presence of any part of the British force, you would be empowered to issue the requisite orders for that purpose.

19. If the Vizier should manifest a disposition to accede to the first proposal, contained in the eleventh paragraph of this despatch, the transfer of the government will be considerably facilitated by the early adoption of effectual measures for the purpose of conciliating the minds of all persons whose interests or personal consideration may be affected by the dissolution of the existing government. With this view, it will be proper that suitable stipends or pensions should be settled on the principal nobles and officers at present dependent on the Court of Lucknow, as well as on all military officers of rank and particularly on those of the cavalry, who may lose their employments in consequence of the change of government, or of the reduction of the actual military establishments of

Oude. Accordingly you will state for my information and ultimate orders your sentiments with regard to the persons for whom it may be expedient and just to provide; and you will suggest the amount and mode of the provision to be made for the several classes or descriptions of claimants. In the meanwhile, if the state of the negotiation with the Vizier for the relinquishment of the civil and military administration of his dominions, according to the plan of the Treaty of Tanjore, should require your attention to the object of providing for individuals before you can receive any detailed instructions from me on the subject, you will promulgate, in the most distinct manner, such general and particular assurances, in the name of the British Government, as shall appear to you calculated to tranquillize the minds of those affected by the change of the administration.

20th. In considering the measures to be adopted with the views stated in the preceding paragraph, it will occur to you that no proceeding can be more calculated to conciliate all descriptions and classes of people, than a liberal attention to the religious establishments and charitable foundations of the country. I accordingly authorize you in the case supposed to take the necessary steps for affording to the people of Oude the most ample satisfaction on this subject; and I desire that you will furnish me with a statement of such public endowments, of both the Hindoo and Mahomedan religion as you may propose to confirm or to extend.

I am, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CX.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Vizier of Oude.

Fort William, January 22nd, 1801.

Lieut.-Colonel Scott has furnished me with copies of the letters, and with a report of the different conferences which have lately passed between your Excellency and him on the subject of the subsidy payable by your Excellency, on account

of the additional British troops, of which you have recently received the aid, for the protection of your Excellency's dominions, in conformity to the Treaty of 1798, and to my letter addressed to your Excellency on the 5th of November, 1799.

Your Excellency has distinctly and repeatedly admitted the existence of those dangers, which I have endeavoured to remove by a seasonable augmentation of the efficient military strength of Oude; and I have already demonstrated the right and duty of the British Government to secure the external defence and internal tranquillity of your Excellency's dominions by such an augmentation.

I have also proved the obligation to which your Excellency is subject, by treaty, of providing the necessary funds for the punctual discharge of the expense incident to the augmented force; and your Excellency has not contested the justice or necessity of the motives and principles which have regulated my proceedings on this occasion.

But although your Excellency has not controverted any of the principles on which this important measure has been founded, I observe, with infinite concern, that you have suggested the probability of a failure on your part in providing the necessary funds for the regular payment of the additional troops furnished within the last year for the defence of your Excellency's dominions.

If the alarming crisis be now approaching, in which your Excellency can no longer fulfil your public engagements to the Company, it will be matter of additional regret to me that your Excellency's neglect of my repeated advice will prove the principal cause of your distress: your Excellency's exertion in the reform of your own useless, dangerous, and expensive military establishments, especially of your cavalry, unfortunately has not kept pace with my efforts to place the security of your Excellency's person and government beyond the reach of every danger, foreign and domestic. The augmented charges arising from the additional British force specified in my letter to your Excellency of the 5th of November, 1799, would have been in a great degree provided for by the amount of the reductions which might have been effected in your own establishment, if your Excellency had vigorously and cordially co-operated with me in the salutary and econo-

mical measure of disbanding your own undisciplined, licentious, and disaffected troops.

Your Excellency, however, having pursued a course entirely opposite to your interests and to my advice, by counteracting, to the utmost of your power, the progress of a reform which you had declared to be indispensable, the natural consequences of such a policy are now necessarily felt by you, and it is now become my duty to interpose effectually for the protection of your interests as well as those of the Company. But in reviewing the actual state of your affairs your Excellency has now publicly admitted the existence of additional evils of the utmost magnitude and of the most alarming tendency.

It appears by your Excellency's statements, not only that you are embarrassed by the continuance of the charge of a large portion of your own troops, but that the general resources of your dominions actually decline with a rapidity menacing the joint interests of your Excellency and of the Company in the province of Oude with utter and speedy destruction.

Your Excellency is already apprised that I have lamented the various defects of the system by which the affairs of your Government are administered. Conscious of the same defects, your Excellency has repeatedly expressed a wish for the advice and assistance of the British Government in correcting them. I have never been indifferent to your Excellency's wishes on this subject; or insensible of the urgent necessity of an effectual change in the administration of the affairs of Oude. Circumstances, sufficiently known to your Excellency, have hitherto prevented me from executing all the dictates of my duty with respect to that distressed country; I have hitherto been compelled to limit my efforts to a partial reform of your Excellency's military establishments; providing for the security of your Excellency's dominions and government to the extent of furnishing an efficient and respectable military force for their defence and support, and of commencing a proportionate reduction in your Excellency's military establishments.

It was always evident that these precautions must prove fruitless if the defects of the civil administration of Oude should be suffered progressively to impair the fundamental

resources of the state. The continuance of the present system for a longer period will not only render your Excellency unable to discharge the subsidy on account of the additional troops; but the resources of your Excellency's country would be exhausted to such a degree as to preclude the possibility of your discharging the former subsidy.

Your Excellency has observed that the difficulty with which the collections are made is no secret. This alarming fact has never been a secret to me. I am equally well apprized that these difficulties are experienced not only with aumils* long established in the country, but that every settlement with a new aumil is concluded for a diminished jumma.† The causes of this increasing defalcation of revenue are equally notorious, and daily acquire new strength. Had your Excellency's territories been subject to the frequent or occasional devastations of an enemy—had they been visited by unfavourable seasons, or by other calamities which impair the public prosperity, the rapid decline of your revenues might be imputable to other causes than evil administration; but, under the favour of Providence, no such visitations have afflicted the province of Oude, while the powerful protection of the British forces has maintained your Excellency's dominions, together with all the Company's possessions in this quarter of India, secure from the ravages of war, in the enjoyment of undisturbed tranquillity and peace. What other cause, than evil administration, can have produced so marked a difference between the state of your Excellency's dominions and that of the contiguous territories of the Company? While the Company's territories have been advancing progressively during the last ten years in prosperity, population, and opulence; your Excellency's dominions, enjoying equal advantages of tranquillity and security, with the possessions of the Company, have rapidly and progressively declined. The operation of these evils did not indeed commence with your Excellency's Government. They necessarily flow from the system of administration which existed at the period of your Excellency's accession to the Musnud.‡ But none of these

* Superintendants and collectors of the revenue of districts or provinces.

† Assessment.

‡ Throne.

have diminished under your Excellency's Government; their daily increase and aggravation is evident to the whole world, acknowledged by yourself, and must be progressive to the utter ruin of the resources of Oude, unless the vicious system of Government be immediately abandoned.

In place of inveterate and growing abuses must be substituted a wise and benevolent plan of government, calculated to inspire your Excellency's subjects with confidence in the security of property and of life; to encourage industry, to protect the fruits of honest labour, and to establish order and submission to the just authority of the State on the solid foundations of gratitude for benefits received, and expectation of continual security. I must again remind your Excellency that you have repeatedly complained to me and to the Resident of the ruinous condition of your internal Government; you have repeatedly and earnestly solicited my direct interference, and you have declared it to be indispensably necessary for the purpose of effecting a complete reform in your affairs.

In August 1798, your Excellency informed me that the frame of your Government which had for a long "period of time been *very loose and confused*," was become in the "last degree" ineffective and "irregular;" adding a request that I would instruct the Company's Resident at Lucknow to afford your Excellency his effectual aid in establishing your authority "on a new basis."

In June 1799 you repeated to me, by letter, the assurances of your anxiety "to establish a systematic settlement of the country, and of the military, for promoting the security and ease of the ryots, the prosperity of the country, and the tranquillity of the people." And you again required that the Resident might be ordered "to assist you in all matters, to the end that you might be thereby enabled to carry on the affairs of your government in a manner to produce ease and satisfaction to your mind."

In the month of November 1799 your Excellency was so convinced of the incurable defects of your Government, and of your own utter inability to administer the affairs of it any longer, that you signified to me in the most formal manner your deliberate determination to descend from the Musnud, and to return into private life. You solemnly avowed, not in

a moment of temporary anxiety and vexation, but after the most deliberate reflection "that your mind was utterly withdrawn from the government of a people who were neither pleased with you, nor you with them; and with whose evil disposition, enmity, disobedience, and negligence you were completely disgusted."

This resolution, adopted with so much deliberation, was suddenly abandoned. I should have rejoiced if the sudden change of your Highness's resolution could have been traced to any improvement in the general administration of your affairs, to any augmentation of your means of conducting the government, and to the consequent establishment of reciprocal confidence and attachment between your Excellency and your people. But this hope is precluded by your Excellency's own recent statement of the condition of your revenues, and by renewed and aggravated symptoms of the most alarming disaffection towards your Excellency's person and government. Your Excellency's life has been lately attempted under circumstances of the most formidable nature; active and general support has been afforded by your subjects to an impostor who recently assumed the name of Vizier Ali, and the acknowledged temper of your people combined with the state of your Government expose your situation every hour to increased hazard, anxiety, and embarrassment.

Having maturely considered the state and condition of Oude with all the attention and deliberation due to the importance of the subject, I am satisfied that no effectual security can be taken against the ruin of that country until your Excellency shall transfer to the exclusive management of the Company the civil and military government of your Excellency's dominions, under such conditions as may effectually secure the affluence and honour of your Excellency and of your illustrious family. I am convinced that no other remedy can materially or permanently improve the resources of the State, or ultimately secure its external safety and internal peace and order. Under the Company's management your subjects would enjoy the rights of property, the honest and vigorous administration of justice, and the security of life; the benefits of a provident and just government now diffused from Bengal to the frontier of Oude, might be extended over that declining country, and the resources of the State would

revive with the vigour of the government, and with the happiness of the people.

Under this conviction, I have communicated to Lieut.-Colonel Scott, in detail, my ideas relative to the measures necessary to be immediately adopted with a view to the preservation of the common interests of your Excellency and of the Company; and I earnestly exhort your Excellency, as you value the happiness and prosperity of your people, the permanent tranquillity of your mind, and your security from the disaffection of a suffering people, to consider the propositions which Lieut.-Colonel Scott will state to you, with calm deliberation.

If your Excellency should be unfortunately persuaded by the interested views of evil advisers to reject the proposals which will be made to you by Lieut.-Colonel Scott, it is my duty to inform your Excellency, that the funds for the regular payment of subsidy, to the full extent of the augmented force, must be placed, without a moment of delay, beyond the hazard of failure. I must, therefore, immediately represent to your Excellency the absolute necessity of making a perpetual cession to the Company of such portion of your Excellency's territories as shall be adequate to defray those indispensable charges.

His Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan has lately ceded to the Company in full sovereignty a country yielding an annual revenue of sixty-two lacs of rupees, in commutation for subsidy. A similar arrangement with your Excellency is absolutely unavoidable, unless you should prefer my first proposition, under any modification, which Lieut.-Colonel Scott may be authorized to make to you for the security, honour, and affluence of your family.

I have furnished Lieut.-Colonel Scott with my instructions relative to the line of territory which it will be desirable that your Excellency should relinquish to the Company in the event of your preferring such an arrangement.

I request your Excellency to be satisfied that the whole course of events in Oude, since your accession, has rendered it my indispensable duty to adhere with firmness to the tenor of this letter, as containing principles from which the British Government never can depart, nor can your Excellency receive, with surprize or concern, a resolution naturally re-

sulting from your own reiterated representations of the confusion of your affairs, and of your inability either to reduce them to order, or to conciliate the alienated affections of your discontented people.

WELLESLEY.

No. CXI.

The Right Hon. Henry Dundas to the Marquess Wellesley.

Downing Street, 6th October, 1800.

MY LORD,

[Received 6th February, 1801.]

By the private letter I received from your Lordship, No. 25, dated the 5th of March* last, and the communications I have since had with Major-General Stuart, I am apprized that the subject of annoying the French army in Egypt, from the Red Sea, has been under your consideration. For that reason, and because I concur in your Lordship's sentiments, as stated in the letter above-mentioned, I feel it the less necessary to enter into any details in this despatch, which cannot indeed be extended to any great length, as it is to be forwarded overland. I shall, therefore, confine myself to shortly stating to your Lordship, that Sir Ralph Abercromby has received his Majesty's orders to proceed up the Mediterranean, and by an attack on Alexandria, and the coast, to co-operate with the Turkish army, assembling in Syria, in whatever plan may be concerted with them for expelling the French from Egypt, and that it is thought expedient that a force should also be sent from India to act in such manner as may appear conducive to that essential object from the side of the Red Sea; with this view, Captain Sir Home Popham, with a proper squadron, will be immediately sent into that Sea, taking with him a regiment from the Cape. His first rendezvous, after leaving that settlement, will be the port of Bombay.

I enclose for your information, the letter I have written to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, on the subject of the expedition under his command, and I am to signify to your Lordship his Majesty's pleasure, that a force of about 1,000 European, and 2,000 native infantry is to be sent from India,

* See p. 225

to the proposed place of rendezvous in the Red Sea, with as little delay as possible, to co-operate with Sir Home Popham, in the object of his instructions. The command of these troops should be given to some active and intelligent officer, and care should be taken that they be furnished with every necessary requisite for such a service. I have thought it right to send a copy of this despatch to the Governments of Madras and Bombay. To the latter it is necessary, because Bombay is the most proper place from whence to send the proposed force; but I have thought it likewise proper to send it to Madras, in case upon a full consideration of the places where the force upon the two coasts is at present stationed, it should appear to that Presidency, expedient to make any new arrangement of any part of the army under their Presidency, in order to enable the Bombay Government to detach the requisite force from their coast, without any real inconvenience to the territories under their own immediate charge.

I have directed those two Presidencies to proceed in making those preparations without delay, and even to carry these orders into execution without waiting for your Lordship's directions if they are ready in other respects.

If nothing unforeseen occurs to prevent or retard it, I hope that the armament under Sir Ralph Abercromby, will reach the coast of Egypt, in the month of December, and that Sir Home Popham may arrive in the Gulph of Arabia, in the month of February. It is, therefore, earnestly recommended, that the forces from India may join them, as soon after as possible; for this reason it will be desirable that you should not wait till the troops are all collected, if it will save time to forward them in two or three distinct detachments.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's
most obedient, humble servant,

HENRY DUNDAS.

(Enclosure in the foregoing Letter.)

To the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

MY LORDS,

Downing Street, 6th October, 1800.

It being judged expedient, that measures should forthwith be taken for dispossessing the French of Cosheir, Suez, and any other ports and places they may now occupy upon the coast of the Red Sea, and to encourage the inhabitants of the countries bordering on that part of Egypt, to assist in expelling them from the whole of that province. I am commanded to signify to your Lordships, his Majesty's pleasure that a ship of war, of not less than fifty guns, together with such armed troop-ships, as may be competent to the accommodation and conveyance of a regiment of not less than 800 men destined to assist in this service, are forthwith to be fitted for foreign service and sent to the Cape, where the said regiment is to be embarked.

It will also be necessary that the troop-ships in question, should in the first instance, convey another regiment, amounting to at least the same number of men from this country to the Cape; and it is, therefore, his Majesty's pleasure that your Lordships should give directions, and make the necessary arrangements accordingly,

Your Lordships will not fail to select for this service, an officer of acknowledged enterprize and ability. And with respect to the instructions with which he is to be furnished from your Lordships, it is his Majesty's pleasure, that after receiving on board the regiment, which the commanding officer at the Cape will be ordered to embark, he should be directed to make the best of his way into the Red Sea; and on his arrival there, to endeavour to procure intelligence respecting the number of the enemy at Coshier and Suez, and the state of defence of each of those places. Should the reports he may receive on these points be such as, in his judgment, and that of the officer commanding the land forces, to warrant an immediate landing and attack on one or both of these places, no time is to be lost in making the attempt, and should it prove successful, they are to make the best arrangements in their power for retaining possession of the same. As soon as in this, or in any other manner, a secure footing shall have been obtained in the country, or sooner if possible, every proper method is to be used to conciliate the inhabitants to our interests, and to induce them to make a common cause with us against the enemy. In order to enable them to do this with more effect, it will probably be necessary to supply them with arms and ammunition, and I shall, therefore, give orders, that a certain proportion of side-arms, muskets and cartridges, shall be sent on board the ships of the squadron with a view to this object.

Supposing the enemy to be driven from Suez, Coshier, and the whole coast, it will then remain for the respective commanding officers, of the land and sea forces, to take every method in their power for harrassing and annoying them in any other posts they may retain in Upper Egypt, and to prevail upon the Arabs, the Mamelukes and other troops, in that part of the country, to act against the French (wherever they may take post,) with union and vigour, until they can be finally expelled from Cairo, and

the remainder of the province; giving the Beys, or other officers, having command in those countries, such advice and assistance as may appear best adapted for this purpose. Upon this point, as well as upon every other which relates to the mode and detail of proceeding in the execution of the services I have pointed out as the objects of this expedition, much latitude must be left to the discretion and judgment of the commanding officers; and it is therefore impossible for me to do more than point out, as I have already done, the views for the attainment of which the plan has been formed, and to add that they are to be pursued with the utmost vigour, and by every means that may suggest themselves to the ingenuity of the commanding officers, provided only they are not inconsistent with those usages, which are deemed fair and honourable between nations in a state of war.

It is intended that the land forces to be sent from the Cape, should be reinforced as soon as possible, by another regiment of Europeans, and about 2,000 sepoys from India. It will be right, that the commanding naval officer should be apprized of this circumstance, in order that he may suspend until their arrival, the proposed attacks against Coshier and Suez, unless the prospect of success with the regiment from the Cape, is so satisfactory as to warrant the attempt, without waiting for a further reinforcement.

Should this last division of troops on the other hand, find our forces in possession of Suez and Cosheir, they will be employed from thence in making diversions in Upper Egypt, and in annoying and harrassing the enemy, as much as possible in conformity to the suggestions already mentioned in these instructions.

In the event (not impossible) of the French having actually evacuated Egypt, before the arrival of the expedition in the Red Sea, the troops must be carried back to their former station, and the ships in that case, may be disposed of for such other services as your Lordships may think proper; but should Cosheir and Suez be retaken from the enemy, by his Majesty's forces, the one or the other, as may appear most commodious for the troops, and shipping, is for the present, and until further orders can be transmitted from this country, to be retained by a detachment of his Majesty's forces, the commanding officer, however, taking care in order to avoid all jealousies, to have it understood that he remains there, not from any intention of interfering with the right of sovereignty vested in the Ottoman Porte, or with the rights and privileges of the native princes, or their subjects; but that from considerations of military precaution, with a view to our Indian interests, which cannot appear extraordinary after what has happened, the British troops cannot be withdrawn without further authority from home.

Your Lordships will not fail to direct the commanding naval officer, and through him, all other officers serving under him, to maintain and cultivate the friendship and good understanding now existing with the native princes and powers of Asia, having ports or territories upon the coast of the Red Sea.

You will also direct the said officer to transmit a detailed report of his proceedings by every opportunity, for his Majesty's information, and to

correspond with the Company's Governor at Bombay, or with the Governor-General in council, who will give the necessary directions to furnish him with any supplies of which he may stand in need, and to pay every attention to such requisitions as he may make for the advancement of the service on which he is employed.

I am, my Lord,

Your Lordships most obedient
humble servant,

HENRY DUNDAS.

No. CXII.

Lieut.-General Lake, Commander-in-Chief, to the Marquess Wellesley.

Madras, January 29th, 1801.

MY LORD,

[Received 10th February, 1801.]

I have the honour to inform your Lordship of my arrival this day at Madras, and to assure your Lordship, I shall take the earliest opportunity of proceeding to Calcutta, unless I receive your orders to the contrary.

Permit me to acknowledge to your Lordship, how particularly gratified I feel by the very extreme flattering manner you have signified your approbation of my appointment to the high command in this country, and I beg you will believe that in every instance, you shall find me anxiously zealous to attend to your wishes, and carry into effect any service you may think proper to entrust to,

Your Lordship's
most faithful and obedient Servant,
G. LAKE.

No. CXIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Major-General Baird.

SIR,

Fort William, February 10, 1801.

At the moment of closing my instructions of the 5th of February to you respecting the destination of the armament assembled at Trincomalé and Point de Galle, I received, overland, despatches from the right honourable Mr. Dundas, apprizing me that his Majesty had determined to adopt the most active measures for the expulsion of the French from Egypt. I enclose a copy of those despatches, which consist

of a letter addressed to me by Mr. Secretary Dundas, under date the 6th of October, 1800,* and of a letter from Mr. Dundas to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty of the same date.

You will observe, that a force, consisting of fifteen thousand men, under the command of Sir Ralph Abercromby has been ordered to proceed up the Mediterranean Sea for the purpose of co-operating with the Turkish army assembled on the frontier of Syria, with a view of attacking the French in Egypt. The force under the command of Sir Ralph Abercromby was expected to arrive on the coast of Egypt in the month of December last.

You will likewise observe, that his Majesty has been pleased to order that a force be immediately assembled in the Red Sea with the view of dispossessing the French of the ports and places which they occupy on the coasts of that Sea, and of creating a diversion in favour of the combined British and Turkish armies acting on the side of the Mediterranean.

The naval branch of the armament which his Majesty has been pleased to order to be assembled in the Red Sea has been entrusted to Captain Sir Home Popham, who was to be despatched from England in the command of one of his Majesty's ships, accompanied by transports, having on board one of his Majesty's regiments destined to replace one of the regiments at the Cape of Good Hope.

From Mr. Secretary Dundas's letter, it appears, that Sir Home Popham is instructed to proceed from the Cape of Good Hope with a regiment to be drawn from that garrison, directly to Mocha, at which port he was expected by Mr. Dundas to arrive in the course of the present month.

His Majesty has been pleased to signify his pleasure that the remainder of the military force required for the operations in the Red Sea be provided from India; and Mr. Secretary Dundas has desired that this force may consist of one thousand Europeans and two thousand native infantry.

I certainly expected that his Majesty's commands would have reached me at an earlier period of the season; in which

event, the preparations made under my orders at Ceylon, Madras and Bombay, would have enabled me to execute his Majesty's intentions at the most favourable season for the navigation of the Red Sea.

The early preparations made at Ceylon, Madras and Bombay, will enable me even now to move a force towards Egypt within the present season; a movement which would have been utterly impracticable, if timely provision had not been made for the eventual execution of his Majesty's commands.

I have already observed, that Mr. Secretary Dundas appears to have calculated on the arrival of Sir Home Popham at Mocha in the course of the month of February; but it is scarcely possible for that officer to arrive at Mocha before the conclusion of the month of March, or the commencement of April. At that period the passage up the Red Sea, although practicable, is attended with delay and difficulty; and if the force ordered to be despatched from India should wait at Mocha for the arrival of Captain Popham, it is scarcely to be expected that any seasonable or effectual aid could be afforded from the operations of the proposed armament on the shores of the Red Sea, to the British and Turkish forces acting on the side of the Mediterranean.

These considerations, and my conviction that the expulsion of the French from Egypt, is indispensably necessary to the future security of the British empire in India, have determined me to relinquish for the present the projected expeditions against Batavia and the Isle of France; and to employ immediately on the shores of the Red Sea the whole force which I had collected at Trincomalé and Point de Galle, together with 1,600 native infantry, which have been holden in readiness for foreign service at Bombay under my orders of the 23rd of October, 1800. This service was the original destination of the armament at Ceylon, Madras and Bombay; but I always considered the previous assurance of an effectual concert and co-operation from the side of the Mediterranean to be indispensably requisite to justify the employment of any considerable force from India in the Red Sea.

Being now satisfied that a large British army will speedily act from the shores of the Mediterranean, I am resolved not to wait for the arrival of Sir Home Popham, but to apply whatever disposable force I can furnish in anticipating the

object of his Majesty's commands, by making an early and powerful diversion on the shores of the Red Sea.

It is my intention, that the forces destined for the Red Sea shall be commanded in chief by you, and that the Honourable Colonel Wellesley shall be the second in command on that important expedition.

It is proper to apprise you that Rear-Admiral Blankett sailed from Bombay for the Red Sea on the 28th of December last, in consequence of my secret advices.

The Rear-Admiral is accompanied by 240 European infantry (belonging to the 86th regiment,) 50 European artillery, 20 gun lascars, 1 engineer officer, and 100 marine sepoy; the whole under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd. The period for which these troops were victualled has not been stated to me.

Besides the troops specified in the foregoing paragraph, Rear-Admiral Blankett was accompanied from Bombay by the armament noted in the margin.*

The armament under Rear-Admiral Blankett may be expected to produce all the effect of an advanced guard to that which is to proceed under you and Colonel Wellesley; and the early appearance of the Rear-Admiral in the Red Sea must influence the conduct of the French in Egypt.

The force, which is now placed under your command, is noted in the margin.†

You are already apprized, that the corps at Ceylon are in readiness to embark at the shortest notice. You will be able to command tonnage for the embarkation of 1,900 Europeans and 1,000 native sepoy; for the conveyance of the remainder

* One frigate (*Bombay* frigate), two bomb vessels (the *Drake* and *Strombolo*), three small cruisers (*Fly*, *Antelope*, and *Alert*), one armed vessel (*Bombay Merchant*, 450 tons), one store ship (*Adam Smith*), two brigs (*Fortune* and *Friendship*, from one to two hundred tons each,) capable of being converted into fire ships. One launch, fitted as a gun-boat, with a 24-lb. carronade, three ketches (of about 150 tons each), two armed boats (of about 80 tons each.)

† At Ceylon His Majesty's 10th regiment, 1,000 strong, 19th reg. 750 strong, 80th reg. 750 strong; 86 and 88th detachments, 500; total rank and file, 3,000; Bengal native volunteers, 1,000; European and native artillery, about two companies, with Lascars attached. At Bombay, 1,600 native infantry, European artillery, about one company, with draft and carriage bullocks attached.

I rely on his Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier, although, after the junction of the *Candidate*, *Anstruther* and *Cecilia*, I conclude that you will possess ample means of accommodating all the troops, even without his Excellency's assistance, beyond the port of Mocha.

Orders have been despatched to the Government of Bombay to direct the corps of 1,600 native infantry, now in readiness at that Presidency for foreign service, to proceed, with all practicable expedition, from Bombay to Mocha, there to wait the arrival of the armament, from the Island of Ceylon.

You are apprized that the provisions for the European and native troops assembled at Ceylon, including the supplies, proceeding on the *Byramgore*, are sufficient for their subsistence to the end of June or middle of July. The native troops ordered to be embarked from Bombay will be victualled, in the first instance, for six months, which, supposing that division to sail from Bombay on the 1st of March, will subsist them to the end of August. Immediate measures will be taken to complete the supplies of provisions and of all necessary articles for all the troops under your command, to the end of the month of November, and also for the native troops directed to proceed from Bombay.

The first additional supply will proceed from hence in a few days to Trincomalé, in the ship *Candidate*, which will be laden with provisions of every kind for 500 Europeans, for a period of three months, and a proportion (to be hereafter stated) of provisions for the native troops. This ship will soon be followed by the ships *Anstruther* and *Cecilia*, on which will be embarked salt provisions for 3,000 Europeans, for a period of two months and ten days, and of all other articles for three months.

On these three ships are embarked a considerable quantity of the articles noted in the margin.*

The departure of the troops from Ceylon for Mocha, and from thence to the several points on the coasts of the Red Sea, where they may be required to act against the enemy, is not to be delayed for these additional supplies, which will follow you with all possible expedition.

Directions will be sent to the Company's Agent at Mocha

* Potatoes, cheese, and porter.

to furnish you with such supplies of money and provisions, as he may be able to command.

You will, of course, take with you the whole military chest consisting of the supply of treasure already transmitted to Colonel Wellesley, and of that actually on board the *Phœnix*.

I enclose a copy of my letter, of this date, to his Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier, who, I am persuaded, will co-operate cordially with me, on the present occasion, to the fullest extent of his means.

His Excellency will determine on the number and description of his Majesty's ships, which it may be proper to employ on the present service.

In consequence of the deficiency of tonnage assembled at the Island of Ceylon, it will be desirable that his Excellency should receive a proportion of the troops on board of his Majesty's ships, and should convey them to the place of their destination in the Red Sea.

The *Candidate*, a country ship of 670 tons, will proceed from hence in a few days to Trincomalé, in aid of the tonnage, for the conveyance of the troops. The *Anstruther*, of 654 tons, and *Cecilia*, of 478 tons, laden with provisions, and also each capable of conveying about 220 Europeans, will proceed from hence about the middle of February. The period of the departure of these ships will be too late to admit of employing them in the transportation of any proportion of the troops from Ceylon. But if it should be found necessary, they may be applied to this purpose in the Red Sea. These ships, as well as all others which shall be sent in succession, with provisions for your army, whether from this presidency or from any of the other settlements in India, will be directed to repair directly to Mocha, and eventually to Judda, and at either port, to conform to such orders as they shall receive, either from you or from the naval commanding officer.

Immediately upon the receipt of these despatches, you will proceed directly to Ceylon, and from thence you will prosecute your voyage with the utmost practicable expedition to Mocha in the Red Sea, with the whole of the military forces and transports now assembled at Trincomalé and at Point de Galle.

The attainment of the important objects proposed by employing an armament to act on the coasts of the Red Sea will

depend, in a great degree, on the timely arrival of the troops, at their several destinations, on those coasts. In order, therefore, to ensure to the armament a safe and expeditious passage up the Red Sea, the advanced period of the season requires that you should exert every effort to expedite the departure of the armament from Ceylon to Mocha, and from thence to the places of its ulterior destination.

I entertain no doubt that his Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier will afford the aid of the requisite number of his Majesty's ships; but if his Excellency, contrary to my expectation, should either decline to furnish the requisite aid, or should be unable to furnish it instantly on your arrival at Trincomalé, it is my positive order that your departure be not delayed an hour on that account.

To preclude all misunderstanding on this subject, I hereby direct you and Colonel Wellesley, instantly after your arrival at Trincomalé, to proceed to Mocha with such troops as you may be able to accommodate in the ships now engaged or attainable at Ceylon.

If, under these orders, you should be compelled to leave at Ceylon any portion of the troops, hereby placed under your command, you will appoint a proper officer to conduct those troops, after you, to Mocha, with all practicable despatch; but I further order and direct that the officer so appointed do not wait for convoy or other aid from his Excellency the Vice-Admiral, but do proceed to join you at Mocha, without delay, as soon as the transports shall be ready for the conveyance of troops.

If on your arrival at Mocha you should find Sir Home Popham at that port, you will concert with him the operations to be undertaken by your united forces. If Sir Home Popham should not have arrived at Mocha, you will, as soon as possible, proceed to join the squadron of Rear-Admiral Blanckett; and having joined the Rear-Admiral, you will concert the measures proper to be adopted, with a view to the annoyance of the enemy in Egypt, and to the most beneficial co-operation with the forces acting from the Mediterranean.

On your arrival in the Red Sea, you will endeavour to procure intelligence respecting the state of the enemy's force at Suez and at Cosseir; and also respecting the condition of the defences of each of those places; should the reports which you

may receive be such as to warrant (in your judgment, and in that of the officer commanding the sea forces, with which you shall have effected a junction) an immediate landing and attack on one or both of these places, you will immediately make the attempt; and if it should prove successful, you will proceed, in concert with his Majesty's naval officer, to form an arrangement for retaining possession of either or both places, as circumstances may admit.

At the earliest possible period of time you will employ every proper method to conciliate the inhabitants of the coasts of the Red Sea or of Egypt to our interests, and to induce them to make a common cause with us against the enemy. In order to facilitate and strengthen their means of acting with us, it may be necessary to distribute arms and ammunition. His Majesty's Ministers have, therefore, directed a supply of muskets, side arms, and musket ammunition, to be sent on board the ships of Sir Home Popham's squadron, with a view to this object.

With respect, however, to the expediency of arming any considerable number of the natives, you and the officer commanding the naval force will exercise your joint discretion.

If the enemy should be driven from Suez, Cosseir, and the whole coast of the Red Sea, it will then remain for the commanding officers of the land forces to employ every method in their power for the annoyance of the enemy in any other posts which they may retain in Upper Egypt; and to engage the Arabs, the Mamelukes, and other troops in that quarter to act against the French, with union and vigour, until the final expulsion of the French army from Cairo, and from the remainder of the province can be effected, giving the Beys or other officers holding command in those countries, such advice and assistance as may appear best adapted for this purpose.

Although considerable difficulty may at first be experienced in moving your forces into the interior parts of the country, I trust that the strength of the force will effectually secure its safety against any attempts of the enemy. You must draw your supplies of provisions, and even of water, in some positions from the ships, but the whole coast will be under your command. Such part of the force as may be able to move in the country will derive additional security from the support

of the remainder, stationed on the coast; and while the magnitude of the armament must contribute to alarm and distract the enemy, its strength will afford additional confidence to the chiefs and inhabitants of the country, and will render them more desirous to break the French yoke, and to join the British cause.

On these points, as well as on every circumstance relating to the mode and detail of proceeding in the execution of the present service, much latitude must necessarily be left to the discretion of the commanding officers of the sea and land forces. It is impossible for me, at this distance, and in this stage of the plan, to enter into more minute detail. The views of his Majesty's Ministers, in the present expedition, are plainly stated in Mr. Secretary Dundas's despatches. I can only add my confidence that his Majesty's views will be pursued with the utmost vigour, and by every means consistent with the received usages of war.

You will employ the earliest exertions for the purpose of opening a safe and speedy communication with the commanders of his Majesty's naval and military forces intended to be employed against the enemy in Egypt from the side of the Mediterranean. On this subject you will receive information from Rear-Admiral Blankett.

It is possible that, before the arrival of the armament from India in the Red Sea, the French may have been compelled to evacuate Egypt. In this case, or if you should find that the troops from India cannot possibly act with effect on the side of the Red Sea, I desire that your whole force, or such part as you may judge necessary, should be employed with all practicable expedition in the reduction of the Isles of France and Bourbon, or of Batavia; or successively of both places, according as the condition of the armament, at the period of withdrawing from the Red Sea, shall appear to recommend in the judgment of the naval and military officers acting with you on this expedition.

In any of these cases, I direct you to act as Commander-in-Chief, and Colonel Wellesley as second in command. If you should reduce the French Islands, Colonel Wellesley will remain in the government and command of those colonies, and you will either proceed to Batavia, or return with the troops to the most accessible port of India or Ceylon, according to

the season. You will receive from me constant advices of the state and strength both of the French Islands and of Batavia.

Previous to your departure from the Red Sea, in the cases supposed, you will leave sufficient garrisons to retain Suez and Cosseir, or any other port or place in Egypt, or on the coast of the Red Sea, which you and the commander of the naval forces acting with you, may judge it advisable to retain in conformity to the tenor of Mr. Secretary Dundas's despatches herewith enclosed.

Notwithstanding every exertion which can be made by this Government, and by the other Presidencies of India, it may not be practicable to supply you amply and seasonably on the coasts of the Red Sea, with the provisions necessary for the troops under your command. In this case it will be proper that you should exercise your discretion, and if you should find any danger of a deficiency of your supplies, and should receive no certain accounts from India of additional supplies, being in progress to the Red Sea, you will relinquish your situation in that quarter, and you will return to such port of India, as may be most accessible, at the period of your return; leaving, if you should judge proper, on a consultation with the naval commanding officer, such military detachment in the Red Sea as may be sufficient to occupy the ports of Suez, Cosseir, or any other of the ports in that Sea.

I am fully aware of the difficulties which must be encountered in furnishing your army with the necessary supplies, and with the means of ready movement, in the event of your effecting a landing at Suez or Cosseir.

To establish a systematic plan of supplying your army, when landed on the coasts of the Red Sea, I have made the following additional arrangements.

I have appointed Mr. Charles Stokes Agent for the care and despatch of supplies for the use of your armament, to reside either at Mocha, or at such place as you may direct, on the coast of the Red Sea, for the purpose of conducting the whole detail of the supplies of your army. I shall forward from this port, and I shall order the governments of Fort St. George, Bombay and Ceylon, to forward, respectively, in armed ships to Mocha, and from thence to any other appointed dépôt, such provisions and other articles as may

be requisite for your use, consigned to the charge of Mr. Stokes, who will take the charge of forwarding them to your order.

You will not only apprize all the respective governments of India of any actual defect of your present stores, but you will state your probable future wants, and the nature of the particular articles, of which you are likely to require a constant and regular supply.

With respect to the means of your eventual movements in Egypt, I have it in contemplation to despatch to you a large supply of horses from the western coasts of India; to which I propose to add a proportion of horse artillery; a certain number of draft and carriage bullocks will accompany the detachment proceeding from Bombay; and I shall endeavour to add a proportion of camels. You will receive further details from me on this branch of the subject, upon your arrival at Mocha. As Colonel Wellesley is particularly conversant with the means which can be afforded from the peninsula of India for the movement of your army, I direct him to report his opinion on this subject to you and to me, and to transmit, by land and sea, without delay, the report by express to Fort William.

To this report I direct that all such observations may be added as may occur to you, to Colonel Wellesley, or to any intelligent officer in the departments of the army, connected with its movement. You will also advert to those means of aiding the movement of your army which can be furnished from Bengal. On this branch of the subject, I also authorize you to make such immediate applications as may appear to be requisite, to me, and to all or any of the subordinate governments; they will be directed to comply with your applications as soon as may be possible.

I have the honour to enclose the necessary powers from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, for enabling you to assemble general courts martial.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

WELLESLEY.

P. S. I expect to be enabled to despatch to you, by the *Anstruther*, the following horse artillery, completely provided

with horses, &c.; one twelve-pounder, three six-pounders, two three-pounders, twenty European gunners and matrosses, and twenty-four golundauz, with the necessary proportion of gun lascars.

No. CXIV.

The Marquess Wellesley to Major-General Baird.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Fort William, 10th February, 1801.

You will find by your instructions of this date,* that your present destination is to the Red Sea and Egypt, for the purpose of co-operating in the great object of expelling the French from that most important position. A more worthy sequel to the storm of Seringapatam could not be presented to your genius and valour. I have chosen my brother to second you in this glorious enterprize, and I rely on your giving the public the full benefit of his talents, by admitting him to your most cordial confidence, and by uniting harmoniously and zealously with him in the prosecution of my wishes. I have manifested an honourable confidence in you by selecting you for this service, which if successful, will attract the applause and admiration of the whole world. In return I claim from you the full benefit for myself and my country, not only of your services, but of those of my brother, and of all the gallant and able officers whom he has brought with him to the army. I desire that you will arrange some mode of confirming in active and honourable stations the whole of his staff, and of those who have accompanied him. I recommend it to you also to employ Lieut-Colonel Murray of the 84th, whom I shall send to Mocha; he has been active, and has manifested ability at Suez and Aden; I also recommend Captain Wilson, Aid-du-Camp to Mr. Duncan, on the same grounds of experience in the affairs of Arabia and Egypt. May the same providential protection which accompanied you to the gates of Tippoo Sultaun's palace,

* See preceding letter.

conduct you to Cairo; and may you be the happy instrument of completing the exclusion of the French from India; a work so nobly commenced in Mysore. Remember that the harmony and cordial union of our counsels in the field, were the main sources of all our triumphs in that glorious war, which has rendered your name memorable in the annals of your country; for the rest, I have no apprehension; and I trust you will preserve my favourable opinion, by preserving unanimity in your army.

Believe me, my dear General,

Your obliged friend, and faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.

No. CXV.

*Minute by the Governor-General.**

Fort William, February 12th, 1801.

The communications, now recorded by Sir Alured Clarke, afford me the opportunity of requesting his Excellency, to accept my grateful acknowledgment of the assistance which I have received from him in the discharge of the various duties of this extensive government, under all the extraordinary occurrences of the three last years 1798, 1799, 1800.

In the course of those years, I have frequently resorted to his Excellency's assistance on many important questions, not immediately connected with the military department; and in the most arduous crisis of the affairs of the British empire in India; during the late memorable war, the principal charge of the affairs of this Presidency was administered by his Excellency to my entire satisfaction, and to the considerable advancement of the public service. I cannot more fully explain my sense of Sir Alured Clarke's zealous and beneficial co-operation during that critical period of time, than by annexing to this minute,

* The Governor-General's Minutes of the 12th of February are inserted a little out of their date in order to preserve the continuity of the instructions relative to the Red Sea Expeditions.—ED.

a copy of my separate letter addressed to the honourable the Court of Directors, under date the 27th of January, 1800.*

I shall always retain a just estimation of my personal obligations to his Excellency, for the aid which he has contributed towards the promotion of the objects of my administration; and my sincere good wishes will ever accompany him. The despatch from his royal Highness the Duke of York, recorded on the proceedings of this day, furnishes an ample testimony of the consideration with which Sir Alured Clarke's services in India are regarded by his Majesty; I entertain a confident expectation, and a sincere desire, that his Excellency's return to England, from his long and honourable career of foreign service, may be attended by every circumstance, which can enhance to him the satisfactory reflection of having merited the approbation of the East India Company, of his king, and of his country.

WELLESLEY.

No. CXVI.

Minute by the Governor-General.

Fort William, February 12th, 1801.

I cannot receive the notification of Mr. Cowper's intended departure from India, without offering to him a public tribute of my sense of the zealous and honourable support which I have received from him in all the arduous trials of difficulty, and danger, to which the British empire in India has been exposed during the period of my administration. On every occasion of public emergency, I have found in Mr. Cowper the most earnest desire to co-operate in the important measures, and exertions which the crisis required, and to strengthen the hands of the government, by an uniform and unabated continuance of honourable confidence, of firmness, and of public spirit. I cannot forget that the nature of the legal powers of the Government of Bengal, during my absence on the Coast

* See p. 200.

of Coromandel, was such, as to entitle Mr. Cowper to a just proportion of the gratitude due from myself, and from the public to that government.

I trust that my sincere thanks will be acceptable to Mr. Cowper; and that he will receive with satisfaction the expression of my wish, that the honourable the Court of Directors, should consider Mr. Cowper's assistance and cordial support to have contributed in a great degree, to the ease of my Government, and the success of that system of measures, which has been distinguished by the honour of their approbation.

WELLESLEY.

No. CXVII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Jonathan Duncan.

SIR,

Fort William, February 16th, 1801.

It is of the utmost importance that measures should be immediately adopted for supplying the army under the command of Major-General Baird, with the means of moving with promptitude and facility, in carrying on military operations by land.

Those means, unless procurable in the country in which the troops may be acting, must be principally supplied from Bombay; and I, therefore, request you will immediately turn your attention to the important object of collecting draft and carriage bullocks, camels, horses, and every article necessary for the above-mentioned purpose, and of providing tonnage for their transportation. You will be pleased to ascertain, and report to me, as speedily as possible, what supplies of this description you think it practicable to collect at Bombay, or on the western side of India; but it is desirable that you should immediately employ your utmost exertions towards the attainment of this important object, and that you should forward any supplies procured, to Mocha without waiting for further instructions from me.

I also request that you will consider of the means of opening a safe and speedy communication with Sir Ralph Abercromby, and that you will contribute, as far as lies in your power, to the speedy and regular transmission of advices from the Red Sea.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CXVIII.

Major-General Baird, to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

On board the Phoenix, 22nd February, 1801

Your Lordship's instruction to me of the 10th instant, I have perused with much attention, as well as the letters to which they refer, pointing out many and serious difficulties. I beg to assure your Lordship, that every possible exertion will be used on my part to surmount them; as yet, I have never met with any that were not to be got the better of by a steady perseverance, and I hope I shall not on this occasion. The greatest difficulties we shall have to encounter are a regular supply of provisions, and the means of moving with celerity, but as these depend on your Lordship's foresight, and from the arrangements you have already made, I have no doubt we shall be enabled to surmount them. It is unnecessary to say more at present, than that the most vigorous measures shall be adopted to endeavour to carry into full effect the grand object of the expedition; and to assure your Lordship, that the talents of your brother, as well as of every other officer shall have full scope; trust me my Lord, I harbour no little jealousy. All in my breast is zeal for my king and country.

I will endeavour to make such an arrangement for the employment of those officers intended for the staff by Colonel Wellesley, as I hope will meet with your Lordship's approbation.

I have now to request your Lordship's acceptance of my warmest acknowledgements, for the very handsome and

friendly manner you have been pleased to express yourself towards me, and particularly on this occasion in your private letter of the 10th instant.*

I have the honour to be,

with most sincere regard and respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most faithful friend,
and obedient servant,

D. BAIRD.

No. CXIX.

Lord Clive to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort St. George, 25th Feb. 1801.

It was my original intention to have addressed your Lordship, in council, upon the subject of the present despatch; but, reflecting that so formal a communication might convey an appearance of gloom that may not be necessary, I judge it expedient to make application to your Lordship for an increase of native troops, through the channel of my private correspondence, being convinced that when your Lordship is fully apprized of the extent and urgency of our wants, they will receive your utmost consideration; and that provided the Bengal Government shall enable your Lordship to furnish the means, we shall not remain long without the requisite assistance. It has been no small mortification to me to have seen the attainment of internal tranquillity almost within our grasp, and to have been unavoidably baffled in the accomplishment of that object by the want of a sufficient body of troops. It is probable that two thousand effective troops, which I hope Colonel Stevenson's successes will, ere long, enable him to detach, would terminate the confusions in Dindigul: and that the addition of two thousand men for which I anxiously look to your Lordship, would produce effects equally beneficial in the circars.

Captain James Bryant has marched to the southward with ninety of my body-guard, including the men attached to the

* See p. 451.

two gallopers, in a state of high order and efficiency; and I am sanguine that when they and the other troops ordered to reinforce Major Macaulay shall have reached their destination, a good account will soon be given of the rebellious Polygars in Tinnivelly.

I remain, with the greatest esteem,

My dear Lord,

most faithfully your's,

CLIVE.

No. CXX.

The Marquess Wellesley to his Excellency Lieut.-General Sir Ralph Abercromby, K.B., Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's Forces in Egypt.

SIR,

Fort William, February 28, 1801.

By an over-land despatch which reached me on the 6th instant,* I have been apprized of the important expedition destined, under your command, to effect the expulsion of the French from Egypt. By the same despatch I have had the honour to receive his Majesty's commands, signified to me by the right honourable Henry Dundas, one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, directing me to furnish a force from India for the purpose of co-operating on the coast of the Red Sea with an armament under Captain Sir Home Popham, and of attempting a diversion in favour of the forces acting from Syria and from the coasts of the Mediterranean.

I have the honour to enclose, for your information, extracts of my instructions to Major-General Baird under date the 10th instant, which will apprise you of the measures adopted under my orders for the execution of his Majesty's commands.†

My views of the proposed expedition, and the foundation and objects of my instructions to Major-General Baird, and of their enclosures, may be more fully explained by the following remarks:

It appears improbable that the armament under Sir Home Popham will reach Mocha before the commencement of the

* See p. 436.

† See p. 440.

month of April, or in any event, before the conclusion of the month of March, 1801.

The navigation up the Red Sea is difficult in April, and extremely precarious from May until August, when the southerly winds re-commence; but it is not absolutely impracticable to a good ship at any period of the season.

Sir Home Popham's squadron may, therefore, possibly reach the northern coasts of the Red Sea early in the month of May, but probably will not arrive before the month of June, 1801.

The difficulties of supplying an army proceeding from the Indian Seas to the coast of the Red Sea are considerable. Supplies of every kind must accompany any force acting in that direction, and in some positions (particularly at Cosseir) the troops on shore must depend on the ships, even for the ordinary supply of water.

The necessity of furnishing such supplies leads to consequences which require the most particular and minute attention. Whatever may be the disposable force in India, it would be impracticable at any season to move any considerable division of that force towards the Red Sea without preparations of a nature which would require long previous notice, and which must occupy a great space of time. This difficulty arises, in a great degree, from the scarcity of salt provisions in India; no dépôt of salt provisions exists in any part of our possessions equal to the supply of any large body of Europeans, even for the period of six months; the means of procuring a larger quantity of this necessary article are always precarious, and are limited by the nature of the climate, which precludes the possibility of salting provisions at any port in India from the month of February to that of November.

The tedious and precarious navigation up the Red Sea from April to August (during the prevalence of the northerly winds), and the equal difficulty of returning down the Red Sea (during the prevalence of the southerly winds), from August to April, render it an indispensable precaution to furnish any army destined for the coasts of the Red Sea with at least six months provisions of every kind.

The difficulties of procuring tonnage for the transport of a large force in India on any sudden emergency are also de-

serving of particular notice ; the available tonnage of the port of Bombay is not considerable, that of Madras is extremely limited, that of Calcutta, however, at certain periods of the season, is of great extent.

No large armament can be provided with transports in India without aid from the port of Calcutta. Bombay, or Madras in the most favourable season of the year cannot furnish transports, properly equipped, to convey even a small body of troops on a long voyage without a notice of several weeks ; at certain seasons of the year, the state of the weather renders the resources of the ports of Calcutta and Madras unavailable for the purposes of a naval and military armament. No ship can leave the port of Calcutta, without difficulty, from the middle of March to the commencement of November, and the port of Madras cannot be approached or quitted with safety from the commencement of October to the close of December. In addition to these circumstances the tonnage ordinarily available at the port of Calcutta is usually pre-occupied, and has actually departed for the purposes of commerce previously to the middle of March ; a large proportion of it usually departs before the end of January.

Adverting, therefore, to the nature and extent of the requisite supplies of provisions, to the available resources of the several ports in India, and to the course of the seasons in these climates, it is manifest that a demand upon all or upon any of these ports to send a large body of troops to the Red Sea, could in no case be effectually answered without a considerable degree of delay.

To supply the means of movement to an army acting on the coast of the Red Sea is a matter of still greater difficulty, and requires a longer period of preparation. It would be desirable that cattle of every description should be provided and transported from India, because it is, at least, uncertain whether our troops could procure the requisite cattle in the country. But the length and difficulty of the voyage from India must render the transport of cattle by sea tedious and precarious at all seasons, and at certain times absolutely impracticable. Without the command of some means of movement it would be difficult for an army even to retain possession of Suez and Cosseir with any advantageous effect upon the operations of the force under your command.

In your present important situation, it is necessary that you should be seasonably and accurately apprized of these facts, and of my opinions resulting from them, in order that you may be enabled to form a correct view of the measures already adopted in India in obedience to his Majesty's commands, and also that you may estimate our future means of co-operating with you, if the war in Egypt should be protracted.

The embarrassments enumerated in the preceding paragraphs would be infinitely aggravated if the main body, or any considerable division of the enemy should be at liberty to act against the force landed on the coasts of the Red Sea. A sense of this danger induced me to determine never to attempt the establishment of a body of troops on the coasts of the Red Sea, until I could be absolutely certain of support from a body of British troops acting on the side of the Mediterranean. No reliance, in my judgment, could prudently be reposed in the single assistance of the Turkish army. The existing state of affairs in India, until the month of October, 1800, also precluded the possibility of an attempt to send troops from India to the Red Sea; the amount of our disposable force (until that period of time) being limited by disturbances, which had prevailed on the frontier of Mysore, and by various important political considerations intimately connected with the tranquillity and security of our recent conquests in the Peninsula.

Concurring, therefore, most cordially in the spirit of intimations repeatedly conveyed to me by the Earl of Elgin, respecting the advantage of an early and vigorous effort for the expulsion of the French from Egypt, the considerations already stated induced me to confine the movements from India towards the Red Sea to desultory operations on a limited scale, until I received his Majesty's commands for the adoption of a more extensive plan in concert with a British force acting from the Mediterranean.

My opinions with regard to a material branch of this important question were confirmed by the judgment of that active, able, and experienced officer Rear-Admiral Blankett; in pursuance of our combined views, I, therefore, concerted with him the expedition, of which the particulars are stated in my instructions to Major-General Baird. I flatter myself that the active operations of this force, which proceeded up

the Red Sea under Rear-Admiral Blankett's command on the 28th of December from Bombay, will serve to create an impression in Egypt favourable to your progress, and will materially interrupt the enemy's supplies.

The state of affairs in Europe precluded the possibility of any early intimation of the designs of his Majesty's ministers against the French in Egypt, and accordingly no intimation from his Majesty's ministers of any intention to employ a force from the Mediterranean in Egypt reached me until the 6th instant.

In the month of October, however, being relieved from the pressure of any demand in India, and having adverted to the state of affairs in Europe and Egypt, I thought it advisable to use the precaution of assembling in the ports of the Island of Ceylon, at Madras, and Bombay, the largest disposable force which could be spared.

The force thus assembled in the month of December 1800, under my orders of the preceding month of October, was intended to wait his Majesty's eventual commands, which I supposed might have reached me in the month of November, or at the latest period in December 1800. I directed that this force should be equipped and furnished with the necessary provisions and supplies; and by commencing these arrangements at the opening of the season for salting provisions, I was enabled to command such a supply of the article of salt provisions, as, if now ordered, would not be procurable before the month of December 1801, or of January 1802. A similar advantage enabled me to secure the necessary transports at the proper season; and for this purpose I was compelled to employ the whole available tonnage of the port of Calcutta.

To provide effectually from India cattle and the means of movement even for 3,000 men on the coasts of the Red Sea, a greater quantity of tonnage would be requisite, than the ports of India could furnish, unless most of the Indiamen in addition to the country shipping, were applied to the purpose. In such a case the commercial investment of the Company could not proceed. The inconvenience and expense attending such an armament could be justifiable only by the positive certainty that the Government in India would be required to send a powerful armament into the Red Sea, but the intentions of his Majesty's ministers being unavoidably

unknown to me in the month of October 1800, I could not proceed so far on my conjectural opinion as to incur such a degree of positive inconvenience and expense with a view of meeting a contingent demand.

If his Majesty's commands could have reached India within the months of November or December 1800, the Government of India might certainly have afforded you a more seasonable and effectual aid. On the other hand, if any seasonable and effectual diversion can now be made from India on the coasts of the Red Sea, it is evident, that the possibility of making such an effort with any prospect of success must result from the preparations commenced in India in the month of October previously to the receipt in India of any intimation of his Majesty's commands.

In my instructions to Major-General Baird you will find a statement of the amount of the force which I have ordered to proceed up the Red Sea, in addition to that already acting there under Rear-Admiral Blankett, and to that expected under Sir Home Popham.

This force considerably exceeds the amount required by his Majesty's commands; I am convinced that the limitation of the force, stated in his Majesty's commands, was dictated exclusively by an estimate of the disposable force of India, and of the difficulty of supplying for the purpose of operations on the coast of the Red Sea any larger force than that required by his Majesty's commands.

The advantage of creating in that quarter the most powerful diversion which may be practicable from India, is evident; and as the measures taken previously to the arrival of his Majesty's commands will, I trust, enable me to secure a sufficient supply of provisions for the force which I now employ, I hope I shall meet your wishes, and shall fulfil the spirit of his Majesty's commands by this considerable augmentation of the army destined to co-operate with your movements.

Major-General Baird sailed from Calcutta on the 14th instant; he will probably reach Trincomalé by the 24th instant; and as Colonel Wellesley has been at that port ever since the close of December, 1800, for the purpose of regulating all the necessary preparations, I trust that the forces may leave Ceylon towards the close of this month; and may reach Mocha before the end of March.

According to those calculations, which appear to be most correct, it is scarcely possible that Sir Home Popham can arrive at Mocha at as early a period of time as the armament from Ceylon. The division from Bombay will probably arrive at Mocha nearly at the same period of time with the armament from Ceylon.

I am apprehensive that no part of the armament either from England or from India, will reach Suez or Cosseir early enough to afford any essential aid to the operations of your army, unless the commencement of your campaign should have been postponed beyond the period indicated in Mr. Secretary Dundas's despatches (by which it appears that your arrival on the coast of Syria was expected in December, 1800,) or unless your operations should be protracted to the month of June or July.

I trust, however, that the expedition under Rear-Admiral Blankett may produce a salutary impression; and I am persuaded that you will be convinced that every practicable effort has been made by the Government of India, not only to execute his Majesty's commands with promptitude and alacrity, but even to anticipate their object, and to extend their spirit. You may rely with the fullest confidence on the activity, enterprize and intelligence of the officers to whom I have entrusted the command of the forces from India. Major-General Baird led the memorable assault of Seringapatam on the 4th of May, 1799; that gallant officer will omit no possible effort to second your exertions. Colonel Wellesley held an important command and was much distinguished in the war against Tippoo Sultaun. Since the conclusion of that war, he has acquired additional reputation by his able and spirited conduct in the chief command of the forces employed in the late campaign against the insurgent Dhoondiah.

It will be extremely desirable that you should endeavour, as soon as possible, to open a correspondence with Rear-Admiral Blankett, and Major-General Baird, or with the officers commanding the land and sea forces, in the Red Sea.

The plan of operations must necessarily be to seize Suez and Cosseir, to endeavour to effect a junction with your army, and to occupy Upper Egypt, while our naval force shall intercept the supplies of the enemy from the Red Sea.

The great difficulty will be the means of movement; I fear that it will be impracticable to remove this difficulty by any effectual assistance from India, before the commencement of the next season. In the meanwhile, I shall exert every possible endeavour to transport to the Red Sea, such cattle as may be most useful; and I trust that the magnitude of the force from India will secure whatever means of movement may be found in the country. By the possession of the sea-coast, any body of troops which Major-General Baird may find it practicable to move, will be enabled to act with more confidence and effect in the interior of the country; the consideration of this advantage was a primary motive for augmenting the force to the greatest practicable extent; since it is to be rationally presumed, that the amount of the force which may be able to act in such a situation, must always increase, in proportion to the magnitude of the whole army, from which it must derive support.

I have given directions to the commanding officers to employ their earliest exertions for the purpose of opening a safe and speedy communication with your army.

Every exertion will be made under my orders at the several Presidencies in India, to furnish a constant and regular supply of provisions, and of all necessary articles for the troops composing the armament in the Red Sea. I have directed the proper agents to be appointed for this express duty. Although the prevailing winds in the Red Sea from the middle of April to the conclusion of August, are unfavourable to the passage of ships up that Sea, yet the voyage not being impracticable to ships of a good construction and well equipped, it is my intention, that ships shall be despatched in succession with supplies of provisions and stores from the three Presidencies, and from Ceylon; and directions have been given accordingly to hire ships for this purpose, and to despatch them successively, (as speedily as they can be laden with provisions) to Mocha, or to such other place as may be appointed for a general dépôt. The principal difficulty will be, that of procuring salt provisions for the European troops; as the season for salting is elapsed, and will not re-commence in any part of India until the month of November. I expect, however, that a considerable supply of this article may be procurable from the American and Danish ships, which frequent the ports of

India, and which usually import salt provisions as an article of trade.

It appears to me to be possible, that the war in Egypt may be protracted to another campaign; for that event I shall make the earliest preparations; and if the troops now sent into the Red Sea should secure an establishment, I hope in the next season to be able to reinforce the native infantry to a considerable extent, and possibly to add a body of European and native cavalry, with a further augmentation of horse artillery.

I shall hope to receive early and constant intelligence from you; it may be proper to apprise you, that a letter from Brigadier-General Koehler, dated Jaffa, the 9th of July, 1800,* did not reach me until the 21st instant.

The channels of correspondence now open to India are, Constantinople, Aleppo, Bagdad, Bussorah, Mocha, and Muscat. The despatches should be addressed through the persons named in the margin.†

I am apprehensive that this despatch may not reach you in time to admit of your deriving any advantage from the communication, I shall forward copies of it by Aleppo and Mocha, and a copy under a flying seal for the perusal of the Earl of Elgin, and of Mr. Duncan, the Governor of Bombay.

I request you always to use a flying seal to such of your despatches as shall be addressed to me through Constantinople or Bombay, for the perusal of the Earl of Elgin, and of the Governor of Bombay. I shall always communicate your despatches to the Governor of Fort St. George. His Lordship, and the Governor of Bombay will receive my orders to attend to any applications which you may transmit directly to them.

If his Majesty's commands had reached me at an earlier period of the season, I should have endeavoured to proceed to the western side of India, for the purpose of accelerating the supplies towards the Red Sea, and of super-

* See page 309.

† Constantinople,—his Majesty's minister at the porte, or the Company's agent, Mr. Tooke. Aleppo, Mr. Barker, or the British consul. Bagdad,—Mr. Harford Jones. Bussorah,—Mr. Manesty. Mocha,—Mr. Stokes, or the Company's broker. Muscat,—The Company's resident, Captain Seton.

intending more immediately the details of the expedition; at present I fear it will not be practicable for me to quit this Presidency, before the month of December, 1801.

I have the honour to be,
with the greatest respect, Sir,
Your Excellency's most obedient
and faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

No. CXXI.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

SIR,

Fort William, March 7th, 1801.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 24th of June, 1800, accompanying his Majesty's commission under date the 7th of August, 1800.*

I request you to lay before his Majesty my respectful sense of the honour which he has been graciously pleased to confer on me by vesting in my hands the powers and authorities specified in that commission.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient and humble servant,
WELLESLEY.

* The Commission appointing the Marquess Wellesley Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief of all the Land Forces serving in the East Indies was as follows:—

George the Third, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, King, Defender of the Faith, and so forth, to all to whom these presents shall come, greeting:

Whereas the united Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies, by their commission under the seal of the said Company, bearing date the sixth day of October, One thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven, have appointed our right trusty and entirely beloved cousin and counsellor Richard Wellesley, Marquess Wellesley (then Earl of Mornington), of our kingdom of Ireland, and Baron Wellesley, of Wellesley, in our county of Somerset, in our Kingdom of Great Britain, and Knight of the most illustrious order of Saint Patrick, to be, during the pleasure of the said Company, Governor-General of the said Presidency of Fort William in the Bay of Bengal, and of all the towns and territories thereunto belonging, and of all and singular the forts, factories, settlements,

lands, territories, countries and jurisdictions within the soubahship of Bengal, and of and for all the affairs whatsoever of the said Company in the Bay of Bengal, and other the places and provinces thereto belonging in the East Indies, together with all and every the powers and authorities committed and given to the Governor-General of Bengal for the time being, by any act or acts of parliament then in force; and by another commission under the seal of the said Company bearing date the same sixth day of October, One thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven, have appointed the said Richard Marquess Wellesley, Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Fort and Garrison of Fort William in Bengal, of the town of Calcutta, and of all the forces which then were, or thereafter should be employed in the service of the said united Company, within the said fort, garrison and town, and the said Company have also from time to time appointed officers to be Commanders-in-Chief of their forces at the said presidency of Fort William in Bengal, and their presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay respectively, and also have occasionally appointed persons to be Commanders-in-Chief of all the said Company's forces in the East Indies; And whereas we have from time to time caused detachments of our land forces to be employed in the East Indies for the protection of the British territories there, and the annoyance of our enemies in those parts; And whereas difficulties have arisen and may arise in the direction and employment of our said forces, inasmuch as the same are under the immediate command of officers commissioned by Us, and not by the said Company, and We are desirous of preventing such difficulties by giving authority to the said Richard Marquess Wellesley to act as Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief, of all our forces in the East Indies, and thereby to put under his orders and directions all our land forces, as well as the military force in the service of the said united Company which may be employed in those parts: Now know ye, that We reposing especial trust and confidence in the prudence, courage, and loyalty of the said Richard Marquess Wellesley, have made, constituted, and appointed, and do by these presents make, constitute, and appoint the said Richard Marquess Wellesley our Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief, of all and singular our land forces employed or to be employed in our service within any of the British territories in India, and in all parts within the limits of the exclusive trade of the said united Company during our pleasure, to order, do, and perform all things whatsoever, which do or ought to belong to the office of our Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief of our land forces, within the parts aforesaid; and generally to order, do, and perform all and whatsoever for us, and in our name, ought to be done in the command, order, and direction of our said forces, and also of all military forces whatsoever in the parts aforesaid which the said Richard Marquess Wellesley is not authorized and empowered to order, do, and perform, by virtue of the said commissions from the said united Company; it being our gracious will and intention by this our commission, to give to the said Richard Marquess Wellesley full power and authority to order, direct, and controul all military forces employed or to be employed, in the territories and parts aforesaid, in all

cases to which the commissions so granted by the said united Company to the said Richard Marquess Wellesley, cannot extend for want of powers in the said Company for that purpose; and we do hereby command all our officers and soldiers who are or shall be employed in our land service within any of the territories and parts aforesaid, to acknowledge and obey the said Richard Marquess Wellesley as their Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief; but nevertheless we do strictly enjoin and command the said Richard Marquess Wellesley, in the exercise of the powers and authorities given to him by these presents, to observe and obey all such instructions, orders and directions from time to time, as the said Richard Marquess Wellesley, shall receive from the first Commissioner for the affairs of India, or from any of our principal secretaries of state; Provided always, and our Will and Pleasure is, that if the said Richard Marquess Wellesley shall cease to be Governor-General of the presidency of the British territories in Bengal as aforesaid, then and from thenceforth all and every the powers and authorities hereby given to the said Richard Marquess Wellesley shall cease, determine, and become void, any thing herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding. In witness whereof we have caused these our letters to be made patent. Witness Ourselves at Westminster, the seventh day of August, in the fortieth year of our reign.

By Writ of Privy Seal, YORKE.

General Orders by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council, under date the 26th of February, 1801.

The General Officer holding the commission of Commander-in-Chief for the time being of his Majesty's forces in the East Indies, will fill, according to former usage, all appointments and commissions which may become vacant in his Majesty's army serving in the East Indies, subject as heretofore to his Majesty's pleasure.

All returns of his Majesty's land forces serving in the East Indies, all applications for leave of absence, and all correspondence respecting the internal regulation of his Majesty's said forces, are to be transmitted as heretofore to the General Officer holding the commission of Commander-in-Chief for the time being of his Majesty's said forces serving in the East Indies, who will report the same, together with all other details respecting the said forces, to his Excellency the Governor-General in Council.

By command of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council.

G. H. BARLOW,
Chief Secretary to the Government.

No. CXXII.

The Earl of Elgin to the Marquess Wellesley.

Constantinople, December 16th, 1800.

MY DEAR LORD,

[Received 10th March, 1801]

The present opportunity for writing to India, finds me in the midst of a very particular deal of pressing business; and I must therefore request your indulgence while I put down in this form, and very hastily, the communications which I am desirous of making to you to-day.

The intelligence from Vienna, contained in the extracts of my correspondence from thence requires no comments.

The conduct of Russia is, the most extraordinary; I fear that not only an embargo is laid upon our shipping in the Russian ports; but, that upon some quarrel happening on board of one of our vessels, several have been burnt. Such at least, is a report believed at the Porte. The cause of this embargo is differently stated. I doubt, if any answer can have been received from England on the application from Petersburgh, to know the determination of the King relative to Malta; and I rather presume that the only provocation, if so it may be called, that the Emperor has received, arises from Lord Carysfort, who, it seems, was requested to convey the demand of Russia to England, and declined taking upon himself such a commission. The demand in itself appears to have been, not only whether the king would cede to Russia, a part of the fortress, and receive in it a Russian Government, (an arrangement which had been in agitation when the blockade was to have been carried on by Russians, as well as us,) but also, the demand of an explanation why no mention of the Russians was made in the capitulation; and the place taken, exclusively in the name of Great Britain.

The Emperor is, no doubt, very much hurt with this success of ours, by which the favourite object of his ambition and anxiety, is wholly in our hands. He is also highly offended with our conduct in regard to neutral navigation, and particularly from our sending a fleet into the Sound, in aid of Lord Whitworth's negotiation at Copenhagen.

He now dreads, that we may effectuate the rescue of Egypt; and I have reason to believe, that he intends attempting to obtain from Buonaparte, the ratification of the convention of El-Arish; although at the time, that convention was a source of the most violent animadversion, and indeed made one cause of the Emperor's breaking with us. I mention this, not that I know it positively, but because the mode in which the notice came to me, is a very strong indication, that, whether that step be, or not, adopted, the Emperor means to thwart, as far as possible, our present expedition against Egypt; unless he has time to take a share in it, and secure to himself the advantages of the success.

Whether one considers the Emperor's feelings and temper, or the strong inducements Prussia, Sweden and Denmark, have to carry Russia along with them, in what is denominated the Confederacy of the North; or the encouragement, which France will find means of applying, for the maintenance of that system, and occupying the Emperor's mind with it; at all events, we must for the present expect, I conceive, every unfriendly proceeding on the part of Russia.

Hitherto, the Porte continues very steady; its exertions at this moment, in aid of the expedition against Egypt, however trifling in comparison with the exertions of other European Governments, do certainly far exceed whatever before has been seen here; and although much pressed by Russia, and even by Prussia, to slacken in its reliance on us, the Sultan promises fair, to do whatever he can to assist us in the present moment.

Believe me, ever, my dear Lord,
with sincere respect,
Your faithful humble servant,

ELGIN.

No. CXXIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Hon. Jonathan Duncan.

SIR,

Fort William, March 19th, 1801.

I have judged it proper to address letters to the principal Arabian chieftains, occupying the territory on the coasts of the Red Sea, inviting them to make a common cause against the enemy. The letters in question are transmitted under cover to Major-General Baird, by the present despatch.* In those letters, I have signified to the Arab chieftains respectively, that Major-General Baird will make proper presents to them on my part. I therefore request that you will immediately provide, and transmit to Major-General Baird such presents as may appear to you proper for that purpose. A list of the persons to whom I have thought proper to address letters is enclosed.

It would be advisable to furnish Major-General Baird with a sufficient number of articles not only to provide the presents above-mentioned, but to make occasional donations to others, when good offices may be engaged by similar gratuities.

The Honourable Company's broker at Mocha, may perhaps have the means of providing a considerable portion of the articles necessary for the purposes above-mentioned; in that event, you will be pleased to issue orders to him accordingly.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

(*Enclosure.*)

* *To the Shereef of Mecca, the Imaum of Senna, and the Sultan of Aden.*

Fort William, 19th March, 1801.

The friendship and harmony which during a long course of years has firmly subsisted between the sublime Porte and his Britannic Majesty, is well known to you; that friendship has been still more closely cemented by the faithless conduct of the French towards the Ottoman Porte; the French are now become the common enemy of both states. That perfidious people, disregarding all the obligations of friendship and the stipulations of treaty have sent forth their armies to invade the peaceful provinces of Egypt, the acknowledged territory of the Ottoman Porte; without urging the slightest pretext to justify this outrage, but on the contrary

professing sentiments of perfect friendship and regard, these disturbers of the peace of nations have carried war and desolation into the most fruitful provinces of the empire, the venerated sanctuary of the Mahomedan faith; they have attempted to establish their authority upon the ruins of your religion; they have now unequivocally declared their resolution to maintain by force what they have acquired by the violation of every principle of public faith, and of every maxim of civil and religious obligation.

I entertain too high an opinion of your attachment to the interests and independence of the parent state, and of your zeal for the support of the religion which you revere, to believe that you can have witnessed without indignation and alarm, this unexampled instance of the inordinate ambition and perfidious conduct of the French nation.

I am persuaded you cannot view with unconcern the ambitious and encroaching spirit of the French nation which, unresisted, must inevitably complete the downfall of the Mahomedan authority, not only in Egypt, but in all the neighbouring territories, and must establish the supremacy of the French power in the most sacred seats of the Mahomedan religion.

It has been the uniform policy of the French to endeavour to disarm the resentment of the people, whose country they have invaded, by professing the most amicable intentions, and by pretending that the sole motive of their actions is to mitigate the tyranny of oppressive governments, to establish the independence of oppressed nations, and to secure to mankind the full enjoyment of civil and religious rights. By these insidious arts, the French have succeeded in reducing to their absolute power many of the states of Europe, which they have invaded and ravaged, without the slightest pretext or provocation.

They have employed the same means to reconcile the inhabitants of Egypt to their unprovoked violence and unjust usurpation, and they will endeavour to practice the same perfidious policy for the purpose of subjugating the remaining dependencies of the Ottoman empire in Arabia.

They will labour to impress you with a belief of their amicable disposition, and of their regard for the sanctity of your religion; under the pretence of establishing your independence, they will endeavour to subvert your government, and to erect their tyrannous misrule upon its ruins.

With the most friendly solicitude, I warn you to take example from the unhappy fate of other states, and to beware of yielding to the insidious professions of a nation, which has forfeited all pretensions to credit by a systematic contempt of the obligations of public faith, and of the established law of nations, especially by their unprovoked and unjustifiable invasion of Egypt.

You have no other security for the preservation of your independence, and for the maintenance of your rights, than a determination to resist the force, and to frustrate the frauds of the French nation.

You are called upon, therefore, by every motive of interest and of self-preservation, by every principle of national honour and religious attachment, to unite your efforts with the combined exertions of the British power, and of the Ottoman state, for the expulsion of the French from

Egypt. A formidable army of Turkish troops is already acting with vigour, for the purpose of dispossessing the French of their usurped authority in Egypt, and a numerous body of British troops now co-operates in Egypt with the army of the porte, in effecting the expulsion of the French from Egypt.

With a view to second the operations of this combined army, I have detached a considerable force of European and native troops from India, to unite in a joint effort for the expulsion of the common enemy. This measure while it favours the success of the operations to be carried on from the side of Syria, and the Mediterranean is calculated to provide for the security of the Mahomedan possessions, on the Arabian side of the Red Sea.

As the existence of the Mahomedan dominion in Arabia, and the interests of the Mahomedan religion are obviously concerned in the expulsion of the French, I cannot doubt that you will employ all the resources of your country, and the influence of your authority in promoting the success of the projected enterprize; I am the more induced to rely upon your exertions by the report which has been made to me by Captain Wilson, and by Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, (who were deputed under my orders to the Red Sea,) of the friendly disposition which you entertain towards the British nation.

I trust you will employ every effort to procure and to facilitate the despatch of provisions, and of stores to the troops employed in the Red Sea, that you will furnish a reinforcement of the troops of your country to act with the British army, and that you will encourage the several chiefs and states in Arabia, and in Egypt, to make common cause against the common enemy of your nation, and of the British power.

Major-General Baird the commander-in-chief of the Indian forces, or a proper person deputed by him, will have the honour to deliver to you this letter, and will present to you a few articles, the produce of Europe, and of this country, as a token of my friendship and regard.

I request your favourable attention to the suggestions and applications which may be made on my part for your assistance in promoting the object of the expedition.

For the rest, believe me anxious for accounts of your welfare, &c.

WELLESLEY.

(A true Copy.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Secretary to the Government.

No. CXXIV.

The Governor-General to the Vizier of Oude.

5th April, 1801.

I have had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter.* The general spirit and tenour of this communication

* *From the Vizier.*

Received 14th March, 1801.

I had the honour to receive your Lordship's friendly letter through Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, on the 2nd of Shawaul (or 22nd Jan. 1801*), and I have fully understood the whole of its contents.

Your Lordship writes, that "your Lordship had learned with great alarm and concern, from my letters to Colonel Scott, the probability of a failure in providing for the charges of the increased force, which had been furnished the preceding year for the protection of my country.

With a view, therefore, to remove your Lordship's concern on that head, I beg leave to state as follows :

The occasion of my writing to that effect in my communications with Colonel Scott was this :

Your Lordship formerly wrote to me, desiring that I would communicate whatever was upon my mind to Colonel Scott; freely and without reserve, as any concealment and reserve in communicating my sentiments to Colonel Scott, who was the medium of intercourse between the two States, would be productive of embarrassment and impediment in our mutual concerns.

Therefore, whereas in your Lordship's former letter it was written, that "by means of this reform I should obtain funds for the discharge of the whole of the expences of the Company's additional troops;" and whereas in your Lordship's second letter it was written that, "for the purpose of providing for the additional expences which were now become indispensably necessary for the defence of my country, without adding to my incumbrances, it would be sufficient to disband the mutinous battalions in my service;" and whereas in the letter from his Excellency Sir Alured Clarke it was written that, "economy would not be the least of the advantages resulting to me from a reform in my military establishment;" and whereas at the close of the statement of the additional force which Colonel Scott delivered to me by your Lordship's orders, it was written that, "the charges of the additional troops were to be provided for by the disbanding of my own."

Therefore, since the resources provided by disbanding my troops were inadequate to supply the expences of the Company's (additional) forces

from your Excellency have excited my serious concern. Your Excellency's conduct on this important occasion has been as unexpected, as it has been evidently incompatible with your approved character of wisdom, prudence, and attachment to the Company. The magnitude of the questions discussed in my last address to your Excellency; the alarming facts submitted to your observation, and the necessary conclusions deduced from those facts, and from your own reiterated declarations, might have been expected to have engaged your Excellency's deliberate and sincere attention, and to have induced you to enter into the subject of my propositions with a spirit of candour and justice. With what sentiments then must my mind be afflicted, when I perceive that your Excellency has met my anxious endeavour to avert the evils now menacing your dominions, not by an open and distinct consideration of the alternative proposed to you, but by a

(in conformity to your Lordship's desire that I would unreservedly communicate my sentiments to Colonel Scott upon all subjects), it became necessary for me to state those circumstances to Colonel Scott; that is, to desire that in conformity to the several writings (above quoted) he would provide the necessary resources.

In the course of these conferences and communications, however, no impediment of affairs occurred, and no failure or deficiency whatever was experienced in the discharge of the expences of the new troops, and in the payment of the Kists of the fixed subsidy. On the contrary, those expenses and Kists were punctually paid; accordingly the Kist of the fixed subsidy, and the charges of the additional troops, have been completely paid to the end of January 1801, and Colonel Scott has expressed his acknowledgments on the occasion.

As my consent to the first proposition is altogether impracticable (accordingly I have already written an ample reply to that proposition,) and as it is impossible for me, with my own hands, to exclude myself from my patrimonial dominion, (for what advantage should I derive from so doing?) this therefore is a measure which I will never adopt.

With respect to what your Lordship writes about providing a territorial resource for the payment of the British troops, since I have not in any way delayed or neglected to discharge the Kists for the expenses of the troops, but have paid them with punctuality, where is the occasion for requiring any territorial resource? I expect to derive the most substantial profits from bringing into a flourishing condition this country, which has so long been in a state of waste and ruin; by a separation of territory my hopes of these substantial profits would be entirely cut off and a great loss would accrue. How then can I consent to any territorial cession?

studious suppression of the most material facts of the case, by an erroneous representation of the only argument which you have noticed, and by an evident design to evade the irresistible inference resulting from your Excellency's former communications both with Colonel Scott, and with me. Deeply lamenting the temper, and disposition of mind, in which your Excellency appears to have entered into this most arduous discussion, most painful regret has been occasioned by the conclusion of your Excellency's letter, in which you have peremptorily rejected, without qualification, both the propositions which I had submitted to your choice, for the preservation of the combined interests of the Company, and of your Excellency, in the province of Oude.

The unhappy counsels which have induced your Excellency to adopt this precipitate and inconsiderate measure leave me no alternative, but that of becoming an inactive spectator of the ruin of your Excellency's, and of the Honourable Com-

Colonel Scott has also verbally communicated to me the demand for the expenses incurred by the Company at the period of Zemaun Shah's approach. I am ready to discharge the expenses which were fairly and actually incurred by the Company upon that occasion. I will reimburse those expenses from whatever resources and in whatever mode it may be practicable.

It is equally a subject of astonishment and concern to me, that whereas under the former government the payment of the Kists, though so much smaller in amount than the present, was constantly kept in arrear during three or four months, the Jumma of the country was diminishing yearly, and yet no such propositions were brought forward, they should be agitated under the government of a friend who hopes for every thing from your Lordship's kindness; who is anxious to obey you, and to manifest the steadiness of his attachment; who punctually pays the full amount of the Kists, notwithstanding their increased amount, and who has conformed to your Lordship. At all events, upon your Lordship I rest my hopes of prosperity.

This is substantially my reply to your Lordship's letter, which, with a view to remove your Lordship's concern, I have hastily committed to paper, and now transmit to your Lordship. I am about to draw up a particular answer to every article (of your Lordship's letter). If your Lordship be desirous of a detailed reply be pleased to intimate the same, and I will in a very short space of time transmit such a reply to your Lordship.

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Secretary to the Government.

pany's interests in the province of Oude, or of resorting to the most decisive steps for the purpose of averting those evils, which must inevitably flow from your Excellency's adherence to your apparent determination of rejecting both the propositions which I have submitted to your consideration.

In my last letter to your Excellency, I reviewed the embarrassed situation of your affairs, and the distressed condition of your country; and expressed my unalterable conviction, that no effectual security against the ruin of the general interests of the province of Oude would be provided, otherwise than by the adoption of the first plan proposed for your Excellency's consideration.

I further informed your Excellency, that if you should unfortunately be persuaded to reject that salutary and advantageous proposal, the funds for the payment of the subsidy, must be placed without a moment of delay beyond the hazard of failure, and I concluded by declaring to your Excellency my determination to adhere with firmness to the tenor of that letter, as containing principles from which the British Government could never depart.

I lament that the facts and conclusions detailed in that letter should not have convinced your Excellency that my determination was the result of the most mature reflection, arising from a deliberate and dispassionate conviction of an insuperable necessity, and confirmed by your Excellency's own representations, and by the progressive experience of every hour; and consequently that a decision formed with such deliberation, founded on such principles, and directed to such objects, would not be relinquished with levity, or precipitation.

Your Excellency has not controverted one of the facts or principles upon which that determination was founded. Recent events have enforced the spirit of both; and have manifested, that the issue of these propositions must ultimately involve the fate of your fertile but decaying dominions, the security of the Company's provinces, and the happiness of a numerous and industrious, but suffering people; entrusted with the charge of such extensive interests, I am resolved never to recede from any measure, evidently demanded by the exigency of my arduous duty.

I, therefore, now declare to your Excellency in the most

explicit terms, that I consider it to be my positive duty to resort to any extremity, rather than to suffer the further progress of that ruin, to which the interests of your Excellency, and the Honourable Company are exposed, by the continued operation of the evils and abuses actually existing in the civil and military administration of the province of Oude.

With this view, I have repeated my former instructions to Lieut.-Colonel Scott; and I have directed him again to offer the two propositions contained in my last letter to your Excellency's most serious consideration.

I trust that your Excellency in your answer to this letter, will signify your acquiescence in one or other of the propositions submitted to you; and I entertain a confident hope of having the satisfaction to learn by your next despatch, that the necessary arrangements have actually been commenced, if not concluded, for carrying into effect that proposition which may be most acceptable to you. I have judged it expedient to introduce these general observations at the commencement of this letter, for the purpose of impressing your Excellency with a solemn conviction of the importance of the occasion, and with a just sense of my fixed and unalterable resolution to apply an effectual remedy without delay, to the existing abuses in the province of Oude.

I now proceed to reply more particularly to the statements contained in your Excellency's letter of the The manner in which you have been pleased to quote from my correspondence, and from the letters of Sir Alured Clarke, and of Lieut.-Colonel Scott, together with the inference which you draw from those papers, would warrant an apprehension, that the substance and spirit of all your Excellency's late communications to Lieut.-Colonel Scott, relative to the failure of your resources, had entirely escaped your memory. Your Excellency has hitherto described your embarrassments to have arisen, not merely from the charge of that part of your Excellency's troops which you have thought fit to continue in your service, but principally from the defective state of the collections, and from the ruinous condition of the country. Independently of your Excellency's repeated acknowledgement of the decline of your resources and revenues, and of evils and abuses which pervade every branch of the administration, your Excellency in your letter to Lieut.-Colonel Scott of the

29th Jemaudy Oosany adverting to the means of providing funds for the payment of the subsidiary force, has distinctly stated that your apprehension of the failure of the necessary funds arose not from the continued charge of your own useless and dangerous troops (the immediate reduction of which was obstructed solely by your Excellency's intervention), but from the precarious state of the collections. I here transcribe your Excellency's expressions from that letter : " The state of the collections of the country is not unknown to you, you know with what difficulties and exertions they are realized, and hence I frequently feel a great degree of solicitude and apprehension, knowing that occasions of exigency often suddenly present themselves, lest, if I should fail at a season of exigency in making the necessary provision, my responsibility should be impeached. I therefore wrote to you, that until I was secure of resources to answer the demands, I could not become responsible. Accordingly Jye Sook Roy has been directed to prepare a statement of the condition of the country, with respect to its resources. You shall be informed when it is ready, and you can then come and inspect it, and in concert, devise resources for the additional demands according to the actual assets." Again in the same letter, your Excellency states, " I am constantly in fear and apprehension lest, on account of the want of resources to supply all these heavy expences, any delay should occur in the liquidation of the Kists, and my good faith be consequently impeached." By this just and candid declaration, your Excellency has directly admitted the notorious and undeniable fact, that the apprehended failure of your resources is to be ascribed to the precarious realization of your revenues, and to the declining assets of the country. This declaration on the part of your Excellency, is a clear admission that the security of the united interests of your Excellency, and the Honourable Company in providing for the defence of your Excellency's territories, is exposed to imminent hazard.

Your Excellency however, in the letter to which I now reply, appears to have lost sight of the facts thus explicitly avowed, and, entirely admitting all reference to the declining state of the collections, and to the abusive administration of the Government of Oude, you now seem disposed to rest your complaint solely on the charges of that remaining portion of your troops, whose dismission from your service, has been

delayed exclusively by your own unfortunate and erroneous policy, in direct opposition to my advice.

I admit, with real concern, that your Excellency's embarrassments are greatly aggravated, by your determination to retain in your service, a considerable proportion of those licentious and disorderly troops, whose disaffection has been proved in every hour of trial, and whose turbulent spirit has repeatedly violated the peace of the country, and endangered your authority and your life.

It is, however, a source of great satisfaction to me, to reflect that the removal of this cause of embarrassment is within your Excellency's own power; and I have directed the resident to take the most effectual means of affording you immediate relief in this respect, by accelerating the dismission of the remainder of your Excellency's troops; I have no doubt, that whatever accidental counteraction, or difficulty, may have occurred to prevent the resident's success in completing the proposed reduction of your Excellency's troops, will now be altogether removed; and that your Excellency will henceforth unite cordially and zealously with Lieut.-Colonel Scott in the final and complete accomplishment of a measure, the delay of which your Excellency now declares to be the principal, if not the sole cause of your embarrassments. It is indeed evident, that the resources expected from the reduction of your troops cannot prove effectual, while your Excellency shall continue to delay the dismission of so large and expensive a part of your military establishments. But I must recall to your Excellency's recollection the fact, which you have so emphatically acknowledged on former occasions, that the principal source of all your difficulties, is to be found in the state of the country.

I have repeatedly represented to your Excellency the effects of the ruinous expedient of anticipating the collections. The destructive practice of realizing them by force of arms, the annual diminution of the Jumma* of the country, the precarious tenure by which the aumils and farmers hold their possessions; the misery of the lower classes of the people, absolutely excluded from the protection of the government, and the utter insecurity of life and property throughout the province of Oude.

* Revenue.

Your Excellency has not only admitted the existence of these inveterate evils, but has solicited the aid and interference of the British Government, as the only mode of remedy.

The transactions of every day in your Excellency's dominions furnish additional proof, that these evils augment to such an alarming degree, as must speedily impair the resources of the State, and must frustrate all your Excellency's efforts to fulfil your engagements with the British Government.

Your Excellency has recently seen within a few miles of your capital, an aumil employing the military force under his command to seize a number of Zemindars, who, with their families and their inhabitants, have deserted the villages which the aumil proposed to destroy by fire.

If such violent measures of extorting the revenues are employed under the walls of your Excellency's palace, what must be the condition of your remote subjects? From such a system the general desolation of the country must rapidly ensue; and while the revenue and population of the districts are failing in every direction, on what foundation rests the security for the payment of the subsidy to the Company?

An immediate alteration in the system of management, affords the only hope of providing either for the security of the Company's military funds, or for any other interest involved in the fate of Oude.*

* The Governor-General's views were supported by the following letter from Lieut.-Colonel Scott, the Resident at Lucknow:—

MY LORD,

Fully sensible that the information which I have been able to convey to your Lordship respecting the disposition, the views, and the administration, of the Nawaub Vizier has been very circumscribed and imperfect, I feel an earnest desire to supply the defects by such occasional communications as arise from observation and reflection.

After attentively studying the character of his Excellency, and acquainting myself as far as circumstances will allow, with the general tenor of his proceedings, I am led to conclude, that whilst he is determined to fulfil, with minute regularity, the peculiar engagements with the Company, his views are directed to the enjoyment of a full authority over his household affairs, hereditary dominions, and subjects, according to the most strict interpretation of the clause of the 17th article of the treaty executed at Lucknow.

I have no conception that he aspires either now or in prospect to political independence; what he aims at is the independent management of the

The necessity of such a change your Excellency has repeatedly admitted, and you have accompanied that admission by an acknowledgement of your utter inability to carry into effect this indispensable reform. If any other proof were required of your Excellency's inability to introduce such an effectual reform, that proof is to be found in the progressive and hourly aggravation of all the inveterate evils and abuses of the former government, notwithstanding the solicitude which your Excellency has upon all occasions professed, for the attainment of an improved system of administration.

Under these circumstances, to introduce a wise and lenient system of administration, to diffuse happiness and prosperity

interior concerns of his dominions, to the exclusion of all interference and inspection on the part of the English Government, and to the gradual diminution of its influence over the internal administration of his country.

In furtherance of this design, according to my judgment, is the suppression of the functions of the ministers who were the channels of communications to the Resident, and through whom he maintained, if not an efficient controul, at least an useful interposition in the details of Government, which it is not very easy, if possible, to exercise, when every arrangement is concluded under the eye of the Vizier, and discussed only amongst his private agents and confidential advisers.

If I discovered any attempts or disposition to introduce a system of order, justice, and energy in the state ; if I saw the Nabob Vizier's exertions directed to the prosperity of his dominions, and to the happiness of his subjects, I should feel no uneasiness at the decline of the Resident's interference in the ordinary internal transactions of government, since the exercise of it does not seem to have been intended by the late treaty, and is unequivocally disavowed by several declarations to his predecessor, and since an effectual controul over the dominions and the political concerns of the Sovereign is formally established by our military force, and will become more vigilant and extensive in proportion as that force shall be augmented and diffused.

But when I see a perseverance in the same abuse and mismanagement in the revenue collections which prevailed under the former government, with the only difference, that the fruits of them go into the private treasury of the Sovereign, and are carefully hoarded by him ; when I hear of the same oppressions and extortions, and observe the same imbecility in respect to impunity of crimes, I cannot but feel that the uncontrolled authority is not exercised to the purposes expected ; and that the ruin of the country, commenced in a reign of profusion and indolence, will progressively proceed in a reign of parsimony and diligence.

Lucknow,

I have the honour, &c.

Sept. 20th, 1799.

W. SCOTT.

The Right Honourable Earl of Mornington, K.P.

among your subjects, to restore the vigour of your resources, and to provide for the internal and external security and tranquillity of the country, what means remain, but the substitution of the Company's management, in place of abuses, which your Excellency's hands cannot control ?

It would be vain and fruitless to attempt this arduous task by partial interference, or by imperfect modifications of a system, of which every principle is founded in error and impolicy, and every instrument tainted with injustice and corruption.

After long and mature consideration, I offer to your Excellency a renewal of my former declaration, "that the province of Oude, cannot otherwise be preserved than by the gradual and regular operation of a system of administration, founded on principles of substantial justice, and of comprehensive policy, and enforced by all the power and energy of the British Government."

The complete introduction of the British authority and management in the civil, as well as military, administration of the province of Oude, would evidently combine more advantages to every party interested in the prosperity of that country, than could be attained by any other arrangement. By the stipulations which form a part of the first of the two propositions offered to your Excellency's acceptance, your Excellency would be relieved from the cares and hazards of a situation to which you have declared yourself to be unequal.

Effectual provision would be made for your comfort, affluence, and dignity, and for the situation of your family. The sons of your deceased father, the widow of your late brother, and his reputed children, would be maintained from the resources of the State; the existing pensions and jagheers would be continued to the persons now entitled to those provisions. Your Excellency would be exonerated from a heavy but just burthen, the debts of your predecessor; the happiness of your subjects, and the prosperity of your country would be established on a durable basis; the hazard of failure in the resources of the country, and the danger of internal conimotion, and of external attack would no longer excite alarm.

But whatever may be your Excellency's sentiments with

respect to the first proposition, the right of the Company to demand a cession of territory, adequate to the security of the funds necessary for defraying the expence of our defensive engagements with your Excellency, is indisputable.

For the purpose of affording to your Excellency a more distinct view of the Company's right to demand a cession of territory, I shall here state some of the leading principles on which that right is founded. The evils and abuses of the existing system of administration have gradually impaired the resources of the State, and these causes of decay in the revenue of the country, must continue to operate with increased effect, and ultimately must disable your Excellency from fulfilling your pecuniary engagements with the Company.

This argument is sufficiently proved by the actual state of the country and government.

In your last letter, your Excellency has indeed omitted your accustomed complaints of the state of the country and government; but your Excellency's repeated declarations to Lieut.-Colonel Scott, and to me, respecting the confused condition of your affairs, and the distress and decline of the country, added to the notoriety of the fact, justify a serious apprehension of the approaching failure of those resources, on which the security for the payment of the subsidy must depend.

The punctuality of your Excellency's present payments neither diminishes this apprehension, nor in any degree affects the right of the Company to a satisfactory security against the operation of evils, of which the existence is evident, and the effect certain. To refrain from demanding adequate security until the resources of the country shall actually have failed, would be to defeat all expectation of attaining the security to which the Company is entitled.

The resources which had been found inadequate to the regular payment of subsidy, must prove still more insufficient to support the additional burthen of a heavy arrear.

Your Excellency indeed, has pledged your private resources in addition to the resources of the state for the payment of the arrears of subsidy; but the extent of your private resources is uncertain, and while that species of security, from its nature, must be fluctuating and precarious, it must also depend on the resources of the country, and consequently

must be affected by the same causes which produce a failure in the payment of the subsidy. Neither the letter nor the spirit of the existing treaty could justify the British Government in delaying the demand of satisfactory security to a period of time, when such a demand must prove altogether nugatory. The intention of the contracting parties, could not have been to pledge their faith to an impracticable and fruitless stipulation. At the time when the treaty was concluded, your Excellency considered yourself to be bound to secure the Company against the evil effects of a failure in the payment of the subsidy. Your Excellency's accession to the Musnud afforded a strong hope, that your prudence and exertions would improve the resources of the country to a degree amply sufficient to secure the payment of the subsidy against any hazard of failure.

The disappointment of those hopes, cannot exonerate your Excellency from a responsibility which the altered state of circumstances has rendered more urgent. The intention of the British Government could not have been to confine its claim of security to a period of time, when the resources of the country should be inadequate to the payment of the subsidy, and to relinquish that claim, when the approaching failure of the public resources should hazard the irretrievable loss of that important branch of the Company's revenue. This right of demanding satisfactory security, is not confined to the extent of the established sum of 76 lacs of rupees. It is equally applicable to the funds necessary for defraying the expences of the additional force. The necessity of stationing the additional force, has been proved already, and the consequent rights of the Company under the existing treaty, arise from that necessity. Entertaining these sentiments, and having satisfied my judgment of the justice and necessity of the measures founded upon them, I was deeply concerned to read the unqualified and peremptory expressions by which your Excellency has signified your absolute rejection of both my propositions, and especially of the first. Your Excellency will be pleased to recollect, that this proposition is founded upon your own deliberate and formal declaration, that you were utterly unable to administer the affairs of your government, that "your mind was utterly withdrawn from the government of a people, who were neither pleased with you, nor you with them; and with whose

evil dispositions, enmity, disobedience, and negligence, you were completely disgusted." The first proposition might seem to be acceptable to a prince, who had declared his determined resolution to abandon the cares and hazards of public life; to descend from the Musnud; and to return to a private station.

Your Excellency must expect me to express some degree of surprize, that, under a manifest and encreasing aggravation of all these circumstances of vexation and difficulty; of embarrassed resources; of internal discord; of popular discontent and disaffection, your Excellency should now decline to enter into any discussion of your former resolution; and, although you originally solicited my attention to your desire of resigning the exercise of the government at a moment when your abdication was entirely unexpected by me, that you should now reject every possible modification of your own suggestion, declaring that your consent to the first proposition "is altogether impracticable." I have already adverted to the inference, which your Excellency has drawn from the punctuality of your payments, "*that the necessity of territorial security is wholly precluded.*" Your Excellency must have observed that my solicitude is directed to future events, and to the necessary and inevitable consequences of the distressed condition of the country, and of the increasing defalcation of the public resources. That your Excellency will continue to discharge with punctuality the current kists of the subsidy, as long as you can derive funds for the payment of them from the resources of your country, I am fully convinced; but under the ruinous system of the existing administration; under the operation of the evils, abuses, and oppressions which prevail throughout your country, on what security does your Excellency rely for the permanence of those resources, from which alone your Excellency is now enabled to fulfil your pecuniary engagements with the Company. Your Excellency has virtually destroyed the force of any argument founded on the punctuality of your past payments, by admitting the ruinous state of the country; by acknowledging your apprehension of an impending failure of your resources; and by declaring your own incompetency to remove the causes of these evils.

Your Excellency in your last letter is pleased to state,

that you "expect to derive ample profits from bringing into a flourishing condition this country, which has so long been in a state of waste and ruin."

From an early period after your Excellency's accession to the Musnud down to this day, your Excellency has never ceased to complain of the disorders and confusion existing in your dominions. Hitherto no effort has been made on your part to improve the system of your civil administration, or to avert the evils and dangers of which you have expressed your apprehension, and of which you have repeatedly experienced the effects. It has always been evident to me, that those mischiefs were insurmountable by any exertion of your Excellency's power. Under a similar impression your Excellency has deliberately avowed your despair of introducing any effectual reform into the system of your administration; but now, under the pressure of accumulated embarrassments, without any increase of power; without any additional means of acting; without any change of principle or practice; your Excellency suddenly announces, "an expectation of ample profits, by bringing the country into a flourishing condition." Can your Excellency then reasonably hope to induce me, by this unsupported assertion, to rest the interests of the Company in the province of Oude, on a foundation so precarious and insecure as the expectation of an improvement, obstructed by the whole system of your government, and by every relative circumstance in the state of your affairs? Your Excellency asserts, that "your expectation of ample profits from the country will be entirely cut off, and that a heavy loss will accrue" to your Excellency from what you have termed "*a separation of your territory.*" Would it then be a "*separation of your territory,*" to place a portion of your dominions in the hands of those, with whose interests your own are indissolubly united? whose justice placed you on the Musnud; and whose power now supports you in that exalted station? Would it be a separation of territory, and a heavy loss of profit to your Excellency to consent to an arrangement, under which the wise and benevolent administration of the Honourable Company would call forth all the resources of the ceded country, and would apply them to the defence of your remaining dominions, while the happiness and prosperity of the people would be effectually secured?

A territorial cession would meet your Excellency's explicit desire, contained in the following extract from your Excellency's letter to Colonel Scott, of the 29th of Jemaudy Oossany.

"Let assets be pointed out and fixed once for all, for the realization of what it is intended to demand, so that henceforth all cause of anxiety upon that head may be removed for ever, and no question of increase, nor any altercation ever after arise; for these repeated altercations are productive of anxiety and vexation."

Your Excellency has anticipated in these words a powerful argument in favour of a territorial grant. By this measure the assets for the realization of what it is intended to demand, will undoubtedly be fixed once for all. Thenceforward all cause of anxiety upon that head will be effectually removed, and no question, nor any altercation can arise.

The tract of territory proposed to be ceded from the circumstances of its situation will form a barrier, against the attempts of any external enemies to disturb the tranquillity of your Excellency's remaining possessions, while the improved and flourishing state of the country, under the British administration, will relieve your Excellency from all apprehension of the turbulence and disaffection of the Zemindars in that quarter.

As the districts to be ceded, will be taken at the amount of their actual Jumma, your Excellency's finances, so far from suffering by the proposed commutation, would benefit in proportion to the amount by which the actual collections from those districts are inferior to their present jumma. With regard to the expectation which your Excellency may entertain of increasing the produce of those districts, your Excellency is aware that the Jumma of a considerable portion of them is already fixed at as high a rate as can be expected, and that the collections have been secured solely by the ability and exertions of Almass Ali Khaun. The infirmities of old age and sickness, have induced him to become desirous of relinquishing that charge, and, whenever your Excellency shall commit those districts to other aumils, you must expect a diminution in the amount of the collections. With regard to the Jumma of the remaining districts, no hope can be reasonably entertained that it can ever be raised to the

standard which it originally bore, when those districts passed into the possession of your Excellency's family, unless the introduction of the wise and equitable administration of the British Government, should afford such a prospect.

In addition to these arguments it may be observed, that the honour and dignity of your Excellency's government will not in any degree be compromised by this arrangement, as the territory proposed to be ceded, was added to the possessions of your Excellency by the aid of the British arms, and was not the original possession of your Excellency's ancestors.

Your Excellency has lately beheld in the conduct of his Highness, the Soubadar of the Deccan, an example of the beneficial commutation of pecuniary payments of subsidy for a territorial cession; although the hazard of failure in his Highness' territorial resources, bore no proportion to the dangers which menace the most alarming defalcation in those of your Excellency's country, yet his Highness wisely considered, that by securing the funds for the payment of the subsidiary force beyond the hazard of failure, he provided the most effectual security for the protection and prosperity of his dominions. Under circumstances of infinitely greater urgency, and of more confirmed necessity, I trust that your Excellency will not neglect to profit by this salutary example.

I have thus stated to your Excellency the benefits and objects of each of the two propositions submitted to you. I have endeavoured to demonstrate to your Excellency the superior security and advantage offered by the first proposition to your Excellency, to your family, and to your people; I have explained the right of the Honourable Company to require effectual and satisfactory security for the payment of subsidy against all future hazard of failure; and I have proved that no other security can be effectual or satisfactory, than an absolute and perpetual assignment of territory; and therefore that if your Excellency should unfortunately persist in declining the first proposition, the second will become unavoidable. I now repeat my anxious hope that your Excellency will not refuse the benefits offered to your acceptance by the advantageous and honourable provisions of the first proposition; at the same time it is my duty again to declare

to your Excellency that if you should unhappily be induced to persist in your rejection of that salutary arrangement, it is my unalterable resolution never to recede from the just and indispensable demand of territorial security. I shall accordingly wait with the utmost anxiety to hear from Lieutenant Colonel Scott that your Excellency has accepted one or other of the propositions.

I am much gratified to be informed by your Excellency that you are prepared to discharge the large arrears due on account of the additional troops serving in the Province of Oude. Lieutenant-Colonel Scott has received my directions to present the account to your Excellency, and as the charges therein stated have been actually incurred for a considerable period of time in the necessary defence of your Excellency's dominions, I trust that your Excellency will defray the amount without delay. It is necessary on this occasion to communicate to your Excellency my decided opinion that a proportion of the expenses attending the embassy of Captain Malcolm and of Mehdi Ali Khaun into Persia is justly chargeable to your Excellency's account. The primary object of both these embassies was the security of your Excellency's dominions by averting the long threatened invasion of Zemaun Shah: Mehdi Ali Khaun was actually successful in exciting the Government of Persia to aid Mahmood Shah in the recovery of his possessions; and Zemaun Shah has, in consequence, been diverted from carrying into effect those designs against your Excellency's possessions which have recently been disclosed by the papers found in the palace of the late Tippoo Sultaun. Captain Malcolm has been employed in negotiating an arrangement at the Court of Persia, calculated to prevent any return of the same danger to your Excellency's dominions. The amount of these charges shall be hereafter stated to your Excellency. Your Excellency will admit the obligation upon you to discharge a proportion of the expenses incurred for the express purpose of averting from your Excellency's territories the dangers of a formidable invasion. But in the event of Your Excellency's acceptance of the first proposition, I shall be ready to take into consideration an equitable modification of the just demands of the Company upon you, as well as on account of the arrears of subsidy for the additional

force serving in Oude, as on account of the charges of both embassies to Persia. These demands, in the case supposed, may admit of considerable abatement.

Your Excellency signifies that, "it is equally a subject of astonishment and concern to you, that, whereas under the former government the payment of the kists, though so much smaller in amount than the present, was kept constantly in arrear during three or four months, and the jumma of the country was diminishing yearly, and yet no such propositions (meaning the territorial cession) were brought forward, they should be agitated under your Excellency's government, notwithstanding the punctuality of your payments." But the long delay which has occurred in making this requisition, for territorial security, is an evident proof that the British Government was not disposed to make it until it became indispensably necessary. It has never been denied that the same evils, now the subject of complaint, have existed for a long course of years in the province of Oude. In proportion to the extent and continuance of the operation of such causes of ruin, their effect is the more to be apprehended; and the necessity of a remedy is become more urgent and indispensable. Your Excellency's peculiar friendship and attachment to the Company, might be expected to render you peculiarly interested in facilitating the success of the necessary arrangement. These considerations have contributed to confirm my determination to effectuate the completion of the affairs of Oude, while your Excellency is seated on the Musnud; for while I am convinced that these salutary measures may derive great advantage from your Excellency's co-operation, I am equally satisfied, that they will tend to secure your own happiness and the prosperity of the country. I am sincerely anxious for the attainment of both objects; but the prosperity of the people of Oude, must be the invariable object of your Excellency's solicitude and of the Company's care.

With regard to your Excellency's proposal of transmitting a detailed reply to my former letter, I beg leave to inform your Excellency, that any detailed reply, either to that letter or to this, appears to me to be unnecessary, confidently expecting that your Excellency will afford the most acceptable and indisputable testimony, which you can furnish of your real attachment to the Company, as well as of your wisdom and prudence and of

your regard for the interests of your family, and of your people, by despatching in reply to this friendly remonstrance, a letter containing your Excellency's unequivocal acceptance of one or other of the propositions which have been offered to you. At all events Lieut.-Colonel Scott has received full powers to act in any exigency without further reference to me, I rely, however, on your Excellency to unite cordially with Colonel Scott, in a final and satisfactory adjustment of all difficulties, according to the tenor of one or other of the propositions submitted to your consideration.

WELLESLEY.

No. CXXV.

The Earl of Elgin to the Marquess Wellesley.

Constantinople, January 16th, 1801.

MY LORD,

[Received 23rd April, 1801.]

I have the satisfaction of informing your Lordship that, on the 30th of December Lord Keith anchored off Marmorice on the coast of Carafmania, with one division of the armament against Egypt. The second division reached that destination on the 1st of January. Your Lordship will rejoice to find, by the enclosed copies of Lord Keith's and Sir Ralph Abercromby's letters to me, that the whole expedition is in the highest health and spirits. These papers contain the latest intelligence I have received on the intentions of the commanders.

I subjoin accurate lists of the ships and of the land forces. I find that, in addition to the 16,000 men as stated in the military return, there are 1,000 infantry, and 1,000 dismounted cavalry, on their way to join Sir Ralph Abercromby. Sir John B. Warren is arrived at Gibraltar, to remain on that station during Lord Keith's absence.

I have received no very recent accounts from General Koehler. Colonel Murray, who went to the Grand Vizier, by order from Sir Ralph Abercromby, had been repeatedly in conference with his Highness, and it was on his communications, combined with other informations, that Sir Ralph has

decided upon attacking on the Damietta branch of the Nile rather than by beginning by Alexandria. General Moore was to sail from Marmorice on the 4th of January, in order to combine the whole operation with the Grand Vizier.

I need not add how anxiously the expedition, that is to proceed up the Red Sea, must now be expected.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Excellency's most obedient, humble servant,

ELGIN.

No. CXXVI.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Resident at Lucknow.

SIR,

Fort William, April 28th, 1801.

I have received your several letters noted in the margin,* and the Persian translator has laid before me a translation of the letter from his Excellency the Vizier in reply to mine to his Excellency of the 22nd of January.

The temper and disposition of mind in which his Excellency appears to have entered into the discussion of the important subjects of my letter to his Excellency of the 22nd of January, and the general spirit and tenor of his reply to that letter have excited my serious concern. His Excellency's conduct, on this occasion, has been as unexpected as it has been evidently incompatible with the dignity of his station, with the interests of his government and people, and with the gratitude due from him to the Company.

The magnitude of the questions discussed in my letter to his Excellency, the alarming facts submitted to his observation, and the necessary conclusions deduced from those facts, as well as from his Excellency's reiterated declarations, might have been expected to engage his Excellency's deliberate and sincere attention, and to have induced him to enter into the subject of my propositions with a spirit of candour and justice.

* 18th February; 6th, 7th, and 16th of March.

But his Excellency has met my anxious endeavours to avert the evils now menacing his dominions, not by an open and distinct consideration of the alternative proposed to him, but by a studious suppression of the most material facts of the case, by an erroneous representation of the only argument which he has noticed, and by an evident design to evade the irresistible inference resulting from all the former communications which have passed with his Excellency since the commencement of my administration.

The artful and uncandid manner in which his Excellency has combined the several extracts which he has quoted from my correspondence, and from your letters, and those of Sir Alured Clarke, together with the inference which his Excellency attempts to draw from those papers manifest a design on the part of his Excellency to evade the substance and spirit of all his communications to you relative to the failure of his resources.

His Excellency has totally suppressed all reference to the acknowledgment which he has repeatedly and explicitly made, particularly in his letter to you of the 29th of Jemaudy Oos-sauny 1215 of the defective state of the collections, of the ruinous condition of the country, and of the evils and abuses which pervade every branch of the administration of Oude. His Excellency now confines his complaint solely to the pressure of the charges arising from the continuance of that remaining portion of his own troops whose dismission from his service has been delayed exclusively by his own unfortunate and erroneous policy in direct opposition to my advice, and to your assiduous representations.

His Excellency's embarrassments must certainly be aggravated in a high degree by his determination to retain in his service so considerable a proportion of those licentious and disorderly troops whose disaffection has been proved in every hour of trial, and whose turbulent spirit has repeatedly violated the peace of his country, defied his authority, and endangered his life.

It is, however, a source of satisfaction to me to reflect that the removal of this cause of embarrassment is within his Excellency's own power. His Excellency's assertion that his embarrassments have arisen from the charges of that part of his own troops which he has continued in his service, will

enable you to renew, with peculiar advantage, your recommendation to his Excellency to dismiss those troops without further delay, and I accordingly direct you to urge his Excellency with the utmost earnestness, assiduity, and perseverance, to carry into immediate effect, this important and indispensable measure.

You will, however, be careful to avoid any argument or any proceeding which might induce his Excellency to construe your earnestness upon this point, into an admission of the truth of his Excellency's assertion respecting the sole cause of his embarrassments, nor will you encourage any expectation in his Excellency's mind that my public duty can permit me to rest satisfied with his Excellency's adoption of my advice in the single instance of disbanding the remainder of his disorderly troops, while all the complicated evils resulting from the vicious system of the civil administration of his government shall continue in full operation.

The facts and conclusions detailed in my last letter to his Excellency ought to have convinced him that my determination as expressed in that letter was the result of the most mature reflection, arising from a deliberate and dispassionate conviction of the existence of an insuperable necessity, and confirmed by his Excellency's representations, and by the progressive experience of every hour. A decision formed with such deliberation, founded on such principles, and directed to such objects, cannot be relinquished with levity or precipitation.

His Excellency has not controverted one of the facts or principles on which that determination was founded. Recent events have enforced the spirit of both, and have manifested that the issue of all the propositions which I submitted to his Excellency's acceptance in my letter of 22d January must ultimately involve the fate of his Excellency's fertile but declining dominions, the security of the Company's contiguous provinces, and the happiness of a numerous and industrious but suffering people.

Entrusted with the charge of such extensive interests, I am resolved never to recede from any measure evidently demanded by the exigency of my arduous duty: and I consider it to be my positive duty to resort to any extremity rather than to suffer the further progress of that ruin to which the

interests of his Excellency and of the Honourable Company are exposed, by the abuses actually existing in the civil and military administration of the Province of Oude.

His Excellency has not only admitted the existence of these evils and abuses, but has solicited the direct aid and interference of the British Government as the only mode of effectual remedy.

The transactions of every day within his Excellency's dominions furnish additional proof that these evils augment to such an alarming degree, as must speedily impair the resources of the state, and must frustrate all his Excellency's efforts to fulfil his engagements with the British Government. The violent measures recently adopted by one of his Excellency's Aumils in the neighbourhood of Lucknow, for the purpose of extorting the revenue, exhibits a forcible example of the oppressions which pervade his Excellency's dominions, and which are probably aggravated in proportion to the distance from the seat of Government.

An immediate alteration in the system of management affords the only hope of providing either for the security of the Company's military funds, or for any other interest implicated in the destiny of Oude.

The necessity of such a change his Excellency has repeatedly admitted. He has accompanied that admission by an acknowledgement of his own utter inability to carry into effect this indispensable reform.

Under these circumstances, to introduce a wise and lenient system of administration, to diffuse happiness and prosperity among the inhabitants of his Excellency's dominions, to restore the vigour of the public resources, and to provide for the internal and external security and tranquillity of the country, no course now remains but the direct substitution of the Company's management in place of abuses, which no exertion of his Excellency's power can enable him to controul.

It would be vain and fruitless to attempt this arduous task by partial interference, or by imperfect modifications of a system, of which every principle is founded in error and impolicy, and every instrument tainted with injustice and corruption.

The experience of every hour has served to confirm the

truth of my former declaration, " that the Province of Oude cannot otherwise be preserved than by the gradual and regular operation of a system of administration, founded on principles of substantial justice and of comprehensive policy, and enforced by all the power and energy of the British Government."

The complete introduction of the British authority and management, in the civil as well as the military administration, of the whole Province of Oude would evidently combine more advantages to every party interested in the prosperity of that country than could be attained by any other arrangement.

By the stipulations which form a part of the first of the two propositions offered to his Excellency's acceptance, his Excellency would be relieved from the cares and hazards of a situation to which he has declared himself unequal. Effectual provision would be made for his Excellency's comfort, affluence and dignity, and for the situation of his family.

The stipends of the families of Shujah Doulah and Asof oo Doulah, and the existing pensions and jaggeers of persons now entitled to those provisions would be continued and secured, and his Excellency would be relieved from the heavy but just burthen of the debts of his predecessor.

The happiness of his subjects, and the prosperity of the country, would be established on a desirable basis ; the hazard of a failure in the resources of the country, and the danger of internal commotion and of external attack, would be effectually precluded.

Under the second Proposition, although his Excellency would be effectually secured against the attempts of any external enemies to disturb the tranquillity of his possessions, he would still be exposed to all the hazards of internal discord, and of popular disaffection ; and although the dangers which now menace a failure in the payment of the subsidy, would be effectually precluded, the evils, abuses, and oppressions of the civil administration, would continue to operate with considerable violence in the territory remaining in his Excellency's hands.

The foregoing considerations have determined me to make another effort to obtain his Excellency's consent to the terms of the first proposition.

If his Excellency should persist in his rejection of that salutary arrangement, the same considerations must confirm my resolution to adhere to the just and indispensable demand of territorial security.

I accordingly direct you to avail yourself of the earliest opportunity to renew the negociation entrusted to your charge by my instructions of the 22d January.* The foregoing observations will suggest the requisite arguments for the support of the first proposition in preference to the second. You will therefore press this important point upon his Excellency with the utmost degree of earnestness; and you will endeavour to obtain his Excellency's consent to enter into a negotiation for the conclusion of a treaty upon the basis of that which you have already proposed to him, or with such modifications as you have been authorized to make, or as circumstances may appear to you to render advisable, without departing from the general tenor and spirit of my instructions upon that head. In discussing this subject it will be proper to remind his Excellency that the first proposition is founded on his own deliberate and formal declaration; that he was utterly unable to administer the affairs of his Government; that "his mind was utterly withdrawn from the government of a people who were neither pleased with him, nor he with them; and with whose evil dispositions, enmity, disobedience and negligence, he was completely disgusted."

You will further express to his Excellency my surprize, that under a manifest and increasing aggravation of all those circumstances of vexation and difficulty, of embarrassed resources, of internal discord, and of popular discontent and disaffection which originally induced him to make a formal avowal of his own incapacity and disqualification, his Excellency should now decline to enter into any discussion of his former resolution; and although he originally solicited my attention to his desire of resigning the exercise of the government at a moment when his abdication was entirely unexpected by me, that he should now reject every possible modification of his own suggestion, peremptorily declaring that

* See p. 422.

his consent to the first proposition is altogether impracticable,

Should his Excellency, however, persist in his absolute rejection of that proposition, it will then become your duty to impress upon his Excellency's mind the unavoidable necessity of his acquiescence in the second proposition, as founded upon the most indisputable principles of right and justice.

With the view to assist your judgment in stating to his Excellency the right of the Company to demand territorial security for the payment of the subsidy, I shall here advert to some of the leading principles on which that right is founded.

The evils and abuses of the existing system of administration in Oude have gradually impaired the resources of the state; and these causes of decay in the revenue of the country must continue to operate with increased and accelerated effect, and ultimately must disable his Excellency from fulfilling his pecuniary engagements with the Company.

This argument is sufficiently proved by the actual state of the country and government. His Excellency has indeed, in his last letter, omitted his accustomed complaints of the state of the country and government, but his repeated declarations to you and to me respecting the confused condition of his affairs, and the distress and decline of the country, added to my positive knowledge and to the public notoriety of the fact, justify a serious apprehension of the approaching failure of those resources on which the security for the payment of the subsidy must depend.

The punctuality of his Excellency's present payments, on which his Excellency founds a conclusion that the necessity of a territorial cession is altogether precluded, neither diminishes the apprehension of his speedy failure, nor in any degree affects the right of the Company to a satisfactory security against the operation of evils of which the existence is evident, and the effect certain. It is evident that to refrain from demanding adequate security until the resources of the country shall actually have failed, would be to defeat all expectation of attaining the security to which the Company is entitled. The resources which had been found inadequate to the regular payment of the subsidy must prove still more

insufficient to support the additional burthen of a heavy arrear.

His Excellency has, indeed, pledged his private resources in addition to the resources of the state for the payment of the arrears of subsidy ; but the extent of his Excellency's private resources is uncertain, and while that species of security from its nature must be fluctuating and precarious, it must also depend on the resources of the country, and consequently must be affected by the same causes which produce a failure in the payment of the subsidy.

Neither the letter nor the spirit of the existing treaty could justify the British Government in delaying the demand of satisfactory security to a period of time when such a demand must prove altogether nugatory. The intention of the contracting parties could not have been to pledge their faith to an impracticable and fruitless stipulation. At the time when the treaty was concluded, his Excellency considered himself to be bound to secure the Company against the evil effects of any possible failure in the payment of the subsidy.

On his Excellency's accession to the Musnud a hope was entertained that his Excellency would improve the resources of the country to a degree amply sufficient to secure the payment of the subsidy against any hazard of failure.

The disappointment of that hope cannot exonerate his Excellency from a responsibility which the altered state of circumstances has rendered more urgent.

The intention of the British Government could not have been to confine its claim of security to a period of time when the resources of the country should be adequate to the payment of the subsidy, and to relinquish that claim when the approaching failure of the public resources should hazard the irretrievable loss of that important branch of the Company's revenue.

This right of demanding security is not confined to the extent of seventy-six lacs, the amount of the former subsidy. It is equally applicable to the funds necessary for defraying the expences of the additional force. The necessity of stationing the additional force in Oude is indisputable, and the consequent rights of the Company, under the existing treaty arise from that necessity.

Whatever may be my confidence that his Excellency will continue to discharge, with punctuality, the current kists of subsidy while he can derive funds for the payment of them from the resources of his country, I cannot forget, that the ruinous system of the existing administration, and the destructive operation of the evils, abuses, and oppressions which prevail throughout his country, deprive his Excellency of all permanent security for the stability of those resources, from which alone he now derives the means of fulfilling his pecuniary engagements with the Company.

His Excellency has virtually destroyed the force of any argument founded on the punctuality of his past payments by admitting the ruinous state of the country, by acknowledging his apprehension of an impending failure of his resources, and by declaring his own incompetency to remove the causes of those evils.

With a view to evade a compliance with the proposition for a territorial security, his Excellency has announced in his letter to me, an expectation of deriving ample profits from bringing the country into a flourishing condition. From an early period after his Excellency's accession to the Musnud down to this day, his Excellency has never ceased to complain of the disorders and confusion existing in his dominions, but hitherto no effort has been made on his Excellency's part to improve the system of his civil administration, or to avert the evils and dangers of which he has expressed his apprehension, and of which he has repeatedly experienced the effects. It has always been evident to me, that those mischiefs were insurmountable by any exertion of his Excellency's power. Under a similiar impression, his Excellency has deliberately avowed his despair of introducing any effectual reform into the system of his administration; after such a course of experience, and after such plain and repeated confessions; under the pressure of accumulated embarrassments; without any encrease of power; without any additional means of action; without any change of principle or practice; his Excellency at this moment suddenly announces an expectation of ample profits, by bringing the country into a flourishing condition. His Excellency cannot reasonably hope to induce me by this unsupported assertion, to rest the interests of the Company in the province of Oude, on a foundation so precarious and

insecure as the expectation of an improvement, obstructed by the whole system of his government, and by every relative circumstance in the state of his affairs.

His Excellency has further stated, that his expectation of ample profits from the country would be entirely cut off, and that a heavy loss would accrue to him from what he has termed, a separation of his territory.

His Excellency cannot justly apply this phrase to an arrangement which would place a portion of his territory in the hands of those with whose interests his own are indissolubly united, whose justice placed him on the Musnud, and whose power now supports him in that exalted station. He cannot reasonably consider it as a separation of territory, and a heavy loss to him to consent to an arrangement, under which the wise and benevolent administration of the Honourable Company would call forth all the resources of the ceded country, and would apply them to the defence of his remaining dominions, while the happiness and prosperity of the people subject to the Company's Government would be effectually secured.

As the districts to be ceded will be taken at the amount of their actual Jumma, his Excellency's finances would be improved in proportion to the amount by which the actual collections from those districts are inferior to their present Jumma.

You have demonstrated to his Excellency in your memorial of the 16th of March, the advantages which his Excellency would derive with respect to the defence and security of his dominions from the local position of the districts proposed to be ceded, and you have proved the fallacy of the illusory expectation, professed to be entertained by his Excellency, of increasing the produce of those districts under his own management.

In discussing this subject with his Excellency you will not fail to place the same arguments in the strongest point of view.

In your discussions with his Excellency, you will advert to the example of his Highness the Nizam, on a similar though less urgent occasion, and you will state to his Excellency, that although the hazard of failure in the Nizam's territorial resources bore no proportion to the dangers which menace the most alarming defalcation in the revenues of Oude, yet the

Nizam wisely considered, that by securing the funds for the payment of the subsidiary force beyond the hazard of failure, under a territorial grant, his Highness provided the most effectual security for the protection and prosperity of his dominions in the Deccan.

You will convey to the Nawaub Vizier my confident expectation that under circumstances of infinitely greater urgency, and of more confirmed necessity, his Excellency will not neglect to profit by this salutary example. In my reply to his Excellency's last letter, which has already been transmitted to you by the Persian translator,* I have entered into a detailed discussion of the preceding topics, and I have declared to his Excellency my unalterable resolution never to recede from the demand of territorial security, if he should still persist in rejecting the terms of the first proposition.

Under this decided determination, any further reference to me from Oude is unnecessary; I therefore empower you to act under the instructions contained in this letter without waiting for additional orders.

If, therefore, his Excellency should persist in rejecting both propositions, you will inform him that any further remonstrances to me upon this subject will be unavailing, that you are directed to insist upon the immediate cession of the territory, proposed to be transferred to the Company, and that in the event of his Excellency's refusal to issue the necessary orders for that purpose, you are authorized to direct the British troops to march for the purpose of establishing the authority of the British Government within those districts.

I trust, however, that the arguments which I have addressed to his Excellency, and which you will personally enforce according to the tenor of this despatch, will induce his Excellency to conform to one of the two propositions submitted to his consideration, and that no necessity will occur of resorting to extremities for the security of the Company's rights, and for the preservation of the combined interests of the two states in the province of Oude.

I was much gratified to be informed by his Excellency's last letter that he is prepared to discharge the arrears due

on account of the additional troops serving in the province of Oude. You have already been furnished with the documents necessary to enable you to prepare a statement of those arrears, and you have received the communication of my orders, to require his Excellency's immediate discharge of the amount.

It is my decided opinion, that a proportion of the expenses attending the embassy of Captain Malcolm, and of Mehdi Ali Khan into Persia, is justly chargeable to his Excellency's account. The primary object of both those embassies, was the security of his Excellency's dominions, by averting the long threatened invasion of Zemaun Shah.

Mehdi Ali Khan was despatched to Persia for that purpose, by the Government of Bombay, in 1798, and was actually successful in exciting the Government of Persia, to aid the Prince Mahmood Shah in the recovery of his possessions, and Zemaun Shah was in consequence diverted from carrying into effect those designs against his Excellency's possessions in Oude, which have recently been disclosed by the papers found in the palace of the late Tippoo Sultaun.

Captain Malcolm has been employed in negotiating an arrangement at the Court of Persia, calculated to prevent any return of the same danger to his Excellency's dominions. His Excellency cannot justly dispute the obligation to discharge a proportion of the expenses incurred for the express purpose of averting from his territories the dangers of a formidable invasion.

You will hereafter be furnished with a statement of those charges; in the meantime I desire that you will communicate to his Excellency my intention of making this demand.

You will, however, inform his Excellency, that in the event of his acceptance of the first proposition, I shall be ready to take into consideration an equitable modification of the just demand of the Company upon him, as well on account of the arrears of subsidy for the additional force serving in Oude, as on account of the charges of both embassies to Persia, and that these demands (in the case supposed) may admit of considerable abatement.

I am, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CXXVII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Earl of Elgin.

MY LORD,

Fort William, May 6th, 1801

I have had the honour to receive your Excellency's several despatches noted in the margin.*

My acknowledgements are due to your Excellency for the many interesting and important documents, which you have done me the honour to transmit.

The accounts which those despatches have conveyed of the safe arrival of Sir Ralph Abercromby, and of the troops under his command, in the vicinity of Egypt, are in the highest degree satisfactory.

The superiority of the British troops, added to the zeal and ardour for the success of the general cause, which now appears to animate the Turkish army, promise a happy issue to the important enterprise in which they are engaged.

The importance of compelling the French to evacuate Egypt, is greatly increased by the late disastrous events on the Continent of Europe, and by the probability of a war between England and Russia.

Your Excellency will have been apprized by my last despatch, dated the 7th of March, of the measures adopted by the British Government in India, for carrying into effect his Majesty's commands, to co-operate with the force under Sir Ralph Abercromby, by a powerful division of British troops from India, on the side of the Red Sea.

The two battalions of native infantry amounting to 1,600 men, "ordered to be holden in readiness for embarkation at Bombay, sailed from that place on the 4th and 12th of March, and will probably have reached Mocha before the close of that month. The progress of that division of the troops

* Four private letters dated 16th December, 1800, received 10th March, 1801; two ditto, 17th December, 1800, received 10th March, 1801; Nos. 1, 2, and 3, 16th January, 1801, No. 4, 19th January, 1801, No. 5, 26th January, 1801, received 23rd April; private—dated 20th February, received 7th May, 1801.

appointed for the expedition, which was assembled at Ceylon, has been retarded by causes which could not be foreseen.

The Honourable Colonel Wellesley commanding the troops assembled at that place, having been furnished by the government of Fort St. George, with copies of the Right Hon. Henry Dundas's despatches of the 6th and 10th of October, 1800, anticipated my determination to conform to the requisition contained in those despatches, and was induced by various considerations connected with the speedy and effectual execution of that design, to proceed with the troops under his command to Bombay, and there to await my instructions for the conduct of the expedition.

Colonel Wellesley accordingly sailed with the whole of the troops, excepting one regiment of Europeans, which was left at Ceylon for want of tonnage, and arrived at Bombay with the greater part of the troops on the 21st of March.

In the meantime Major-General Baird sailed for Ceylon, for the purpose of taking the command of the troops, according to the arrangement communicated to your Lordship in my last despatch.

Major-General Baird on his arrival at Ceylon, finding that the troops had embarked for Bombay, followed them immediately, and arrived on the 31st of March at that Presidency. On the 6th ultimo, all the troops from Ceylon had arrived at Bombay, and had reembarked for Mocha, excepting a small proportion which had been compelled to touch at Goa, whence they were ordered to proceed directly to Mocha. Measures have been taken to supply the place of the regiment left at Ceylon.

It is probable that the troops which sailed from Bombay in the beginning of March, will have proceeded up the Red Sea from Mocha without waiting for the remainder of the armament, and it may be expected that the whole will be in a situation to combine their operations by the end of this month.

I am, however, of opinion that the success or the failure of the expedition under Sir Ralph Abercromby, will have been decided before the arrival of the armament at the head of the Red Sea.

The unavoidably late arrival in India of his Majesty's orders

for employing a body of troops from this quarter, to co-operate in the expulsion of the French from Egypt, would probably under any circumstances, have prevented the arrival of the force destined for that service at the scene of its operations, in time to co-operate with the army under Sir Ralph Abercromby.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CXXVIII.

Mr. Wickham to the Marquess Wellesley.

Vienna, 29th January, 1801.

MY LORD,

[Received 9th May, 1801.]

By a messenger who is going with despatches to your Lordship, I forward an extract of one of mine to Lord Grenville,* containing the only information, I have received on the subject of the intended expedition to the Isles of France, and Bourbon, since my letter of the 13th of November, from Cremsmunster.† I have, however, lost several letters since the Austrian retreat, and have reason to believe, that some communications upon that subject have miscarried.

We are here in hourly expectation of seeing a separate peace concluded by Austria. The Archduke Charles joined

* Extract of a Despatch from Mr. Wickham to the Right Honourable Lord Grenville, dated Vienna, 25th January, 1801.

As to the intended expedition to the Isles of France and Bourbon, of which I spoke in my despatch of last November, No. 132. I am still positively assured, that it is as much as ever in contemplation though great pains are taken to conceal its real destination, and that the vessels of which it is composed appear to make a part of the St. Domingo squadron, of the destination of which I also spoke in my despatch No. 157.

It is suggested that the Red Sea may make a part of the object of the expedition, but that its first destination is the Isle of France, the dependence of which it is necessary first to secure.

† See p. 417

the army, after it had sustained several successive defeats, and was absolutely incapable of any exertion whatever. An armistice, concluded on the 26th ultimo, when the army was on the banks of the Erlau, about six posts from here saved the capital and probably the empire.

The Archduke Charles has been made Field-Marshal, and President of the Council of War, and is now entirely at the head of affairs. Baron Thugut retires, after some faint attempts to act in concert with his Royal Highness.

It is a question whether we shall go to war with the Northern Powers or no. Appearances seem at this moment to be in favour of peace, as Sweden and Denmark have shown some symptoms of returning intellect in consequence of which the Emperor of Russia has sent away both their ministers from Petersburgh.

I shall remain with the army, whose head-quarters are at S'beit (a short league from hence) until the peace, and possibly at Vienna some months longer, and shall not fail to forward to your Lordship any thing of consequence that I may receive from France, in any way relating to the British settlements in the East.

In the meantime I have the honour to remain, with very high and sincere respect and regard,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and
faithful humble servant,

W. WICKHAM.

No. CXXIX.

Mr. Wickham to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Vienna, 1st February, 1801.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that a squadron of seven sail of the line dropped down from Brest harbour, into Berthaume Roads, in the evening of the 8th ultimo, and sailed from thence at five in the afternoon, of the 9th. Its destination is unknown, but as it is conjectured that it may

be intended either for the Red Sea, or the Mediterranean, I lose no time in informing your Lordship of the event. It appears that the whole was out of sight of land on the morning of the 10th and it was believed at Brest, that the squadron had escaped the observation of the British fleet.

I have the honour to be,
with sincere respect and regard, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most faithful and
obedient servant,

W. WICKHAM.

P.S. Supposed force of the squadron that sailed from Brest of the 8th, and 9th ultimo, commanded by Admiral Ganttheaume ; *L'Indivisible*, *Le Formidable*, *L'Indomptable*, of eighty guns; *La Constitution*, *Le Desaix*, *Le dix Août*, *Le Jean Bart*, of seventy-four each. The *Bravoure* and *Créole* frigates, carrying eighteen pounders, and two luggers. It is not known whether they have troops on board or no.

W. W.

No. CXXX.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Barrackpore, May 10th, 1801.

1. The object of this despatch is to intimate to you, my sentiments on the plans which you appear to have in contemplation relative to the permanent government of the Island of Ceylon, if that possession should remain in our hands after the peace.

2. The present civil establishment of Ceylon is certainly a heavy burthen on the finances of the Company in India, and as far as relates to them, it would be a relief to throw the burthen of the civil Government of Ceylon on the Crown. With respect to the European force to be maintained for the defence of that island, I think it might be provided without any addition to the number of 18,000 effective infantry, which I proposed in my letter of the 13th July, 1800, for the whole

of our present Indian Empire, continental, as well as insular, including Ceylon, the Moluccas, Malacca, and Goa, as a British possession.

3. The revenue of Ceylon is not adequate to the payment of the necessary establishments under a separate royal government; nor can I think, that the revenue of that Island will be found answerable to its necessary expenditure under a separate government, if ever, for many years to come. The deficiency must, therefore, be provided from home, if Ceylon be entirely separated from the general Government of India. To meet this charge at home, the cargoes of cinnamon, and the investment of Ceylon, might possibly be taken by the Crown; still however, an advance must annually be made by Parliament for the expenses of Ceylon, to be balanced by the sale of its investment, as the charges of our colonies in the West Indies may be balanced by the duties levied on the produce of those colonies. But I rather suppose that the Crown would take no direct concern in the commercial investment, but would leave that trade, either to the East India Company, or to private traders under certain regulations, and that the Crown would levy duties on the trade, as a more natural and proper mode of drawing a resource from the possession of Ceylon.

4. The transfer of the civil and military expense of Ceylon to the Crown, would render that part of our Indian Empire a charge on the public of the United Kingdom, and would be substantially the same measure which you so earnestly deprecate. For the direct operation of such an arrangement necessarily must be to render that part of our Indian Empire a burthen upon the mother country, and to have recourse to the public finances at home, for the payment of that branch of our Indian establishments.

5. In this view of the subject, therefore, the account between the British Islands and India, would stand, precisely the same as if aid were to be granted by Parliament, to a similar extent, in the shape of direct assistance to the finances of the East India Company, holding Ceylon as a territorial possession, and defraying the general charges of that possession, together with those of the continental empire of India.

6. In this case, as in the separate case of Ceylon, if annexed to the Crown, the public would be remunerated by the duties

derived from the trade, and by other collateral benefits resulting from the extensive power of Great Britain in the East.

7. It appears to me, however, to be a perfectly just and reasonable statement in taking a general view of the expectations which you have held out at various times to Parliament respecting India, to exclude from the account altogether, the charge of Ceylon, and of our possessions acquired from the Dutch in the Eastern Seas, of Goa, and perhaps of all our acquisitions in the East obtained from European powers during the present war.

8. But the same benefit must in reason and justice be allowed to the Government of India, and to the credit of the Company's finances; and with this allowance, after having excluded the charges of those acquisitions, a large surplus revenue would certainly accrue applicable to the combined purposes of reducing debt, and of maintaining commercial investment.

9. As far as the questions of expense and finance are to be viewed distinctly from other branches of political consideration, I am convinced that the revenue of Ceylon would be infinitely better administered, and more productive, and that its expenses would be much more moderate, if it were permanently annexed as a province to the Government of Fort St. George, than if it be retained as a separate and distinct Government under the Crown.

10. The permanent annexation of Ceylon to the Crown, while the continent of India shall remain under the Government of the East India Company, is however, a measure more important in my estimation with respect to its political, than to its financial operation.

11. It is essential to the vigour of this Empire, that the administration of all its parts should be uniform, framed upon the same system, combined by similar principles, and directed to similar objects and views. Unity of power, and an invariable correspondence of system and action throughout the whole fabric of our government, are the best securities which can be provided against the dangers to which we are necessarily exposed in India, by the vast extent of our possessions, and by the variety of interests which they embrace. If to the

natural principles of division and discord, resulting from the remote position of our provinces, and from the differences of local prejudice and conflicting interests, be added the establishment of distinct authorities, different in substance and in form from the general government of the Empire, and exempt from its control, the weakness of overgrown dominion must ultimately fall upon us, and in every arduous crisis our power will be found inefficient in proportion to its nominal magnitude and extent.

12. Whatever, therefore, may be the nature of that Government which the wisdom of Parliament may permanently establish for India, I hold two principles to be indispensable to its permanent efficiency and vigour.

First, that every part of the empire in India, continental as well as insular, shall be subject to the general control of one undivided authority; which shall possess energy in peace, to maintain order, connection and harmony between all the dispersed branches of our dominion, and to extend equal benefits of good government to every class of our numerous and various subjects; and in war, to direct every spring of action to similar and correspondent movements, to concentrate every resource in an united effort, and by systematic subordination, to diffuse such a spirit of alacrity and promptitude to the remotest extremities of the Empire, as shall secure the co-operation of every part in any exigency which may demand the collective strength of the whole.

Secondly, that the constitution of every branch of the empire should be similar and uniform; and above all, that no subordinate part should be so constituted as in any respect to hold a rivalry of dignity even in form with the Supreme Power.

13. The distinction between the Royal Power and that of the Company is perfectly understood by the natives of India, and more sensibly felt by them than by any class of persons in Europe. Even by Europeans in India a degree of respect is attached to the representation of the Royal Power, which they either boldly refuse, or reluctantly yield to the Company's Government.

14. The application of these principles to the case of Ceylon would lead me to submit most seriously to your considera-

tion the absolute necessity of preserving the control of the Governor-General in Council over the Government of Ceylon entire, and in the fullest efficiency; without this control the possession of Ceylon, instead of being as you justly estimate it, the great bulwark of this Empire, may become nearly as useless to the common cause as if it were in the hands of a neutral power.

15. An independent Governor of Ceylon, acting in the King's name, might prove the source of the most dangerous confusion and distraction in the bosom of our dominions. In the next place, I should feel it to be my duty to represent to you, that if the Governor of Ceylon shall permanently hold a commission, civil and military, from the Crown, the Governor-General should hold a commission, civil as well as military, from the same authority. Without this arrangement, I doubt whether it would be possible permanently to maintain an efficient control over Ceylon when annexed to the Crown.

16. An anxiety for the good government of India being the common sentiment of your mind and of mine, will be my excuse for having submitted these ideas to you, you will use them according to your discretion.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CXXXI.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. the President of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India.

SIR,

Fort William, May 10th, 1801.

1st. I had the honour to receive his Majesty's commands, signified in your letter of the 14th of January, 1801, by express overland, on the 7th instant.

2nd. I proceeded, without delay, to carry his Majesty's pleasure into execution, by taking possession of Serampoor, and of all other Danish settlements and factories within the immediate reach of my orders, together with all ships, stores,

and public property belonging to Russia, Denmark, or Sweden.

3rd. Possession was accordingly taken of the settlement of Serampoor in the night of the 7th instant by a detachment of the Hon. Company's native troops from Barrackpoor, and at the same time two Danish ships were seized in the river Hooghley by detachments of his Majesty's troops from Fort William, and of the Hon. Company's native troops from Barrackpoor. No opposition was attempted to either operation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CXXXII.

N. B. Edmonstone, Esq. to Harford Jones, Esq. Resident at Bagdad.

SIR,

Fort William, May 11th, 1801.

I am directed by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General to acknowledge the receipt of your several despatches, noted in the margin.* His Lordship desires me to convey to you his Lordship's acknowledgements for the various interesting communications contained in your despatches.

I am also directed to communicate to you his Lordship's commendation of the judicious measures which you have adopted to prevent the calamity of the plague from reaching Bagdad and Bussorah.

I am instructed to make acknowledgements, on the part of his Lordship, for your judicious observations on the commerce of the Gulph of Persia communicated in your despatch of the 16th of October, 1800.

His Lordship highly approves the zeal and activity which you have manifested in facilitating and improving the transmission of packets to and from India; an object which, with reference to the state of affairs in Europe and in Egypt, is of the most essential importance. His Lordship desires that you will continue to pay the most unremitting attention to

* 1800. 5th March; 14th June; 16th October; 18th November; 18th ditto; 3rd December. 1801. 10th January; 1st March.

this object, and in particular, that you will concert with Mr. Barker, his Majesty's Pro-Consul at Aleppo, the means of facilitating and securing a communication with the British army serving in Egypt under the command of Sir Ralph Abercromby.

His Lordship directs me to communicate to you his approbation of the measures you adopted to secure from the Pasha of Bagdad a reception of the Envoy to Persia suitable to his station. His Lordship is highly satisfied with the distinguished manner in which the Pasha had determined to receive Captain Malcolm.

I have the honour to be, &c.

N. B. EDMONSTONE,

Sec. to Government.

No. CXXXIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Lord Clive

My LORD,

Fort William, May 28th, 1801.

1. My determination has long been formed on the important subject of the future arrangement of the affairs of the Carnatic, connected with the conduct and designs of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah; but various considerations have hitherto prevented me from signifying to your Lordship my final instructions for your guidance in that arrangement.

2. At the period of time when I received from your Lordship the result of the oral examinations taken at Vellore and Seringapatam, the critical state of the negotiation depending with the Nizam, which has since terminated in the treaty concluded at Hyderabad on the 12th of October, 1800, appeared to me to render it advisable to postpone the adoption of the measures required for the security of the Carnatic. The successful issue of the negotiation with the Nizam would necessarily lead to a commutation of subsidy for territorial cession; and appeared, therefore, likely to facilitate the arrangements which became indispensably necessary for the Carnatic; while a premature prosecution of these arrangements might

have impeded, and perhaps frustrated, the successful issue of the negotiation at Hyderabad. When the treaty of Hyderabad was concluded, I entertained a confident hope of being enabled to visit Fort St. George in the course of the approaching season, and to assist your Lordship with the presence of the supreme authority of these Governments in the accomplishment of the final settlement of our affairs with the Nabob of Arcot.

3. I continued to entertain this expectation until the arrival of the *Georgina* packet; when I found myself absolutely precluded from all hope of being at liberty to quit this Presidency before the change of the monsoon. At this time the peculiar nature of our situation at Fort St. George appeared to me to render a personal communication with your Lordship, or with some public officer, fully apprized of your sentiments and of the actual state of affairs in the Carnatic, an indispensable preliminary to any specific instructions with regard to the course of measures to be pursued with the Nabob of Arcot. I, therefore, signified my anxious wish that Mr. Webbe, Chief Secretary to the Government of Fort St. George, should proceed to Fort William.

4. The delay which has occurred has enabled me to receive the sentiments of the President of the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India, and of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, on the subject of the correspondence of the late and present Nabob of Arcot with Tippoo Sultaun: those sentiments entirely accord with your Lordship's and with mine on the same subject. Since Mr. Webbe's arrival in Bengal I have carefully revised the documents connected with every branch of this extraordinary transaction; and I now proceed to communicate to your Lordship the result of the opinions which I have formed on the written evidence of the papers discovered at Seringapatam, and on the oral examinations which have been taken by the Commissioners appointed by your Lordship.

5. The tendency of those examinations is of a nature, in some important parts of the evidence, rather to weaken than to confirm the impression made on my mind by the written documents. In other branches of the evidence the oral testimony has served to illustrate and to strengthen the proofs afforded by the correspondence discovered at Seringapatam.

Combining the result of the whole body of proof, together with all the explanations given by the vakeels Gholaum Ali Khan and Ali Reza Khan, my judgement is convinced of the criminal purpose, and of the actual endeavours of the late and present Nabob of Arcot to establish an union of interests with the late Tippoo Sultaun, incompatible with the existing engagements between the Nabob of the Carnatic and the Company, and tending to subvert the British power in the peninsula of India.

6. It is my intention to record with the least practicable delay the course of reasoning, which I have drawn from the papers discovered in Seringapatam, from the subsequent proceedings of the Commissioners, and from the general tenor of the conduct of the Nabob Mahommed Ali, and of his Highness's son the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah. I shall transmit this detailed review of the evidence to your Lordship at a future period. Your Lordship is so fully acquainted with every part of the evidence, as not to require any recapitulation of its substance, and still less any review of its details, for your information.

7. This despatch is accompanied by the originals of such of the papers discovered at Seringapatam, as it may be necessary to exhibit to the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, for the purpose of convincing him that his designs have been brought to light. To these papers I have added the reports of Mr. Edmonstone on their contents, and also on the tenor of the oral examination taken at Seringapatam. In addition to these documents, I shall confine myself at present to a summary statement of my general sentiments on the case, concluding with my final directions for the purpose of imparting to your Lordship the authority necessary to enable you to act without delay in establishing the security of our interests in the Carnatic on a permanent foundation.

8. Their Highnesses the Nabob Mahommed Ali, and the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, by negotiating a separate connection with Tippoo Sultaun, have violated not only the fundamental principle and vital spirit of their alliance with the British power, but the express letter of their engagements with the Company: the nature and principles of the proposed connection with Tippoo Sultaun as avowed in the correspondence; the implacable enmity of Tippoo Sultaun to the

British power; and his known views in the hour of that negotiation furnish a conviction that the object of the intrigue on the part of the family of Mahommed Ali was hostile to the permanence of the British power.

9. In reflecting on the condition of our interests in the Carnatic, previous to the discovery of the correspondence, now transmitted, your Lordship and I have frequently found considerable difficulty to assign any rational solution of the perverse temper of the Councils of the House of Mahommed Ali: your Lordship and I, in the various discussions which we held together at Fort St. George, have frequently agreed that nothing less than the proof of an existing union and concord with the views of the common enemy could reconcile, with any course of reason and consistency, the uniform resistance, opposed by the Nabobs Mahommed Ali and Omdut ul Omrah, to every possible approach towards the improvement of their connection with the Company; the prevailing character of animosity and contention which pervaded every stage of Omdut ul Omrah's negotiations with Lord Hobart, with me, and with your Lordship; his Highness's determined aversion to every conciliatory proposition for the final adjustment of his relations with the Company; and lastly, his unremitting counteraction of every effort of your Lordship's government, and of my authority for the equipment and march of the army in the most critical season of the late contest with Tippoo Sultaun.

10. The solution of these apparent inconsistencies is annexed to this despatch; the cause of all our embarrassments in the Carnatic is now explained; and I cannot express to your Lordship, with more force, the impression of this discovery on my mind, than by requesting your Lordship to call to your remembrance my repeated declaration during the course of the late war, that the conduct of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah was incompatible with any other principles of policy than a determined hostility to the British power, and a secret attachment to the cause of the enemy.

11. The treaty of 1792 imposed on the Nabob Mahommed Ali a perfect obligation; and while his Highness professed to transmit to his successor that obligation in the sanctimonious form of a testamentary injunction, he had actually violated the perfect right acquired by the Company under the corres-

pondent provisions of the treaty. If the hostility of the Nabob Mahammed Ali had been discovered during his life, the Company would have been at liberty to enforce that right against his Highness, to the extent which might have been deemed expedient. The Nabob Omdut ul Omrah was the confidential agent of his father, and the actual negotiator of the treaty of 1792; and the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, by securing to himself the right of succession under the same conditions and obligations, which attached to the rights of his father, actually became a contracting party to the treaty of 1792, previously to the death of the Nabob Mahomed Ali. The tenure by which the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah held the right of succession was, therefore, equally connected with his father's good faith and with his own; and the rights of both under the alliance were equally involved in a just adherence to its obligations and duties.

12. It is now manifest that, while the Nabob Mahomed Ali employed his son and successor the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah to negotiate the treaty of 1792 with the British Government, his Highness delegated the same Prince at the same moment to establish the foundations of an intimate connection between his Highness's family and the hereditary and implacable enemy of the British empire in India. The Nabob Mahomed Ali and his successor Omdut ul Omrah had secretly destroyed the fundamental principle on which alone the treaty of 1792 could be rested, previously to the ostensible conclusion of that instrument. The spirit of that engagement, which had been vitiated in its origin, was farther impaired soon after its conclusion by the conduct of the Nabobs Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omrah, in communicating the march of the British troops against Pondicherry; in warning Tippoo Sultaun of the imprudence of displaying any symptoms of attachment to the declining cause of France in India; in admonishing Tippoo Sultaun that his intrigues at the Court of Poonah had alarmed the vigilance of the Marquess Cornwallis. The Nabob of the Carnatic expressed no anxiety to frustrate the hostile designs of the Sultaun of Mysoor; nor did our ally, according to the duties of the alliance, communicate to the British Government any intimation of Tippoo Sultaun's hostile views, or warn or admonish the Company to take the necessary precautions against their pro-

secution. In both instances the Nabob Mahomed Ali not only violated the express stipulation of the treaty, but actually promoted the Sultaun's views by persuading that determined foe of the British name to postpone his exertions to a more favourable season, when a more propitious concurrence of circumstances should facilitate the execution of his vindictive plans.

13. Subsequently to the conclusion of the treaty of 1792 the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah has expressed his intention to revive an intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun, correspondent with the terms of the previous negotiation during the life of his father, and absolutely incompatible with the existence of the British power in India. The Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, in his own hand-writing, in the month of August, 1794, corroborates the evidence of his intention to complete the purposes of the secret intercourse which he had negotiated with Tippoo Sultaun: and the continuance of the same intention is manifested by letters from the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, and from his confidential agent, addressed to the supposed agent of Tippoo Sultaun in the year 1796, subsequently to the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah's accession to the government of the Carnatic under the treaty of 1792. The existence of that intention has also been corroborated by the overt conduct of his Highness the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah in a flagrant attempt to deceive the British Government with respect to the important consideration of providing the funds necessary to enable our army to march into Mysoor in 1799, and also by a systematic course of active exertions calculated to frustrate the measures of the British Government in the most critical period of the late contest with Tippoo Sultaun.

14. It is manifest, therefore, that the intentions of the Nabobs Mahomed Ali, and Omdut ul Omrah, have been uniformly and without interruption hostile to the existence of the British power in India; and that those intentions have been carried into effect to the full extent of the actual power possessed by their Highnesses at the several periods of time, in which they have acted in pursuance of their criminal system of co-operation with the enemy. By acting on these principles of conduct, the Nabobs Mahomed Ali, and Omdut ul Omrah, have not only violated the rights of the Company, but by uniting their interests with those of the most implacable enemy of the Bri-

tish empire, actually placed themselves in the relation of public enemies to the Company's Government—dangerous to the extent of their respective power, and active according to the means and opportunities afforded to them by the circumstances of the moment, and especially by the most severe exigency and pressure of actual war. Every principle, therefore, of public law releases the British Government from the intended obligations of the treaty of 1792; and every consideration of self defence and security requires us to exercise our power in the manner most expedient for the purpose of frustrating the hostile councils of the present Nabob of the Carnatic, modelled upon the artful example, actuated by the faithless spirit, and sanctioned by the testamentary voice of his father.

15. In determining the mode, in which it may be expedient to exercise the rights of the British Government, under this discovery of the Nabob's violation of the alliance, our right to establish whatever system shall be judged advisable for administering the civil and military Government of the Carnatic is entirely relieved from the impediments hitherto opposed to the progress of improvement, by considerations personal to the Nabob, and his Highness's family. In all the different discussions which have taken place, in every modification which has been proposed for the improvement of the connection between the Company and the Nabob of Arcot, territorial possession has justly been considered to afford the only adequate security for the military subsidy of the Carnatic. My knowledge of the internal administration of his Highness's affairs, convinces me that the resources of the Carnatic can never be faithfully applied to the exigencies of public affairs, while his Highness shall exercise the executive government. I have no hesitation, therefore, in stating my decided judgment, that no actual security can be established for the rights pledged to the Company in the Carnatic, for the effectual restraint of the adverse and faithless disposition of the Nabob of Arcot, or for the successful introduction of an improved system of finance, revenue, and judicature into the territories subject to the Government of Fort St. George, by any other mode, than by administering through the Company's officers the entire civil and military government of the Carnatic.

16. In the execution of this necessary measure, it would have been satisfactory to my mind, if the safety of the British interests had permitted me to consult the personal convenience of the Nabob of Arcot, to the extent proposed in the modification of the treaty of 1792, offered by Lord Hobart to his Highness's acceptance, and in the general plan for the arrangement of his Highness's affairs, which I proposed to him during the progress of the late war in Mysoor. It would have been an act of wisdom to have sacrificed to the principles of national moderation and magnanimity, the advantages which I had proposed to surrender for the attainment of the Nabob's cheerful concurrence in an engagement, which he was considered at liberty to reject; but his Highness's hostile disposition having transpired, his violation of the most sacred ties of amity and alliance having been detected, it is become my duty to deprive him of the future means of injuring the British Government. Wisdom and prudence require, justice and moderation warrant, that his Highness should not retain the possession of actual resources, greater than shall be requisite for the support of the rank, which he shall hereafter be permitted to hold in the Carnatic. Reduced by his conduct to the condition of a public enemy, he has forfeited all positive right to any share of the resources of the Carnatic; and his future situation must be determined entirely by the prudence of the Company, tempered with those considerations of lenity, which I trust will always enter into the councils of every British authority. Under this view of the subject it is my opinion, that the stipend to be allowed to his Highness the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, and to his family, should not exceed the sum of three lacs of pagodas, nor be less than the sum of two lacs of pagodas.

17. I consider it to be extremely desirable, that the Nabob should be induced, under a full conviction of the rights acquired by the Company, in consequence of the discovery of his father's negotiations, and of his own, to accede to the proposed engagement (in the form of a treaty). In expressing this wish, I am more desirous of consulting the dignity of the British Government, than of admitting any claims to its generosity and forbearance on the part of the Nabobs Mahomed Ali, and Omdut ul Omrah. It would, however, be painful to your Lordship, and to me, to be compelled to expose to the

world all the humiliating proofs of the ingratitude and treachery of those infatuated princes towards that power, which has uniformly proved their guardian and protector. I, therefore, request that your Lordship will immediately open a negotiation with the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, for the purpose of adjusting an arrangement for the entire transfer of the civil and military Government of the Carnatic to the hands of the Company, on the terms specified in the draft of a treaty, which I have now the honour of transmitting to your Lordship.

18. In order to obtain his Highness's acquiescence in this mode of adjustment, it will be proper for your Lordship (after having fully apprized the Nabob of the nature of the proofs which we possess of his correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun,) to offer the inducement of the largest provision to be made for his Highness's personal expenses; and in that event, I authorize your Lordship to insert in the treaty the sum of three lacs of pagodas.

19. It is possible, however, that in the actual state of his Highness's councils and temper, the Nabob may be disposed to reject even this moderate proposition; and to appeal to the authority of the Honourable the Court of Directors. In that event, being already in possession of the sentiments of the secret Committee, founded on the discovery of the Nabob's faithless conduct, I shall consider it to be injudicious and unnecessary to admit the appeal; and by that admission, to enter upon a formal trial of his Highness's criminal conduct. The case requires that we should act as against a state, on the basis of the general law of nations, and that we should employ the power of the British empire in India, to demand, and if necessary to enforce, an adequate security for our rights and interests against the machinations of a faithless ally, who has violated the fundamental principles of a public alliance to the extent of placing himself in the condition of a public enemy. If therefore, the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah by refusing to acquiesce in the proposed arrangements should compel the British Government, contrary to its wishes and intentions, to exercise its power and its authority to their full extent, I authorize and direct your Lordship to assume the civil and military Government of the Carnatic; and I have the honour of enclosing a declaration, which, in that event, I request

your Lordship to publish under the authority of the Governor-General in council. Even under this contingency, it is not my intention that the allowance to be made to the Nabob should be less than two lacs of star pagodas.

20. Under every contingency it will be prudent and humane, that provision should be made, chargeable on the revenues of the Carnatic, for the principal officers of his Highness the Nabob's government, for his Highness's dependants, and for the family of the late Nabob Mahomed Ali, upon the principles observed in the settlement of the affairs of Mysore, and to the extent which may be deemed necessary after the fullest investigation by your Lordship in council.

21. The provision for these persons is to be defrayed from funds separate from the contingent sum of two or three lacs of pagodas described in the 16th paragraph of this despatch; that sum being intended by me to be applicable exclusively to the personal expenses of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, and to the charges of his Highness's Mahal.*

22. I have the honour to annex to this despatch, a letter to be delivered to the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, whenever your Lordship shall deem it advisable to communicate to him the nature of these instructions. A copy of that letter also accompanies for your Lordship's information.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord, with great esteem,
Your Lordship's most faithful Servant,

WELLESLEY.

[Enclosure in the foregoing letter.]

The Marquess Wellesley to the Nabob of Arcot.

Written 28th May, 1801.

For some time past, your Highness must have observed, that although I have received various communications from you, with relation to the internal government of the Carnatic, and to the general state of your affairs, I have not deemed it consistent with my public duty to return any reply to any other letters, which I had the honour to receive from your Highness, excepting those containing the usual interchange of compliments between your Highness, and the British Government. The cause of my silence is of the most serious nature, and has occasioned the deepest and most sincere regret to my mind.

* Female Household.

The success of our arms against the late Tippoo Sultaun has brought to light many important and extraordinary transactions. My determination on the subject of the proofs which I possess, has been formed after the fullest deliberation, and after the most dispassionate review of all the circumstances of the case. I have communicated to Lord Clive my final opinion, with my positive directions to carry into effect without delay, those arrangements which the nature of the case appears to me to require, for the security of the British interests in the Carnatic. Lord Clive will enter into a full explanation of all the evidence which has been discovered at Seringapatam, and will also state to your Highness, the purport of the instructions which he has received from me. I request your Highness to consider Lord Clive to be fully authorized by me to terminate the requisite arrangements; and under this view of the question I trust that you will not expect from me any interruption to the course of those measures which I have judged to be indispensably necessary, and which I have directed Lord Clive to accomplish, without further reference to my authority.

WELLESLEY.

(A true Copy.) N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Secretary.

No. CXXXIV.

*Memorandum from The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Clive, respecting the Nabob of the Carnatic.**

Fort William, May 31, 1801.

Lord Clive will be pleased to advert to these notes in conducting the arrangement of the affairs of the Carnatic.

1. If the Nabob should be so ill as to render negotiation impracticable, great caution must be used in collecting into one point of view every circumstance tending to show the intention of negotiating with him.

2. If the Nabob should die previously to the proposed arrangement, it will be expedient that his reputed son should be acknowledged by the Government of Fort St. George, provided that the young man shall consent to an adjustment of the affairs of the Carnatic by treaty on the principles of the draft now transmitted to Fort St. George; but if the reputed son shall make any opposition to such an arrangement it will be proper for the Government of Fort St. George to proceed to exercise the government of the Carnatic by declaration. In either of these events, the stipend to be granted to the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah should be

* See p. 533.

diminished below the standard of that which is proposed for the present Nabob. And if the Government of Fort St. George should be compelled to proceed by declaration, it will be proper that the stipend of his Highness's reputed son should be regulated by the general scale of the allowances to be granted to the other branches of the family of Mohammed Ali.

3. If the Nabob, at the first interview, should declare a positive resolution not to negotiate, the declaration should be published without further delay.

4. If the Nabob, with a proposed intention to negotiate, should demand a short delay for deliberation, two or three days should be allowed for his determination. But if it should appear at the expiration of that time that he is only studying to evade the question, the question must be considered decided.

5. If, at the expiration of that period, he should decline making further progress in the negotiation under the pretext of ill health, such pretext should be considered to have decided the question; if his illness be real you will observe the first paragraph of this memorandum.

6. In the event of the Nabob, professing to negotiate, it will be prudent to take notes of his conversation.

7. If it should appear that the Nabob's inclination to an adjustment by treaty can be determined by an increase of his stipend, the sum may be extended to four lacs of pagodas.

8. If it should appear probable that his acceptance of the treaty can be accomplished by including in it a provision for his reputed son, an article may be introduced for this purpose.

9. If he should demand an augmentation of his stipend, and a guarantee for the succession of his reputed son, both points may be conceded. In this event the guarantee may be extended to the full amount of the augmented stipend; but every endeavour should be employed to obtain the Nabob's consent to a reduction of the reputed son's stipend to three lacs.

10. In the event of the Nabob making any stipulation in favour of his private creditors, no direct provision for the liquidation of those debts should be made. The general question should be left open for decision in England; but a guarantee

may be offered to the Nabob against the diminution of his stipend under any circumstances which may occur.

11. If the Nabob should demand any separate stipulation in favour of his sister the Begum (who has always possessed great influence over his mind) it should not be admitted in favour of that person, unless the negotiation should appear to turn on that point, in which case it may be conceded.

12. If the Nabob should demand the removal of his residence to Arcot, or to any other place in the Carnatic, it should be resisted as long as possible. With respect to Arcot it should positively be rejected ; and Trichinopoly should be chosen in preference to any other place in the Carnatic.

13. As soon as the arrangement shall have been adjusted, an express should be despatched, by sea and land, to England, with copies of the most material papers.

WELLESLEY.

No. CXXXV.

Remarks by the Governor-General on the Vizier of Oude's Propositions.

2nd June, 1801.

The Governor-General is precluded by the strongest obligations of public duty from affixing his seal and signature to the articles communicated from the Nabob Vizier through the Resident at Lucknow, under date the 3rd Mohurrum, 1216.*

Certain Articles to be submitted to the consideration of his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley, to which I trust his Lordship, by affixing his seal and signature, will afford me satisfaction regarding the stability of the points therein mentioned.

Article 1st.—The payment of the debts of my predecessor Asoph ul Dowlah, is not stipulated for in the existing treaty ; I am moreover unable to liquidate the debts contracted in the late reign, but this is an affair which will be adjusted between the State and the creditors of the late Nawab, and regarding which the Company are in no shape responsible, the treaty being silent on this subject.

His Lordship has demanded territorial security for the payment of the subsidy due by the Vizier to the Company

2nd.—The sum of seventeen lacs of rupees has frequently in conversation been specified as the amount of the extraordinary expense incurred by the army taking the field to oppose Zemaun Shah, and suppress the disturbance created by Vizier Ali; although I formerly stated my inability to pay this sum, yet, to testify submission, I am ready, by every means in my power, to pay such portion of the above sum as shall appear to be justly chargeable to me.

3rd.—Whereas the increase of expense on account of additional troops having been deemed expedient on the sole ground of preserving my dominions against the ravages of Zemaun Shah and others; and considering that I have consented to bear this expense for all times to come, whilst the Company, in consideration of this increase of force have bound themselves to protect my dominions; under such circumstances the expense of the Persian embassy is by no means chargeable to me, neither are the extra military expenses, such, for example, as the dismissed independent regiment of cavalry, &c. chargeable to this sircar; charging the pay and contingent expenses of this corps to me, is a claim never started until now.

4th. Whatever hereditary rights of this state descended to the late Nawab Asoph ul Dowlah now devolve upon me his successor; let me enjoy such rights exclusively, and let all the inheritances of my ancestors, and the whole of the rights attached to my family centre in me, and let no person interfere in or assume them.

5th.—Should any person have obtained or hereafter obtain, by breach of trust or other means, possession of specie or property belonging to this sircar, let no one obstruct my taking back such property or specie.

6th.—Whereas the union and friendship subsisting between his Lordship and myself being obvious, I trust from his Lordship's kindness that all letters passing to and from his Lordship and the dependants of this sircar may henceforth be carried on with my knowledge, and through me, since the present practice is apt to render such people contumacious. It is not my wish to interrupt such correspondence, all I request is, that in consideration of the friendship subsisting between us, such correspondence should in future be carried on through myself and the Resident.

7th.—Should any person prove disobedient to my orders, or should any one disturb the affairs of Government, on such crimes being duly proved, let no one oppose or impede the punishment or banishment of such people.

8th.—After setting apart and delivering over the Jaidad* for the British troops, let a schedule, expressing the names of the Pergunnahs and Mohals, with the respective limits of the countries which shall then remain in my possession, be inserted in the treaty, to the end that there may be

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* Land alienated for a specific payment, or for military service.

as a matter of right and justice, which required no correspondent concession on the part of the Company. His Lordship, therefore, could not enter into the consideration of the

on no account any clashing or interference in such countries; and that thenceforth they (the Company) may possess no sort of interest in a claim upon the said countries which shall descend in perpetuity to the sole and exclusive possession and management of the heirs of this family—it requires time to draw out the schedule, but it shall be sent hereafter.

9th.—All fugitives from the territories of the Sircar coming under the description of murderers, deserters, robbers, or persons in arrears to government, who may take refuge in the Company's provinces, shall be apprehended and delivered up; and on the other hand such persons of the above descriptions, who, flying from the Company's territories, may take refuge in my dominions, shall be seized and surrendered to the Company.

10th.—Whenever and on whatever occasion I may be in want of troops, whether to regulate the country, or to attend my person, let the Resident command the attendance of such a portion of the British troops as the exigency of the case may point out.

11th.—The Company shall engage to impose duties to such extent only upon goods passing from their eastern and western possessions as shall not prove injurious to the sayer or permit customs of this state; grain intended for the consumption of British troops which may at any time be employed at my desire in the countries dependent on me shall be exempt from duty; but all articles for the use of the station of Cawnpore shall hereafter be subject to duties, no exemption from duties will be granted to any person.

12th.—Whatever commotions or disturbances, whether external or internal, may affect the Company's possessions, let the servants of the said Company (according to what his Lordship has written) be alone responsible for the quelling of them; neither shall this sircar have in any shape any concern with the quelling of the disturbances.

13th.—Some arrangement amongst the servants of the Sircar, tending to diminish my expenses, will become indispensable; and to obviate disturbances, it will be necessary to retain such numbers only as can be paid monthly and regularly; this arrangement can only be effected by dismission, and I desire that no intercession be made for any person whatever

14th.—Let the Resident cordially and with sincerity uniting with me, pay no sort of attention to the representations of event-searching, self-interested persons, who are ever on the watch to sow dissensions; and should any circumstance reach his ears, observing the dictates of friendship, let him immediately and candidly acquaint me of it, that without a moment's delay an eclaircissement may take place between us.

15th.—When the matters now under discussion shall have finally been adjusted (according to what his Lordship has written) let no fresh claims, of whatever sort, be advanced; let no increase be demanded, nor, unless by

preliminary and conditional articles proposed by the Vizier in this stage of the transaction, even if the substance of those articles had been exempt from objection. On the other hand, if the Governor-General felt himself to be at liberty to enter into a negotiation respecting the condition of a territorial cession, the tenor of the conditions contained in the proposed articles, is so objectionable in every point of view, that no consideration would induce his Lordship to entertain for a moment, a project disgraceful to the British character, ruinous to the authority and honour of the Nabob Vizier, and incompatible with the dignity and security of his Excellency's parents and relations, or with the general happiness of his subjects.

The Governor-General will not depart from the demand which he has made upon the Nabob Vizier, for the payment of the arrears due by his Excellency on account of the additional troops which the safety of the province of Oude, has required the Company to station in the country; and his Lordship now positively requires the Nabob Vizier to pay into the hands of the President at Lucknow, the whole of that arrear amounting to (*) without further delay.

The Company have actually incurred and defrayed the whole charge of the additional troops, as stated by the Re-

way of advice, interference take place in any one affair in the affairs of Government.

16th.—Let the engagements entered into between his Lordship and this Sircar be firm and permanent, and let such a treaty be now drawn up, that no Governor-General, who shall hereafter be appointed to the charge of the Company's affairs, may have it in his power to alter, change, or infringe the said treaty.

17th.—Let the number of troops, for which a Jaidad shall be granted, always remain within the ceded countries.

18th.—Whenever I may feel inclined to perform pilgrimages, let no hindrance be offered to my departure; such excursions will prove the source of amusement to me, and I shall recover my wonted state of health, which has of late been on the decline.

Sunday, 3d. Mohurrum, 1216, Hidgree.

(A true Translation.) W. SCOTT, Resident.

(A true copy.) N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Secretary to the Government.

* Blank in original.

sident to the Nabob Vizier. The right and duty of the Company to station the additional troops in the Vizier's dominions, has already been fully proved and admitted by the Vizier himself. The exigency of the Company's affairs forbids further delay in the liquidation of this debt. The Governor-General, therefore, expects to learn within a few days that the Vizier has made provision for the discharge of its full amount, and his Lordship requests that no further reference may be made to him, on a question already decided.

The Governor-General will hereafter observe in concert with the Nabob Vizier, the proportion of the expences of the Persian embassies to be charged to the Vizier, but desires that it may be understood to be his Lordship's fixed intention to insist on the Company's right to require from the Vizier, a due proportion of that extraordinary charge incurred for the express purpose of augmenting the security of his Excellency's dominions.

The Governor General has read the remaining articles of the Nabob Vizier's proposition with the utmost degree of regret. His Excellency is concerned to be under the necessity of declaring that the nature of those articles is such as to impress upon his Lordship's mind the most unfavourable apprehensions of the Nabob Vizier's intentions and views. Several of these articles betray the most unjustifiable, undignified and improvident jealousy of the Company's authority and power, especially the 6th, 8th, 15th, 16th and 17th Articles. From these articles it appears that the Nabob Vizier has already forgotten that the safety of his person, and the existence of his government, have been maintained exclusively by the British power, and by the presence of British troops. His Excellency now seems disposed to gratify his unwarrantable suspicions at the hazard of the continuance of his authority over his subjects, and even of his personal safety, by removing the British forces from his territories, and by confiding his government and his life to those whose treason has repeatedly endangered both.

It would be utterly repugnant to the justice and humanity of the Company to uphold the various arbitrary powers and vexatious authorities for the establishment of which the Vizier has solicited the sanction of the British Government in the 1st, 4th, 5th, 7th and 13th Articles.

The object of those articles appears to be, under the shelter the British name, to cancel all the public debts of the state of Oude, to degrade and plunder the ancient and venerable remains of the family and household of Shujah Dowlah, together with whatever is respectable among the surviving relations and servants of the late Nabob Asoph oo Dowlah ; to involve the whole nobility and gentry of Oude, in vexatious accusations and extensive proscriptions ; to deprive the established dependants, pensioners of the state, of the means of subsistence ; to frustrate every institution founded in the piety, munificence, or charity of preceding governments ; and to spread over the whole country a general system of rapacious confiscation, arbitrary imprisonment, and cruel banishment. The Governor-General, in the name of the Company, and the British nation, not only refuses his sanction to every article of a system so adverse to the wisdom and justice of the great nation, whose authority his Lordship represents in India, but his Lordship hereby enters his solemn protest against the evil and odious councils which have so far perverted the judgment of the Nabob Vizier, as to engage his Excellency to propose to the Governor-General to sanction the misery and ruin of a whole people, by the signature of the representative of the British nation in India, and by the seal of the English East India Company. His Excellency must be aware that the slightest intimation of the existence of such designs would inflame to the most alarming heights of passion and despair, that discontent which his Excellency has so frequently represented to constitute the characteristic spirit of the people of Oude. The publication of the articles tendered by his Excellency to the Governor-General, and still more any attempt to carry them into effect, would immediately occasion the most dreadful convulsions in the province of Oude, and would for ever alienate from his Excellency's person and government, every sentiment of affection, obedience or respect. The Governor-General, therefore, not only expresses his anxious hope, that the Nabob Vizier will never revive the project contained in the proposed articles, but his Lordship most earnestly recommends it to his Excellency to exert every possible precaution to prevent the tenor of those propositions from transpiring in his Excellency's court, or among any description of his Excellency's subjects.

With regard to the permanency of any settlement to be

now concluded with the British government, the articles already proposed by the Resident, are sufficient for that purpose. Articles will also be admitted for the purpose of providing ample security for the maintenance of the authority of the Vizier within his remaining territories, to the extent compatible with the general safety of the Company's contiguous possessions.

His Lordship deems it unnecessary to add any further observations on the subject of the Vizier's proposition, and he concludes by repeating in the most express terms, his demand for an immediate liquidation of the arrears of subsidy, and for a speedy adjustment of a competent territorial security.

WELLESLEY.

No. CXXXVI.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 4th June, 1801.

1. My separate instructions, as delivered to Mr. Webbe for your Lordship's information* and guidance, had provided for the contingency of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah's death, and for the arrangements which it would, in that event, be advisable to adopt for the future government of the Carnatic; but your Lordship having intimated the probability of his Highness's immediate demise, I now judge it prudent to furnish your Lordship with my sentiments on that subject, in the form of an official despatch.

2. Whatever right the reputed son of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, may be supposed to possess to the Company's support of his pretensions to the government of the Carnatic on the death of his Highness, is founded on the grounds of the right of his Highness himself: the right of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah to the assistance of the Company, in securing his succession to the Nabob Mahomed Ali, in the govern-

* See Memorandum at p. 525.

ment of Arcot, was founded on the express stipulations of the treaty of 1792; the result of the written and oral evidence, obtained from the papers discovered at Seringapatam has established abundant proof, that the fundamental principles of the alliance between the Company and the house of Mahomed Ali, as well as the express letter of the treaty of 1787, (of which the treaty of 1792 was an indulgent modification) had been absolutely violated and rendered of no effect by the Nabobs Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omrah, previously to the ostensible conclusion of the treaty of 1792. It is manifest, therefore, that the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah could derive no rights from the formal ratification of that instrument, the vital spirit of which had already been annihilated by his Highness's conduct; and that the Nabob Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omrah, by forming an intimate union of interests with Tippoo Sultaun, had placed themselves and their whole house in the relation of public enemies to the British empire in India.

3. Whatever right to the Company's protection and support the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah, may derive from his supposed father, had been utterly destroyed by the hostile conduct of Omdut ul Omrah; and my instructions to your Lordship in consequence of the discovery of the inimical conduct of Mahomed Ali, and of Omdut ul Omrah, having provided for the immediate exercise of the civil and military government of the Carnatic, on the part of the Company, as the only measure of self defence and security under all the circumstances of the case, it follows that the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah, (in the event of his Highness's death previously to your Lordship's execution of my orders) must succeed to the condition of his father; and that the British Government will, in that event, remain at liberty to exercise its rights, founded on the faithless policy of its ally, in whatever manner may be deemed most conducive to the immediate safety, and to the general interests of the Company in the Carnatic.

4. Under this view of the question, the British Government in India is at liberty to proceed to exercise on the part of the Company the civil and military government of the Carnatic, if it should judge that the most advisable plan of arrangement.

5. Many considerations however of expediency and policy must be connected with a measure of so much magnitude: the long established connection between the Company and the house of Mahommed Ali, justifies us in sacrificing to the sentiments of national magnanimity and generosity, the resentment occasioned by his Highness's flagrant breach of the alliance; and in every event it would be incumbent on the British Government to make a pecuniary provision for the family, suitable to its dignity. The discharge of this duty is fully appreciated by the nations of India; but it is by no means certain that, in the event of our proceeding to exercise a right founded on the violation of treaty, and on the necessity of self defence, the powers of Hindostan would refrain from confounding the abstract principles of the general law of nations, with ambitious views of aggrandizement, and extension of dominion. If, therefore, it should be practicable to obtain equal advantage and security for the Company, by relaxing the exercise of its actual rights, and by substituting the more gracious mode of conciliation and indulgence, I am disposed to think under all the circumstances of the case that it will be more consistent with the principles of our policy and character, to adopt the most lenient method of arranging the future government of the Carnatic.

6. In this view of the question it appears to me, that, under the insufficiency of the pretensions of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah's reputed son, as well as of all other claimants, to the government of the Carnatic, no obstacles can be opposed to such an arrangement as the British Government may deem it expedient to adopt for the affairs of the Carnatic; while the proofs of the violation of the alliance between the Company and the house of Mahommed Ali, will furnish your Lordship with abundant reason, upon every principle of precautionary policy and of justice, for reducing the pecuniary stipend of the proposed successor of Omdut ul Omrah to the lowest scale, consistent with the dignity and honour of the British Government.

7. If, therefore, upon the receipt of this despatch, your Lordship should be satisfied of the disposition of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah's reputed son to consent to an adjustment of the affairs of the Carnatic by treaty, on the principles of the draft which I have had the honour of transmitting to

your Lordship, I authorize and direct your Lordship in council to acknowledge the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah to be the heir of his father, and to conclude a treaty with him, as Nabob of the Carnatic, on the terms and conditions which I have specified.

8. But if the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah shall oppose any resistance to such an arrangement, it will be proper for your Lordship in council to proceed to exercise the government of the Carnatic, by publishing the declaration enclosed in my separate despatch of the 28th of May,* with such additions as the change of circumstances shall have rendered necessary, adverting to the reasoning contained in the second and third paragraphs of this despatch.

9. In either of these events the stipend to be granted to the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah, should be diminished below the standard of that proposed for his Highness; and if the government of Fort St. George should be compelled to proceed by declaration, it will be proper that the stipend of Omdut ul Omrah's reputed son should be regulated by the general scale of allowances to be granted for the support of the other branches of Mahommed Ali's family.

I have the honour to be, My Lord,
with great esteem and regard,
Your Lordship's most faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

P. S. Your Lordship will observe that the reasoning applied in this despatch to the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah is equally applicable to any person, whom his Highness may nominate to the succession. It does not appear probable that his Highness will make any other nomination than of his reputed son; but if he should proceed to any such act previously to his dissolution, the person whom he shall name his heir must be acknowledged, and a treaty concluded with him on the conditions already specified.

* See p. 515.

No. CXXXVII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-Colonel Scott, Resident at Lucknow.

SIR,

Fort William, June 15th, 1801.

1. I think it necessary to despatch by express, the following instructions for your immediate direction.

2. You will persevere with the utmost degree of assiduity and firmness, in requiring from the Nabob Vizier the instantaneous liquidation of the whole arrear, due by his Excellency on account of the augmentation of the army in Oude. For this purpose, you will inform his Excellency that you have received my orders to forward to me by express, a daily report of the sums paid into your treasury by his Excellency on account of the balance. You will further apprise his Excellency, that if any additional delay should be created by him in the discharge of this just demand, you have received authority and directions from me to sequester a sufficient portion of his Excellency's revenue for the satisfaction of the Company's claims. The various pretexts which his Excellency now opposes to a claim of which he has repeatedly acknowledged the justice, reduce me to the necessity of proceeding to measures of compulsion, for the recovery of the public rights entrusted to my charge.

3. In pursuance of the spirit of this order, you will sequester the revenue of whatever district shall appear to you to be most convenient for the purpose; observing, that the temporary sequestration of revenue for the discharge of the arrear of a part of the subsidy, is to be kept completely distinct from the permanent territorial cession for the future security of the whole subsidy.

4. I am anxious to learn what progress has been made in the further reduction of the Vizier's military force; and I earnestly desire that you will suffer no consideration to delay for a moment, the completion of that most necessary reform. It is, therefore, my wish that you should make to me a weekly report of the progress of the reduction of his Excellency's troops. It may be useful that the Vizier should know that you have received orders from me to this effect.

5. I entertain a confident expectation that the remarks which I have forwarded to you upon the paper of requests lately received from the Vizier, will have brought his Excellency to a sense of his duties. If, however, I should be disappointed in this hope, I authorize and direct you to proceed, as soon as you may judge convenient, to establish the Company's authority within the whole line of territory described in my recent instructions, with this addition, that under the present circumstances of the case, I think it will be necessary to take possession of the whole of the two districts of Azimghur, and Gorukpoor, instead of adopting the partial line of demarcation drawn through those districts in my recent instructions.

6. It is become matter of serious consideration, whether the conduct of the Vizier may not require the speedy adoption of a more comprehensive arrangement for the complete establishment of the Company's authority over every part of the territory of Oude. In the meanwhile the completion of the territorial cession, as stated in my recent instructions, will facilitate any further settlement which may be deemed expedient.

7. I take this opportunity of apprising you, that it is my intention to visit the Upper Provinces during the approaching season, and that with this view, I hope to be able to embark on the river before the close of the present month. This intelligence will probably afford the Vizier a fresh pretext for procrastination and evasion; but I desire that you will proceed to execute my orders without reference to any subterfuge which his Excellency may hereafter attempt to practice. It is indeed doubtful, whether I may think it expedient either to pay any visit to his Excellency, or to receive any from him during the actual crisis of affairs.

8. His Excellency's object in desiring that his paper of requests should be restored to him is sufficiently obvious. I conclude that you have retained an attested copy of that paper, of which you have sent me the original. If it should become necessary to assume the districts without his Excellency's consent, I desire you to consider whether it may not be expedient to furnish the Begum, Almas Ali Khan, Hussein Reza Khan and the principal personages in Oude, with attested copies of such parts of that paper

as tend to disclose the comprehensive project of confiscation, proscription, and tyrannical violence, entertained by his Excellency against his own family, nobility, and people.

9. If you should concur with me in opinion, that a communication to the persons named and described in the preceding paragraph might be useful, I authorize you to make it, at the period of time, and to the extent, which you may judge advisable.

I am, &c. &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CXXXVIII.

The Earl of Elgin to the Marquess Wellesley.

March 31st, 1801.

MY LORD,

[Received 1st of July, 1801.]

I hasten to acquaint your Lordship that the army under the command of Sir Ralph Abercromby effected a landing on the 8th instant, on the peninsula of Aboukir, in the most brilliant manner, under a very heavy fire from mortars, cannon and musketry; the enemy having withdrawn the whole garrison of Alexandria, and many detachments from their positions in the vicinity to oppose them. Lord Keith, who availed himself of the departure of a vessel from Rhodes to send me this intelligence, refers naturally for all particulars of the operations to Sir Ralph Abercromby's reports. Hitherto I have not received any: but in general I find from Lord Keith, that, after making the necessary preparations on the 9th, 10th, and 11th, the army advanced on the 12th to within five miles of Alexandria; they there took a position, with their right towards the sea, and their left supported by the lake Maadié, where Sir Sidney Smith, who was posted there, with his command of boats, was keeping up a communication with the natives, and supplying the army with fresh provisions and water. On the 13th, at seven in the morning, the enemy made an attack, but were repulsed with loss about eleven. In the meanwhile the marines had been disembarked,

and had relieved the 2nd regiment and the dismounted cavalry in attacking by land the castle of Aboukir, the only post in that peninsula occupied by the enemy. On the 14th at sunset (when the vessel was under weigh,) the troops on shore, and the bomb vessels, were throwing shot and shells into Aboukir: and at the same moment a firing was heard towards Alexandria, which appeared from the *Foudroyant* to be a general attack. It seems that the French, who were evidently resolved on making a great resistance, had concentrated all their force near Alexandria, and towards Cairo; Rosetta, and even Rahmania were evacuated.

A frigate from Rochefort had got into Alexandria on the 2nd instant, bringing advice that Admiral Gantheaume would be there in a few days with (what was stated to be) fourteen ships of the line. The squadron that sailed from Brest, under that commander, had passed Gibraltar on the 9th of February, on its way to Toulon, where it arrived on the 19th, having captured the *Success* frigate.

On the 11th the fleet captured a vessel from Ancona, with ordnance, muskets, shot, arms, sulphur, &c.; another had been run on shore with a similar cargo.

The Capitan Pacha had not joined, but he had reached Rhodes about the 15th of this month, and having embarked some thousand men, who were there in readiness, will, it is supposed, have been off the coast of Egypt about the 24th.

The Grand Vizier marched forwards from Jaffa on the 25th ultimo, having, according to Major Halloway's letters to me, received a reinforcement of 2,000 men, and with his army in greater order and spirits than had before been observed.

Lord Keith acquaints me that he has intelligence of the French being still in Toulon on the 20th of February. He adds that Sir John Warren was at Minorca with five ships of the line.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect, my Lord,
your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

ELGIN.

No. CXXXIX.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Hon. Henry Wellesley.

SIR,

Fort William, July 5th, 1801.

1. Having reason to apprehend that his Excellency the Vizier has adopted a systematic course of evasion and delay for the purpose of frustrating the issue of the depending negotiations, and having received intimation that his Excellency may attempt to pass over the present season without concluding any final engagement with the British Government, under the pretext of awaiting my expected arrival at Lucknow, I have thought it expedient to despatch you forthwith to Lucknow with public credentials to the Vizier, and with full power to bring the negotiation to an immediate issue. The various exigencies of the public service being likely to detain me at Fort William for some time, your appearance at Lucknow is, in my judgment, the most advantageous measure which can be substituted for my actual presence at that city. You will, therefore, proceed with all practicable expedition to Lucknow, and I have directed Messrs. J. Forbes and R. Strachey to accompany you in the capacity of assistants, and Lieut. Armstrong, one of my Aides-de-Camp, to attend you during your mission.

2. You have either already inspected, or you will examine at Lucknow, the whole correspondence upon the subject of the late negotiations with the Vizier; it is unnecessary, therefore, to enter into any detail of past transactions, or of the actual state of affairs.

3. You are hereby vested with full powers to conclude, in concert with Lieut.-Colonel Scott, one or more treaties conformable to the instructions which Lieut.-Colonel Scott has already received. On all points of the negotiation my wish is, that you should act in concert with Lieut.-Colonel Scott, and that he should be a party to the signature of any treaty which you may conclude. The general object of your mission is to confirm the representations of Lieut.-Colonel Scott, by the most direct application of my authority; and my high estimation of the zeal, talents and knowledge of Lieut.-Colonel Scott, together with my entire approbation of all his pro-

ceedings, render me desirous to manifest every mark of respect and consideration for him. In this disposition I am satisfied that your personal knowledge of Lieut.-Colonel Scott's merits will induce you to concur with a degree of cordiality, which cannot be described by an official order. It is, however, necessary to vest you with the exclusive power of concluding with the Vizier, in my name, such arrangements as may appear to you, on a full consideration of these instructions, to be consistent with my intentions, and accordingly I hereby vest you with that exclusive power. In adverting to this part of your instructions, you will, therefore, understand that I wish you on every occasion to act jointly with Lieut.-Colonel Scott, and to render your appearance at Lucknow an effectual confirmation of his influence and authority: while, on the other hand, you will not hesitate to act under your exclusive powers, if you should judge such a measure to be indispensably necessary to the success of your mission.

4. The primary object of your mission is to endeavour to obtain the Vizier's acquiescence in the terms of the first proposition submitted to his Excellency by Lieut.-Colonel Scott with or without such modifications as have been authorized by my instructions to Lieut.-Colonel Scott.

5. The subject has been so fully discussed through the Resident, that no hopes of success can be entertained from a renewal of this branch of the negotiation through the same channel. My present hope of success is founded upon the probable effect which may be produced upon his Excellency's mind by the revival of my former statements and arguments, supported by the influence which you must derive from your near connection with me and from the peculiar circumstances of your mission.

6. If you should fail in the primary object of your mission, the next object will be, to obtain his Excellency's consent to the second proposition submitted to the Vizier by Lieut.-Colonel Scott, with all its attendant conditions and provisions.

7. By the Resident's despatches it appears that his Excellency is determined to withhold his consent from the proposed territorial cession, but to refrain from any direct and open opposition to the measure.

8. I am of opinion that his Excellency's conduct in pursuing this plan is governed by one of the following considerations. His Excellency may possibly have been led to believe that the rumoured resignation of his Majesty's ministers at home, may soon produce a change in the administration of this country, or that my measures may not meet with the same countenance and support under another administration, which they might have been expected to obtain under that which entrusted the government of India to my hands.

9. The peculiar advantages under which you will be enabled to renew the negotiation affords the best prospect of removing these erroneous impressions from his Excellency's mind.

10. Previous to your arrival at Lucknow it is possible that one of the following contingencies may have occurred.

Firstly. The Resident may have proceeded to act under the authority vested in him to establish the Company's troops in the districts proposed for cession, and the measure may be in a course of execution previously to the receipt of my orders, directing a suspension of that measure.

Secondly. His Excellency the Vizier may have consented to the cession of territory without acquiescing in the arrangements which I have deemed indispensably necessary to accompany the cession.

Thirdly. His Excellency may have consented to the territorial cession with all its attendant arrangements, and may have entered into a treaty with the Resident for that purpose.

11. In the first case your object must be to endeavour to induce the Vizier to confirm the appropriation of the territory, and to consent to the arrangements which I have deemed necessary to be made in the Vizier's remaining dominions.

12. In the second case you will endeavour to persuade the Vizier to acquiesce in the additional arrangements to which I have adverted in paragraph 6; but whatever arrangements may have taken place previously to your arrival, founded on the basis of a territorial cession, it is my desire that the negotiation for an arrangement upon the terms of the first proposition submitted to the Vizier by Lieut.-Colonel Scott, should be renewed. Accordingly I direct that, under any

state of circumstances, you resume the discussion of the first proposition; for this purpose I have prepared a representation, in writing, to be presented by you to his Excellency.

13. The instructions which have been from time to time transmitted to the Resident, and the correspondence which has passed between his Excellency the Vizier and me, together with the Resident's letters, contain so comprehensive a view of the subject that it is unnecessary to furnish you with any specific instructions for the purpose of regulating the course of argument to be adopted on this occasion.

14. Although an arrangement, concluded in the terms specified in the first proposition, appears to me to be calculated to provide for the security of the various interests involved in the administration of the dominion of Oude in a more effectual manner than any other plan which could be devised, yet with a view to meet the wishes of his Excellency, I shall be disposed to concur in any modification of the terms of the first proposition consistent with the preservation of the general spirit and principles of the proposed arrangement.

15. If, therefore, in conformity to his Excellency's original proposition, his Excellency should desire to relinquish the musnud of Oude to one of his sons, you are hereby authorized and directed to acquiesce in that proposition, under stipulations conformable to the general spirit and principles of my uniform endeavours to secure the civil and military government of Oude in the hands of the Company.

16. With a view to guide you in concluding an arrangement upon this basis, I refer you to the copy of a treaty concluded with the Rajah of Tanjore, now in the possession of Lieut.-Colonel Scott, to the draft of a treaty with the Vizier, prepared by Lieut.-Colonel Scott, and to a copy herewith transmitted of the draft of a treaty lately forwarded to Fort St. George for the perpetual transfer of the civil and military government of the Carnatic to the Company. In the event either of the Vizier's acquiescence in the first proposition in his own person, or of his abdication in favour of his son, I desire that you will enter into engagements with the Prince possessing the musnud, corresponding, as far as local circumstances may admit, with the terms and stipulations of the treaty recently forwarded to Fort St. George.

17. If every attempt to obtain his Excellency the Vizier's

consent to any arrangement, founded upon the terms of the first proposition, should prove fruitless, you will then employ your endeavours to effect an arrangement, upon the basis of the second proposition, in the manner already described.

18. It is possible, however, that his Excellency, with a view to avoid the reproach which he attaches to the measure of a territorial cession, may think it expedient to resign the government in favour of his son, and to leave that Prince to conclude the terms of a territorial cession with the Company, on the basis of the second proposition.

19. No material objection exists to preclude such an arrangement, and I accordingly empower you, in the case supposed to acquiesce in his Excellency's abdication, and to conclude a treaty for the cession of the proposed territory to the Company, with his Excellency's son as successor to the musnud of Oude.

20. It must, however, be distinctly understood that, in the event of his Excellency's abdication, under the circumstances stated in the (15th) and (18th) paragraphs, no separate provision can be allowed for his maintenance, and under whatever circumstances his Excellency may relinquish the government, it will be necessary that he should remove from the dominions of Oude into the Company's provinces. The reasoning upon this subject, contained in my address to his Excellency, of the 9th of February, 1800, is applicable to any supposed case of his Excellency's abdication.

21. In providing for the case of his Excellency's eventual abdication, I have supposed that his eldest son alone can be proposed to succeed to the vacant musnud, and under present circumstances I cannot consent to the establishment of any other person in the rank of Nabob of Oude.

22. The preceding instructions, will serve to apprise you of the general tenor of my sentiments respecting the conduct of this important negotiation. I shall occasionally transmit to you such further directions as circumstances may appear to require.

23. It is my intention to proceed on my journey to the upper provinces as soon as the situation of public affairs shall admit of my absence from the Presidency.

24. In the event of my having arrived within a short distance from Lucknow at the period of time when your negotiation shall have been brought to a close, and when the

result shall have been reduced to the form of written engagements, it is my desire that those engagements should be transmitted to me previously to their final conclusion, but if such a reference should appear to you likely to be attended with material delay, or to hazard the failure of your negotiation, you are in that event authorized to conclude those engagements without previous reference to me.

I am, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CXL.

Lord Clive to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Fort St. George, July 5th, 1801.

The reports which have been made to me relative to the state of his Highness the Nabob's health, have prevented my carrying into execution the orders contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 28th of May.*

The malady which afflicts his Highness has now attained so great an ascendancy as to leave no expectation of the continuance of his Highness's existence for any considerable period of time.

Under this impression, I am informed that means have been used by a part of his Highness's family to introduce armed men into the palace of Chepauk.

I have, therefore, judged it expedient to station a party of the Company's troops at the palace of Chepauk, for the purpose of preserving order until an arrangement of the affairs of the Carnatic can be effected.

Your Lordship is aware that a measure of this nature cannot be acceptable to many parts of the family of his Highness the Nabob; and I am prepared to expect that objections will continue to be opposed to it, founded on considerations connected with the present debility of his Highness's mind and body.

If any measure of less apparent decision and efficiency could have guarded against the commotion which might be expected at the demise of the Nabob from the variety of

* See p. 515.

prevailing interests, and from the actual intention of an appeal to arms, your Lordship will believe that I should have studiously avoided any step likely to agitate the feelings of the Nabob's mind, or those of any part of his Highness's family, at this crisis of his disorder. But the measure was indispensably necessary to the immediate security of the Nabob's family, to the future arrangement of the affairs of the Carnatic, and to the dignity of the British Government: I have, therefore, rendered it effectual.

I have the satisfaction of informing your Lordship that the party of troops, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Mac Neil, has taken a position which commands the entrance of his Highness's palace, without producing any commotion on the part of his Highness's family, dependents or troops; and your Lordship may rely, that every degree of conciliation and humanity, consistent with the secure attainment of the ultimate object of this arrangement, will be observed in the further communication with the Nabob, and with every part of his Highness's family.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord, &c. &c.

CLIVE.

No. CXLI.

Lord Clive to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Fort St. George, 15th July, 1801.

I have the honour of informing your Lordship, that his Highness the Nabob Omdut ul Omra departed this life about nine o'clock this morning.

The arrangement which I informed your Lordship had been made for the preservation of order, at the palace of Chepauk, upon the occurrence of his Highness's death, has completely answered the purposes intended by that measure, and I have the satisfaction of acquainting your Lordship, that entire tranquillity prevails throughout the neighbourhood of Chepauk, and of Madras.

This measure of precaution proved to be entirely satisfactory to the mind of the late Nabob, from the time his Highness became acquainted with the intention of it. Tippoo Padsha, (or Hussain ul Moolk), the fourth son of the late

Mahammed Ali, from whom principally I expected an attempt to excite a commotion on the death of the Nabob is at present under the protection of the troops stationed at Chepauk.

Previously to the receipt of your Lordship's despatches committed to the charge of Mr. Webbe, I had determined to take immediate measures on the demise of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, for exercising the Government of the Carnatic on the part of the Company; but since the receipt of those despatches, which define more distinctly your Lordship's wishes in regard to the mode of executing that intention, I have judged it advisable to suspend the declaration of the right of the British Government to assume the administration of the affairs of the Carnatic, and to preserve the gracious appearance of national forbearance and moderation, as long as it might be consistent with the actual security of the British interests.

With this view I deputed Mr. Webbe, and Lieut.-Colonel Close, to the palace of Chepauk for the purpose of conferring with the principal officers of the late Nabob upon the subject of any arrangement which it might have been the intention of his Highness Omdut ul Omra to provide for administering the affairs of his family and of his government.

An authentic will was produced to the deputies, under the seal and signature of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, appointing his reputed son Ali Hussein Khan, (or Taj ul Omra,) to be the heir and successor to all his Highness's possessions of every description, and nominating Nujeeb Khan, and Tuckea Ali Khan, to be the guardians and supporters of his Highness's reputed son.

In conformity to my conditional instructions the deputies proceeded to disclose to the guardians Tuckea Ali Khan, and Nujeeb Khan, the nature of the discoveries which had been made respecting the breach of the alliance between the Company, and the late Nabobs Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omra, by the hostile conduct of their Highnesses. Having explained during this conference the entire grounds on which the right of the Company, to use its discretion in securing the interests pledged to it is founded, the deputies pressed Tuckea Ali Khan, and Nujeeb Khan to concur in a negotiation for an amicable adjustment of the affairs of the Carnatic, rather than to compel the British Government to proceed to the exercise of its own rights and power.

The plea of delay founded on the decency and necessity of providing for the immediate funeral of the late Nabob, was urged in a manner so consistent with public decorum, and with the feelings natural to the family of his Highness on this occasion, that Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe, judged it expedient to allow a latitude until seven o'clock to-morrow evening, for the declaration of a final answer to the proposition of an adjustment by negotiation.

In granting this latitude, the deputies were careful to refuse all validity to the will of the late Nabob, and concluded the conference by an assurance to the guardians, that, upon their answer to be given at the next conference, would absolutely depend, either the acknowledgement of the will of Omdut ul Omra by the Company, or the necessity of asserting the rights of the Company, by proceeding to exercise the civil and military government of the Carnatic.

The guardians having declared their intention to give a categorical answer at the time proposed, I shall be prepared at the expiration of it to act according to the termination of the conference, either by acknowledging the succession of Taj ul Omra and receiving possession of the Carnatic through the channel of negociation, or by asserting the right of the Company, and immediately proceeding to exercise the government of the Carnatic.

I should have availed myself of the earliest opportunity of opening a negociation with his late Highness the Nabob Omdut ul Omra upon the grounds of your Lordship's despatches; but having satisfied myself on the solemn declaration of his Highness's physician taken on oath, that the communication of important business at the time of my receiving your Lordship's instructions, might have been attended with fatal consequences to the life of the Nabob, I refrained from informing his Highness of the arrival of those despatches. The gradual decay of the Nabob has since continued to render it impracticable for me on the same motives of humanity, to make any communication to his Highness, founded on your Lordship's instructions.

I have the honour to be,
with the greatest respect and esteem,
Your Lordship's most faithful servant,
CLIVE.

No. CXLI.

Lord Clive to the Marquess Wellesley.

Fort St. George, 20th July, 1801.

MY DEAR LORD,

[Received 2nd August, 1801.]

It is not without the most real and unaffected concern that I acquaint your Lordship of the entire failure of what had yesterday so fair a prospect of being brought to an amicable and satisfactory termination, the proposed arrangement with the reputed son of the late Nabob. I met the young man this afternoon in the full expectation of finding him prepared to enter into such engagements as I deemed necessary for the future accomplishment of your Lordship's intentions, but notwithstanding the favourable disposition evinced by him yesterday, and his explicit assurance of acceding to my propositions, he has since suffered himself to be turned from what appeared to have been his genuine resolution, and has finally rejected them in deference to the advice of those by whom he is surrounded, and by whose influence he seems to be entirely controled. An earnest desire of bringing this important business to an amicable issue, and I may add a feeling of regard for this youth, have induced me to afford him every reasonable latitude of time to weigh and consider his own situation and interest. But since these measures of conciliation and forbearance have failed, and the consequences of his rejection of the Company's liberal offers have been stated to the young man in my presence in distinct and forcible terms, I feel that I have discharged what humanity and a sense of the forlorn situation of the young man required of me.

Considering, therefore, all treaty with Hussein Ali as concluded, I am now proceeding, according as I conceive, to the spirit of your Lordship's instructions, to open a negociation with the son of the Ameer, to which I expect a more favourable, certainly a more speedy result. I trust your Lordship will be persuaded that no delay which could with propriety have been avoided, has taken place, and that my unremitting attention has been and will continue to be employed to bring

this delicate and important business to the best practicable conclusion.

The details of this affair which has branched out to a considerable extent, will be prepared and transmitted to your Lordship with all possible expedition.

I am always with the greatest esteem and regard,

My dear Lord,

most faithfully yours, &c.

CLIVE.

No. CXLIII.

Lord Clive to the Marquess Wellesley.

Fort St. George, 27th July, 1801.

MY DEAR LORD,

[Received 14th August, 1801.

In my private letter dated the 20th instant,* I had the honour to acquaint your Lordship of the entire failure of my endeavours to effect a satisfactory arrangement of the affairs of the Carnatic with Hussein Ali, the reputed son of the late Nabob Omdut ul Omra, and of my intention of opening a negotiation with Azim ud Dowlah the undoubted and only son of the Ameer, to which I expected a speedy and favourable result. In that expectation I have not been disappointed, and I am now enabled to congratulate your Lordship upon my having brought this important business to the best conclusion according to my judgment, of which, in the present situation of things it was susceptible. I am aware that in your Lordship's instructions brought by Mr. Webbe,† no order is prescribed for treating with Azim ul Dowlah in the event of the failure of negotiation with Hussein Ali. But when your Lordship drew those instructions I am persuaded that it was not more in your Lordship's contemplation than it was in mine when I received them, that Ali Hussein could be so infatuated and misled, as finally, under the circumstances of doubt which overhang his birth, and of disqualification arising from the faithless conduct of his reputed father, to reject the terms by which alone he could have become Nabob of the Carnatic, and to place himself in

* See p. 550.

† See p. 525.

the situation of a pensioner dependent on the bounty of the Company. Such, however, after an explanation which my sense of duty, and a feeling for the mild and gentle qualities of Ali Hussein induced me to offer in terms of kindness and persuasion, although in the most explicit manner, was his deliberate determination.

Combining then the instructions brought by Mr. Webbe with those imparted by your Lordship in March* 1800, which appear to me to apply, in some essential points, to the actual state of affairs, considering the inefficient and dispersed state of our military force at this Presidency, and what it has to perform, as well as the precarious and unpleasant situation of domestic politics; and being convinced that your Lordship fully concurs with me in what irresistibly presses upon my mind, the expediency of obtaining an effectual control over the Carnatic, by negotiation, if practicable, rather than by assumption by force, I please myself with the belief that in concluding a treaty† with Azim ul Dowlah, I have acted according to the spirit of your intentions, and that had your other important duties allowed of your presence here, the measure now adopted would have been your own; and knowing the liberality with which your Lordship views the conduct of those whom you confidentially trust, I have no apprehension in submitting to your judgment a transaction which places Azim ul Dowlah on the Musnud and the control of the Carnatic in the Company.

In the early part of this business the reports I received of this young man made me doubt the prudence of bringing him forward. He was represented to exhibit a ferocity of manner and incapacity, the consequence of a long exclusion from society. I have, therefore, been most agreeably undeceived upon these points, both by the reports made to me by the deputies and by my own observation; and I can with truth assure your Lordship that the reverse of what has been asserted characterizes Azimul Dowlah. His figure is manly, his countenance open and expressive; in conversation his language is good, and even elegant, and so far is he from being deficient, that we had more than one occasion to notice the shrewdness and readiness of his replies; indeed, the

* See p. 249.

† See Appendix.

manner in which he spoke of the late Nabob and the other branches of his family, as well as the sentiments which he expressed regarding them, indicate an elevation of mind the more pleasing and striking, perhaps because not expected.

Your Lordship will notice, in the treaty, an article by which Azim ul Dowlah acknowledges the right of the Company to certain debts; and a secret article, which has not been submitted to the Council, stipulates the payment of the cavalry-loan at an early period. In consequence of reports of treasure belonging to the Sircar, to a very large amount, being within the precincts of Chepauk, (to which reports I give credit) I have thought it incumbent on me to take this measure for the eventual liquidation of the debt due to the Company. Should this intelligence be correct, the result must be productive of great advantage, not only to this presidency, but of general relief to the finances of India.

I have the honour to be,
with the greatest regard and esteem,
my dear Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful servant,

CLIVE.

July 27th, 1801.

Declaration of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, by and with the authority of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in council of all the British possessions in India.

An alliance of the most intimate union and friendship has long subsisted between the Honourable English East India Company, and the family of their Highnesses Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omrah, late Nabobs of the Carnatic Payen Ghaut. By the aid of that alliance, his late Highness the Nabob Mahomed Ali was enabled under Providence, to support his pretensions to the possession of the Carnatic at the death of his illustrious father; to defeat the power of his enemies in arms, and finally to establish his authority in the Government of Arcot, and of its dependencies, on the foundations of the British power. For the defence and protection of the valuable possessions thus acquired by the united arms of the English Company, and of the Nabob of Arcot, various treaties and obligations have been established, by which it was intended that the interests, security and power of both parties in the Carnatic Payen Ghaut, should be cemented

and identified. In conformity to the faith and spirit of those engagements the honourable Company has invariably employed not only the resources derived from that alliance, but the whole power of the British empire in India, to maintain the government of the late Nabobs of the Carnatic against all their enemies, and has caused them to be acknowledged by foreign states as the allies of the British nation. By these means, and by the unabated exertion of its whole power, the English nation was enabled during the war which continued from the year 1780 to the year 1783, to support the pretensions of the Nabob Mahomed Ali, and to rescue his dominions from the violence of Hyder Ali Khan, and of his successor Tippoo Sultaun, who, by the assistance of the French nation had been enabled to conquer a considerable part of the Carnatic, and to establish their authority over the greatest portion of the territorial possessions of the said Nabob.

To support the authority of the Nabob Mahomed Ali, and to secure the British interests in the Carnatic, it became expedient for the contracting parties to enter into specific engagements for the maintenance of an adequate military establishment. The English Company accordingly bound itself by a treaty, bearing date in the month of February, 1787, to maintain the whole military force required for the protection of the territories of the allies; in consideration of which engagement, the Nabob Mahomed Ali agreed, among other conditions, and under certain penalties therein specified, to pay an annual subsidy amounting to fifteen lacs of pagodas.

According to the further stipulations of that engagement, rendered necessary by experience for the mutual safety of the contracting parties, the English Company in the year 1790, charged itself with the administration of the civil government in addition to the military defence of the Carnatic, in a critical juncture of affairs, when the ambition and implacable enmity of the late Tippoo Sultaun compelled the British Government in India, to resort to arms for the support of its rights, and for the protection of its allies.

At the conclusion of the war, in the year 1792, (the successful and glorious termination of which tended in the most direct manner, to secure the safety and prosperity of the possessions of his Highness the Nabob of the Carnatic) the British Government restored the civil government of the Carnatic to his Highness, thereby manifesting the strictest adherence to the stipulations of the existing engagement of 1787; but the British Government did not confine itself to the mere discharge of the stipulations of its existing engagements; its views were extended to an enlarged and liberal consideration of the principles of the alliance subsisting between the Company, and the Nabobs of the Carnatic.

At that period of time the Nabob Mahomed Ali, relying on the friendly disposition of the British Government, represented in the most urgent manner to the Marquess Cornwallis, the inadequacy of his Highness's resources to discharge the pecuniary engagements of the treaty of 1787; and the Governor-General, acting in conformity to the spirit of the alliance and friendship so long subsisting between the Nabobs of the Carnatic, and the English Company, relieved his Highness from the burthensome terms

of that engagement; thereby surrendering the pecuniary rights, acquired by the Company under the treaty of 1787, for the purpose of promoting the tranquillity, comfort and interests of the Nabob Mahomed Ali.

With this liberal view of the principles of the connexion established between the British Government and the Nabob of Arcot, an indulgent modification of the treaty of 1787 was framed, and by a subsequent treaty, bearing date in the month of July, 1792, the pecuniary contribution of his Highness the Nabob of the Carnatic towards the general defence and protection of the rights and possessions of the allies was diminished from fifteen to nine lacs of star pagodas. The spirit of moderation by which the British councils were guided, in respect to this alliance, was unequivocally manifested by a further stipulation for the purpose of securing to the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, the son and presumptive heir of the Nabob Mahomed Ali, the succession to the territories of his father, on the terms and conditions of the treaty of 1792.

In return for this relinquishment of a considerable portion of its pecuniary resources, the English Company obtained no other advantages than an extended renewal of the territorial security, already provided by the treaty of 1787, for the performance of the Nabob Mahomed Ali's pecuniary engagements, and a repetition of his Highness's previous obligation not to contract alliances, nor to enter into correspondence with any European or native power, without the knowledge and concurrence of the British Government. Conformably therefore to this indulgent modification of the treaty of 1787, the government of the Carnatic was restored to the Nabob Mahomed Ali. On the death of his Highness the Nabob Mahomed Ali, in the year 1795, the Nabob Omdut ul Omra succeeded to the possession of his father's territories, according to the provision of the treaty of 1792.

The Nabob Mahomed Ali, as well as his son and successor, had repeatedly granted tuncaws and assignments of revenue on the districts pledged to the Company, in direct violation of the treaty of 1792, and to the manifest injury of the territorial security provided by the Company, for its interests in the Carnatic. The British Government however, continued to extend to their Highnesses the indulgent operation of the beneficial conditions of the treaty of 1792, by abstaining from the exercise of the just rights acquired against their Highnesses, under the express stipulations of that engagement, and under the acknowledged interpretation of the law of nations.

Under these circumstances, the British Government might justly have required from the house of Mahomed Ali, not merely the exact and rigid observation of the treaty of 1792, but a zealous and cordial attachment to the spirit of an engagement, under which the Nabobs of the Carnatic had found the most ample protection, accompanied by the most indulgent and liberal construction of every stipulation favourable to their separate interests, and by the most lenient relaxation of those penal articles, the obligation of which their Highnesses had respectively incurred by violating the article of the treaty of 1792, relative to the grants of tuncaws, or assignments of revenue, on the districts pledged to the Company.

It is with the deepest concern, that the Governor in council is compelled to declare, that these ancient allies of the Company, the Nabobs Mahomet Ali, and Omdut ul Omra, have been found not only deficient in every active duty of the alliance, but unfaithful to its fundamental principles and untrue to its vital spirit.

In the full enjoyment of the most abundant proofs of the moderation, indulgence and good faith of the Honourable Company, the Nabob Mahomed Ali, and the Nahob Omdut ul Omra, actually commenced and maintained a secret intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun, the determined enemy of the British name, founded on principles, and directed to objects, utterly subversive of the alliance between the Nabob of the Carnatic and the Company, and equally incompatible with the security of the British power in the Peninsula of India.

After the fall of Seringapatam, the British Government obtained possession of the original records of Tippoo Sultaun; the correspondence of that Prince's ambassadors, during their residence at Fort St. George, in attendance on his sons, the hostage princes, in the year 1792, and 1793, established sufficient grounds of apprehension, that their Highnesses, the late Nabob Mahomed Ali, and the late Nahob Omdut ul Omra, had entered into a secret intercourse with the late Tippoo Sultaun, of a nature hostile to the British interests in India. The enquiries of the British Government have been since directed to ascertain a fact so intimately connected with the security of its rights in the Carnatic. The result has established the following propositions by a series of connected written and oral testimony.

First. At the very period of time when the Nahob Mahomed Ali appealed to the generosity of the British Government for an indulgent modification of the treaty of 1787, his Highness had already commenced a secret negotiation for the establishment of an intimate intercourse with the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun, without the knowledge of the British Government, and for purposes evidently repugnant to its security and honour.

Secondly. The Nabob Omdut ul Omra (who was empowered by the Nabob Mahomed Ali to negotiate the treaty of 1792 with the British Government, and who actually negotiated that treaty for himself and for his father) was actually employed at the same period of time under his father's authority, in negotiating for himself and for his father the terms of the said separate and secret intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun.

Thirdly. The tendency of the said intercourse was directed to the support of Tippoo Sultaun in victory and triumph over all his enemies.

Fourthly. In the month of December 1792, the Nabob Mahomed Ali imparted secret information to Tippoo Sultaun regarding the sentiments and intentions of the British Government in India with relation to the hostile views and negotiations of Tippoo Sultaun at the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad; and on the first intelligence of the war between Great Britain and France in the year 1793, the Nabob Mahomed Ali imparted secret information to Tippoo Sultaun respecting the views and power of France in India and in Europe, and respecting the intended operations of the British forces against the French possessions in the Carnatic; and the Nabob

Mahomed Ali conveyed to Tippoo Sultaun secret admonitions and friendly advice respecting the most favourable season and the most propitious state of circumstances for the violation of Tippoo Sultaun's engagements with the Honourable Company.

Fifthly. The Nabob Omdut ul Omra was employed by his father as one of the agents to convey secret intelligence, friendly admonition, and seasonable advice to Tippoo Sultaun, through the confidential agents of Tippoo Sultaun, who were furnished with instructions from the said Sultaun of Mysore to receive such communications from the said Nabob of the Carnatic, and from the Nabob Omdut ul Omra.

Sixthly. A cypher was composed and actually introduced into the separate and secret correspondence between the Nabob Mahomed Ali and Tippoo Sultaun. The original key of the said cypher, discovered among the records of Seringapatam, is in the handwriting of the confidential Moonshee (or secretary) of the Nabob Mahomed Ali, and of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra; and the said cypher was delivered by a confidential agent of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra to the ambassador of Tippoo Sultaun for the express purpose of being transmitted to Tippoo Sultaun.

Seventhly. The terms employed in the said cypher, particularly those intended to designate the British Government and its allies, the Nizam and the Mahratta State, united in a defensive league against Tippoo Sultaun, contain the most powerful internal evidence that the communications proposed to be disguised by the said cypher, were of the most hostile tendency to the interests and objects of the said alliance, and calculated to promote the cause of Tippoo Sultaun in opposition to that of the said allies.

Eighthly. The Nabob Omdut ul Omra, in his own hand writing, in the month of August, 1794, corroborated the evidence of his intention to complete the purposes herein described of the secret intercourse which he had negotiated with Tippoo Sultaun; and the continuance of the same intention is manifested by letters from the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, and from his confidential agent, addressed to the supposed agent of Tippoo Sultaun in the year 1796, subsequently to the Nabob Omdut ul Omra's accession to the government of the Carnatic under the treaty of 1792.

Ninthly. At the commencement, and during the progress of the late just, necessary, and glorious war with the late Tippoo Sultaun, the Nabob Omdut ul Omra to the utmost extent of his means and power, pursued the object of his secret intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun by a systematic course of deception with respect to the provision of the funds necessary to enable the British troops to march into Mysore, as well as by a systematic and active opposition to the supply and movement of the allied army through different parts of the said Nabob's dominions.

Tenthly. The stipulations contained in the fifteenth article of the treaty of 1787, and the tenth article of the treaty of 1792, by which the Nabobs of the Carnatic were bound not to enter into any political negotiations or correspondence with any European or native power or state without the consent of the Government of Fort St. George or of the Company, formed a fundamental condition of the alliance between the said Nabob and the

Company, and the violation of the said stipulations necessarily involved the entire forfeiture on the part of the Nabob of all the benefits of the said alliance.

Eleventhly. The Nabob Mahomed Ali and the Nabob Omdut ul Omra have violated the said stipulations, and have thereby forfeited all the benefits of the said alliance ; and the Nabob Mahomed Ali, and the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah having violated the said stipulations for the express purpose of establishing an union of interests with Tippoo Sultaun, thereby placed themselves in the condition of public enemies to the British Government in India.

It is manifest, therefore, that the intentions of the Nabobs Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omra have been uniformly and without interruption hostile to the British power in India ; and that those intentions have been carried into effect to the full extent of the actual power possessed by their Highnesses respectively at the several periods of time in which they have acted in pursuance of their system of co-operation with the enemy.

By acting on these principles of conduct, the Nabobs Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omra not only violated the rights of the Company, but by uniting their interests with those of the most implacable enemy of the British Empire, the Nabobs Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omra actually placed themselves in the relation of public enemies to the British Government, dangerous to the extent of their respective power, and active according to the means and opportunities afforded to them by the circumstance of the moment, and especially by the most severe exigency and pressure of war. Every principle of public law, therefore, released the British Government from the intended obligations of the treaty of 1792, and every consideration of self-defence and security authorized the Company to exercise its power in the manner most expedient for the purpose of frustrating the hostile councils of the late Nabob of the Carnatic, modelled upon the artful example, actuated by the faithless spirit, and sanctioned by the testamentary voice of his father.

In proceeding to exercise this right it was painful to the British Government to be compelled to expose to the world all these humiliating proofs of the ingratitude and treachery of the Nabobs Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omra towards the power which has uniformly proved their guardian and protector ; but in acting from the impression of this sentiment, the British Government was more desirous of consulting its own dignity than of admitting any claims on the part of those infatuated princes to its generosity and forbearance.

In conformity to this spirit of temperance and moderation, it was the intention of the British Government to have made a formal communication to the Nabob Omdut ul Omra of the proofs which had been obtained of his Highness's breach of the alliance, with the view of obtaining, by the most lenient means, satisfaction for the injury sustained by the British Government, and security against the future operation of the hostile councils of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra.

Circumstances of expediency, connected with the general interests and policy of the British Government, interrupted the communication of this

demand to the Nabob Omdut ul Omra: the intermediate illness of his Highness protracted the execution of that intention, and his subsequent death frustrated the wish of the British Government, to obtain from that Prince satisfactory security for the rights pledged to the Company in the Carnatic.

The death of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra has not affected the rights acquired by the British Government under the discovery of his breach of the alliance. Whatever claim the reputed son of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra may be supposed to possess to the Company's support of his pretensions to the Government of the Carnatic, is founded on the grounds of the rights of Omdut ul Omra himself: the right of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra to the assistance of the Company in securing his succession to the Nabob Mahomed Ali in the government of the Carnatic was founded on the express stipulations of the treaty of 1792: the result of the propositions stated in this declaration has established abundant proof that the fundamental principles of the alliance between the Company and the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, as well as the express letter of the treaty of 1792, had been absolutely violated and rendered of no effect by the Nabobs Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omra, previously to the ostensible conclusion of that instrument. It is manifest, therefore, that the Nabob Omdut ul Omra could derive no rights from the formal ratification of that treaty, the vital spirit of which had already been annihilated by the hostile and faithless conduct of his Highness; and that the Nabobs Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omra, by forming an intimate union of interests with Tippoo Sultaun had actually placed themselves in the relation of public enemies to the British empire in India.

Whatever claim to the Company's protection and support the reputed son of Omdut ul Omra may derive from his supposed father had been utterly destroyed by the hostile conduct of Omdut ul Omra: it follows, therefore, that the reputed son of Omdut ul Omra has succeeded to the condition of his father, which condition was that of a public enemy, and consequently that, at the death of Omdut ul Omra, the British Government remained at liberty to exercise its rights, founded on the faithless policy of its ally, in whatever manner might be deemed most conducive to the immediate safety and to the general interests of the Company in the Carnatic.

Before the British Government proceeded to exercise this right, founded on the violation of the alliance and on the necessity of self-defence, it was desirous of manifesting its attention to the long established connection between the Company and the house of Omdut ul Omra, by sacrificing to the sentiments of national magnanimity and generosity the resentment created by his Highness's flagrant breach of the alliance. In the spirit of those councils, therefore, with which it had been the intention of the British Government to demand satisfaction and security from Omdut ul Omra, and to avoid the publication of facts so humiliating to the family of that Prince, the British Government communicated to the reputed son of Omdut ul Omra, knowledge of the proofs now existing in the possession of the Government of Fort St. George, of the violation of

the alliance; at the same time the British Government manifested a consistent adherence to the principles of moderation and forbearance by opening a latitude to the reputed son of Omdut ul Omra to afford, by means of an amicable adjustment, that satisfaction and security which the hostile and faithless conduct of his supposed father had entitled the British Government to demand, and which the dictates of prudence and self-defence compelled it to require.

The reputed son of Omdut ul Omra, by and with the advice of the persons appointed by his father's will to assist his councils, has persisted in opposing a determined resistance to this demand, thereby exhibiting an unequivocal proof that the spirit which actuated the hostile councils of the Nabob Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omra, has been transmitted with unabated vigour to the supposed son of Omdut ul Omra, secured in its operation under the sanctimonious forms of their testamentary injunctions, and preserved with religious attachment by the ostensible descendant of that Prince.

Frustrated in the hope of obtaining from the reputed son of Omdut ul Omra reparation for its injuries and security for its rights, the British Government is now reluctantly compelled to publish to the world the proofs of this flagrant violation of the most sacred ties of amity and alliance by the Nabobs Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omra, and the hereditary spirit of enmity manifested by the reputed son of Omdut ul Omra to the interests of the British Government. The duty and necessity of self-defence require the British Government, under the circumstances of this case, to exercise its power in the attainment of an adequate security for its rights. Justice and moderation warrant that the family of Omdut ul Omra shall be deprived of the means of completing its systematic course of hostility; wisdom and prudence, demand that the reputed son of Omdut ul Omra shall not be permitted to retain the possession of resources dangerous to the tranquillity of the British Government in the peninsula of India.

Wherefore, the British Government, still adhering to the principles of moderation, and actuated by its uniform desire of obtaining security for its rights and interests in the Carnatic by an arrangement founded on the principles of the long subsisting alliance between the Company and the family of the Nabob Mahomed Ali, judged it expedient to enter into a negotiation for that purpose with the Prince Azim ul Dowlah Bahadur the son and heir of Ameer ul Omra, who was the second son of the Nabob Mahomed Ali, and the immediate great grandson by both his parents of the Nabob Anwer ud Deen Khan, of blessed memory; and his Highness the Prince Azim ul Dowlah Bahadur having entered into engagements for the express purpose of reviving the alliance between the Company and his illustrious ancestors, and of establishing an adequate security for the British interests in the Carnatic, the British Government has now resolved to exercise its rights and its power, under Providence, in supporting and in establishing the hereditary pretensions of the Prince Azim ul Dowlah Bahadur in the soubahdarry of the territories of Arcot and of the Carnatic Payen Ghaut.

And for the more full explanation of the grounds and motives of this declaration, the Right Honourable the Governor in Council by and with the authority of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council has caused attested copies and extracts of several documents discovered at Seringapatam to be annexed hereunto, together with an extract from the Treaty of 1792.

By command of the Right Hon. the Governor-in-Council.

J. WEBBE,

Chief Secretary to Government.

No. CXLIV.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Vizier of Oude.

Fort William, August 14, 1801.

With the utmost degree of astonishment and concern I received from Lieut.-Colonel Scott information that your Excellency had adopted the extraordinary resolution of withholding the future payments of subsidy to the Company, under the plea that Colonel Scott's orders to your Excellency's aumils, and to the Company's military officers, preparatory to the eventual occupation of the territory proposed to be ceded, had deprived your Excellency of the means from which the subsidy was to be realized.

Admitting that the orders issued by Lieut.-Colonel Scott were such as your Excellency thought proper to describe, they could not be considered to exonerate your Excellency from the subsidy, until the territories to which these orders applied should have been completely occupied by the Company's officers. The effect of Colonel Scott's orders even as described by your Excellency, could not have impaired the resources for the payment of the kist which had been due before these orders could possibly have impeded any expected receipts of revenue from your Excellency's country, still less can the intimations and instructions which Lieut.-Colonel Scott actually gave to your aumils, and to the Company's military officers, be supposed to produce the effect which your Excellency has been pleased to ascribe to them.

But if any doubts existed on this subject, they would be

entirely removed by your Excellency's acknowledgment that you were actually in possession of the resources necessary for the payment of the kist of June, at the moment when you asserted that the measures adopted by Colonel Scott had deprived you of the means of fulfilling your pecuniary engagements.

Your Excellency's refusal, therefore, to continue your subsidiary payments, was a direct violation of treaty, and (I am concerned to add) was aggravated by the disrespectful offer of discharging the disputed kist, under the plea of relieving the supposed exigencies of the British Government, under conditions which required the British Government to sanction your Excellency's violation of treaty, and to compromise its dignity by a public retraction of the measures which a due regard for the rights and interests of the Company had compelled the British Government to adopt.

Having since, however, the satisfaction to learn, that your Excellency had returned to a due sense of your engagements, and had actually commenced payment of the kist for June, I deem it unnecessary to enter into any further discussion of the question, or to communicate to your Excellency the sentiments which your Excellency's conduct upon that occasion excited in my mind, and the decisive measures which my duty would have compelled me to adopt for the immediate and effectual support of the rights and interests committed to my charge against the injurious effects of so direct a violation, on your Excellency's part, of the engagements subsisting between your Excellency and the Honourable Company.

I cannot, however, refrain from expressing the regret with which I observed the disposition, in this instance, so unequivocally manifested by your Excellency to evade the Company's just and equitable demands, and to avail yourself of a crisis occasioned by your unwarrantable opposition to the rights of the Company, in the expectation that you might successfully violate the fundamental principle of your existing engagements with the British Government.

My regret is not diminished by your Excellency's dereliction of pretensions, so evidently unjustifiable; for it is with pain that I am compelled to observe, that your Excellency in relinquishing your late extravagant claims has not afforded any symptom of a disposition more favourable to the Compa-

ny's indefeasible rights, and more conformable to the spirit of your subsisting obligations.

I cannot comprehend the causes of your Excellency's perseverance in this system of conduct in opposition to every principle of reason, unless it were possible to suppose that your Excellency has been persuaded to believe that I shall ultimately be induced to abandon the maintenance of the Company's rights whenever I shall have lost all hope of your Excellency's concurrence in the arrangements which I have proposed for their security. If such be the impression upon your Excellency's mind, it becomes my duty to repeat, in the most decided and unqualified terms, that my conviction of the justice and equity of the demands which I have made upon your Excellency remains unaltered, and that no consideration whatever, excepting your Excellency's concurrence in the more wise and beneficial arrangements of the first of the two propositions submitted to you, can induce me to relinquish the important objects of the pending negotiation.

Your Excellency deceives yourself, if from the temporary suspension of the measures which I had authorized the Resident to adopt, your Excellency infers the probability of my relinquishing the demand of territorial security, or of my hesitating to adopt whatever measures may appear to be necessary for the security of the rights and interests of the Honourable Company. My motive for this temporary delay, was a consideration of regard for your Excellency. I was averse to pursue measures of extremity, while any hope remained, that your Excellency might be induced to consider the proposed arrangement in a manner more consistent with justice, and with the relations subsisting between your Excellency and the Honourable Company, I accordingly directed Lieut.-Colonel Scott to inform your Excellency, as I had been prevented by the urgency of public business from proceeding in person to the upper provinces as soon as I intended, I had determined to despatch my brother the Honourable Henry Wellesley, to your Excellency, for the express purpose of confirming all the sentiments and resolutions which had been already communicated to your Excellency by Colonel Scott, and of conveying to your Excellency in the most decided manner, the conviction of my invariable determination to adhere to the declarations so repeatedly made to your Ex-

cellency upon the subject of the affairs of Oude: as your Excellency therefore had no reason to entertain from my brother's arrival at Lucknow, the most distant expectation that I could be induced to abandon claims so strongly supported, and so indispensable to the British interests, as those which have been preferred to your Excellency, I indulged a hope that your Excellency would have afforded an acceptable proof of your justice and discernment, by consenting to the proposed arrangement without waiting for Mr. Wellesley's arrival; but in this expectation I have hitherto been unhappily disappointed. Your Excellency's conduct has disclosed a spirit of opposition, not confined to the particular measures actually in agitation, but affecting the fundamental principle of your Excellency's connexion with the Honourable Company. Although your Excellency's erroneous interpretation of the nature and objects of that connexion may have prevented you from forming a proper estimate of the justice and necessity of the proposed arrangements, yet under the circumstances of my repeated and solemn declarations to your Excellency, it might have been expected that your Excellency would be convinced of the sincerity of my resolutions, and that you would not expose yourself to the discredit of compelling the British Government to assert its rights on your Excellency's dominions, without your consent or co-operation.

Under these circumstances, your Excellency's conduct can only be ascribed to a fallacious reliance on the groundless expectations which the ignorance or depravity of your Excellency's advisers has excited in your mind. It is my duty to remove those dangerous and illusory impressions, by repeating my most solemn and deliberate resolution never to recede from the demands with I have made on grounds so uncontestedly just, and of extreme exigency; and by assuring your Excellency that no course of events can be supposed either in Europe or in this country, which would render the proposed arrangement in Oude an object of inferior importance, or diminish the solicitude with which it will be pursued by the British Government in India, and supported by the British administration in Europe.

I trust however, that upon mature reflection, your Excellency will be induced to waive your opposition to the proposed

arrangement, and that I shall have the satisfaction to learn, that your Excellency has united cordially with Colonel Scott in carrying it into effect before the arrival of Mr. Wellesley, the remaining objects of whose mission will not then be impeded by painful and unnecessary discussions.

In this hope, I trust that I shall learn from Colonel Scott in the course of a few days, that your Excellency has completed the discharge of the arrears of the augmented subsidy; that you have concluded the terms of a territorial cession; and adopted the requisite measures for the final reform of your military establishment, by reducing the remnant of your refractory, useless, and expensive troops.

I am now on the point of embarking from Calcutta, and I shall hope to learn from Colonel Scott before I have advanced many days on my voyage, that your Excellency has at length returned to a course of measures suitable to your character, and conformable to your interests.

WELLESLEY.

(A true Copy.) N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Secretary to the Government.

No. CXLV.

The Earl of Elgin to the Marquess Wellesley.

Constantinople, May 6th, 1801.

MY LORD,

[Received 2nd September, 1801.]

I have just received advices from our army in Egypt, of the 22nd ultimo, and I am happy to say, that they are of a nature to promise a happy issue to our operations there.

The French to the number of 6,000 men, occupy a strong post upon some heights near the eastern walls of Alexandria, and our army of observation is strongly encamped between the westernmost point of Lake Aboukir, and the sea. That position has greatly been strengthened by the opening of sluices which have let the waters in from Lake Aboukir, to a space of low ground between it and Alexandria. That inundation it is thought, will interrupt the enemy's communication with Rahmanièh, their only central point between Alexandria, and Upper Egypt.

The strength of our position near Alexandria has permitted

the Commander-in-Chief to detach a body of 4,500 British, and as many Turks to Rosetta, which was immediately evacuated by the enemy. The castle that defended that branch of the Nile, surrendered on the 21st ultimo, and the garrison of 368 men made prisoners of war. Head quarters were in consequence to be removed there, and operations to be immediately carried on against Rahmanièh, where the enemy are said to be near 3,000 strong. The Grand Vizier was at Belbeis, and a detachment of his army had entered Damietta.

I am happy to add, that the natives have shewn uncommon zeal in our cause, and provide our army very plentifully with fresh provisions. Our cavalry is nearly mounted to the number of 1,000, and our effective infantry is 11,000 muskets.

It is natural to suppose, that the French are considerably weakened, for they have never attempted to disturb us in our movements, or to relieve their garrisons. The hope which they entertained of succour from the mother country is now I trust totally vanished. Their fleet under Admiral Ganttheaume of seven sail of the line, which had sailed from Toulon was seen on the 29th of March, steering for that place in great distress. Sir John B. Warren chased them on the 22nd of March, but lost sight, and came off Alexandria on the 22nd ultimo, but was immediately sent off to the westward by Lord Keith, who is cruising off Alexandria with eight sail of the line.

It appears that the Emperor Paul was put to death by a very extensive conspiracy, in which Pahlen was a party, and the Zuboffs perpetrated the act with their own hands. Alexander refused a crown that was stained with his father's blood, but being informed that everything was prepared for an infant Emperor, and a regency in the event of his refusal, he accepted. The oath was administered to the troops and senate in the night, and by six in the morning Alexander was in full possession of the throne. Panin is at the head of the new ministry. Woronzow is restored to his mission in England. Razomowsky comes back to Vienna, ambassador. An order was sent to the Russian minister at Copenhagen, to propose to Sir Hyde Parker a suspension of hostilities, assuring him that the Emperor would be responsible for his acquiescence. In the meanwhile our fleet forced the passage

of the Sound on the 30th of March, and on the 2nd April a division commanded by Nelson, attacked the defences of Copenhagen, took and destroyed in all twelve ships, and killed by the Danish account, 2,000 men. Two sail of the line, and three block ships, (I suppose floating batteries) are taken, another block ship blew up, a frigate sunk, and six other vessels of different descriptions were destroyed. When the Danish fire had entirely ceased, Nelson proposed an armistice. He went on shore and had a conference with the Prince Royal, the result of which was a short armistice, I believe, of three days. There seems no doubt of an accommodation, as soon as the death of Paul and the pacific disposition of his successor is known. Nelson at Copenhagen extolled the bravery of the Danes in their defence. No account whatever has hitherto reached me of the loss sustained in the action, and in the passage of the Sound by our fleet.

A second armistice has been made between Murat and Naples, by which a French army is admitted into the country, considerable territories, and nearly all the Neapolitan ports on the Adriatic are put into the possession of the French, who profess to intend embarking from thence expeditions against Malta, Egypt, or the Turkish possessions on the other side. I fear they will begin by overthrowing the present Sicilian monarchy.

I have the honour to be,
 with the highest respect, my Lord,
 Your Lordship's
 most obedient humble Servant,
 ELGIN.

No. CXLVI.

The Honourable Henry Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Lucknow, September 6, 1801.

1. I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I this morning waited upon the Vizier for the purpose of communicating with his Excellency on the object of my mission to Lucknow.

2. I opened the conference by observing that his Excel-

lency had some time ago been apprized by Lieut.-Colonel Scott of the object of my mission to Lucknow, and more recently in a letter from your Lordship, but that for his Excellency's more particular satisfaction I had committed to paper the primary object of my mission, and requested his Excellency's perusal of the paper, which I then presented to him, and copies of which, in Persian and English, I now enclose.

3. After the Vizier had read the paper, he said that he had frequently made a representation to Lieut.-Colonel Scott of the actual situation of himself and his affairs, and that if I pleased he would relate it to me in detail. I replied that I was ready to listen to any recital which his Excellency might be pleased to make, but that I must previously express my conviction, that his Excellency would regard your Lordship's having deputed me to Lucknow, as the strongest proofs which your Lordship could afford of your friendship for his Excellency, and of the interest which you take in his Excellency's welfare, and I entreated that his Excellency would also consider it as a proof of your Lordship's unalterable determination to prosecute the negotiations which had been so long pending to a favourable and speedy issue.

4. The Vizier said he would reflect on the paper which I had prepared, and that it was his earnest wish that whatever should be determined on might be executed without delay. I observed that the speedy conclusion of the business rested with his Excellency; that I entirely concurred with his Excellency in the wish which he had expressed of an immediate conclusion; and that my deputation to Lucknow had no other view.

5. His Excellency begged it might be understood that he did not pledge himself for the acceptance of any specific proposition; but that he was sensible a resistance to any arrangement proposed by your Lordship would not be for his advantage. I observed that while his Excellency possessed that sentiment the delay which had been practised could not fail of being a matter of surprize to me; and I earnestly exhorted his Excellency to come forward in a candid manner, and with a full determination to adjust the matters in reference as speedily as possible.

6. Upon his Excellency entreating that whatever arrangements might be determined upon, his interest should be con-

sulted, I replied, that his Excellency's interest was a principal object of your Lordship's solicitude, and that his Excellency was in possession of the draft of stipulations connected with the proposition referred to in the paper which I had just presented to him; and I entertained a thorough conviction that if his Excellency would enter into a fair consideration of these stipulations with me and Lieut.-Colonel Scott, we should be able to satisfy his Excellency that that proposition provided in the most effectual manner, as well for his Excellency's ease, his affluence, and his dignity, and for the permanent prosperity of his family, as for the welfare and interests of the state.

7. His Excellency having promised to re-consider the first proposition, I entreated him to keep in his recollection that the Company was his natural friend, and that it would be more for his advantage to consult with me and Lieut.-Colonel Scott on the measures now under discussion, than with persons of corrupt and abandoned principles, and totally regardless of his Excellency's honour and interests.

8. His Excellency observed that it was not becoming a man of honour to bring forward the names of persons with whom he might advise, lest they might be brought into difficulties; but that he would freely consult with me and Lieut.-Colonel Scott on all subjects connected with the negotiation; and, after taking a short time to reflect upon the stipulations of the first proposition, would fix a day for delivering his sentiments upon it.

9. Lieut.-Colonel Scott was present during the whole of my conference with the Vizier, and interpreted between his Excellency and me. The official despatches to your Lordship relative to the negotiation will in future be under the joint signatures of Lieut.-Colonel Scott and me.

I have the honour to be, &c.

HENRY WELLESLEY.

(Enclosure.)

1. His Excellency the most noble the Governor-General is apprized that your Excellency's final determination upon the various important communications which you have received from his Lordship, through Colonel Scott, has been delayed by the expectation of a personal interview

with his Lordship, and by the effect of certain impressions which have been produced upon your Excellency's mind through the artifices of persons who have abused your Excellency's confidence.

2. His Lordship has therefore despatched me immediately to Lucknow for the purpose of co-operating with Lieut.-Colonel Scott in the complete execution of his Lordship's orders; and I am especially instructed by his Lordship to express his hope that the presence of a person so nearly allied to his Lordship by the ties of blood, as well as of most intimate confidential connection, will inspire your Excellency with a serious conviction of the importance annexed by his Lordship to the success of the depending negotiations, and that my cordial concurrence in aid of the talents, experience, and zeal of Lieut.-Colonel Scott, will satisfy your Excellency of his Lordship's unalterable resolution to prosecute to a speedy issue the comprehensive system of measures already submitted to your Excellency's considerations by Lieut.-Colonel Scott.

3. For the more complete satisfaction of your Excellency's mind I am directed by the Governor-General to apprise your Excellency, in the most distinct terms, that in consequence of the critical state of the public discussions which have taken place between your Excellency and his Lordship, it will be his Lordship's painful duty, in visiting the stations of the army in the Province of Oude, to decline the honour of a personal interview with your Excellency until the negotiation now depending shall have been brought to a favourable termination. I am also directed to take the earliest opportunity of informing your Excellency that no change in his Majesty's councils at home will affect the general tenor of the policy of the British nation in India, and that his Lordship is determined to pursue, without deviation or interruption, the same course which has already received the approbation of his sovereign, of parliament, and of the Company.

4. Under these circumstances I am expressly authorized and commanded by the Governor-General to enter, jointly with Lieut.-Colonel Scott, into a discussion with your Excellency of the terms of the first proposition submitted to your Excellency through Lieut.-Colonel Scott, to the end that it may be brought to a speedy and favourable conclusion. And I am further directed to express to your Excellency, the Governor-General's unalterable conviction that your acquiescence in this proposition combines most advantages to every party interested in the prosperity of Oude, and affords the only reasonable hope of an effectual remedy to the evils existing under your Excellency's Government.

HENRY WELLESLEY.

No. CXLVII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Hon. Henry Wellesley.

On the River Bhaugulpoor,

SIR,

September 17, 1801.

1. I have received your official and secret letter dated the 6th instant, communicating the substance of your first conference with his Excellency the Vizier.

2. I have great satisfaction in communicating to you my entire approbation of the judicious manner in which you have opened the negotiation with his Excellency the Vizier entrusted to your charge; and I rely with confidence on the continuance of the same judgment in the progress of your discussions which you have manifested in the commencement of them.

3. My future letters and instructions upon the subject of the negotiations depending with his Excellency the Vizier will be addressed jointly to you and to Lieut.-Colonel Scott, and usually through the Secretary in the secret and political department.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
your most obedient and faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.

No. CXLVIII.

The Right Honourable Henry Dundas, to the Marquess Wellesley.

Wimbledon, 16th March, 1801.

MY DEAR LORD,

[Received 24th September, 1801.]

By the time you receive this, you will hear many unexpected changes in the administration of this country. Mr. Pitt, Lord Grenville, Lord Spencer, Mr. Windham, and myself have resigned our respective situations in his Majesty's service. The Chancellor likewise has resigned not for the same reason, but from a wish to retire. We have parted from his Majesty on the most cordial terms, and mean to give a decided support to his new government. We differed with his Majesty

in opinion upon the subject of the Irish Catholics. His five servants whom I have named, were of opinion that the union with Ireland gave a fair opportunity to relieve the Catholics of that country from the disfranchisements to which they are still subjected, but his Majesty had been advised that his coronation oath was irreconcileable with such a concession. The Lord Chancellor, the Duke of Portland, Lord Westmoreland, though not upon the same ground with his Majesty concurred with him, as to the policy of the measure. Lord Camden who was in the cabinet without an office, concurred with us, and has likewise retired; and for the same reason Lord Cornwallis gives up the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland.

Mr. Pitt is succeeded by Mr. Addington, the late speaker, whose chair is filled by Sir John Mitford; Lord Grenville is succeeded by Lord Hawkesbury; Lord Spencer, by Lord St. Vincent; Mr. Windham, by Mr. Charles Yorke; myself in the war department, by Lord Hobart; and in the Board of Controul, by Lord Lewisham. For his sake, and at his earnest request, and for the sake of keeping my own principles from going to wreck, I have allowed my name to remain as a member of the Board of Controul, and mean to give to the department every assistance in my power. Lord Eldon succeeds the Chancellor; Lord Hardwicke succeeds Lord Cornwallis in Ireland; there are some changes in some of the subordinate situations of government; but none of Mr. Pitt's friends or mine have retired so far as by our influence we could prevail upon them to stay; and as I have already stated, we will give every support to keep down a jacobinical opposition, and to keep out a jacobinical government.

I remain, my dear Lord,

Yours most sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

No. CXLIX.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Monghyr, September 28, 1801.

1. My anxious desire to visit the interior parts of the provinces immediately subject to this presidency (as well as the province of Oude) has been repeatedly disappointed by the occurrence of various events which have either detained me at Fort William, or required my presence at Fort St. George.

2. The objects which I originally proposed to attain by a progress through these possessions have ever appeared to me to be highly interesting and important, and not to be postponed for any consideration of inferior exigency to those urgent calls of the public service which have hitherto occupied my attention.

3. By personal observation and local inspection, I expected to be able to form a more accurate view of the actual state of the provinces than could be acquired by any other means.

4. It appeared to me to be a primary article of my duty to ascertain, at the earliest opportunity, by the best evidence which could be collected, the real operation of the existing system of the Company's Government upon the prosperity of the country, and upon the wealth, industry, morals, and happiness of the people. Recent events had rendered it highly desirable that I should become personally acquainted with the general temper of your native subjects, with the sentiments entertained by them towards the British Government, and with their sense of the spirit, object, and practical operation of the laws by which they are governed. It seemed also that it might prove highly advantageous to the character and stability of your government to convince the inhabitants of these extensive and populous dominions, that the public officer exercising the supreme executive and legislative authority of the empire, was enabled occasionally to superintend and control in person, the conduct of the subordinate administration, and to appear among the body of the people for the salutary purpose of confirming just authority, and of repres-

sing the vexatious and abusive exercise of local power. I felt a further solicitude to investigate with accuracy, the condition of the Company's civil service in stations remote from the Presidency, to satisfy the civil servants, in such stations, that their respective characters and conduct were continually under the observation of the Governor-General, and to encourage and animate their exertions in the public service, by the immediate prospect of public notice, distinction and reward.

5. Similar advantages were to be expected from a personal inspection of the army, at the several stations, and on the whole it seemed rational to hope, that my visit to the interior parts of the country, if conducted with proper attention, might prove useful to the spirit and discipline of the army, to the general administration of justice, to the efficiency of the police, to the collection of the revenue, and to the improvement of every branch of your commercial and financial resources in these provinces.

6. Under these impressions, the general aspect of affairs appearing to admit of my temporary absence from the Presidency, I made the necessary preparations for the voyage upon the river, and I proposed to have quitted Fort William early in July, but the delay of the despatches expected from Europe, and other circumstances having detained me at the Presidency; I was unable to take my departure until the 15th of August, when I embarked at Fort William.

7. In a council holden on board the yacht, at Barrackpore, on the 18th of August, I appointed Peter Speke, Esq., to be Vice-President in council, and Deputy-Governor of Fort William, and I then proceeded up the river. The Commander-in-chief had preceded me in the month of July. He arrived at Cawnpore on the 5th instant.

8. In addition to the general objects which I have in contemplation in this visit to the provinces, the state of affairs in Oude, rendered it absolutely necessary that I should move publicly from Fort William, with the declared intention of proceeding to Lucknow.

9. His Excellency the Vizier, after having employed various subterfuges and evasions, had manifested a disposition to elude altogether the final settlement of Oude, upon the

principles indispensably requisite to be applied to the reform of the administration of that declining country.

10. With a view to induce his Excellency to adopt without delay, the conclusive arrangements proposed to him, I despatched Mr. Henry Wellesley to Lucknow early in July, for the purpose of aiding Lieut.-Colonel Scott in the depending negotiation, as well as of convincing the Vizier of my resolution to insist on the completion of that system, which appeared to me to be necessary for the preservation of the Company's rights and interests in Oude.

11. His Excellency had formed considerable expectations from the intelligence received of the change which had taken place in his Majesty's councils at home, under the hope that the Governor-General in council would be deterred by that event from the active prosecution of the reform successfully commenced in Oude.

12. The arrival of Mr. Wellesley at Lucknow, on the 3rd of September, and my public departure from Fort William, with the avowed intention of proceeding to Oude, combined with the communications which I have recently made to the Vizier, have I trust satisfied his Excellency of my unalterable determination to pursue without relaxation, in every part of the empire committed to my charge, the same system of policy which has obtained the sanction of the honourable Company, of Parliament, and of my Sovereign.

13. It is therefore my expectaion, that by the next despatches, I shall have the satisfaction to announce to your honourable Committee, the conclusion of the settlement of Oude.

14. Your honourable Committee may be assured, that no events which can occur either in Europe, or in India, shall induce me to yield to the enemies, or to the allies and tributaries of the Company any advantage which I shall possess the power to acquire, and to maintain by just and honourable means.

15. Relying on the wisdom and justice of that authority to which I hope ultimately to render an account of my administration, I shall continue under the favour of Providence, my unremitting exertions in the service of the Company and of the nation, until the Honourable Court of Directors shall be pleased to relieve me from this arduous trust, by enabling

me to deliver it into the hands of a successor especially appointed to receive it.

16. Since my departure from Fort William, I have received the letter of the Court of Directors, to the Governor-General in council, under date the 22nd of April, 1801, I have accordingly taken the necessary measures for establishing the new council at Fort William, and I have appointed George Hilario Barlow to be Vice-President in council, and Deputy-Governor of Fort William. My experience of the eminent talents, knowledge, integrity, and discretion of Mr. Barlow, inspire me with the fullest confidence that he will discharge the trust which I have reposed in him to my entire satisfaction.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CL.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Monghyr, September 28th, 1801.

1. It is my sincere wish to retain my present charge, while the exigency of your affairs shall require my services, and while you shall be pleased to extend to me the aid and encouragement of your confidence and support.

2. But I have suffered considerable anxiety, since the departure of Sir Alured Clarke from Bengal has left me unprovided with a successor especially appointed by your Honourable Court, to take charge of the government in the event of any contingency which might render me unable to serve you.

3. No consideration, inferior to the sense of an utter incapacity of serving you, shall ever induce me to suffer the arduous trust which you have reposed in me, to pass into the hands of any successor (however respectable in my judgment,) who shall not have received from your Honourable Court a direct notification of your confidence, signified by a special appointment, empowering him to succeed me in the event of my death, absence, or resignation.

4. Various circumstances however, might occur to require

my speedy and sudden return to Europe; and the reflections which arise from the precarious state of health, and even of life in this climate, occasion in my mind a solicitude, (intimately connected with my zeal for the prosperity of your affairs, and for the dignity, stability, and vigour of your government in India,) that you should preclude the evils which might be apprehended, if this government should accidentally fall into any hands which you had not expressly designated to receive it.

5. I therefore most earnestly entreat your honourable Court to add to the favours, which you have already conferred on me, by issuing without delay, a provisional appointment to any person whom you may in your wisdom deem properly qualified to hold the temporary charge of this government in the event of my death, absence, or resignation; and I further solicit your Honourable Court, to forward such an appointment by an express, overland, at the earliest practicable period of time, after you shall have received this request.

6. It is a requisite act of justice to eminent merit to declare to your Honourable Court, that the earnestness of this application is entirely unconnected with any doubt of the qualifications of the gentleman, who in the ordinary course of law, would succeed to my trust, were it now to become vacant. My experience of Mr. Barlow's character, and my implicit confidence in his talents, and virtues, would leave me without an emotion of doubt or apprehension of his ability to conduct your affairs, if I were instantly to resign this charge into his hands. But my anxiety is founded on a sense of the impropriety and risk of suffering the government to devolve to any person, unempowered by your express sanction, to exercise it, and consequently destitute, in exercising the powers of Governor-General, of the advantage of your previous approbation, and of your declared confidence, without which the most splendid abilities, combined with the most exalted virtues, might be found unequal to the burthen of this great Empire.

I have the honour to be, Honourable Sirs,
with the greatest respect,
Your most obedient, obliged, and faithful Servant,
WELLESLEY.

No. CLI.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Monghyr, September 28th, 1801.

Your Honourable Committee has been apprized of the motives which induced me to despatch Captain Malcolm to the Court of Persia, and of the general objects of his mission. I have now the satisfaction to inform you, that Captain Malcolm returned from his embassy in the month of May, after having completely succeeded in accomplishing every object of his mission, and in establishing a connection with the actual government of the Persian Empire, which promises to the British nation in India, political and commercial advantages of the most important description, and of as great a degree of stability as appears compatible with the nature and character of the Persian Government.

2. I have the honour to transmit separate numbers in this despatch, copies of two treaties,* the first relating to a political connection, and the second to a commercial arrangement, and a copy of a letter from Captain Malcolm, which accompanied the communication of these treaties from Persia. These treaties have been concluded by Captain Malcolm, between the British Government of India, and the Court of Persia.

3. I likewise transmit copies of the whole of Captain Malcolm's correspondence with this government from the date of his appointment until his return, from which your Honourable Committee will be informed of all the circumstances attending this interesting and important mission.

4. Notwithstanding the fluctuations which have occurred in the Government of Persia, the power of the reigning Prince appeared to me to have acquired sufficient stability to render it an object of considerable importance to conciliate the attachment of that Prince to the British interests, and to establish with Persia an intimate connection founded on durable and comprehensive principles. The policy which dictated my opinion, was calculated to provide not only against the menaced invasion of Zemaun Shah, but also against the views

* See Appendix.

which other powers may entertain of attacking the British possessions in India. This object is important in proportion to the hazard to which the British interests would be exposed, by a connection between the Court of Persia, and those European powers, whose views have long been directed to this quarter of the British dominions. Great advantages in a commercial point of view were likewise to be expected from the connection which I proposed to form with the Court of Persia.

5. To accomplish these important objects, it was indispensably necessary that the embassy should be so constituted as to convey to the Court of Persia, and to the inhabitants of that country, a respectable impression of the power, wealth, and dignity, of the British Government in India. To produce this effect upon the minds of a nation peculiarly devoted to outward forms and ceremonies, I judged it to be necessary to attach to the embassy, appointments calculated to ensure from the Court of Persia, a reception suited to the dignity of the British Government and to the importance of the mission.

6. From the perusal of the correspondence your honourable Committee will find, that my opinion on this subject was amply justified, and I am satisfied that the extent of the appointments of the embassy, and the liberal manner in which it was conducted, materially contributed to its success, and tended to excite in the minds of the inhabitants of Persia, an exalted opinion of the power and liberality of the Company's government in India.

7. Your honourable Committee in your letter of the 10th of September, 1800, has expressed a doubt of the policy of Captain Malcolm's mission, founded on the accounts which had been received from Bombay, of the success of Mehdi Ali Khan's exertions in a similiar capacity.

8. The objects of Mehdi Ali Khan's mission were comparatively of a limited and temporary nature. This mission was neither intended, nor calculated to embrace those important and comprehensive views which I had in contemplation, in furnishing Captain Malcolm with credentials to the Court of Persia. The value of Mehdi Ali Khan's services on that occasion was certainly considerable, but he was not in my opinion a proper person to be entrusted with the negotiation of such important objects as those which I had in contempla-

tion at the Court of Persia, in the mission of Captain Malcolm. Independently of any disqualifications applicable to Mehdi Ali Khan, the objections to the employments of a native of India in such a mission are numerous and insurmountable.

9. It is not consistent with the dignity of the British Government, to employ any native of this country as its representative at a foreign court, nor could the British interests be with any degree of safety confided to any person of that description. Intrigue, falsehood, and collusion, are the uniform characteristics of such of the natives of India, as aspire to the qualifications of statesmen. They are ignorant of the national honour, and insensible to every emotion of public spirit, they are, therefore, ever disposed to sacrifice the public interests to views of private ambition and individual profit.

10. No native of India can possess a sufficient knowledge of the political interests of the British nation, nor of the principles and maxims which regulate its conduct, to qualify him for the arduous duty of superintending an important branch of the political relations of the British empire in India, nor can he assume that degree of consideration at a foreign court, which is indispensably necessary in a situation so distinguished and important as that of the representative of the honourable Company in Asia.

11. The natives of India may occasionally be employed with advantage for the promotion of temporary views of policy, or for the attainment of separate and limited objects. They may sometimes be rendered, in a subordinate situation, successful instruments for opening the way to political systems of a more permanent and comprehensive nature. In both these respects, I consider the services of Mehdi Ali Khan to have merited reward and approbation ; but I should have betrayed the important interests committed to my charge, if I had attempted to accomplish views of such magnitude as those which suggested the mission of Captain Malcolm, through the agency of Mehdi Ali Khan, or of any other native agent.

12. I shall now proceed to make some remarks upon the nature and effects of the alliance so happily established with the Court of Persia, for the purpose of enabling your honourable Committee to form a just estimate of the advantages which may be expected to result from the success of Captain Malcolm's mission.

13. A firm and intimate connection has now been established between the British Government and a State, the resources of which, are capable of aiding in an essential manner the hostile views of the enemies of the British nation against our Eastern possessions.

14. The measures which have succeeded in conciliating the favourable disposition of the Persian Government towards the British nation, have produced a proportionate opposition in that Court to the views and interests of our enemies, and have opened to us the prospect of commanding those resources and local advantages, which, under a different state of circumstances might eventually have been employed against us. I entertain the fullest confidence that the Court of Persia, in conformity to its declarations and engagements, will cordially resist any attempts which may be made, either by negotiation, or by force, on the part of our enemies, to obtain any establishment in that country, or to render it in any manner subservient to their views.

15. I consider the unrestrained use of the Persian sea-ports, and the exclusion of our enemies from them to be an essential advantage. By securing the entire command of the Persian coast, we shall facilitate the means of defeating any attempts on the part of our enemies to establish themselves in that quarter, and as the enemy's cruisers will be deprived of all refuge and assistance in those ports, the commerce of the Persian Gulph, (which, under the operation of the commercial treaty may be expected rapidly to increase), will in a great measure be free from interruption, and the communication with Europe, by the way of Bussorah, will be less subject to molestation.

16. The active measures adopted by the Court of Persia against Zemaun Shah, which were instigated in the first instance by Mehdi Ali Khan, and subsequently encouraged by Captain Malcolm, produced the salutary effect of diverting the attention of Zemaun Shah from his long projected invasion of Hindostan during three successive seasons. The hostility of Baba Khan unquestionably proved the ruin of Zemaun Shah's power. The assistance afforded by Mehdi Ali Khan under my orders, to the Prince Mahomed Shah, originally enabled that Prince to excite those commotions, which have recently terminated in the defeat of Zemaun Shah, in his deposition from the throne, and in the entire extinction of his

power; to the consolidated and active government of Zemaun Shah, has succeeded a state of confusion in the country of the Afghans highly favourable to our security in that quarter. Since the fall of Zemaun Shah, several competitors for the throne have opposed the establishment of Mahomed Shah, and the Afghan power is broken down by their mutual contentions, while the vicinity of the King of Persia's force, now connected with our interests, operates as an additional cause of weakness to the empire formerly held by Zemaun Shah. The relation which that Prince had formed with Tippoo Sultan, and the probability of his concurrence in the hostile views, either of Russia, or of France, render the actual state of affairs in Candahar a most favourable contrast with that which existed in the year 1798.

17. The details of the transactions which have led to the fall of Zemaun Shah accompany this despatch.

18. The engagements which Captain Malcolm has lately contracted with the Court of Persia, relative to the Afghans, afford abundant reason to believe, that the provinces of Hindostan will, for a long course of years be effectually relieved from the apprehension of an Afghan incursion.

19. The immediate effect of these arrangements has been to enable me to prosecute with confidence my negotiations at Lucknow, and to relieve me from the necessity of making expensive military preparations on the frontiers of Oude, a measure which, under other circumstances, I should have thought it my duty to adopt.

20. I consider the liberty granted by the Court of Persia to British merchants to settle at any of the ports in the Persian dominions, for the purposes of commerce, to be a valuable concession, calculated to establish the foundation of important benefits to our commercial and political interests in that quarter.

21. The proposed settlement in the Gulph of Persia, which your honourable Committee will observe, is suggested in several parts of Captain Malcolm's correspondence, is a question worthy of the most serious consideration. I shall communicate my sentiments to your honourable Committee on this important subject, in a future despatch.

22. From the perusal of Captain Malcolm's correspondence, your honourable Committee will have the satisfaction to observe, that this important and beneficial alliance with the

Court of Persia has been concluded under circumstances, which warrant a perfect confidence in the sincerity of the Persian Monarch, and that the impression, which the embassy has produced upon the minds of the inhabitants of Persia, is so favourable to the interests of the British nation, as to leave no apprehension of its being effaced by the intrigues of a rival power, or by any internal changes or revolutions in the Persian empire.

23. Your honourable Committee will further have the satisfaction to observe that these important advantages have been obtained without any sacrifice whatever, either of interest or of honour on the part of the British Government. The returns which the British government is bound to make, are of a nature to improve the advantages acquired by us, and are consistent with every principle of true policy and honour.

24. The issue of Captain Malcolm's negotiation with the Imaum of Muscat, has proved highly advantageous to the interests of the British nation. The importance of cultivating a good understanding with the Government of Muscat, is sufficiently obvious, and the arrangements which have taken place with that government, through the agency of Captain Malcolm, may be expected to ensure all the benefit of which that connection is susceptible.

25. The intercourse which Captain Malcolm held with the Pasha of Bagdad, appears to have produced upon the mind of that Prince, an impression extremely favourable to the British interests, and to have laid the foundation of future essential advantages, intimately connected with the alliance so happily contracted with the Court of Persia.

26. Under these circumstances, adverting to the great public advantages which have already resulted from Captain Malcolm's mission, as well as to those which may be expected to flow from its future consequences, I anxiously solicit the particular attention of your honourable Committee, and of the Court of Directors, to the ability, firmness, temper, and dignity, which have distinguished Captain Malcolm's conduct, through the whole course of the arduous and important duties committed to his charge.

27. Your honourable Committee will observe by Captain Malcolm's letter, under date the 31st of July, that he has

transmitted to me the journal of his mission to Persia, which I should have forwarded by this despatch to your honourable Committee, had I not understood from Captain Malcolm that it was his intention, as soon as he should have leisure to arrange the materials which he had collected, to prepare a much more complete and extended work upon this interesting subject.

28. I have the honour to annex to this letter, two documents which I have received from Captain Malcolm, and which contain discussions serving to illustrate the objects and consequences of his mission.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CLII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Major-General Baird.

SIR,

Patna, October 15, 1801.

I have great satisfaction in expressing my entire approbation of the activity, zeal, and judgment manifested in the various arrangements which you adopted for concentrating the army under your command at Cosseir, and for supplying it with the means of advancing into Egypt. Your negotiations with the Shireef of Mecca appear to have been conducted with considerable prudence, and to have had the effect of influencing the disposition of that chieftain in favour of the British interests.

2. I received, with particular pleasure, the details of the activity, perseverance, military skill, and judicious arrangement which enabled the army under your command to surmount the difficulties which opposed its march through the desert from Cosseir to Kinné. I desire that you will communicate my thanks to Lieut.-Colonels Murray and Montresor for their respective able and laborious exertions in promoting the public service. I request also that you will communicate to all the officers from India, serving under your command, and to the troops composing your army, the high sense which I entertain of the military order, discipline, and firmness

which have distinguished their conduct under the peculiar difficulties and hardships to which they were exposed.

3. Various circumstances have induced me to detain, in India, the reinforcements with which I originally intended to supply your army. The difficulty of proceeding up the Red Sea at the earliest period of time at which the reinforcements could have embarked, would under any circumstances have prevented their arrival at any point from which they could have proceeded to join you, until you had made a considerable progress in Egypt, and the hazard and difficulty of forming a junction would have been proportioned to the delay in their arrival, and to the extent of your distance. Under the circumstances of our late glorious successes in Egypt, and of the expectations which we may reasonably entertain of the complete success of the British arms in that quarter, the force already with you will be amply sufficient for the purposes described by Lieut.-General Hutchinson, in his despatches to you. At the same time the state of affairs in India is such as to render it extremely imprudent to diminish our force in this quarter. The necessity of any reinforcement, with reference to the eventual resumption of the expeditions against Batavia and the Isle of France no longer exists, as various considerations connected with the situation of affairs in Europe and in India, and with the success of the British arms in Egypt, have induced me to relinquish the intention of prosecuting either of these enterprizes.

4. In consequence of this determination, it is my desire, that when the services of the army under your command shall no longer be required in Egypt, or in the event of any occurrence which might leave you at liberty, under my former instructions, to undertake the projected expedition to Batavia or the Isle of France, you will return with the troops under your command, or such part of them as it may not be necessary to leave in Egypt, to the nearest port in India.

5. I have been informed by despatches from the Cape, in reply to my application for a reinforcement of troops from that quarter, that the condition of the military establishment and other circumstances will not admit of any diminution of the force of that Colony.

6. The arrival of Sir Home Popham at Calcutta has en-

abled me to obtain much useful information upon points connected with the public service, and has afforded me an opportunity of making arrangements calculated to promote the objects of the expedition, and to secure our interests in the Red Sea. I have communicated to Sir Home Popham my sentiments with respect to the mode of conducting the department of supplies, and of superintending the employment of the transports, for the details of which I refer you to Sir Home Popham.

8. I have likewise invested Sir Home Popham, under the order of the honourable the Secret Committee with a political commission for the purpose of negotiating the terms of a permanent alliance and connexion between the Company and the Arab chieftains occupying the shores of the Red Sea. Sir Home Popham's negotiation will provide for any arrangement with the Shireef of Mecca, of the nature adverted to in your despatches.

9. Having invested Sir Home Popham with the exclusive charge of all political concerns in the Red Sea, I have directed the Government of Bombay to abolish the appointment of political Commissioner hitherto held by Lieut.-Colonel Murray. I desire, however, that you will signify to Lieutenant Colonel Murray my entire approbation of his services in that capacity. I have directed the office of political Commissioner to be abolished, merely with a view of uniting all the powers necessary for negotiation with the Arab chiefs in the hands of the person appointed by the Secret Committee for that purpose.

10. Under the supposition that Mehdi Ali Khan has not been required to join you in Egypt, I have sent instructions to him to place himself under the orders of Sir Home Popham, to whom his talents may perhaps be useful in conducting the duties of his political mission.

11. I am satisfied that you have observed the utmost degree of economy in your expenditure, consistent with the exigencies of the public service; and I have no doubt that you will continue to pay the same attention which you have hitherto manifested to this object.

12. Previously to your return to India it would be highly advantageous to the public service in this quarter, if his Majesty's regiments on the Indian establishments could be completed to the established strength by drafts from the troops

sent from England into Egypt. I desire that you will signify my wishes on this subject to General Hutchinson, and through him to his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief.

13. I cannot close this despatch without renewing to you the assurances of my most cordial approbation of the manner in which you have executed the important service for which I selected you. I consider your conduct in Egypt to have added to the honour which you had justly acquired by your brilliant services in Mysore; and I anticipate, with confidence, the assistance that General Hutchinson will derive from the co-operation of your talents, zeal, and experience, if any exigency should demand further native service in Egypt. Your return to India, at the earliest practical period of time, will be highly acceptable to me.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CLIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Earl of Elgin.

MY LORD,

Patna, 17th October, 1801.

1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letters noted in the margin,* with their separate enclosures, and to express my thanks for your Excellency's continued attention.

2. In offering my warmest congratulations to your Excellency upon the success of the British arms in Egypt, I cannot repress the emotion of regret which every British subject must feel for the loss of that gallant and able officer Sir Ralph Abercromby. If any lustre could be added to a character so eminently distinguished throughout the long career of an active and laborious military life, it would result from the interesting circumstances related by your Excellency in announcing to me the glory and honour which attended his death.

* April 24th, May 6th, May 30th, June 13th, and June 23rd.

3. I observe with sincere satisfaction, that the conduct of Major-General Hutchinson has been such as to avert all apprehension of those dangers which might have menaced the public service, if so arduous and important a command had devolved to an officer of inferior talents, firmness, and skill.

4. The glorious success of his Majesty's fleet in the Baltic, and the immediate consequences which followed that victory, joined to the death of the Emperor Paul, and to other events in Europe, justify a confident expectation that the great cause in which his Majesty and the nation are embarked will finally be crowned with a degree of triumphant success proportioned to the wonderful efforts of our country, to the energy and wisdom of our councils, and to the valour and ability which have conducted our armies and navies in every part of the world.

5. I congratulate your Excellency on the complete success which has attended Captain Malcolm's negotiations in Persia. Future advantages of considerable importance, both to the political and commercial interests of the British Government, are to be expected from the connection now formed with Persia. The immediate operation of that connection has averted one of the most serious dangers which menaced the British possessions in India. To the success of the negotiations in Persia, I chiefly ascribe the fall of Zemaun Shah and the actual confusion of the Affghan Government, events which will probably repress for many years the revival of the annual project of invading Hindostan from Cabul.

6. This change in the state of the Affghan empire, has been rendered more important by occurring at a period of time when I am anxious to accomplish a settlement of Oude, which, in my opinion, is equally necessary for the purpose of promoting the internal prosperity of that country, and of securing the north western frontier of Hindostan from foreign attack.

7. I observe the information which your Lordship has been pleased to communicate respecting the probability of a British army remaining in Egypt, for the protection of that country during the continuance of the war. No measure can be more wise, nor any plan more effectually calculated to secure the advantages of our recent success. It will not, however, be practicable for me to augment the force already

detached from India to Egypt; and I shall look anxiously for the early return of the army, which has been spared from the defence of these possessions. It will undoubtedly be prudent to leave a considerable garrison at Suez; but I trust that a respectable squadron in the Red Sea will be added to our defences in that quarter, until the termination of the war shall relieve us from any apprehension of the activity and enterprize of France.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CLIV.

The Marquess Wellesley to Harford Jones, Esq. Resident at Bagdad.

SIR,

Patna, 20th October, 1801.

1. Since the receipt of your despatches acknowledged by the Secretary to the Government, under date the 11th May, 1801, I have been favoured with your several official and private addresses noted in the margin.*

2. My acknowledgements are due for the various interesting communications contained in your despatches.

3. I received with much concern the accounts which your despatches and those of Mr. Manesty contain of the late extraordinary conduct of the Pasha of Bagdad. My early attention will be given to that subject, as well as to the consideration of the general condition of our political relations with the Pasha of Bagdad. I postpone the discussion of these subjects until I shall have communicated with Captain Campbell, to whom you refer me for information with respect to the actual state of affairs in that quarter. I expect him to join my suite within a short period of time.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

* *Official.*—March 26th, 1801; do. do.; April 15th and 24th; May 12th, 14th, and 16th; and June 5th and 16th. *Private.*—May 12th, 13th, and 14th; and July 19th.

No. CLV.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Patna, 21st October, 1801.

At the moment of closing my letters intended for the present despatch overland, I received a letter from the Right Honourable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, under date the 22nd ultimo, notifying the final conclusion and exchange of engagements between the Honourable Company and his Highness the Nabob Azeem oo Dowlah, and enclosing for my ratification two explanatory articles; which articles, according to my instructions, had been executed by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council and his Highness the Nabob Azeem oo Dowlah.

2. Being absent from the Presidency of Fort William on my progress towards the Upper Provinces, I have this day ratified the explanatory articles of the treaty of the Carnatic.

3. I request your honourable Committee to accept my congratulations on the conclusion of an arrangement which, while it is highly creditable to the justice and moderation of the British character, has happily established the rights and interests of the honourable Company in the Carnatic, upon the secure and permanent foundations of territorial possession, of exclusive civil and military government, and of undivided influence and power. It is a great satisfaction to have ultimately accomplished an object long and anxiously desired by the honourable Company, and earnestly recommended by the Court of Directors to my special attention, when I had the honour to receive the charge of this Government. Your honourable Committee is apprized of the early solicitude which I manifested for the accomplishment of this important measure upon my first arrival at Madras, in the month of April, 1798, as well as of the repeated attempts which I made on various occasions, in the years 1798 and 1799, to effect the same salutary arrangement. The successive failure of all those attempts, combined with the reflections arising from the equally unpropitious result of every preceding proposition

of a similar nature, have enhanced in my mind the pleasure of witnessing the conclusion of the late treaty. The intimate connection of this happy event with the success of your arms in Mysore, forms a peculiar and interesting feature of the whole transaction. Nor can your honourable Committee fail to remark that the possession of the records of the House of Hyder Ally in disclosing to your Government the whole system of the policy of your enemies in India, is the source from which we have derived that information which has enabled us to complete the settlement of the Carnatic.

4. The introduction into the Carnatic of the wise and benevolent system of government to which these provinces are indebted for their present happiness and prosperity, will be the next object of my anxiety and care. The union of all local authorities, and the extinction of every principle of conflicting power, will preclude the operation of those causes of discord and counter-action which must ever have impeded the progress of good government in the Carnatic, while the administration of affairs continued in the hands of the Nabob.

5. I consider it a most grateful part of my duty to express to your honourable Committee the high sense which I entertain of the zeal, judgment, and temper, which have distinguished the conduct of Lord Clive and of the Government of Fort St. George, during the whole course of those important transactions and arduous negotiations which have terminated in a manner so advantageous to the interests of the honourable Company in India.

6. To his Lordship's judicious exercise of the powers vested in him by my authority for the settlement of the affairs of the Carnatic, is principally to be ascribed the success of those measures which the treachery and ingratitude of their late Highnesses, the Nabobs Walahjah and Omdut ul Omrah, compelled me to adopt for the preservation of the rights and interests of the honourable Company in that country.

7. Justice to the merits of Mr. Webbe, Chief Secretary to Government at Fort St. George, and of Lieut.-Colonel Close, late resident in Mysore, requires me to express to your honourable Committee my cordial and grateful approbation of the important services rendered by those gentlemen to the public during the course of the late transactions and negotiations at Fort St. George. The assistance which Lord Clive

has derived from the zeal, talents, and knowledge of Mr. Webbe and of Lieut.-Colonel Close, contributed in an essential degree to the success of his Lordship's measures for the arrangement of affairs in the Carnatic.

8. The discretion manifested by those gentlemen in the conduct of the examination of Ghoolaum Ali and Ali Rezza, instituted by the Government of Fort St. George, under circumstances of peculiar delicacy and difficulty, deserve the highest applause.

9. I acknowledge with gratitude the assistance which I received from the abilities and local knowledge of Mr. Webbe, whom I directed to attend me at Fort William, for the purpose of aiding me in framing the system of measures to be adopted for the future administration of affairs in the Carnatic, in consequence of the detected treachery of their late Highnesses the Nabobs Walahjah and Omdut ul Omrah.

10. The obligations of public duty, and the most indispensable rules of justice, concur to demand from me a recorded testimony in favour of the indefatigable activity, powerful abilities, and proved integrity of Mr. Webbe, who adds to these qualities a most accurate knowledge of the Oriental languages and an intimate acquaintance with every branch of your affairs in the Peninsula. In confirming the honourable testimony afforded by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George to the public merits and services of Mr. Webbe and Lieut.-Colonel Close, on the important occasion which attracted his Lordship's approbation, I consider it to be incumbent on me to solicit the special attention of your honourable Committee and of the Court of Directors to the unremitting exertions of Mr. Webbe in the service of the honourable Company since the commencement of the late war in Mysore; being satisfied, through the regular public channels of information, as well as by my personal observation, that the laborious industry of that gentleman has been employed with the most disinterested zeal and with great success to render himself an useful instrument, under the Government of Fort St. George, of promoting the interests of the honourable Company, of securing the integrity and vigour of the administration of Government, of improving the condition of our native subjects in the Peninsula, and of augmenting the reputation and honour of the British name in

every part of the extensive dominions subject to the Presidency of Fort St. George.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CLVI.

The Right Honourable Lord Lewisham to the Marquess Wellesley.

India Office, London, June 11th, 1801.

MY DEAR LORD,

[Received in Nov. 1801.]

I do myself the honour to address your Lordship for the purpose of announcing to you that, in consequence of the resignation of Mr. Dundas, his Majesty has been pleased to nominate me to the office of President of the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India. Not having been for many years in habits of business, I should have felt more hesitation in taking upon me the responsibility accompanying that situation, if your high character and eminent abilities, (which an acquaintance of many years would have enabled me to appreciate, could any doubt upon that subject have now remained in the mind of any one individual), together with the entire support and confidence of my friend and predecessor Mr. Dundas, had not removed the weight of these objections which forced themselves strongly upon my mind at the moment when that office was offered to my acceptance. I beg leave at the same time to assure you that that system for the administration of the affairs of India which has been honoured by your support, and under which that country has risen to such an eminent degree of prosperity, is the system which no exertions on my part shall be wanting to support.

I have the honour to be,

My dear Lord,

with the highest regard,
your faithful, obedient servant,

LEWISHAM.

No. CLVII.

Lord Clive to the Marquess Wellesley.

October 18th, 1801.

MY DEAR LORD,

[Received Nov. 1801.]

I had determined, in consequence of the receipt of a private letter from the Chairman of the Court of Directors, to transmit to your Lordship a copy of the letter, which I have judged it to be incumbent upon me to address to Mr. Scott in his official capacity. By intelligence recently received, I am informed, that the intention of the Court of Directors, indefinitely expressed in Mr. Scott's letter, has since been confirmed by a resolution to effect such changes in the constitution of this government as appear to be incompatible with my continuance to reside in it.

It was my ambition to have conducted this government on the principles which I have repeatedly had the honour of stating to your Lordship, until I should have completed the accomplishment of the great objects in your Lordship's contemplation with respect to the affairs of Fort St. George, by the annexation of Tanjore and the Carnatic to the British possessions on a permanent foundation, by the settlement of the territories acquired under your Lordship's auspices by cession or conquest; by the establishment of the Company's authority in Malabar; by the introduction of a permanent settlement of the land revenues and of a system of judicature; and by the restoration of the Company's finances, and its investment to an efficient footing.

The success which has hitherto attended my measures under your Lordship's authority, had encouraged me to hope for the accomplishment of the objects which I had prescribed to myself, under the continued support of your Lordship in Council, and under the confidence of the Court of Directors.

It is now plain that the confidence of the Court of Directors has been withdrawn from me; in conformity, therefore, to the principle stated by me to the Chairman, I consider it impracticable for me to persist in the system of measures which I judge to be necessary to the completion of my administration; and the result of that view of the subject is a deter-

mination to proceed to England with all practicable expedition. The earnest desire which I had cherished of engraving the reputation of my government, on the fame of your Lordship's exploits, by a cordial co-operation with the Governor-General in Council in the plans adopted by your Lordship in Council for the security and aggrandizement of the British empire in India, has been anticipated by the recent determination of the Court of Directors; and the mortification which I naturally feel from the defeat of my arrangements, is aggravated by the necessity of my retiring from the honour and happiness of participating your Lordship's labours. If any hope remained that I could continue to afford support to your Lordship's administration, my reluctance to deprive myself of the pleasure I have derived from the continued intercourse of your Lordship's friendship would induce me to submit to any difficulties of a personal nature; but the despair of reconciling the principles of my public measures with the system of government, which the resolution of the Court of Directors appears calculated to enforce, irresistibly demands my retirement from the government of Fort St. George. Under the impression of these sentiments, I shall not hesitate to obey the orders which I may receive from the Court of Directors with respect to the changes in question; and it is my wish to follow that submission to superior authority by embarking for England at the earliest practicable period of time. I request, therefore, that your Lordship will do me the honour to consider this intimation of my intention to be of an official nature, and to make such provisions as your Lordship may judge expedient for the contingency of my departure.

The regret which I feel in communicating this resolution to your Lordship is tempered by the satisfaction with which I shall always reflect on the uninterrupted course of harmony which has prevailed between the Supreme Government and the Government of Fort St. George during the time I have resided in it. I shall dwell with greater pleasure on the success which has hitherto attended my constant co-operation in your Lordship's measures; and I shall derive the most permanent gratification from the particular kindness and friendship which I have continued personally to experience from your Lordship. It is my request to your Lordship, to direct

accommodation to be reserved for me on one of the ships intended to load at Madras; should it be consistent with your Lordship's intentions to fix upon the *Dover Castle* for that purpose, that ship would be particularly agreeable to me.

I have the honour to be,
with the greatest regard and esteem,
my dear Lord,
most faithfully yours,

CLIVE.

P. S. Understanding that the *Dover Castle* is not one of the ships fixed upon to sail for the coast in December, I take the liberty to suggest that the *Charlton*, Capt. Cumberledge, which is said to be intended for that service, would in every respect be equally agreeable to me for my accommodation.

No. CLVIII.

The Honourable Henry Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR MORNINGTON,

Lucknow, Nov. 10th, 1801.

I have the satisfaction to inform you that the treaty was signed this morning. In congratulating you upon the conclusion of this important arrangement, I can only express my wish that it may redound as much to your honour and reputation as your letter of the 1st instant has contributed to my happiness. As soon as a copy of the treaty can be prepared, we shall send it off to you in order that it may be ratified, in the mean while I write you this short Letter.

Upon full consideration, and after consulting Colonel Scott, I am of opinion that it will be advisable to introduce Courts of Justice into the ceded countries, immediately. For the first year, or at least until the resources of the country shall have been ascertained, the Civil establishment should consist of four Magistrates and four Collectors, one Court of Circuit and Appeal, and one or two commercial Residents. For the first year Rohilcund (in which Bareilly and Rehr are included) will require two Collectors and two Magistrates. I am informed, from good authority, that the revenues of Rohilcund and the Dooab, formerly amounted to a crore and sixty

or seventy lacs of rupees, and it is said that the Dooab produces a clear profit to Almas of twenty-four lacs of rupees annually.

I have not included Gorruckpoor in the foregoing statement of Collectors and Magistrates.

Ever your's, most affectionately,

HENRY WELLESLEY.

No. CLIX.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Chairman of the Honourable Court of Directors.

On board the Sonamooky Yacht,
off the Mouth of the Goomty,

SIR,

November 13, 1801.

I have the satisfaction to inform you that the negotiations which have been so long depending with his Excellency the Nabob Vizier, were brought to a favourable issue on the 10th instant, by the signature of a treaty* under which his Excellency has ceded in perpetuity and in full sovereignty to the honourable Company the territories enumerated in the statement which I have the honour to enclose.

I expect to receive, in the course of a few hours, a copy of the treaty which I shall immediately ratify; and with all practicable expedition I propose to forward to the Secret Committee a copy of the ratified treaty, together with such explanations as may appear to be requisite for the purpose of apprizing the Court of Directors of all the beneficial consequences of this important arrangement. In the meanwhile, however, I have judged it advisable not to delay for a moment the notification of an event which must afford such satisfaction to every person conversant with the interests of the Company on this side of India.

It is my intention immediately to appoint a temporary administration for this settlement of the ceded districts. This provisional Government will be composed of several of the most experienced, able, and active of the Company's civil servants in the departments of judicature, commerce, and re-

* See p. 508.

venue, and will be presided by Mr. Henry Wellesley, to whose discretion, address, and firmness, the Company is principally indebted for the early and tranquil attainment of these extensive and fertile territories.

I have the satisfaction to assure you that the result of this settlement will prove highly beneficial to the general finances of the Company in India, and will afford immediate relief to those of Bengal.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CLX.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable Henry Wellesley and Lieutenant-Colonel Scott.

GENTLEMEN,

On the river near Benares,
November 14, 1801.

I had the satisfaction to receive this day the copy of the treaty* exchanged by you with his Excellency the Nawaub Vizier on the 10th instant; I now return this treaty, ratified

**Treaty between the Honourable the East India Company and his Excellency the Nuwaub Vizier Ool Mumaulich, Yemeen oo Dowlah, Nazim ool Mookh, Saadut Ali Khan Bahauder, Mobaurez Jung, for ceding to the Company, in perpetual sovereignty, certain portions of his Excellency's territorial possessions, in commutation of the subsidy now payable to the Company by the Vizier:*

Whereas by the treaty now subsisting between his Excellency the Vizier and the Honourable East India Company, the Company have engaged to defend his Excellency's dominions against all enemies; and to enable them to fulfil that engagement, his Excellency is bound by the aforesaid treaty to pay to the Company, in perpetuity, the annual subsidy of seventy-six lacs of Lucknow sicca rupees; and is further bound by the said treaty to defray the expence of any augmentation of force, which, in addition to the number of troops stipulated in the treaty, shall be judged necessary to enable the Company to fulfil their engagements of defending his Excellency's dominions against all enemies: And whereas it is advisable that the funds for defraying these charges be established on a footing which shall admit of no fluctuation of either increase, or decrease, and which shall afford satisfaction and security to the Company, in regard to the regular payment in perpetuity of all such charges, the following treaty, consisting of ten Articles, is concluded on the one part by the Honourable Henry Wellesley and Lieutenant-Colonel William Scott, on behalf and

in regular form according to established usage, together with a letter for his Excellency, which you will present to him as soon as may be convenient; my letter to the Vizier is founded on a suggestion contained in a private despatch from Mr. Wellesley, and I trust that the measure which I have adopted may prove satisfactory to his Excellency; I desire, however, that you will urge his Excellency in the strongest terms to issue his immediate orders to his Aumils in conformity to the obligations which he has regularly contracted with the

in the name of his Excellency the most noble the Marquess Wellesley, K.P. Governor-General for all affairs, civil and military, of the British nation in India, by virtue of full power vested in them for this purpose by the said Governor-General, and on the other part by his Excellency the Nawaub Vizier ool Mumaulick Yemeen oo Dowlah, Nazim ool Mookl, Saadut Ali Khan Bahauder, Mobaurez Jung, in behalf of himself, and his heirs and successors, for ceding to the Honourable the English East India Company, in perpetual sovereignty, certain portions of his Excellency's territorial possessions, in commutation of the former and augmented subsidy, and of all other sums of money now chargeable to his Excellency on account of the Company's defensive engagements with his Excellency.

Article 1. His Excellency the Nawaub Vizier hereby cedes to the Honourable the East India Company, in perpetual sovereignty, the undermentioned portions of his territorial possessions, amounting in the gross revenue to one crore and thirty-five lacs of rupees, including expences of collection, in commutation of the subsidy, of the expences attendant on the additional troops, and of the Benares and Furruckabad pensions

Statement of the Jumma :

*Chucklah Corah, Kuwah, and Chucklar Etawa	55,48,571	11	9
Rehr and others	5,33,374	0	6
Furruckabad and others	4,50,001	0	0
Khairaghur and others	2,10,001	0	0
Azimghur, and others—Azimghur, Mownan-Bunjun	6,95,621	7	6
Goruckpore, and others, } Goruckpore 5,09,853 8 0 } and Butwul } Butwul 0,40,001 0 0 }	5,49,854	8	0
Soobah of Allahabad and others	9,34,963	1	3
Chuckla Bareilly, Asophabad and Kelpory	43,13,457	11	3
Nawaub Gunje, Rehly and others	1,19,242	12	0
Mohoul and others, with the exception of the Talook } of Arwul	1,68,378	4	0
Total Jumma—Lucknow sicca rupees	1,35,23,474	8	3

The above-mentioned Mohauls being ceded to the Honourable Com-

* A division of land.

British Government under the ratified treaty; and I authorize you to suggest to his Excellency that any delay in the execution of his engagements will be highly injurious to his character, and must tend to create serious suspicions in my mind of his good faith. I enclose a copy of my proceedings of this day, adapted to the purpose of forming the basis of a provisional administration for the government of the ceded districts. In closing this despatch I am happy to declare my entire approbation of the manner in which you have con-

pany, as held by the Aumils in the year 1208 Fusli, no claims are to be hereafter to be made on account of villages or lands, which in former years may have been added to or separate from the said Mohauls.

2. The subsidy, which by the second Article of the treaty of 1798, his Excellency engaged to pay to the Company (now that territory is assigned in lieu thereof and of the expences of the additional troops) is to cease for ever; and his Excellency is released from the obligation of defraying the expences of any additional troops which at any time may be required for the protection of Oude and its dependencies, whether of the countries ceded to the Company, or the territories which shall remain in the possession of his Excellency the Vizier.

3. The Honourable the East India Company hereby engage to defend the territories which will remain to his Excellency the Vizier against all foreign and domestic enemies; provided always, that it be in the power of the Company's Government to station the British troops in such parts of his Excellency's dominions as shall appear to the said Government most expedient; and provided further, that his Excellency, retaining in his pay four battalions of infantry, one battalion of Nejeebs and Mewatties, two thousand horsemen, and to the number of 300 Goolandauz, shall dismiss the remainder of his troops, excepting such number of armed Peons as shall be deemed necessary for the purpose of the collections, and a few horsemen and Nejeebs to attend the persons of the Aumils.

4. A detachment of the British troops, with a proportion of artillery, shall at all times be attached to his Excellency's person.

5. That the true intent and meaning of the first, second, third, and fourth articles of the treaty may be clearly understood, it is hereby declared, that the territorial cessions being in lieu of the subsidy, and of all expences on account of the Company's defensive engagements with his Excellency no demand whatever shall be made upon the territory of his Excellency on account of expences which the Honourable Company may incur by assembling forces to repel the attack or menaced attack of a foreign enemy, on account of the detachment attached to his Excellency's person, on account of troops which may occasionally be furnished for suppressing rebellions or disorders in his Excellency's territories, on account of any future change of military station, or on account of failure in the resources of the ceded districts, arising from unfavourable seasons, the calamities of war, or any other cause whatsoever.

ducted the important negotiation intrusted to your management. The treaty embraces all my views in this salutary arrangement, and constitutes in my judgment one of the most valuable additions which has been made for many years past to the security and honour of the British Empire in India. For the accomplishment of this great work the Company and the British nation are greatly indebted to the exertion of your joint talents, discretion, and perseverance; and the cordi-

6. The territories ceded to the Honourable Company by the first article of this treaty, shall be subject to the exclusive management and control of the said Company and their officers; and the Honourable the East India Company hereby guarantee to his Excellency the Vizier, and to his heirs and successors, the possession of the territories which will remain to his Excellency after the territorial cession, together with the exercise of his and their authority within the said dominions. His Excellency engages that he will establish in his reserved dominions such a system of administration (to be carried into effect by his own officers) as shall be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and be calculated to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants; and his Excellency will always advise with, and act in conformity to the counsel of the officers of the said Honourable Company.

7. The districts ceded by the first article of this treaty shall be delivered over to the Company's officers from the commencement of the Fusli year 1209, corresponding with the 22nd September, A.D. 1801,* and his Excellency will continue to pay the subsidy and expence of the additional troops from his treasury, in the same manner as hitherto observed, until the Company's officers shall have obtained complete possession from his Excellency's officers of the countries so ceded. The Company will not claim any payment of subsidy from his Excellency's treasury after their officers shall have obtained possession of the said districts from the officers of his Excellency.

8. The contracting parties, with a view of establishing such a commercial intercourse between their respective dominions as shall be mutually beneficial to the subjects of both States, hereby agree to frame a separate commercial treaty. In the meantime it is agreed that the navigation of the Ganges, and of all other rivers where they may form the mutual boundary of the two States, shall be free and uninterrupted, that is to say, that no boats passing up and down the Ganges, or other rivers, where they form the mutual boundaries of both States shall be stopped or molested for duties; nor shall any duties be exacted from boats which put to in the possessions of either of the contracting parties without intention of landing their goods. It shall, however, be in the power of both Governments to levy such duties as they may think proper on goods imported into or exported from their respective dominions, not exceeding the pre-

* Sic in orig.

ality with which you have co-operated throughout the whole course of the negotiation, is highly creditable to your prudence and temper, and has proved essentially advantageous to the despatch of the public service.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CLXI.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Vizier of Oude.

Written November 14, 1801.

I had the pleasure this day to receive the treaty concluded between your Excellency and the honourable Mr. Wellesley and Lieut.-Colonel Scott, possessing full powers from me to sign that instrument in my name and on my behalf. I have

sent usage. It is further stipulated, that no exemption from duties on articles purchased in his Excellency's reserved dominions, for the consumption of the troops stationed within the ceded territories, shall be claimed after they shall have been delivered over to the Company's officers.

9. All the articles of former treaties, for establishing and cementing the union and friendship subsisting between the two States, are to continue in full force; and all the articles of the treaty concluded by the late Governor-General Sir John Shore, on the part of the Honourable the East India Company and his Excellency the Vizier in the year 1798, not annulled by this treaty, are to remain in force and continue binding upon both contracting parties.

10. This treaty, consisting of ten articles, having been settled and concluded in the city of Lucknow on the tenth day of November, in the year of our Lord, 1801, corresponding with the second of the month of Rejeb of the year 1216 Hegira, the Honourable Henry Wellesley and Lieut.-Colonel William Scott have delivered to the said Vizier one copy of the same in English and Persian, sealed and signed by them, and his Excellency the Vizier has delivered to the Honourable Henry Wellesley and Lieut.-Colonel William Scott, another copy also in English and Persian, bearing his seal and signature, and the Honourable Henry Wellesley and Lieut.-Colonel Scott engage to procure and deliver to his Excellency the Vizier, within the space of thirty days, a copy of the same under the seal and signature of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General, when the copy under their seal and signature shall be returned.

ratified the act of the honourable Mr. Wellesley and Lieut.-Colonel Scott, and have annexed my seal and signature to the instrument which I received from them.

2. The treaty is therefore now complete and binding upon both contracting parties; under this impression I request that your Excellency, immediately on the receipt of this, will be pleased without delay, to issue your orders to the Aumils of the ceded countries, directing them to place themselves under the authority of the Company in conformity to the treaty.

3. In a confident expectation that your Excellency will be disposed to conform to the obligations of public faith established by common usage amongst all states, I have this day appointed my brother, the honourable Henry Wellesley to preside over the country ceded by the first article of the treaty, and I have appointed several other gentlemen to assist him in the administration of affairs, and to take charge of the districts from your Excellency's officers.

Understanding, however, that your Excellency has stated to Mr. Wellesley your desire that two copies of the treaty should be prepared, and signed and sealed by me, with some difference of form from the instrument now transmitted, and being always disposed to gratify your Excellency's wishes, as far as may be compatible with my public duty, I have directed two copies of the treaty to be prepared accordingly, and one of them will be delivered to your Excellency in the course of a few days by Mr. Wellesley and Lieut.-Colonel Scott, that copy you will retain for your satisfaction.

5. It is necessary to observe, that in making this concession to your Excellency's wishes, I am departing from the established form, uniformly observed by me in all negotiations with the native powers in India. The various treaties which I have concluded through gentlemen empowered by me to act in my name and on my behalf having been executed and ratified exactly in the form to which your Excellency has been pleased to object, it is therefore a strong proof of my respect for your Excellency to have departed from a form so invariably observed merely for the purpose of acceding to your wishes.

6. I repeat my confident expectation that no attempt will be made to delay the orders to the Aumils, or any other mea-

sure necessary to the completion of the cession after the receipt of this letter, with the ratified treaty which I now have the honour to transmit.

7. I sincerely congratulate your Excellency on the amicable adjustment of this important arrangement, which I trust will prove highly beneficial to the contracting parties, as well as to their respective subjects.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CLXII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable Henry Wellesley.

SIR,

Benares, November 14th, 1801.

I have had the honour to receive your separate and official despatches under date the 11th instant, and I derive great satisfaction from the honourable testimony which it bears to the zeal, diligence, and address of Lieut.-Colonel Scott, in co-operating with you in the conduct of the arduous negotiation which has been conducted to so happy and prosperous an issue by the treaty concluded with the Vizier on the 10th instant. In rendering the most ample justice to the assistance which has been afforded to you by Lieut.-Colonel Scott, I feel it however to be an act of justice and public duty to signify to you my conviction that the speedy, successful, and tranquil conclusion of the important arrangement lately accomplished in Oude, is principally to be ascribed to the eminent discretion, firmness, and wisdom with which you have conducted yourself in every stage of the negotiation, and particularly to the dignified temper with which you frustrated the repeated endeavours of his Excellency the Vizier to distract the course of the negotiation by alternate efforts to establish separate channels of communication with you and with Lieut.-Colonel Scott, and to disturb your joint operations in the public service. The strongest testimony which I can afford of my sense of your conduct on this difficult and trying occasion is contained in the order inclosed in my despatch to you and Colonel Scott, of this date, by which I have ap-

pointed you to preside over the provisional government of the ceded districts. I desire that you will consider this despatch to be an official notification of that appointment, and that immediately upon the completion of the cession of the districts enumerated in the treaty, you will proceed to assume the civil and military government of the same. The Commissioners and collectors appointed to aid you in the administration will be ordered to repair, without delay, to such place as you shall appoint within the ceded districts, by letter to the secretary in the political department, now attending my person.

You will receive in the course of a few days my instructions for the provisional administration and ultimate settlement of the provinces committed to your charge. It is highly desirable that I should have a personal interview with you with the least practicable delay; I propose to depart from this place by water in the course of two days, for Allahabad; from that fortress it is my intention to proceed by land to Cawnpore, this information will enable you to regulate the means of meeting me at the earliest possible period of time.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CLXIII.

To the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

On the Ganges, near Benares,
November 14, 1801.

1. I have the honour to transmit to you a copy of a treaty concluded by Mr. Henry Wellesley, and Lieut.-Colonel Scott, with his Excellency the Nawaub Vizier, on the 10th instant, at Lucknow, and ratified by my authority on this day.*

2. The various discussions which have taken place during the administration of my two immediate predecessors relative

* See p. 598.

to the state and condition of the interests of the Company in Oude, combined with the documents which have already been submitted to your honourable Committee, on the same subject during my administration, will render the general policy and objects of this treaty sufficiently manifest to your wisdom and experience. It is however my intention, by the Mornington Packet now under despatch to transmit to you a detailed statement of the means which I have employed to accomplish this important arrangement, and of the beneficial consequences which I expect to derive from it to various branches of your affairs.

3. By the present despatch, I shall content myself with requesting your attention to some of the leading advantages obtained by the successful issue of this measure.

4. The treaty effectually secures the reduction of the Nawab Vizier's military establishments within such limits as may be deemed sufficiently contracted to effect the entire extinction of his military power.

5. Your honourable Committee is already apprized that a considerable progress has been made during the past year in the reduction of his Excellency's army; the third article of this treaty will accelerate the completion of that salutary reform, while it will afford perpetual security against the revival of a similar danger.

6. In the place of his Excellency's irregular and precarious military power, is substituted such a British force as may be deemed adequate to our defence in that quarter of India, while the operation of this treaty exonerates the British Government from the obligation of maintaining any definite or specified number of troops in the province of Oude, the Company being charged with the general defence of the Vizier's dominions, and being relieved from all special engagement with regard to the description or amount of the force to be employed for that purpose.

7. A considerable augmentation is made in the amount of the subsidy for the purpose of embracing the expenses of the army to be maintained on our north-western frontier, in the ceded districts, and in those reserved to the Vizier as well as the charges of administering justice, and of managing the revenue through the channel of the Company's servants.

8. The payment of the subsidy no longer rests on the

faith of the native government of Oude, nor is subject to be affected by the corruption, imbecility and abuse of that vicious and incorrigible system of vexation and misrule.

9. The security of the subsidy is now established on the solid foundation of territorial possession, and the result of all accounts which I have been able to obtain, warrants a confident expectation, that under the wise and benevolent administration of the British Government, the territories ceded by this treaty will prove more productive, in a considerable degree than they are represented to be in the statement of Jummah, contained in the first article of the treaty.

10. In addition to these advantages, your honourable Committee must derive great satisfaction from reflecting that the British Government under this treaty will become the instrument of restoring to affluence and prosperity one of the most fertile regions of the globe, now reduced to a condition of the most afflicting misery and desolation by the depraved administration of the native government of Oude.

11. Since my departure from the Presidency, I have enjoyed frequent opportunities of contemplating the benefits diffused by the operation of the British system of government, over every part of the flourishing and happy provinces which I have visited. I can, therefore, declare my conscientious conviction, that no greater blessing can be conferred on the native inhabitants of India, than the extension of the British authority, influence and power.

12. The authority of the Nawaub of Oude was sustained exclusively by his connection with the Company's government, and the reputation and honour of the British nation in India, were deeply involved in the operation of that authority on the welfare and happiness of those countries over which it was uphelden by the terror of our name, or exercised by the immediate force of our arms. Your honourable Committee will, therefore, deem it natural, that, having frequently been reduced to the painful necessity of applying the influence of the British name, and the power of the British sword to the maintenance of a system so disgraceful in its principles, and ruinous in its effects, I should feel a considerable degree of satisfaction in substituting for such an administration, the salutary influence of those regulations and

laws, of which I have recently witnessed and admired the practical wisdom and extensive benevolence.

13. Your honourable Committee will further remark that by the operation of the sixth article of the treaty, the Company's government has reserved the positive right of interference in the internal management of that part of the country retained by the Nabob Vizier, and you may be assured of my unremitting endeavours to exercise this right to such an extent as shall afford every practicable degree of security for the lives and properties of the Vizier's remaining subjects, and shall preclude any disturbance of the peace and good order of our dominions from the vicinity of his Excellency's administration.

14. It is my intention to proceed immediately to vest the administration of the ceded districts in the hands of the Company's civil servants. This measure appears to me to be indispensably necessary for the purpose of securing all the important objects of the new arrangement. I shall not however attempt to form any settlement of the revenues, or to introduce any special code of regulations and laws, until sufficient time shall have been afforded for ascertaining the resources of the country, and for investigating the local customs, usages, manners and dispositions of its inhabitants. The immediate introduction of the Company's civil servants in the administration of all the details of the government in all its branches will operate as an effectual control upon such native officers and agents as it may be necessary to retain provisionally, and will facilitate the acquisition of that knowledge which must constitute the foundation of a permanent settlement of the country.

15. The peculiar character of the people of the ceded districts, and the obstacles which the artifice and treachery of the Vizier or his dependants may be expected to oppose to the final settlement of the country under the British Government, will require the constant presence of an active and vigorous authority, until the foundations of the new arrangement shall be firmly establishment. It is, therefore, my intention to place Mr. Henry Wellesley in the ceded districts for some time, with the most ample powers, for the purpose of settling the country, with the aid and assistance of such

of the Company's Civil servants as I have selected to co-operate with him in this arduous and salutary task.

16. The discretion, temper, judgment, and firmness which Mr. Wellesley has manifested, in the principal conduct of the negotiation with the Vizier have been the most efficient cause of its speedy, prosperous, and tranquil issue. These qualities, combined with the authority which he naturally derives from his near connexion with me, have induced me to consider him to be the most useful instrument which I can employ on this occasion. In the course of a year, or possibly within a shorter period of time, I trust that the settlement of the ceded districts may be so far advanced as to enable me to withdraw Mr. Wellesley, and to leave the administration of the country nearly in the same form as that of Benares, with such differences as may be required by the greatly superior magnitude of the dominion ceded by this treaty.

17. In the progress of the important arrangement which I have introduced into Oude, I have frequently had occasion to applaud the zeal, diligence, and address of Lieut.-Colonel

* The Right Honourable Henry Dundas expressed the following opinion of the Honourable Henry Wellesley (now Lord Cowley) in a letter to the Marquess Wellesley, dated Cheltenham, September 11, 1800:—

I write you these few lines in addition to the long letter you will receive from your brother,* chiefly with the view of stating to you the very sincere satisfaction I have received from the various communications and interviews I have had with your brother during the time he has been in this country. I am aware that he has been detained much longer than you expected; but it has been unavoidable. The various interruptions our communications have met with, partly from the multitude and variety of great objects which have pressed for these last twelve months past on the time of all public men, and partly from the tardiness, which attends all proceedings in which great bodies of men are sharers, has been the cause of much more procrastination than I expected, and certainly much more than I wished. But to return, for one sentence more, to the subject of your brother; I cannot allow myself to part with him without assuring you, that in the course of my life I never met with any person with whom I have had more satisfaction in transacting business than with him. He joins together one of the most amiable tempers to one of the soundest judgments I ever met with; and I trust opportunities will occur to enable him to prove to the world that my judgment of him is not erroneous.”

* Mr. Henry Wellesley.

Scott, since Mr. Wellesley's arrival at Lucknow, Lieut.-Colonel Scott's unremitting exertion of the same qualities has had its full share in the success of the negotiation: and Mr. Wellesley has, in an official letter to me, stated his high sense of Lieut.-Colonel Scott's merits and his public acknowledgment of his eminent services. I therefore propose to leave Lieut.-Colonel Scott in the Residency at the Vizier's Court, in which situation considerable talents, knowledge, and vigilance, will be required for the purpose of securing the timely accomplishment and continued effect of the stipulations of the treaty relative to the territories retained in the Vizier's hands.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs, your's, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CLXIV.

Sir John Anstruther, to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR LORD,

Calcutta, November 17th, 1801.

I was made very happy yesterday, by a letter from Mr. Wellesley to Mr. Barlow, which knowing the interest I take in all the great measures of your government, he was so good as to request Mr. B. to communicate to me. It contained the intelligence of the final completion of the Oude treaty, and a copy of it. Very sincerely do I congratulate you upon an event the most important that can occur in this part of India. The conquest of Mysore—the fall of Tippoo—the late treaty with the Nizam, and the settlement of Oude, completes every thing that can be wished by the most sanguine lover of his country, when to all these is added the settlement of Tanjore, and the Carnatic, the most able or the most active Governor General, has now nothing to do but to persevere, and cultivate those possessions you have acquired, and to communicate to our new possessions the benefit of those principles of justice and moderation, which no less distinguish your internal government, than your external government is distinguished by activity and foresight. As if India was too small a space to act in, you have strengthened British

power in India, by armies sent to aid the forces of England at the mouths of the Nile, and by negotiations near the banks of the Caspian Sea.

To the general joy, I felt at such an event as the treaty with Oude completed under your government, I had a very considerable addition of private satisfaction in knowing, that Henry had been the instrument of its negotiation. It would form no inconsiderable feature in any man's life, to have negotiated the treaties of Mysore and Oude, I trust it will be remembered with gratitude by those who have the power of reward in their hands.

I presume you will now proceed with more expedition to Lucknow, where I am afraid the climate, the settlement of the new territory, and other causes may detain you longer than I wish, and deprive us of the pleasure of seeing you, till the approach of heat.

Adieu, my dear Lord, and believe me,
Yours very sincerely and faithfully,

J. ANSTRUTHER.

No. CLXV.

The Marquess Wellesley to James Drummond, Esq. President, and the Committee of Supra-Cargoes, Canton.

GENTLEMEN,

Benares, 20th November, 1801.

1. By a despatch from the Honourable the Governor in Council of Bombay, I have received the copy of a letter addressed to you by that Government upon the subject of the advices lately received from Europe, respecting the convention supposed to have been concluded, or to be in agitation, between the Governments of France and Portugal.

2. The letter and its enclosures addressed to you by the Government of Bombay, contain all the information which has hitherto been received relative to that important event, and its probable consequences. I shall not, therefore, repeat the communication contained in that despatch; but, to pre-

clude the embarrassment which would arise from the loss of the packet, or from any delay in its arrival, I enclose attested copies of the several documents which composed it.

3. His Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier, in conformity to the instructions transmitted to him from his Majesty's Ministers, will certainly appoint a naval force for the purpose of protecting the settlement of Macao from any attempt on the part of the Government of France to gain possession of it, and with a view to add to the strength of the naval armament which will be employed on that service, I have directed that the honourable Company's ships the Asia and Dover Castle be completely armed and equipped, and ordered to join his Majesty's ships in the China Seas. I have also directed that a company of European infantry, and a proportion of European artillery, be embarked on each of those ships for the purpose of serving on board them as marines and gunners, or of acting at Macao, as occasion may require. I have requested his Excellency the Vice-Admiral to direct the naval officer who may be appointed by him to command the squadron employed upon this service, to communicate with you, and with the Governor of Macao, respecting the most effectual mode of providing for the protection and security of that settlement; and I rely with confidence on your approved zeal for the interests of the honourable Company, and on your knowledge of the state and condition of Macao, as well as of all other points connected with its local situation, to afford the commanding officer of the naval armament such information as may be necessary to regulate his operations. I have addressed a letter to his Excellency the Viceroy of Goa, requesting him to transmit instructions to the Governor of Macao, directing that officer to concert with you, and with his Majesty's naval commanding officer, the best means of providing for the defence of Macao. But I request that, without waiting the arrival of those instructions, you will immediately on the receipt of this despatch, communicate to the Governor of Macao the certain information of an intended design on the part of the French Government to make a descent upon that colony; and urge him to employ his exertions in placing it in the best possible state of defence which the resources of the settlement may admit, informing him at the same time of the measures adopted by the British

Government to assist in its protection. It is desirable that the Governor of Macao should admit a reinforcement to the garrison, of British troops, or a detachment of sailors trained to the use of arms and the management of artillery, if such a force can be spared from the squadron.

4. It will be your peculiar duty also to guard against the effect of any jealousy or suspicion which the Chinese Government might entertain of the preparations and measures adopted under this despatch with a view to that important object. It may be proper that you should state to the superior officer of the Chinese Government at Canton, the necessity of providing against the establishment of the French in Macao, not only for the purpose of securing the commercial interests of the British and Portuguese nations in that quarter, but for the preservation of the benefits which the Chinese Government derives from its commercial intercourse with those nations; advantages which would be totally annihilated by the establishment of a power destitute of the means of maintaining a commercial intercourse with China, and actuated in the projected attempt against Macao solely by a design to injure the interests of the British nation through the channel of its trade to China. You might also intimate with effect, the danger to which the interests of the Chinese Government would be exposed by the approach of any force acting in support of the ambitious and encroaching spirit of the French nation; and you might represent the imminent peril to which the tranquillity and independence of the Chinese Government would be subject, were France to be successful in securing an establishment upon the Island of Macao.

5. I desire that you will transmit to me the earliest information respecting the state of the Portuguese establishment at Macao, the military defences of that settlement, and of the plan of operations adopted for its protection against the expected attempts of the French nation. Much must be reserved for the exercise of your discretion in selecting that mode of conducting the defence of Macao which shall embrace the two important objects of effectually excluding the French from that possession, and of conciliating the mind of the Chinese Government. I rely with confidence on your discernment and ability to pursue the most advisable course.

Under this impression I am persuaded that Vice-Admiral Rainier will issue particular directions to the naval officer commanding in the Chinese Seas, to take no steps whatever for the defence of Macao without your advice and concurrence.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CLXVI.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable the Court of Directors for the affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

near Cawnpore, January 1st, 1802.

1. My separate despatches to your Honourable Court, under date the 28th of September, 1801, have conveyed to you my wish to retain my present charge, while the exigency of your affairs shall require my services; and the same despatches have apprized you of my solicitude to prolong my exertions in your service, until the beneficial consequences of your conquests shall be finally secured, and until the ultimate result of your success in the field, shall be brought into direct operation upon every branch of your affairs. By those letters I also requested your honourable Court, to issue without delay, a provisional appointment, empowering any person, whom you might deem qualified to hold the temporary charge of this government, to succeed me in the event of my death, absence, or resignation.

2. Since the date of those despatches, the happy conclusion of the treaty with the Nabob Vizier, forwarded to your Select Committee in my despatch of the 14th of November, 1801, and the tranquil and promising state of the ceded districts under the progressive introduction of the British Government, afford a reasonable prospect, that I shall be enabled to settle the interests of the Company in the north-western provinces, upon a secure basis during the course of the year 1802.

3. The affairs of the Carnatic will be adjusted by Lord Clive previously to his departure for Europe; and a stedfast maintenance of the system, which his Lordship will establish under my orders, cannot fail to secure and improve the interests of the Company, in the territories subject to the Government of Fort St. George.

4. The affairs of the Government of Bombay, furnish no ground of apprehension or difficulty, under the conduct of the approved discretion, diligence, and integrity of Mr. Duncan; and I trust, with his assistance in the course of the present year, to bring to a favourable issue the most important concerns of that government with the Mahratta powers.

5. The danger of invasion from Candahar is entirely removed by the destruction of the power of Zemaun Shah, and by the actual state of his dominions, while our north-western frontier has been considerably strengthened by the recent arrangements effected in Oude.

6. The general aspect of our political concerns with the native powers, especially with the Mahrattas, as well as the internal state of the Mahratta Empire, leave no reason to apprehend immediate danger from any quarter in India, and it appears probable, that in the course of a few months a considerable improvement may be produced in our relation towards the state of Poona.

7. The glorious success of the British arms in Egypt, the powerful British force (a portion of which was furnished from India) now holding possession of that country, and the great superiority of the British navy, in every quarter of the globe, added to the actual condition of all the native powers of India, appear to constitute in the present moment a sufficient state of security, against any possible designs which France may meditate for the destruction of this empire.

8. Within the current year I expect to be able either to ascertain the extent to which it may be practicable to reduce the military establishments of Fort St. George, and Bombay, or to provide such additional resources as shall supply the necessary charges of the army of those Presidencies respectively.

9. The improvement which has taken place in the state of the public finances in Bengal, within the last three months, promises to enable me within the current year, to establish

the basis of a comprehensive financial arrangement, connected with a regular system for the gradual augmentation of your commercial investment. During the existence of war with France, I could not hope to effect more on the subject of your finances in India, within any space of time to which my continuance in your service could possibly be extended.

10. Under all these circumstances, it appears to me, that I may now resign into your hands the trust, which I received from your honourable Court in the month of October, 1797, without incurring the hazard of injury to your service in India, or of any inconvenience in the selection of my successor at home.

11. My despatches of the 28th of September, 1801, will have afforded an opportunity to your honourable Court of nominating a provisional successor, to hold the temporary charge of this government in the event of my death, absence, or resignation, and this letter must reach you in sufficient time to enable you to appoint my permanent successor, at a season which will admit of his arrival in India, in the month of January, or February, 1803.

12. I, therefore, have the honour to submit to your honourable Court, this respectful notification of my wish to embark for Europe in the course of the month of December, 1802, or of January, 1803, and to resign the Government-General of your possessions in India at the time of my embarkation.

13. I request that your honourable Court will be pleased to employ every possible precaution, with a view to enable me to receive during the course of the month of October, 1802, your formal and regular permission to proceed to Europe, and to resign your service at the season stated in the 12th paragraph of this letter.

I have the honour to be, honourable Sirs,
with the greatest respect,
Your most faithful obedient and obliged servant,
WELLESLEY.

No. CLXVII.

*The Marquess Wellesley, to his Excellency the Viceroy of Goa.**

SIR,

Cawnpore, January 17, 1802 .

1. By authentic advices which I have just received from Europe I am apprized of the conclusion of a treaty of alliance between the Government of France and Portugal, by which her most faithful Majesty has been compelled to abandon the relations hitherto subsisting with his Britannic Majesty, and to unite with the Government of France in hostile proceedings against the British Empire.

2. Under the knowledge of this event, it becomes my indispensable duty to adopt the necessary measures for precluding the Government of France from the means of applying the resources of the Portuguese possessions in India, under the provisions of the late treaty of alliance, to purposes injurious to the interests of Great Britain.

3. The security of this object manifestly requires that the Portuguese Settlements in India should be immediately placed under the authority of the British power, and should continue subject to that authority until those possessions shall be restored to her most faithful Majesty by any arrangement which may take place at the conclusion of a general peace in Europe, or which may be hereafter established between his Britannic Majesty and the Court of Lisbon.

4. Anxious that the measures which my duty compels me to pursue, with respect to the settlement of Goa, should be carried into effect without injury to the persons and property of its inhabitants, and desirous to combine with the execution of those measures the utmost consideration for your Excellency's high rank, and exalted station, and also wishing to make every practicable provision for your Excellency's convenience and accommodation, I have directed Sir William Clarke, previous to the employment of the force placed under his command to propose to your Excellency terms for the

* A similar letter was addressed to his Excellency the Governor of Macao.

peaceable surrender of the civil and military Government of Goa and its immediate dependencies.

5. Your Excellency's wisdom and discernment will suggest to you the inutility of opposing any resistance to the accomplishment of this measure, and your Excellency's justice and humanity will not permit you to expose the lives and property of the inhabitants of Goa, to the danger of an unavailing contest with the superior power of the British arms.

6. In expectation of this I have directed Sir W. Clarke to receive and to communicate to me any representations which your Excellency may desire to convey to me relating to the concerns and interests of the Portuguese settlements, also relating to any points connected with the execution of the orders and instructions with which he has been furnished. It will afford me satisfaction to conform to your Excellency's wishes, on all occasions to the utmost extent compatible with the obligations of my public duty.

7. It is proper that I should inform your Excellency that I have transmitted orders for the introduction of the British authority into the settlements of Damaun and Diu, similar to those which I have deemed it necessary to issue for the occupation of the settlement of Goa.

8. I refer your Excellency, for a more ample communication upon all these points, to Sir W. Clarke.

I have the honour to be,
with great consideration and respect, Sir,
your Excellency's most obedient, faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.

No. CLXVIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to his Excellency Lieut.-General Lake, the Commander-in-Chief.

SIR,

Lucknow, February 8, 1802.

1. I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that on this day I have received official advice from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the ratification of preliminary articles of peace between his Majesty and the French republic. A copy of those articles has been already transmitted to your Excellency through the Adjutant-General.

2. The conditions of the peace combined with his Majesty's intention already notified to this Government of providing, by a separate establishment for the defence of the island of Ceylon will relieve the Military establishments of the three Presidencies of India from a considerable burthen.

3. We shall no longer be required to furnish troops for the defence of Ceylon, of Malacca, or of the Eastern islands, and we shall also evacuate Chinsurah, Chandernagore, Pondicherry, Cochin, and Mahé, together with Goa, Damaun, and Diu, while the return of the Indian army lately employed in Egypt and the troops recently embarked for Macao, may be speedily expected.

4. Your Excellency will further observe by the enclosed copy of a letter received overland from the Court of Directors that a reduction is to take place of the military force hitherto employed at Bencoolen.

5. Under all these circumstances it appears to me that it will be practicable without inconvenience or hazard to carry into speedy effect an efficient system of reduction in every branch of our military charges in India.

6. In considering the means of reducing the native army in India to a peace establishment, I have adverted to the following separate branches of reform.

First. The reduction of such corps of volunteers, or other temporary and local corps as may have been raised during the exigency of the war.

Second. The discharge of the sepoys supernumerary to the peace establishment of each native battalion.

Third. The reduction of such a number of native regi-

ments at each Presidency as may appear absolutely necessary to be retained upon a peace establishment; and,

Fourth. The retrenchment of various establishments and contingent charges connected with the movements of the troops in the field.

7. I expect to be able, within a short period of time, to afford relief to the public finances by important reductions under each of these heads; but in the present moment I propose to confine my orders to the three Presidencies: to the first, second, and fourth objects, reserving for a more full consideration my final determination with regard to the number of native regiments to be reduced at each of the Presidencies in consequence of the peace.

8. In this letter, therefore, I shall limit my instructions to your Excellency to those articles of reduction which appear to me to be practicable and expedient to carry into effect without a moment of delay.

9. I have issued orders to the Governor in Council at Bombay, directing him to return, as speedily as possible, to Bengal the corps of volunteers from the establishment now serving at Bombay; and I request your Excellency to prepare the necessary orders for disbanding these corps upon their return to this Presidency.

10. Your Excellency is already apprized of my anxious desire to encourage, amongst the native troops in India that spirit, which, on various important occasions during my administration, has induced them to embark with zeal and alacrity on foreign service.

11. I, therefore, earnestly recommend to your Excellency's attention the condition of the privates in the several corps of native volunteers which must be reduced in consequence of the peace.

12. Your Excellency will be pleased to consider whether it might not, hereafter, be practicable to discharge a portion of the privates, in some of the native corps, to be retained on this establishment for the purpose of giving employment to such privates as have embarked as volunteers on foreign service. If this arrangement should be deemed objectionable, I request your Excellency to suggest any other plan which may appear to you to be more eligible for the purpose of providing employment or maintenance for those native pri-

vates who have voluntarily embarked on foreign service during the late war.

13. Under this branch of reduction it will also be necessary immediately to order that the recruiting for the Golundauze corps (if it has not already ceased) should cease forthwith; and I also request your Excellency to suspend or revoke the order for the increase of the number of gun-lascars at the Presidency.

14. The corps of Golundauze will, of course, be reduced as soon as the proposed augmentation of the European artillery shall have taken effect.

15. All the regiments of native infantry on this establishment being now complete to the war establishment of 900 privates in each battalion, a considerable reduction of expense may be accomplished immediately under that head. I, therefore, hereby authorize and direct your Excellency to be pleased to issue an order for the immediate discharge of the sepoys supernumerary in each native battalion to the peace establishment of 1796; your Excellency will be pleased to notify that the order is issued by authority, and you will direct it to be carried into effect throughout the army of this Presidency on the 31st of March next ensuing.

16. This reduction will still leave each native battalion of the strength of 800 privates, or 1,600 for each native regiments. In my judgment a further reduction of 100 privates may now be safely effected in each battalion, leaving the strength of each battalion 700, and of each regiment 1,400 privates. Your Excellency is aware of the importance of this reduction in point of expense, and unless you should apprehend from its adoption any evil consequences which have not occurred to my judgment, I authorize you to issue an immediate order for the reduction of each battalion of native infantry on this establishment to the strength of 700 privates, on the 30th of April next ensuing.

17. I request your Excellency to communicate with the Lieut.-Governor of the ceded provinces with regard to the means of disposing of the privates who shall be discharged from the army now serving within the limits of his authority. I shall signify my orders to the Resident at Lucknow on the same subject with reference to the troops stationed within the reserved dominions of the Nabob Vizier, and I shall give

the necessary instructions to the Vice-President in Council with a view to the same object in the lower provinces. In the meanwhile I shall hope to receive the favour of your Excellency's opinion with regard to the means of disposing of such sepoys as shall be discharged in the ensuing months of March and April.

18. I have the honour to apprise your Excellency of my intention that such body-guard of cavalry as I may deem necessary to establish permanently for the personal service of the Governor-General should hereafter be considered as being composed of detachments from the several regiments of the native cavalry on the establishment of Bengal and Fort St. George, and that correspondent reductions should be made from the strength of each troop in those regiments respectively in order to provide for the expense of the body-guard in the time of peace. I shall hereafter have the honour to transmit to your Excellency a more detailed statement on this subject previously to your issuing any orders upon it.

19. Your Excellency will be pleased to issue an order immediately for the reduction of the honourable Company's second European regiment according to the plan already communicated to me, with this variation, that in the present moment I think it inexpedient and unnecessary to form the marine battalion into a regiment. I, therefore, request your Excellency to suggest to me the best practicable mode of providing for the officers who will be thrown out of employment by the reduction of the second European regiment.

20. The corps of native infantry on this establishment are unquestionably defective in the number of their European officers, and it would be a great improvement to their efficiency if the number of their European officers could be permanently augmented, I request your Excellency to advert to this circumstance, and to report to me whether such European officers as may be reduced from the second European regiment, or from any other native corps which it may be deemed necessary to reduce, might not be posted as supernumeraries to the native corps retained on the establishment.

21. The Court of Directors, in their letter of the 11th of February 1801, have left it to the discretion of the Governor-General in Council either to post the officers of reduced

corps to the regiments retained on the establishment as supernumeraries of their respective ranks, or to leave them unemployed for the present on their pay and half batta, and to appoint them to regiments as vacancies may occur.

22. The former of these modes of provision appears to me to be preferable to the latter in every view connected either with the efficiency of the army or with the welfare of the officers. A question, however, will necessarily arise with regard to the comparative expense of these plans; and on that question, as well as on every other part of the subject, I request to be favoured with your Excellency's early opinions.

23. I am, however, aware that with the utmost degree of attention which can be paid to the condition of the officers of the reduced corps, they must suffer by the effect of the reduction. But it must be recollect that amidst the numerous blessings of the general peace, the officers of the army must ever expect some diminution of those advantages which they receive from the State in return for the fatigues and dangers to which they are exposed in time of war. No reduction of the army would be either wise or just which should not also be necessary and consistent with the security of the empire. But it will be the duty of the Government to accomplish, with firmness and despatch, and the duty of the officers to bear with fortitude and temper, whatever reduction shall be demanded by the principles of a rational economy, and shall be compatible with the public safety.

24. In issuing the order for the reduction of the second European regiment, I request your Excellency to annex to it the order for the augmentation of the artillery, as directed by the honourable Court. The improvement of our artillery is a point of such importance that I am resolved not to postpone it under any circumstances whatever.

25. With regard to the fourth object of reduction, namely, the retrenchment of various establishments and contingent charges connected with the movement of the troops in the field, I have the honour to enclose to your Excellency a copy of my orders of this date to the Vice-President in Council; and I request your Excellency to favour me with any suggestions which may occur to you respecting the objects of my instructions to the Vice-President in Council, or re-

specting any other military charges or establishments which may appear to you susceptible of reduction, I have forwarded a copy of this despatch to the Vice-President in Council, and to the Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay for their guidance.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CLXIX.

The Marquess Wellesley, to his Excellency Lieutenant-General Lake, Commander-in-Chief.

SIR,

Lucknow, February 8th, 1802

1. Although in my despatch A of this date I have signified my intention of reserving for further consideration the question of reducing any of the native regiments on this establishment, I have judged it to be expedient to communicate to your Excellency, without delay, my sentiments on that important part of the peace establishment of this army.

2. The number of regiments of native infantry on this establishment is now nineteen, of which eight were intended to be stationed in the provinces south of Allahabad, and eleven in the vizier's dominions and the ceded provinces. With the expected increase of His Majesty's troops in Bengal, it appears to me that eight regiments of native infantry, of 1400 privates of 1600 fire-locks each, will be as large a peace establishment as will be required for the provinces south of Allahabad.

3. With the great force of cavalry now stationed in the ceded districts (which are likely to become the permanent station of the main body of our cavalry), it appears to me that seven regiments of native infantry of the establishment of privates already stated, together with a due proportion of European cavalry, infantry, and artillery, will be a sufficient peace establishment for the ceded provinces.

4. In the reserved dominions of the Vizier, including Lucknow, are now stationed eight battalions, or four regiments of native infantry and one regiment of native cavalry. With the exception of the 12th regiment, stationed at

Lucknow, these corps are much dispersed, and are employed on duties which might be more properly performed by the troops to be maintained by the Vizier under the late treaty. It is, therefore, my intention to propose to the Vizier to permit a cantonment to be formed in the neighbourhood of Lucknow, at which may be stationed the troops necessary for his Excellency's personal service, as well as the force requisite to maintain the general tranquillity of this country.

5. By concentrating this force in one point, it will be practicable to diminish its numbers without affecting its efficiency; and in the event of any emergency, the dominions of his Excellency under the late treaty have been reduced to so compact a form, that occasional detachments from the cantonments at Lucknow will reach with facility any point which may require the presence of a regular force.

6. Having consulted Lieutenant-Colonel Scott on this question, I found his opinion to be, that two regiments of native infantry, with one of cavalry, stationed in the vicinity of Lucknow, would be a sufficient force upon a peace establishment for the protection of the Vizier's reserved dominions. Concurring entirely with Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, it is my intention to propose to the Vizier the establishment of a cantonment in this neighbourhood; and as soon as I shall have obtained his Excellency's consent to this arrangement, my decided judgment is, that it would be practicable and safe to reduce two regiments of native infantry on this establishment.

7. I need not apprise your Excellency of the urgent necessity of availing ourselves of the season of peace, to effect in our expenditure every degree of reduction consistent with the security of the empire, and with the dignity and honour of the government.

8. It is indispensable to our safety in India, that we should be prepared to meet any future crisis of war with unembarrassed resources. These sentiments render me extremely anxious to embrace the earliest opportunity of affording effectual relief to our finances from the heavy pressure of our military charges, and I shall therefore look with the most earnest anxiety to your Excellency's concurrence in the plan proposed in this letter, and to the unabated exertion of that cordiality and zeal, with which you have uniformly contri-

buted your assistance, to strengthen my hands in the discharge of my arduous and invidious duties.

9. I am not at present disposed to attempt any reduction in the native cavalry on this establishment. That branch of our force is in my opinion, of the utmost importance to our security in this quarter of India, and under your Excellency's auspices, I entertain a confident expectation that the native cavalry on this establishment, will speedily become as efficient as its services are requisite for the defence of this part of our frontier.

10. The state of the 3rd regiment of native cavalry inspires me with a hope, that your Excellency's success in improving this branch of the service, will be proportioned to your ability, assiduity, and zeal. If, however, your Excellency's efforts should unfortunately be frustrated, and if the state of the native cavalry on this establishment in the course of another season should disappoint my expectations, it is my intention to propose and to carry into effect a considerable reduction of that expensive part of our establishment; I trust however, that the necessity of this retrenchment, (however desirable on principles of economy,) will be precluded by the proficiency of the officers and privates, placed under the command of Colonel St. Leger, and in this event, I shall readily forego any financial advantages attainable by the reduction of the establishment of our cavalry.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CLXX.

The Marquess Wellesley, to the Honourable Court of Directors, for the Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies.

HONOURABLE SIRS, Camp near Juanpore, March 8th, 1802.

It has afforded me considerable satisfaction to find by the 148th paragraph of the general letter from your honourable Court to the Governor-General in council, in the military department, dated the 10th of June, 1801, that my conduct

with respect to the star and jewels, presented to me by the army, employed in Mysore, had met with your approbation.*

The judicious and liberal measures which your honourable Court has been pleased to pursue, for giving effect to that honourable testimony of the good opinion of the army, without creating a precedent injurious to the public service in India, demand my most cordial expressions of gratitude and respect. I now have the honour of submitting to your honourable Court, my respectful acceptance of the additional mark of favour, which you have been pleased to confer upon me, by presenting to me the star and jewels of Tippoo Sultaun, originally tendered to me by the gallant army, which atchieved the conquest of Mysore; and I assure your honourable Court, that this distinguished honour is greatly enhanced in my estimation, by the grateful reflection, that the favourable sentiments of such an army, on an occasion so glorious to the British name, and so interesting to my public character, should have been sanctioned by the deliberate voice of your honourable Court.

I have the honour to inform your honourable Court, that in conformity to your orders, Lieut.-General Stuart has transmitted to me the star and jewels from Fort St. George, and I have received the same by the hands of Major Malcolm, together with a letter from Lieut.-General Stuart, of which I have the honour to annex a copy, as well as a copy of my reply to that respectable officer.

I have the honour to be,

HONOURABLE SIRS,

YOUR MOST OBEDIENT, OBLIGED,

AND FAITHFUL SERVANT,

WELLESLEY.

(A true Copy.) MERRICK SHAWE,
Military Secretary.

*Extract of a general Letter from the Honourable the Court of Directors in the Military Department, dated the 10th of June, 1801.

Par. 148. We are thoroughly sensible of the propriety and delicacy of the motive, which induced our Governor-General to decline the acceptance of this token of respect to his Lordship, from the gallant conquerors of Mysore. In order, however, further to testify the very high sense which we entertain of the distinguished services to this Company, of the most noble the Marquess Wellesley, by the superior wisdom and energy of

No. CLXXI.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-General Stuart.

SIR,

Juanpore, March 8th, 1802.

1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, under date the 6th of February,* which was delivered to me by Major John Malcolm this morning, together with the star and jewels, originally tendered to me by the gallant army, which reduced the hostile power of Tippoo Sultaun, and since presented to me by the honourable the Court of Directors.

2. In accepting this distinguished mark of honour, I reflect with the highest satisfaction, that it is the united testimony of the deliberate approbation of the honourable the Court of Directors, and of the kindness and favour of an army, to which I must ever remain attached by the most ardent sentiments of public and private gratitude.

3. It is peculiarly gratifying to me, that you should have been the ultimate channel of conveying to me a gift, intimately connected with the remembrance of your eminent services in the late glorious war in Mysore. I acknowledge with gratitude the expressions by which you have been pleased to accompany your communication on this interesting occasion, nor could a more acceptable addition have been

whose councils, the late war in Mysore was brought to so speedy and glorious a termination, we hereby present the star and badge of the order of St. Patrick, formed from the jewels taken at Seringapatam, to his Lordship's acceptance, the same having been tendered to and received by the Court of Directors for that purpose.

* MY LORD,

Feb. 6, 1802

I have learnt with peculiar satisfaction, that your Excellency's mind has been relieved from the legal impediments which had induced your Excellency to decline the acceptance of an honorary mark of public gratitude, and that your Excellency has been solicited by the honourable Court of Directors to receive the star and badge of the order of St. Patrick, presented to your Excellency by Lieut.-General Harris, in the name of that army which under the direction of your Lordship's councils attained the conquest of Mysore.

The return to Fort William of your Excellency's private Secretary, Major Malcolm, who shared in the glory of that memorable campaign, and participates the sentiments of respect which this token is intended to com-

made to the honour which I have received from the Court of Directors and from the army than this public declaration of the favourable opinion of an officer, whose long and honourable career has placed his character among the most distinguished names in the British service.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

By command of his Excellency the most noble the Governor, and Captain-General.

MERRICK SHAWE,
Military Secretary.

No. CLXXII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Benares, March 13, 1802.

On the 1st of January 1802, I closed a separate letter to your honourable Court containing a respectful notification of my resignation of the Government general of your possessions in India, to take effect upon my embarkation for Europe in the course of the month of December 1802 or January 1803.

2. It was my wish and expectation to have been enabled to have accompanied the despatch of that letter by a detailed state of the settlement of the provinces ceded by the Nawaub Vizier, and also by a general view of the events

memorate, has afforded me the most appropriate means of repeating the request of the army, and of transmitting the star and badge to your Excellency, in the confident hope that you will do them the honour of accepting this memorial of their esteem and admiration.

The circumstances which have rendered me the ultimate channel of conveying to your Excellency this mark of the high sense entertained of your public services on that most arduous occasion, combine the flattering exercise of a public duty, and the highest gratification of my personal feelings.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. STUART.

(A true Copy.) MERRICK SHAWE,
Military Secretary.

which preceded, and of the beneficial consequences which must result from the treaty concluded with the Nawaub Vizier on the 10th of November 1801.

3. But the unavoidable delays which have arisen in arranging the details of the settlement, and my continued occupation in the inspection of the army, and in the negotiation of the various important points which remained for adjustment with the Nawaub Vizier as well as the pressure of other urgent affairs connected with the introduction of the Company's authority into the ceded provinces rendered it impossible for me, either to collect the necessary documents or to digest them in a proper form for the notice of your honourable Court; the transmission of my letter of the 1st of January has, therefore, been delayed until the present time, and the operation of the same causes still prevents me from furnishing your honourable Court with the information proposed.

4. On the other hand I have the satisfaction to assure your honourable Court that the settlement of the ceded provinces has proceeded with a degree of facility and success which has exceeded my most sanguine expectation; the land revenue of the current year promises to equal the amount of the Jumma stated in the treaty, after defraying all charges of collection, including the whole of the Company's civil establishment employed within the ceded provinces; and I entertain no doubt that the clear produce of the revenues of the ceded provinces within the course of 1803 and 1804, after defraying all charges, will form an important addition to the surplus revenues of the Presidency of Bengal, and that a considerable successive increase may be expected in each year under a settlement of three or five years; beyond which extent, I deem it to be unadvisable to conclude any settlement of the land revenue of the ceded provinces, until more accurate information can be obtained with respect to the resources of the country.

5. I have the further satisfaction to inform your honourable Court that I have every reason to expect a favourable issue of all the questions depending between the Nawaub Vizier and the Company, in consequence of the late treaty. Of the arrear of twenty-one lacs of rupees due by his Excellency on account of the augmented subsidy His Excellency

discharged eight lacs during my residence at Lucknow, and formed satisfactory arrangements for the gradual liquidation of the remaining sum. His Excellency has also adopted measures for the final completion of the reform of his army with all practicable despatch; and he has signified his disposition to introduce into his reserved dominions such regulations as I may suggest for the welfare of his subjects, and for the prosperity of the country.

6. I shall hereafter have the honour to transmit to your honourable Court or to the Secret Committee the particular details of that information of which the despatch is now unavoidably delayed.

7. In the meanwhile no circumstance has arisen to require any delay of my resignation of this Government. In addition to the statement submitted to your honourable Court in my letter of the 1st of January which accompanies this despatch, the further progress of the settlement of the ceded provinces, the improved state of public credit, and my knowledge of the ratification of preliminary articles of peace between his Majesty and France furnish new motives to relieve my mind from anxiety with respect to any possible consequences which can result from my retirement at the period of time proposed.

8. In transmitting, therefore, to your honourable Court my letter of the 1st of January 1802, I beg leave to renew my application for your permission to resign the service of the honourable Company in the month of January 1803.

9. The delay which has unavoidably arisen in the transmission of my letter of the 1st of January precludes the possibility of my receiving, during the course of the month of October 1802, your formal and regular permission to embark for Europe, and to resign your service. I trust, however, that this despatch will reach your honourable Court in sufficient time to enable you to furnish me with that authority at the conclusion of the month of December, 1802, or early in January, 1803. My letter of the 28th of September, 1801, will I trust, have induced you to appoint a provisional successor to receive from me the temporary charge of this government; while my present despatch will afford you the opportunity of making an early nomination of my permanent successor. I shall, therefore, deem myself at liberty under all the circumstances

of the case, to embark for Europe, although your express permission for that purpose should not have reached me, in the last week of January, 1803, provided I shall have received previously to that time the notification of your pleasure respecting the appointment of my provisional successor.

10. Your honourable Court may be assured, that, unless I should be compelled by the state of my health, (of which misfortune I entertain no immediate apprehension) I will not relinquish the charge of this government until I shall have received your appointment of my provisional successor.

11. I have the honour to inform your honourable Court, that I am now returning to the presidency for the purpose of accelerating such reductions of military expense as appear to be safe and practicable in consequence of the conclusion of preliminary articles of peace with France; I hope also to accomplish various other arrangements for the completion of such a financial system as may enable the government in India to maintain the commercial investment on the high scale of the present year; and to give effect to any plan which may be in the contemplation of your honourable Court for the reduction of the India debt, according to the suggestions to your honourable Court, by Mr. Dundas, in his letter under date the 30th June, 1801.

12. In the course of the current year, I confidently expect to be enabled to establish such a system of finance in India, as shall secure the complete and early operation of that or of any plan founded on similar principles, provided the assistance which Mr. Dundas has proposed to your honourable Court, to afford from home to your finances in India shall be regularly furnished, in the manner suggested in the letter to which I now refer.

13. The Vice-President in council under my special instructions has regularly apprized your secret Committee of the progressive state of the finances and investment, and I shall direct him to accompany this despatch by a similar statement, including the latest period of time, and referring to such information as he may receive from me, together with such documents as are not at present within my reach.

14. On my arrival at Fort William, I shall avail myself of the earliest opportunity to transmit to your honourable Court, the fullest information respecting the state of your finances

in India; recent events and the general prospect of affairs justify me in the certainty of being able upon my arrival at Fort William, to submit to your honourable Court a more satisfactory view of that branch of your affairs than it has hitherto been my duty to bring under your consideration.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CLXXIII.

The Earl of Elgin to the Marquess Wellesley.

Constantinople, December 11th, 1801.

MY DEAR LORD,

[Received March 18th, 1802.]

By my last letters from Moscow, of the 28th of October, nothing was yet known there of the preliminaries between England and France, excepting only the articles that relate to Malta, an outline of which was sent to Lord St. Helens, "with an instruction to propose to the Court of Russia, an eventual agreement, in virtue of which, on our relinquishing the island to the Order of St. John, the Emperor was to take upon himself, as protector of the order, the care of maintaining its independence, and securing its possession against any foreign invasion. This negotiation was accordingly set on foot, and on the eve of being brought to a favourable conclusion, as it coincided exactly with Count Panin's views; but the change of ministry produced an immediate alteration in these dispositions, and Lord St. Helens was accordingly informed, that His Imperial Majesty had upon mature deliberation determined to decline the proposal in question, partly on account of the difficulty of maintaining a body of his troops in so distant a quarter; and partly from his apprehension of the political embarrassments and risks, that he might incur from the umbrage and jealousies that this measure would excite in France and Spain, and even at Constantinople. We must, therefore, now bethink ourselves of some other expedient, and perhaps the least ineligible would be to endeavour, through the influence of the Court of Russia, to cause the election of a new grand master of Malta

to fall upon some trustworthy person, whom we might furnish, on his re-instatement, with such supplementary means as might enable him with the resources of the order to maintain his island in a respectable state of defence.

Adieu,

Yours most respectfully,

ELGIN.

P.S. Count Panin has been removed from the direction of Foreign Affairs in Russia, and is succeeded by Kotzebue.

No. CLXXIV.

Extract from a letter of the Earl of Dartmouth to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR LORD,

London, April 9, 1802.

I cannot return your Excellency my acknowledgements for the favour of your letters, (received per *Georgiana Packet*, and overland) without assuring you in the first place that it would occasion in my mind the most sincere regret, should any transactions have taken place here of a nature to make you think it possible you may be induced to quit the high station you hold in India with such honour to yourself, and so much advantage to the Company, and the British empire; before the final completion of the different objects your Excellency has enumerated as now occupying, and about to occupy your attention. I should more particularly lament that the event of your quitting India, should take place at a moment when the wisdom and energy of your administration has already brought about in the midst of the difficulties and embarrassments of a state of war, such ameliorations in the Company's finances, as could have been looked for but from the operation of peace.

It would be the highest gratification to me, (as I am convinced it would be of the first importance to our interests in India) if I could entertain a full confidence that the same vigour and the same talent which have brought the war to so glorious a conclusion, would continue to preside over the work of peace; and which would, I have no doubt, restore to

the finances of India that prosperity, towards which, even in war, so considerable a progress has been made.

Your Excellency will perceive that the wishes you have expressed to the Court of Directors, and to me, have been complied with, and that Mr. Barlow has been appointed your provisional successor, in case you should think it proper, at any time, to quit your present situation. Before I proceed, it seems incumbent upon me to make some apology for the omission of a due notification of my appointment to the office of President of the Board of Commissioners; in truth it had not occurred to me, that I was myself to make that notification. I am sure you will acquit me of any intention of omitting any mark of respect or attention to you. I shall have the less to trouble you with on the present occasion, as Mr. Addington has informed me, that it is his intention to write fully to your Excellency upon the affairs of India.

It shall be my particular care that should a plan for the distribution and management of the Indian army be sent from hence, it shall go out (as far as depends upon me,) in such a form as shall leave to your Excellency all possible discretionary power with regard to its adoption. Indeed in my opinion, the whole business could not be put into a better train than by vesting it wholly in your Excellency's judgment and discretion. Nobody is so good a judge of what is necessary for the protection of our Indian possessions; and I am persuaded no one feels more strongly than your Excellency, the circumstances of the Company's finances which make it of the utmost expedience that no force should be kept up beyond what that necessity requires.

We are still engaged in a warm dispute with the Court of Directors upon the private trade. They have come to a resolution against government which was yesterday confirmed by a Court of Proprietors. I have ordered their third printed report with the communication which had taken place between Government and the Court to be transmitted to you. The business must now I should suppose, be brought before Parliament; the only competent tribunal to decide, whether it was the intention of the legislature to leave the Court of

* See on this subject the letter of Lord Wellesley to General Lake, p. 624, (No. 171,) [Ed.]

Directors without restraint or control, the power of sacrificing an object of so much consequence as the bringing to the Port of London the surplus trade of India, or at least that part of it hitherto carried on by British capital for the advantage of our rivals.

I have the honour to be,
 with great truth and regard,
 My dear Lord,
 Your Excellency's faithful servant,
 DARTMOUTH.

No. CLXXV.

Minute by the Governor-General.

Fort William, April 21st, 1802.

In resuming my seat in council at this presidency, my first duty is to express my entire approbation of the conduct of the honourable the vice-president in council during my absence. Various important circumstances have required the active exertions of this presidency since my departure for the Upper Provinces; and I am happy to avail myself of this occasion to declare, that I have received the most satisfactory and useful assistance from the vice-president in council, in every emergency of the public service, which rendered the signification of my previous instructions impracticable, and that every order which I have issued, has been executed with the most cordial zeal, promptitude, and alacrity, and with the utmost degree of judgment and prudence.

From such a confirmation of the justice of those sentiments of respect and esteem which induced me to repose in Mr. Barlow the important charge of vice-president in council, I derive additional confidence in the security of the British interests in India, during the remaining period of my administration. Experience has proved, that I may repair without apprehension to any quarter of this extensive empire in which my presence may be demanded by the local exigencies of the service; and that during my absence, I may rely on the

maintenance of the wisdom, vigour, dignity, and integrity of the administration of affairs at this presidency. In offering my sincere acknowledgements to Mr. Barlow for his conduct since he has filled the office of vice-president in council, I cannot omit a similar testimony of the public zeal, prudence, and integrity of Mr. Udny, whose honourable spirit of co-operation, combined with judicious and diligent service, have essentially contributed to promote the prosperity of the public interests during my absence from this Presidency.

WELLESLEY.

No. CLXXVI.

Translation of a Letter from the Kaymakan to the Right Honourable Lord Wellesley, Governor-General of Bengal, delivered by the Reys Effendi to forward the 30th April, 1802.

To the noblest among the princes believing in the Messiah, Support of the grandees of the Christian nation, the Governor-General of the British dominions in the East Indies, his Excellency the most esteemed and beloved Lord Wellesley, our friend; may his end be attended with happiness.

After our sincere assurances of perfect friendship and regard, we have, hereby, the pleasure of acquainting your Excellency, that the exertion and zeal which have been evinced by your Lordship in sending, so opportunely, the corps of troops belonging to your establishment, who have been destined by the Court of Great Britain to co-operate in the late expedition, together with the forces of the sublime Ottoman Porte, not only have served to strengthen the bonds of union and friendship so firmly subsisting between the two Courts, but also to secure to you the friendly esteem of the Emperor, whose favourable opinion of your Excellency is equal to the satisfaction he has reaped from your zealous conduct.

Indeed the measures pursued in defence of the common cause in question, were but the natural result of the candid friendship since time immemorial subsisting between the

Sublime Porte, and the court of Great Britain, but more particularly of the concert and union which have prevailed, with such reciprocal good faith, since the contracted alliance.

As a mark of approbation of that exertion and zeal, therefore, which have been so manifestly witnessed on your part, and a token of distinction and compliment, the Sublime Porte have prepared and destined for your Lordship the order of the Crescent, of the first rank, consisting in a half-moon, fixed in the middle of a star set with brilliants, together with a ribbon, the two ends whereof joined by a medal bearing the Grand Signor's cypher in gold.

We have, therefore, the pleasure of writing this official letter, to enquire after your health, and to acquaint your Excellency with the transmission of the above imperial mark of attention expressive of his Highness's satisfaction, herewith annexed. On its reception, (please God) and on your Lordship becoming acquainted with its tenor and motive, we hope your Excellency will not refuse to act up to the dictates of friendship, and to fulfil the rules of the sincere intimacy between the two countries.

Your friend,

MUSTAFFA KAYMAKAN.
(L.S.)

No. CLXXVII.

The Earl of Elgin to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Constantinople, May 1, 1802.

The British army having received orders to evacuate Egypt, in virtue of the stipulations of the treaty of peace between England and France; I have a peculiar gratification in being directed by the Grand Signor, to convey to your Excellency the diamond star and ribbon of the order of the Crescent, as a testimony of his Imperial Majesty's sense of your Excellency's active and friendly zeal, so conspicuously displayed in the preparations which your Excellency had of your own authority made towards a co-operation for the recovery of

Egypt; by which provident measure, a still more formidable force than was demanded from England, embarked from India for the coasts of the Red Sea, instantly upon the receipt of the King's commands.

It is the Grand Signor's further desire in offering to your Excellency the insignia of this order, thereby to express to you his particular admiration of the spirit and steadiness, with which Major-General Baird, and the army under his command, performed the very difficult services that they had to encounter in Egypt; and the distinguished discipline and good conduct which they maintained during the whole period of their continuance in the Turkish dominions.

I have the honour to be,
 with the utmost respect, my Lord,
 Your Excellency's
 Most obedient humble servant,
 ELGIN.

No. CLXXVIII.

Extract from the Proceedings of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council in the Secret Department under the date 5th August, 1802.

[Read a Minute from the Governor-General.]

I now record the following letter addressed to the Chairman of the honourable the Court of Directors, in explanation of the motives which actuated the determination of the Governor-General in council, recorded on the public proceedings of the 24th of June, last, to postpone the abolition of the College of Fort William, until the 31st of December, 1803, and of the grounds on which I rest my expectation, that the honourable Court will rescind the order of the 27th of January, 1802, for the abolition of the College, as soon as the Court shall be in possession of the important facts, and circumstances connected with the condition of the Company's finances in India, with the actual charges of the College, and

with the beneficial effects already produced by that institution, which were not within the knowledge of the Court, when the order of the 27th January, 1802, was issued.

WELLESLEY.

The Board entirely concurs in all the facts and arguments detailed in the letter, from his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General to the Chairman of the Honourable the Court of Directors, and the Board expresses a perfect conviction that the institution of the College of Fort William as at present constituted, is essentially and indispensably necessary to ensure the benefits of good government to the inhabitants of the extensive empire now subject to the Company in Asia.

The Board also expresses an earnest and anxious hope that the Honourable Court of Directors will restore the College of Fort William on its present basis, when the information conveyed in his Excellency's letter to the Chairman, shall be submitted to the Court.

(A true Extract.) J. LUMSDEN,
Chief Secretary to the Governor

(*Enclosure.*)

To the Chairman of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

Fort William, August 5, 1802.

SIR,

1. On the 15th of June the Governor-General in Council received, with the deepest regret and concern, the commands of the Court of Directors for the immediate abolition of the institution established at Fort William on the 4th of May 1800, under the name of the College of Fort William.

2. Although neither the present time, nor the nature of this conveyance admits of an official reply from the Governor-General in Council to the letter of the Honourable Court, I am anxious to avail myself of the earliest opportunity of submitting to the Court a general view of the principles by which my conduct has been regulated, and of the measures which I have pursued on this painful and most afflicting occasion.

3. For the purpose of explaining my proceedings in the most distinct manner, it is necessary to advert to the impressions under which the letter of the honourable Court appears to have been written, to the supposed facts therein stated, to the inferences therein drawn from that statement,

to the sentiments expressed by the honourable Court with regard to the principles and objects of the Institution of the College, and to the nature and necessary operation of the orders for its immediate abolition.

4. The letter of the Court appears to have been written under an apprehension of the existence of a considerable embarrassment in the situation of the Company's financial affairs in India, and the primary grounds of the commands of the honourable Court are stated to be the unexampled amount of the debt, the unparalleled scarcity of money in India, the consequent depression of public credit, and the reduction, or total suspension of the commercial investment.

5. The statements of account furnished by this despatch, and the general tenor of the official advices from this Presidency for the last nine months will satisfy the honourable Court.

That the augmentation of the resources of the Company in India, has at least, kept pace with the growth of the debt;

That the surplus revenues of India applicable to investment in the current year amounts to nearly one million sterling, a sum greatly exceeding the amount of surplus revenue applicable to the same purpose in the year 1798-99;

That no such scarcity of money now exists in India as to depress public credit;

That public credit is now in a state much more favourable than that which existed in 1798-99, or in any year since that time; and that the general condition of affairs justifies a confident expectation of a progressive improvement in the state of public credit;

That the investment of Bengal for the current year is allotted on the high scale of a full investment, or ninety lacs of sicca rupees;

That the investment of Madras for the same season, is allotted on the high scale of sixteen and a half lacs of pagodas;

That the investment of Bombay for the same season is allotted on the scale ordered by the honourable Court of fifteen lacs of rupees;

That no apprehension exists of any probable necessity for reducing the scale of the investments in the ensuing season; and that every circumstance in our situation warrants the assurance, that the investments at all the Presidencies will be continued during the continuance of peace on the scale of the current year;

That from the combined result of reduction of charges (principally military) and of augmentation of resources, the financial affairs of the honourable Company in India are actually relieved from embarrassment, and that the state of political security established in India, and the prospect of a progressive augmentation in our resources, and of a further gradual reduction of our military charges afford a rational certainty, that the finances of the Company in India will continue to improve, and that public credit will speedily attain the utmost degree of prosperity under circumstances, which will ensure its stability.

6. The letter of the Court, paragraph 1, states that the institution of the College must involve the Company in an expense of *considerable* and

unknown amount, and that this expense might be applied to purposes more beneficial for the Company's interests.

7. The magnitude of the expense of this Institution cannot be justly estimated otherwise than by examining its purposes, objects, and actual or probable effect, and by comparing the pressure of that expense on the finances of the Company in India, with the proportionate benefit to be derived from the operation of the Institution on the whole frame of the Government of this empire.

8. If the extent of this benefit should prove answerable to the purposes and intentions of the Institution, it might be difficult to fix the precise amount of the price at which it would be consistent with the Company's interests to purchase such a benefit; and it appears still more difficult to conceive any purposes to which money could be applied with more benefit to the Company's interests in India.

9. Prudence would forbid your Government in India to incur any expense of "*considerable*" and "*unknown*" amount in any branch of the Company's affairs; nor can I imagine any principle of calculation by which a probable estimate can be formed of the advantage to be derived to the Company's interests by applying a sum of "*considerable*" and "*unknown*" amount to any purpose in India.

10. The beneficial application of any sum of money must be estimated by a comparison between the known amount of the sum to be expended and the certain or probable benefit to be attained by such expenditure.

11. But the sum of money applied to defray the charges of this institution is neither *indefinite*, nor *unknown*, nor *considerable*, with relation to the magnitude and importance of its objects and actual effects, nor applicable with equal prospects of success to any purposes more beneficial to the Company.

12. The expense of the Institution in its commencement was necessarily more considerable than it would have proved hereafter, when the whole system of the College should have been reduced to regular order. The estimate for 1802-1803 is four lacs of rupees, and it is not probable that this sum would have been exceeded, as the current charges of the College are now fully ascertained, and the mode of managing the Institution, in all its branches, is now thoroughly understood.

13. In the time which has elapsed since the institution of the College, many expenses have been incurred, which will not again be requisite; the total expense incurred on account of the College in the first year of its institution ending on the 31st of October 1801, amounted to the sum of about six lacs and thirty thousand rupees, after deducting all disposable articles of stock on hand, the value of which amounted, on the 31st of October 1801, to about two lacs and seventy thousand rupees.

14. I have stated that the future current annual charges of the College are estimated at four lacs of rupees. From this sum, however, some deductions are to be made on account of certain expenses which existed previously to the Institution of the College, and which must equally have been incurred if the College had not been established. These articles are principally, the former allowances to Moonshees, and the

rent of the Writers' Buildings. The aggregate amount of these deductions would be about 70,000 rupees, leaving the total additional annual expense to the Company on account of the current charges of the College at the sum of three lacs and thirty thousand rupees.

15. As all the students receive an equal allowance of three hundred rupees per mensem, the expense of the increased allowances to the writers attached to the College from the establishments of Fort St. George and Bombay, would be nearly balanced by the reduction of the allowances of such of the writers of Bengal attached to the College as have completed a residence of two years in the service in India.

16. The expense of conveying the writers from the subordinate Presidencies to Bengal would cease, if the Court should agree to my proposition for sending, in the first instance, directly from Europe, to the College at Fort William all the writers destined for the service in India.

17. But the Governor-General in Council has already apprised the Court in his letter of the 31st of July 1801, that he has actually provided for the current expense of the College by new resources, on which he has expressly charged that expense. Those resources are, the town duties, and Government customs revived by Regulations 5, 10, and 11 of 1801. The revived duties already produce an annual sum far exceeding the current expenses of the College. The produce of these new duties has been, in 1801-2, twelve lacs and seventy thousand rupees, and is estimated for the current year at fourteen lacs. The mode of collecting the duties having been found imperfect, and in some respects inconvenient under Regulations 5, 10, and 11 of 1801, a new Regulation was passed for the further improvement of the collection of those duties, on the 8th of July 1802, under which, the produce of the duties will probably be increased, while every existing inconvenience and imperfection in the mode of collection will be removed. The current expenses of the College, therefore, now constitutes no additional charge on the Company's revenues in Bengal, as they existed previously to the foundation of this Institution; since a new resource has already been found, which actually produces a sum exceeding the amount of that expense.

18. But if this resource should fail, or if the Governor-General in Council should hereafter deem it expedient to repeat or modify these duties, the promising condition of your finances in India leaves no doubt on my mind, that ample means would be found independently of the produce of the Town duties and Government customs, to defray the current expenses of the College without injury to any other branch of the public service.

19. The commercial investment is estimated, in this year, and in the next at the highest standard, and notwithstanding those ample allotments for commercial purposes, provision has been secured for defraying the current charges of the college. Neither the continuance, nor the immediate abolition of the College, would affect the investment in any degree, since the investment could not conveniently be augmented beyond its actual scale, even if the abolition of the College had already been accomplished; nor would that scale be reduced, although the College

should be continued. The question, therefore, on this part of the subject, is narrowed to the limited consideration, whether it be more beneficial to the Company's affairs to continue the annual application of a sum of three lacs and thirty thousand rupees (arising from a new fund, especially charged with this sum, and producing a considerable surplus) to the maintenance of the College, or to add this sum to the general surplus in the treasury or to the sinking fund? Even if it should be contended that this sum might be conveniently applied to the increase of the investment, it would remain to be proved that the effect of three lacs and thirty thousand rupees, added to the commercial investment of Bengal (already raised to ninety lacs) would be more beneficial to the interests of the Company and of the nation in India, than the operation of the same sum of money applied to defray the current charges of the College of Fort William.

20. The decision of the question will be easily determined by the examination of some particular facts and general principles of Government, to which I shall refer at the close of this letter.

21. With respect to any further expense to be incurred on account of the College, it must arise from some of these articles ;—

First, The augmentation of the number of Professorships ;

Second, The future pensions of the Professors, and officers of the College ;

Third, A building on a permanent plan.

22. The list of the actual number of Professorships, and the statutes will show, that it is my intention to render the study of Oriental literature and law the principal object of the College. Ten additional Professorships or Teacherships, therefore, would have been necessary beyond the number actually filled. The principal would have been,

First, Mahratta Language ;

Second, Ethics, and Civil Jurisprudence, which might have been united with the English law ;

Third, The History and Antiquities of India, which might perhaps have been united with the preceding branch of instruction ;

Fourth, Natural History ;

Fifth, Astronomy. These branches, four and five, might have been united.

23. The institution of any of these Professorships, with the exception of the first and second, might have been subject to future consideration. These arrangements, therefore, would have occasioned no variation, of importance, in the current charges of the College, and certainly would not have involved an indefinite expense.

24. The probable amount of the future Pension-list to the Professors and officers of the College would have afforded no ground of alarm to the Court, if the Court had considered the age and probable habits and dispositions of those persons from whom the greater proportion of the Professors and officers of the College must be selected, and it would not be difficult, on correct practical principles, to form a sufficiently accurate estimate of the future amount of this pension-list.

25. This part, however, of the Regulation might be modified in its operation, in such a manner as should secure the Company against any considerable burthen on this account.

26. With respect to any building to be erected for the use of the College, the question is, and ever has been entirely open to the decision of the Court, for although ground has been purchased, and allotted for the purpose of a building, no building has been commenced, nor would any have been commenced without the authority of the Court. The expense of clearing and draining the ground, and making roads in its vicinity has not been great, and has been already defrayed, and the charge of preserving the ground in its improved state, is not considerable. The ground now retained can at any time be sold again without hazard of loss. Many of the most beneficial purposes of the College have certainly been attained, and may probably be secured by the temporary continuance of the present system of the establishment in the Town of Calcutta. I am, however, decidedly of opinion that it would be highly advantageous to the efficacy and stability of the Institution, and ultimately most consistent with just economy, to erect a building at Garden Reach, according to my original plan. The expense of this building might be easily defined, and might be gradually distributed through five or six years of account in such a manner as scarcely to produce a sensible effect upon the finances of the Company in India. It is proper, in this place, to communicate to you an addition which will soon be made to the funds of this Institution, if the Court of Directors should be pleased to revive it. A sum of three lacs of rupees will soon be paid into the treasury on account of a legacy from the late General Martine of Lucknow.

27. I have already taken the most respectable opinions with regard to the legality of applying this sum in aid of the funds of the College; and I have been assured that such an application of the legacy would be strictly conformable to the intentions of the testator.

28. This sum, now amounting to three lacs of rupees, is likely to receive a considerable contingent increase under the operation of other dispositions of General Martine's will. A further increase of these funds may also arise from certain sums bequeathed by General Martine for the purpose of founding a literary institution at Lucknow. I trust that the Nabob Vizier, to whose authority the application of these legacies is subject, will readily apply their amount to the support of the College of Fort William.

29. I have already observed that the Court would have possessed ample time for deliberation with respect to the propriety of erecting a building for the uses of the College, in the meanwhile, the funds to which I have adverted, would have necessarily increased, and might have received considerable augmentation by the contingencies which might arise under the various disposition of General Martine's will.

30. The preceding observations will, I trust, convince you—

That the expenses already incurred on account of the College have not been more considerable than was required by the magnitude of the objects proposed by its institution, and that those expenses have been actually defrayed by the new resources destined to that express purpose;

That the amount of the estimated future current expenses of the College is accurately defined, subjected to regular controul, and moderate, as well with relation to the benefits of the Institution, as to its pressure on the finances of the Company;

That provision has actually been secured for defraying the future current expenses of the College, without interfering with any other branch of the public service, without diminishing the scale of your commercial investments, and with the certainty of maintaining a permanent surplus revenue, applicable to the purposes of investment, in India, of nearly one million sterling, in the present year, and of greater probable amount in every succeeding year of peace;

That any future augmentation of the contingent expense of the College amounting to any sum of considerable importance, will be subject to the previous controul of the Government in England;

That funds are actually provided (partly by the new duties, and partly by the legacies of General Martine) sufficient to meet any contingent increase in the expenses of the College without further pressure on the finances of the Company; and lastly,

That the finances of the Company in India are in such a state of actual prosperity, connected with the probability of progressive improvement, as will sustain (even independently of the produce of the new duties) the continuance of the current charges of the College of Fort William, and will afford the means of meeting any contingent increase of the expenses of that Institution, without injury to public credit, and without the hazard of any delay in the reduction of the Indian debt.

31. In the first paragraph of the honourable Court's letter, the Court declares that it cannot sanction the immediate establishment of the institution of the College of Fort William, and in the fifth and subsequent paragraphs, the Court directs the re-establishment, on a somewhat enlarged scale of an Institution which the honourable Court is pleased to denominate "Mr. Gilchrist's Seminary," by the restoration of which, it is stated to be the intention of the Court to supersede, for the present, the establishment of the College of Fort William.

32. By the letter of the 12th of March, 1802, addressed to Fort St. George, it also appears to be the intention of the Court to found some establishment at Fort St. George, for the better instruction of the junior civil servants of that presidency, and it is reasonable to suppose that a similar measure will be adopted for the instruction of the civil servants on the establishment of Bombay.

33. It is, therefore, manifestly the intention of the Court, that some establishment for the better instruction of the civil servants at each of the Presidencies should subsist in India, although the Court has been pleased to direct the immediate abolition of that institution, which has been established at Fort William, with a view to the same salutary and indispensable purpose. In the letter of the 27th January, 1802, addressed to the Governor-General in council, the Court has traced the outlines of the establishment, which it directs to be substituted in place of the college at Fort

William. These intentions of the Court, clearly expressed in their commands to Bengal, and to Fort St. George, reduce the subject of this letter within limits still more confined than those within which I have endeavoured to comprise my observations in the preceding pages.

34. In considering the question in its present state, it is necessary only to compare the actual expense, and the ascertained benefit of the institution now subsisting at Fort William, with the probable expense, and probable benefit of the "seminaries," by which the honourable Court intends to supersede that institution. The honourable Court in reviewing the experimental establishment at Calcutta originally placed under Mr. Gilchrist's direction, is pleased to sanction an extension of the scale of that establishment, adding to the study of the Hindostanee, that of the Persian and Bengalese languages, and also that of the laws and regulations enacted by the Governor-General in council, for the government of the Company's territories in India. It is evident that without an establishment of teachers, or professors in each of these languages, it would be utterly impossible to accomplish the declared intention of the honourable Court, "of effecting by the institution of a seminary for oriental learning, many of the beneficial purposes expected by the Governor-General, from the foundation of the college." On the augmented scale of Mr. Gilchrist's seminary, each professor, or teacher, could not be expected to be engaged at a monthly salary inferior to 1500 rupees. This charge would amount to 6000 rupees monthly, or to about two thirds of the total amount of the present salaries to the provost, vice-provost, professors and teachers in the oriental languages, in classics, in the modern languages, and in mathematics.

35. I am persuaded that a further consideration of the subject will satisfy the honourable Court, that the study of the Arabic language is absolutely necessary to the attainment of a correct knowledge of the Persian, the knowledge of Arabic, is also indispensable to those who desire to attain any considerable degree of skill in the Mahomedan law. A teacher, or professor of the Arabic must, therefore, form a part of the establishment in Bengal, even on the limited scale proposed by the Court.

36. To the expense of this establishment must be added the charge of whatever foundations shall be established at Fort St. George, and Bombay respectively, considerations of justice as well as of policy, would certainly induce the honourable Court to afford to their servants at each of those Presidencies, sources of instruction equally pure and abundant, as those which might be opened to the civil service in Bengal. The duties of the civil service at each of the subordinate Presidencies, now embrace objects of equal importance in every department to those comprehended in the administration of Bengal.

37. In proportion to the improvement of the internal constitution of each of the subordinate Presidencies, qualifications of a higher description will be demanded in the civil service; and I must add, that the progress of that improvement, and the abundant supply of public officers properly qualified to discharge their arduous duties in the several stations of the

administration, are the securities on which the Company must rely for the prosperity of the country, for the happiness of our native subjects, for the augmentation of our resources, and for the stability of our power.

38. The incontestable wisdom, policy, necessity, and justice of providing for the civil services of Fort St. George, and Bombay, similar advantages of education to those established in Bengal, warrant me in assuming the certainty, that the honourable Court will never consent to curtail the institutions proposed for the subordinate Presidencies respectively, within limits more confined, than the necessary extent and scope of the respective duties of the civil service under each of those governments.

39. Consistently with this principle, at Fort St. George, the Court will find that the knowledge of the Arabic, Persian, and Hindostance language, and of the laws and regulations of the local British Government of India, is not less necessary than in Bengal; teachers and professors must, therefore, be established at Madras in each of those branches of study.

40. In addition to these teachers, it will be necessary at Fort St. George to provide teachers in the following languages: Telinga, Tamul, Canarese, Mahratta.

41. At Bombay the knowledge of the Arabic, Persian, and Hindostance languages, and of the laws and regulations of these governments, is as necessary a qualification for the civil service as at Fort St. George, and consequently similar means must be afforded (upon the principles already stated) to the civil service at Bombay, of attaining a competent knowledge in each of these branches of study.

42. The study of the Arabic, is however, peculiarly necessary at Bombay, and may become indispensable in proportion to the extension of our relations with the nations inhabiting the coasts of the Persian and Arabian Gulfs.

43. In addition to these establishments, the civil servants at Bombay would require teachers in the following languages: Canarese, Mahratta, Malabar, as spoken on the coast of that name.

44. You will observe that the necessary effect of this plan would be to involve the expense of a triple establishment for every branch of study equally requisite at each of the three Presidencies, and of a double establishment for every branch of study equally requisite at any two of the Presidencies.

45. In the united institution founded at Calcutta, four professors or teachers would be found sufficient with occasional assistance for the instruction of the whole body of the students from the three Presidencies in the Arabic, Persian, and Hindostanee languages, and in the laws and regulations of the British Government in India; if the institution be broken into three seminaries, twelve professors or teachers will be required for the same purpose. The same observation applies to the establishments for the study of those languages, of which the utility is common to Fort St. George and Bombay, one teacher in each branch at Calcutta, would serve for the instruction of all the students from the two subordinate Presidencies; on the new plan two teachers must be established, one at Fort St. George, and one at Bombay.

46. It will be manifest, therefore, to your judgment, that the current expenses of these separate establishments at each Presidency respectively, framed even on the scale stated in the preceding pages, or on any scale compatible with the attainment of the proposed objects, must equal, and would probably exceed the total current charges of the college of Fort William, on the highest estimate of those charges.

47. But a more attentive examination of the subject will convince you that the expense of the three proposed seminaries, must far exceed the preceding calculation, and in the same degree must also exceed, not only the current charges, but the probable amount of the contingent expenses of the college founded at Fort William.

48. The fifth paragraph of the honourable Court's letter is expressed in terms which might convey a supposition, that the minute of the Governor-General under date 21st December, 1798, originated in some plan of a literary establishment proposed by Mr. Gilchrist. But the minute of the Governor-General of the 21st December, 1798, states distinctly, that "my attention had been long directed to the existing defects in the education of the civil service, that I had formed and had stated verbally in council, the general outlines of an extensive plan for the purpose of remedying those defects, and that the execution of that plan had been delayed exclusively by the dangers which then menaced the existence of this empire, and demanded my presence on the coast of Coromandel." The minute and the order in council annexed to it, bear date on the 21st December, 1798. On the 25th, I embarked for Madras

49. The zeal, ability, and diligence of Mr. Gilchrist as a teacher of the Hindostanee language, and his eminent merits in forming a most useful grammar and dictionary, of that colloquial dialect, induced me to consider him to be the most eligible instrument for the purpose of aiding me in attempting an experiment of the practical use of a systematic plan of instruction in the study of the oriental languages.

50. Mr. Gilchrist never offered to my consideration, any proposal for the institution of a seminary for oriental learning; that gentleman merely proposed to me the aid of his services in giving lessons in the Hindostanee, and in the rudiments of the Persian language, under whatever institution this government might establish. Mr. Gilchrist's laudable offer of the aid of his labours on that occasion was not only prompt and zealous, but was accompanied by circumstances highly creditable to his liberality and public spirit, to the moderation of his views of private interest, and to his just sense and value of public fame.

51. The result of Mr. Gilchrist's services corresponded with my most sanguine expectations, and proved in the most satisfactory manner, the great advantages which must result from establishing for the civil service, a regular and systematic plan of instruction in the oriental languages, in place of the desultory mode of study which had hitherto prevailed under the ordinary practice of resorting exclusively to native Moonshees, for assistance in learning those languages.

52. Mr. Gilchrist's lessons indeed were more particularly directed to the grammatical study of the Hindostanee language. That able and indefatigable

scholar does not profess to furnish instruction in the Persian language beyond its first elements; and the knowledge of the Persian language acquired by some of the students under Mr. Gilchrist, was merely elementary; but the examinations holden in July, 1800, and the progress (unexampled until that time) made by some of Mr. Gilchrist's scholars in the Hindostanee dialect, and in the rudiments of the Persian language, furnished ample ground for estimating the benefits which would be derived to the civil service, under the operation of a regular education, not only in the Hindostanee language, but in every branch of knowledge connected with the public duties of the civil servants.

53. I request you to remark, that in my original minute of December, 1798, I expressly proposed the employment of Mr. Gilchrist, and the future examination of his scholars with the exclusive view of ascertaining the efficacy of Mr. Gilchrist's mode of instruction.

54. The notification issued at the same period of time to the civil service in Bengal, is stated in my minute of 21st December, 1798, to have been proposed as a measure which might be useful, with a view to establish the fundamental principles of the general and more extensive plan at that time in my contemplation.

55. These principles consisted in imposing an obligation upon the civil service, to attend to the study of the oriental languages, and of the laws and regulations of government; and in rendering previous examinations in those studies, necessary qualifications for office.

56. The object of this notification was rather to excite the diligence of your civil service, than actually to enforce the examinations announced in that paper; considerable difficulties would have occurred in prosecuting an attempt to enforce such a system of examination. And it was always my opinion that the existing defects in the qualifications of your civil service could not be corrected effectually without applying the remedy to the source of the evil, the original education of the writers. The notification of 1798, however, was useful in raising a general spirit of attention to oriental knowledge throughout this service.

57. The respectable and learned gentlemen who formed the committee of examination of Mr. Gilchrist's scholars in July, 1800, refer the benefits to be derived from the progress of Mr. Gilchrist's services directly to the institution of the college, and they justly consider Mr. Gilchrist's lessons to have been merely introductory to the foundation of that institution, and to have furnished the most abundant proofs of its indispensable necessity, as well as of its certain utility and beneficial effect.

58. The letter of the honourable Court, under date the 7th of May, 1800, approves the principles stated in the notification of December, 1798, and sanctions the more extensive arrangement intended to be founded on those principles, but that letter contains no reference to the existence of any seminary under the direction of Mr. Gilchrist, as furnishing the model of the establishment which the Governor-General in council, had declared to be in his contemplation.

59. Adverting to these circumstances, I should have found considerable

difficulty in forming a just conception of the precise intention of the honourable Court in directing me to supersede the establishment of the college of Fort William, by the re-establishment of "Mr. Gilchrist's seminary," if the honourable Court had not been pleased to state in the 6th and 7th paragraphs of the letter of the 27th January, 1802, the particular branches of knowledge deemed by the Court sufficient to qualify a civil servant for the administration of affairs in Bengal, and had not thus described the extent and nature of the establishment which it proposed to sanction.

60. But no modification or extension of the plan under which Mr. Gilchrist was employed in 1799, and 1800, can embrace the objects proposed to be secured by the collegiate establishment at Fort William.

61. It was among the advantages arising from the employment of Mr. Gilchrist, that not only the success of his services was highly beneficial, to the extent which it reached, but that the fundamental defects of that limited plan, furnished rules for my guidance in founding a comprehensive and liberal institution on the grounds of practical experience.

62. It was found that the numerous body of young men assembled at Calcutta, for the purpose of attending Mr. Gilchrist's lectures, was exposed to various disadvantages, the effect of which counteracted the assiduity of their teacher, and tended to produce mischiefs of a serious description.

63. The local authority of this great government could not be immediately and constantly applied to control among the young men individual habits of negligence, dissipation, contumacy, extravagance, or immorality. The continual and important avocations of the Governor-General in council, and the nature and eminence of his station, rendered it impracticable, as well as improper for him to attempt to exercise the immediate discipline requisite to maintain regularity of conduct, and attention to study, among such a numerous body of the junior servants. Mr. Gilchrist's lectures, therefore, although highly useful to those naturally disposed to industry and order, furnished no control or discipline to restrain or correct those of opposite inclinations.

64. The young men of more unsettled dispositions neglected the lectures, and availed themselves of their residence in this populous town, to indulge in courses of extravagance, expense and dissipation. The limited plan of Mr. Gilchrist's lectures supplied no intermediate and special jurisdiction, placed between the government and the students, to apply through a respectable channel the authority of the Governor-General in council, in enforcing a due system of discipline, and study, in regulating private economy, and moral conduct, in precluding temptation to expense, and in guarding against every vicious excess.

65. But it cannot be denied, that these objects are of the highest importance, not merely on moral considerations, but in their relation to the political interests and honour of the Company, and of the nation in India, and to the purity and efficiency of the public service.

66. Wherever a numerous body of young men shall be assembled for the purpose of study, whatever form of instruction may be devised for their

education, it cannot be expected that their attention will be systematically fixed on their prescribed duties, unless the discharge of those duties shall be duly enforced by an efficient system of discipline and restraint.

67. These incontrovertible principles, derived from general experience, and confirmed by my personal experience of the dangers to which the young men were exposed during their attendance on Mr. Gilechrist, induced me to form my general plan for the better instruction of your civil service on the basis of a collegiate institution, in which study should be enforced by discipline, and education regulated by efficient restraint; in which, (according to the words of the regulation which the honourable Court has been pleased to abrogate) "under the superintendance, direction, and control of the supreme authority of these possessions, the studies of the junior servants, appointed at an early period of life to the civil service of the honourable the East India Company; should be directed and regulated, their conduct upon their first arrival in India guided, their morals formed, improved, and preserved; and in which, the junior servants should be encouraged to maintain the honour of the British name in India, by a regular and orderly course of industry, prudence, integrity and religion."

68. In pursuance of these indispensable objects, the regulation established the offices of provost and the vice-provost, and the statute constituted a council of the superior officers of the college for the internal government of the institution, and it was declared to be the primary duty of the provost "to receive the junior civil servants on their first arrival at Fort William, to superintend and regulate their general morals and conduct, to assist them with his advice and admonition; and to instruct and confirm them in the principles of the Christian religion, according to the doctrine, discipline and rites of the church of England, as established by law."

69. The statutes also made especial provision for applying the authority of the provost "to guard the moral and religious interests and character of the institution, by controlling the conduct of the officers, professors, and teachers of the college, and for applying the internal authority of the superior officers of the college, to strengthen and confirm within these possessions the attachment of the civil servants of the East India Company, to the wise laws and happy constitution of Great Britain, and to maintain and uphold the Christian religion in this quarter of the globe." The statutes also established a public table, and required the regular attendance of the students at that table, for the purpose of precluding habits of debauchery and expense, and the statutes also provided the most effectual restraints which could be devised to prevent the junior civil servants from contracting debt.

70. Without such a vigorous and respectable system of restraint and discipline, it is my conscientious opinion that great mischief would be infused into your civil service, at its very source by establishing any seminary of instruction, which should require the whole body of your junior civil servants to continue assembled together for any considerable period of time in any part of your possessions; and above all, at the seats of the respective Presidencies.

71. When the honourable Court shall have deliberately reviewed the

probable consequences of assembling the body of the junior civil servants at each of the Presidencies under such circumstances, I am persuaded that the Court will issue a positive command to establish at each Presidency, in addition to the necessary teachers and professors, some authority of the nature of that exercised in colleges in Europe, and of that now existing in the college of Fort William, for the purpose of maintaining and promoting order and discipline, good morals and religion.

72. Having formed a decided judgment founded on personal experience, and on a most assiduous and deliberate attention to the state of your service, and of your possessions, that the institutions ordered by the honourable Court, will prove not only inefficient with reference to their proposed objects, but the sources of positive danger to the service without the additional establishments described in the preceding paragraphs, my respect for the wisdom, justice and honour of the Court demands the conclusion which I have drawn from these premises. I therefore repeat my certain conviction, that the Court will immediately command each of these Presidencies to incur this additional charge, for the purpose of giving efficiency to the proposed system of study, and of saving the younger branches of the service from ruinous courses of dissipation, licentiousness, and expense.

73. The seminary to be established in Calcutta, under the late orders of the Court would necessarily include all the writers for Bengal, according to their successive arrival in India; no material reduction of establishment or of expense would therefore be effected at Calcutta, if the public table, and the existing system for the internal government of the college should be maintained, although the writers belonging to the subordinate Presidencies should be separated from the institution.

74. On the other hand, the same internal jurisdiction necessary for the discipline and government of the numerous body of the students of Bengal, would be sufficient to preserve order and regularity in the whole collective body of students from the three Presidencies. Neither the Government of Fort St. George, nor that of Bombay, could compromise its local authority in enforcing hourly attention to study, and in compelling regularity of individual conduct among the junior civil servants, attached to their respective seminaries of instruction. If therefore, the writers of Fort St. George, and Bomlay should be attached to distinct seminaries at each of those Presidencies, each institution must be framed nearly on the model of the college at Fort William, with similar establishments for the maintenance of internal discipline and control, and for preventing expense and debt.

75. Under all these circumstances, the final result of dividing the college of Fort William into three seminaries, to be established separately at each Presidency would either be to render each and all of those seminaries inefficient and dangerous, or to aggravate the collective expense of this triple institution to an amount greatly exceeding the charges of the united establishment now existing at Fort William.

76. Having thus compared the actual expenses of the college of Fort William, with the probable expense of the establishments by which the Court has been pleased to supersede that institution, I am anxious to direct

your particular attention to the benefits already derived to your civil service, from the operation and effect of the system of study and discipline constituted and enforced by the regulations, statutes, and rules of the college.

77. The periodical examinations of the students, of which the regular reports are transmitted by the ships, *Comet* and *Sovereign*, will manifest the progress made by the greater number of the students towards the objects of the institution.

78. The examiners who have always been selected from the ablest oriental scholars actually at Calcutta, have invariably expressed their judgment, that the general progress of the students in the oriental languages and literature, has exceeded their most sanguine expectations, as well with reference to the rapidity and extent of the improvement of the students, as to the accuracy and solid foundations of critical knowledge which they have acquired.

79. An universal opinion is received, that the students of the college now make greater progress in oriental learning in a few months, than the same persons could have attained in as many years under the former system. This great improvement is attributed not only to the zeal and diligence, both of the professors and students, but to the number of useful works published in the college, for the purpose of facilitating the acquisition of the several languages, and to the unexampled skill of the professors and teachers in the mode of instruction which they have adopted.

80. The voluntary aid of every respectable oriental scholar in India, has been afforded to support the discipline, and to improve the course of study, and the mode of instruction pursued in the institution; the respectable and dignified character of the institution has interested the literary part of this settlement, not only in promoting its prosperity, but in seeking the station of a public officer of the college, as an object of high honour and distinction. In this respect, the comprehensive, munificent, and liberal scale of the establishment has actually contributed to diminish its current expences.

81. From the commencement of the institution to the present time, only two professors, and two teachers, in the oriental languages have received salaries. They have been assisted and supported in the conduct of their respective classes, by the aid of learned gentlemen of high station and character, who certainly could never have been expected to promote with equal zeal, the establishment of a seminary, contracted within more narrow limits, confined to views of less ample extent, and destitute of the energy and respect, which accompany a regular system of collegiate discipline, strengthened by the most powerful incitements of immediate public honour and splendid distinction, and directed to the noblest, the highest, and the greatest object of human pursuit, the good government of a great empire.

82. Formed with these advantages, and accompanied with these circumstances of dignity and respect, the college has received the voluntary aid of Mr. Barlow, Mr. Harrington, Mr. Edmonstone, Lieut.-Colonel Kirkpatrick, and Mr. Colbrooke, each of whom either have held, or now actually

hold professorships without salary under the present structure of the institution. To these are to be added, many respectable names of gentlemen who have assisted voluntarily without reward in conducting the public examinations.

83. If the scale of the institution be lowered, its authority degraded, and the lustre and magnitude of its character and objects diminished, it must be conducted by instruments duly suited to its reduced importance, and the respectable aid, which it has hitherto received from the most able and learned men in India, can neither be justly demanded, nor reasonably expected.

84. The public examinations, the frequent distribution of honorary medals, and pecuniary rewards, the encouragement, and applause of the whole body of oriental scholars in India, and the peculiar opportunities of conferring eminent distinction, which the present constitution of the college affords to the person exercising the supreme authority in India, have excited a spirit of emulation among the students, as unexampled in its scope and ardour, as it is propitious to the future government of these possessions. This happy spirit is not confined to a few; not to those whose talents, former acquisitions, habits, or character, appeared to be of the most favourable promise at their entrance into the institution; not to those whose connections might be supposed to influence their conduct; it is nearly universal in its operation, and unlimited in its extent; and I must here declare to you, with that freedom which a regard for your interests demands, that the institution (which the Court has been pleased to abolish) has already corrected many of the defects which I found existing in the younger branches of your civil service upon my arrival in India, has reclaimed to industrious and meritorious pursuits, many of your junior servants, who were disposed to pursue courses of a contrary tendency, and has raised a standard of public honour, which is become the general resort of diligence, order, good morals, learning, and religion.

84. The regulations of the college for the prevention of habits of extravagance and expense, and for restraining young men from contracting debts, have produced a most beneficial effect; and I have the satisfaction to assure you, after an accurate investigation of this branch of the institution, that a general disposition to economy and regularity now prevails among the students of Fort William; that the principles of due subordination have also been established among them with the happiest success; and that the most salutary consequences are visible in their general conduct, manners, and morals. I have no hesitation in declaring that the young men now composing the body of the students at Fort William afford the most auspicious hope, that the local administration of India for several years to come, will be amply provided with instruments properly qualified to accomplish all the purposes of a wise, just, and benevolent government.

85. Considerable force and animation have been derived to the principles of the institution, from the honourable contention between the students of the different establishments assembled at Fort William. They consider the character of their several Presidencies to be deeply concerned in their

respective progress, and the public distinctions which they respectively obtain.

86. The negligence and disorder of any one member of their body is felt by the whole, as a common disgrace ; and they all deem the honour of their particular establishment, and their own personal consequence to be involved in the conduct of each individual of their number.

87. The students of Fort St. George and Bombay, highly value the advantage of pursuing their studies under the immediate inspection of the Governor-General, and of the chief public officers of the supreme government. It is difficult to describe the degree of alacrity and zeal, with which this circumstance alone has inspired the students from the subordinate Presidencies, many of whom (it is a matter of satisfaction and just pride to me to assure you) have attained the highest distinctions in the college, and have rivalled the most eminent examples of merit among the civil servants of Bengal.

88. By the influence of these powerful causes, a general attention to oriental languages, literature and knowledge, has been excited, far beyond the limits of the institution ; and the pursuit of these laudable objects has been facilitated and encouraged among many of your civil servants, who could not be admitted within the rules of the college. The students of Fort St. George and Bombay, have also manifested the most favourable disposition to avail themselves to the fullest extent of the benefit of an unity of instruction in the principles and practice of the Government of Bengal. To this peculiar and inestimable advantage of the present institution, I request your most serious attention. The administration of the Government of Bengal in all its branches, may justly be considered to furnish a most desirable model for each of the subordinate Presidencies. The prosperous issue of the last war in Mysore, combined with the happy result of various political negotiations in the Peninsula, has extended the limits of the territorial possessions under the Government of Fort St. George to a magnitude, which nearly equals that of the dominions administered under the immediate authority of this Presidency ; at this moment the Government of Fort St. George is employed under my orders, in establishing the foundations of an improved code of laws and regulations, and of an entirely new constitution for the due distribution of the executive, legislative, and judicial functions of that extensive and arduous government.

89. The functions of the Government of Bombay, have recently received a proportionate extension, and the civil servants of the establishment of Bombay, are now eligible to some of the most important offices under the immediate control of the Government of Fort St. George.

90. In this situation, it is of the utmost importance to the good government of the subordinate Presidencies, that the spirit and character of the service of Bengal should be infused into the administration of their respective governments.

91. This salutary effect has already been produced with the utmost degree of facility and security, to the extent of that portion of each subordinate establishment now attached to the college of Fort William. Many

of these young men are of the highest promise, of the most extensive knowledge, and of the purest principles, acquired, formed, or confirmed, under this institution ; and I doubt not, that they will carry with them, upon their return to their respective Presidencies, the fruitful seeds of reform and improvement for the benefit of each of those yet imperfect systems of administration.

92. The advantages described in the preceding paragraphs, are neither doubtful, remote, nor contingent. Their existence has already been ascertained by public proof; and, to the extent which they have reached, they must produce correspondent effects on the public service at each of the Presidencies. It is at least questionable, whether under the proposed system of establishing three distinct seminaries, for the instruction of the civil service in Bengal, Fort St. George, and Bombay, any of these advantages can be attained to an equal extent; it is certain that, under the new system, many of the benefits of the existing institution will be found unattainable in the same extent, and some of the most important, utterly unattainable in any degree.

93. No person acquainted with the actual state of India, can suppose that the Presidencies either of Fort St. George, or of Bombay, can furnish means of instruction in the Arabic, Persian, or Hindostanee languages, or in the system of the laws and regulations for the Government of India, equal to those, now afforded by the college of Fort William. Nor can it be imagined that either of the subordinate Presidencies can attract the resort of learned men, to the extent which has been so beneficially effected at Calcutta.

94. With respect to the study of the vernacular dialects, in use within the dominions of each of the subordinate Presidencies, it is evident that the study of those languages may be systematically pursued with equal advantage at Fort William, as at the seats of either of the subordinate Presidencies. The study of the elements of those vernacular dialects ought not to supersede the acquisition of those essential parts of oriental literature and knowledge, and of the spirit and general constitution of these governments, which should form the basis of the education of every civil servant in India. In the college of Fort William, the pursuit of all these objects may be advantageously combined; and the degree of attention to be bestowed on each particular language may be properly apportioned, according to the views and destination of the student, under the superintending authority of the college.

95. In the letter of the honourable Court of 27th January, 1802, no observation occurs with respect to the necessity of studying the Sanscrit dialect; but I am satisfied that a due enquiry into that branch of the question will convince the honourable Court, that the study of the Sanscrit is absolutely necessary to those who would obtain a correct knowledge of the Hindoo law, or of the manners, customs, usages, or religion of the Hindoos; the study of this most antient language appears to be peculiarly necessary to the civil servants at Fort St. George, and Bombay.

96. The Sanscrit dialect being the source and root of the principal vernacular dialects prevalent in the Peninsula, a knowledge of the Sanscrit

must form the basis of a correct and perfect knowledge of those vernacular dialects. But it would be difficult, if not impracticable, at present, to supply means of instruction in the Sanscrit language at either of the subordinate Presidencies, in any degree approaching to the advantages in that branch of study which can now be furnished at Fort William ; this eminent advantage, added to the facility of collecting at Fort William, the best teachers in the several vernacular dialects of the Peninsula, seems to open to the Writers of Fort St. George and Bombay a more favourable prospect of obtaining a correct, fundamental, and systematic knowledge of the vernacular dialect of the Peninsula, at Fort William, than could be now expected at their respective Presidencies.

97. A source of instruction in Oriental literature actually exists at Fort William which could not be procured without great difficulty and expense at either of the subordinate Presidencies. This advantage consists in an extensive and valuable collection of Oriental manuscripts, comprising the library of Tippoo Sultaun, and various other collections, some of which have been purchased, and others presented to the Institution.

98. Many of the most efficient causes of the extraordinary spirit of emulation which now exists in the whole body of the students from the three Presidencies collected at Calcutta, could not be supposed to operate with equal force when the body of the students shall be broken, and distributed partially in three distinct and remote seminaries at their respective presidencies.

99. The abatement of this spirit in any degree, would be injurious, not only to the students from the subordinate Presidencies, but to those of Bengal. It is, however, reasonable to conclude, that the evil consequences of the separation of the students would be most injuriously felt at Fort St. George and Bombay. The students from those settlements now justly conclude that their education at Fort William, by bringing their individual merits immediately under the eye of the Governor-General, opens a new field of honourable emolument to their interests, and a more enlarged career of distinction and fame to their ambition.

100. Various offices connected with diplomatic stations, and with other employments, principally of a political description, must necessarily remain under the immediate authority and appointment of the supreme Government. To these respectable stations the civil servants of all the Presidencies are equally eligible, and it cannot fail to furnish a powerful incitement to the diligence and zeal of the students from Fort St. George and Bombay, that the period of their residence at Calcutta opens repeated opportunities of founding claims to such stations on the solid basis of distinction obtained in the regular course of their studies at the College of Fort William ; and of honours publicly recorded on the proceedings of the supreme Government.

101. But the most important benefits which will be forfeited by the separate establishments at the subordinate Presidencies are the uniform education and instruction of the whole body of the Civil Service in India in one system of political, moral, and religious principles, derived from a common source, and diffused throughout all the British

Establishments under the immediate superintendence of the Supreme authority in India.

102. It has been a principal object of my attention since my arrival in India to consolidate the interests and resources of the three Presidencies, to promote in each of them a common spirit of attachment to their mutual prosperity and honour, to assimilate their principles and views, and to unite their respective powers by such means as might secure their co-operation in the common cause, and might facilitate the management of this extensive empire in the hands of the supreme Government of India. I am firmly convinced that a more intimate union of the three establishments, is an object not merely of good policy, and of just economy, but of indispensable necessity to the stability of this empire.

103. The general principles of government (applicable, with few modifications to every part of the Company's territories) will certainly be studied with most advantage at the main spring of power in India, and will be circulated to the extremities of the empire, with more vigour and purity in proportion to the early, direct, and free communication between the fountain head of authority and the subordinate branches of the service.

104. The same advantages will be the better secured under an united Institution in preserving the attachment of the civil servants of the Company to the political, moral, and religious principles of the mother country.

105. This topic has already been stated by me in my notes of the 18th of August 1800. I remain in a firm conviction, founded on the experience attained of the effects at the College at Fort William, as well as on the nature and condition of both the subordinate Presidencies, that the continuance of the Institution at Fort William will produce upon the general character and efficiency of your civil service (by the diffusion of just and correct principles, of sound knowledge, and of a general spirit of subordination and harmony,) salutary effects unattainable under any form of education, which shall separate the Writers on their first arrival in India, and shall confine them, in detached divisions, to study the local principles, contracted knowledge, characteristic prejudices, and domestic spirit of their respective settlements.

106. These considerations have satisfied my judgment, that the benefits actually derived, and reasonably to be expected, from the operation of the present Institution, are and must be greatly superior to any advantage, which can be expected from the most complete possible success of the three seminaries proposed by the honourable Court, while the probable expenses of the proposed system must considerably exceed those of the College of Fort William.

107. In directing the immediate abolition of the College of Fort William, the letter of the honourable Court of the 27th of January 1802, appears to acknowledge, with approbation, the liberal and enlightened spirit of the Institution, the just principles on which it is founded, and the important ends to which it is directed.

108. The objections stated by the Court against the continuance of the establishment are apparently confined to its expense, and to the pressure

of that charge on the present circumstances of the Company's finances in India.

109. Possessed, therefore, of the Court's approbation of the general principle and objects of the Institution ; having actually experienced and ascertained its beneficial effects, being satisfied that its expenses can be defrayed without inconvenience to any branch of the Company's affairs, and without any degree of pressure on the finances of the Company in India, being further convinced that the plan of instruction proposed by the Court in supercession of the College would exceed the expense which the Court had condemned, and would expose to hazard the principles which the Court had approved, I might have deemed it to be my duty under such circumstances to suspend the execution of the commands of the Court for the abolition of the College, to refer the question to the further pleasure of the Court ; and to request that the Court would be pleased to renew the consideration of Orders, the declared foundation of which has been entirely removed by the happy change effected in the financial situation of the Company in India.

110. But although the first view of my duty might have suggested the propriety of such a reference, the peculiar character and spirit of the Court's commands on this unhappy occasion, and the nature of the Institution (intimately blended with the general subordination of the service), seemed to me to require that I should proceed immediately to the public abolition of the Institution, as an act of necessary submission to the controlling authority of the Court of Directors, and as a testimony of the obedience due to the superior power, placed by law in the Government at home. I, therefore, passed an order in Council on the 24th of June, directing that all expenses incurred on account of the College of Fort William should cease, and that the Institution should be abolished. At the same time I repealed the Regulations enacted for the foundation and management of the College, together with all statutes and orders enacted or passed by the Governor-General in Council, or by the Visitor, for its discipline and Government. But a most serious and difficult question arose with regard to the time when the abolition of the College, and the repeal of the Regulations should take effect ; and also when all the expenses of the College should cease, and when the Students collected at Calcutta from the subordinate Presidencies should be returned to their respective settlements.

111. The determination of this question involved principles deeply affecting the welfare, future prospects, and just expectations of the students and also the consideration due to the situation of the Professors and Teachers, and of the numerous learned natives attached to the Institution.

112. If, in pursuance of the orders of the honourable Court contained in the ninth paragraph of their letter " all expenses hitherto incurred on account of the College had immediately ceased," the whole system of discipline and order hitherto maintained by that expense must, of course, have been instantaneously and abruptly dissolved, and the numerous body of students now assembled at Fort William must have been suddenly ex-

posed to all the evils incident to an uncontrolled and unrestrained residence in this populous town, until means could have been found of employing them at distant stations, or of returning them to their several establishments.

113. This sudden dissolution of discipline would have acted with the most dangerous and protracted effect on the Students from the subordinate Presidencies, who could not conveniently have returned thither for some time.

114. The revival of Mr. Gilchrist's lectures on the former plan, would have afforded no remedy to these evils. In order to preserve the young men from exceptionable habits, the controlling authorities of the College must have been revived at the same time. The restoration of those authorities would, in fact, have restored the whole of the Institution, together with all the expenses which the Court had ordered immediately to cease. No alternative, therefore, remained between the instantaneous abolition of the whole Institution, and its continuance with all its present establishments until the period of time should have elapsed, during which it might appear to be necessary and just to detain the great body of the Students at Calcutta. And here, it is with pain and regret, that I feel myself bound by the most sacred obligations of duty to claim your attention to the consequences which the immediate execution of the honourable Court's Order must have produced upon the honourable and equitable pretensions of the promising young men now attached to the College. Some of these meritorious students have voluntarily relinquished their immediate advantage at their respective Presidencies, and have resigned eligible situations with the laudable motive of prosecuting their studies in the College for the prescribed time. These Students would have completed their course in December next; they expected to receive the reward of their labours at the public examination, to be holden at that period of time. On their awarded rank at that examination they rested their hopes of promotion at their respective Presidencies; and they have been further encouraged by the animating hope of seeing, on that occasion, the record of their merits and the honour of their success publicly entered on the proceedings of the supreme Government, and of being distinguished by the personal approbation of the Governor-General in Council.

115. Every principle of sound policy, every real and legitimate interest of the Company forbids that the industry of a numerous body of the junior civil servants should be discouraged, their honourable ambition frustrated, and their active and laborious emulation disappointed in those fair hopes of distinction which they had been taught to entertain by the laws and orders of this Government, and by many preceding examples of successful labour and rewarded study.

116. In addition to the motives of a wise policy, the considerations of justice, and of humane regard for the interests and feelings of these young men appeared to require that the Government should not interpose a sudden act of authority between the termination of their studies, and the season of their reward. It would not be strictly conformable to the principles of justice, that the Government should have excited among

these young men a spirit of diligence and attention to the pursuit of Oriental knowledge under a public pledge of securing to them, at stated periods of time, special honours and advantages, according to their respective progress, and that the same authority should prematurely intervene to deprive the students of the promised fruits of their exertions.

117. The abolition of the College, therefore, could not have taken place, with justice to this class of students, until the month of December, 1802.

118. But the great body of the students now in the college, will not have completed their course of study until the month of December, 1803.

119. The sudden abolition of the institution would be still more severely felt, by the great body of the students, than by that particular class, to which I have adverted in the preceding paragraphs

120. By the prescribed course of study in the college, the attention of the student is more particularly directed during the first year to the Hindostanee and Persian languages. During the latter period of his course, he enters upon the study of the vernacular languages prevalent at the respective Presidencies. If, therefore, the great body of the students now attached to the college of Fort William, should be unseasonably interrupted in the course of their studies, and should be precluded from the advantage of the latter period of their prescribed education, those who should return to Fort St. George, and Bombay, under such circumstances, would necessarily be exposed to embarrassments and disadvantages of the most adverse and discouraging nature.

121. In addition to the premature interruption of their progress at Fort William, their sudden return to their respective Presidencies, would expose them to the hazard of remaining for a considerable time deprived of all efficient means of instruction in the principal objects of their collegiate course. Some interval of time must elapse before any institution at either of the subordinate Presidencies could be so far advanced as to afford to these young men means of instruction, in the vernacular dialects of their respective Presidencies, in any degree equal to the facilities now furnished in the college of Fort William. In the meanwhile, their continuance at Fort William, until the month of December, 1803, would secure to them such a foundation of knowledge as would enable them to prosecute their studies without further assistance upon their return to Fort St. George, or Bombay.

122. These considerations seem to me to demand, that, with exclusive reference to the welfare and just pretensions of the young men now attached to the institution, "the abolition of the college of Fort William," should be gradual, and that the institution should not be finally closed, previously to the month of December, 1803, when the great body of the students now attached to the college will have completed the course which they have so successfully commenced.

123. The immediate abolition of the college, might also be deemed an act of injustice towards those learned professors and teachers, who have been called from other situations and pursuits to assist in the management and conduct of this important establishment. It would be equally inconsistent with true wisdom and with the liberal spirit, which has ever distinguished

the conduct of the Company in the encouragement of oriental literature and science, to dismiss these gentlemen from their high stations with such a degree of precipitation, as might involve their circumstances in embarrassment, and might bear the appearance of harshness and disrespect.

124. Most of these gentlemen have devoted their entire time and labour to promote the objects of the institution, and have withdrawn their attention from every other pursuit. It would not be just to deprive them suddenly of salaries, which may be considered in some degree as a remuneration for past exertions, and a compensation for the relinquishment of other avocations.

125. The assiduity and learning of these gentlemen have produced several works in oriental languages and literature, which have been published since the commencement of the institution, and which have greatly facilitated its success. Continuations of these useful works are now in a considerable degree of progress. Some works of this nature are actually in the press. At this time the professors and teachers of the Persian, Arabic, Hindostanee, Bengalese, and Sanscrit languages, are each employed in composing grammars, and dictionaries, and in making translations or compilations for the use of the students.

126. It is probable that the greatest part of these works will be completed in the course of a year. No cause inferior to the pressure of absolute necessity would justify your Government in the sudden dismission of a body of learned men, whose labours are now employed with such utility to the public service, and the continuance of whose exertions in the same field, promises to produce such fruits.

127. Many learned natives are now attached to the institution, who have been invited to Fort William by my special authority from distant parts of Asia. These respectable persons have been encouraged by the prospect of pecuniary and honorary rewards, to undertake works in original composition for the use of the college. They also render considerable service to the professors and teachers in the ordinary duties of the several classes. The expense of rewarding these persons according to their labours, is indispensable to the progress of the young men. The sudden dismission of the learned natives attached to the college would, therefore, be an act of manifest injustice on the grounds already stated; it would also be an act of the most flagrant impolicy; nor would it be consistent either with the interest or honour of the Company in India, that a numerous body of learned natives, after having been expressly invited by the British Government to support a public institution by the aid of their knowledge and talents, should be abruptly deprived of their emoluments, should be denied the opportunity of completing those works, which they had been encouraged to commence, and should be driven forth to the extremities of Asia, to report in their respective countries, that the British Government was unable to support the charges, which it had deliberately incurred, for the promotion of learning and virtue; that we were compelled by the distress of our finances, to violate our faith with the whole body of oriental scholars in India, and that, in the extreme and desperate condition of our affairs, we had abdicated the support of our recent public institution for

the liberal education of the civil service in the branches of knowledge absolutely necessary to secure the blessings of good government to our native subjects.

128. It is scarcely necessary to repeat in this place, that the revival of Mr. Gilchrist's lectures would have left all these apprehensions and evils in full force, unless that revival had in fact been equivalent to the restitution of all the establishments of the college.

129. Urged, therefore, by these powerful principles of policy, and by these irresistible claims of justice, on the part of the younger branches of your civil service actually attached to the college; on the part of the learned gentlemen whose literary services have been devoted to the aid of the institution; and on the part of the learned natives collected from distant parts of Asia, retained in your service under the solemn pledge of public faith, and now successfully employed in diffusing their knowledge among your junior servants; I have resolved, that the order passed by the Governor-General in council for the abolition of the college should not take full effect until the 31st of December, 1803.

130. In the meanwhile I have issued orders to the government of Fort St. George, and Bombay, directing that such writers of this season as had arrived at those Presidencies respectively from Europe should be retained, and that no writers belonging to the establishment of either of the subordinate Presidencies, should be conveyed to the college of Fort William until further orders.

131. According to the regulations and statutes, a considerable number of students from each of the Presidencies, will be detached from the college in the ensuing month of December.

132. The operation of the circumstances described in the two preceding paragraphs, will tend to diminish the expenses of the college during the ensuing year; I have, however, judged it to be proper to direct that such writers as shall arrive in Bengal with appointments to this establishment, shall be attached to the college upon their arrival, and shall be admitted to all the benefits of the institution, until its final abolition.

133. I shall issue to the Governments of Fort St. George, and Bombay, such orders as shall appear to me most conducive to the better instruction of the junior civil servants retained at each Presidency during the current year, and I shall pass such regulations as may be calculated to protect the Company against any considerable expense in consequence of any temporary system of instruction for the writers detained at each Presidency. I am however aware, that some inconvenience must necessarily attend the detention of these young men at their respective Presidencies, until the further pleasure of the Court upon the whole subject shall be communicated to this Government. But this inconvenience is inseparable from the nature of the case; viewed in its utmost possible extent, it admits of no comparison with the important considerations stated in this letter.

134. Among the motives which induced me to protract the existence of the institution until December, 1803, I have dwelt with considerable expectation on the opportunity, which this delay will afford to the honourable Court of reviewing the considerations which dictated their orders of the

27th of January, 1802, of advertizing to the facts and arguments submitted to you in this letter, and of estimating the result of the important change effected in the situation of affairs in India, since the date of those advices, which had reached the Court in the month of January, 1802, and which appear to have formed the foundation of the Court's letter of the 27th of that month.

135. The honourable Court after the receipt of this despatch, will be enabled to proceed to a final decision of this important question with information amply sufficient to illustrate all its essential parts; and if the immediate result of the Court's renewed deliberation, should be to command this Government to accelerate the abolition of the college, and to demolish that institution at any period of time earlier than the 31st of December, 1803, you may be assured that, in the arduous situation which I now hold, I would manifest a prompt and dutiful obedience to an order, which would be founded on a full knowledge of the state of local circumstances in India, and of all the motives which now direct my opinion and conduct.

136. In such an event, I should certainly discharge my duty with promptitude and despatch; but I must have renounced the fixed conviction of my judgment, and I must have extinguished the warmest sentiments of my heart, before I could discharge such a duty without suffering the most severe pain and regret, in reflecting on the public benefits which must flow from the establishment of this institution, and on the public calamities which must attend its abolition.

137. The objects proposed by this institution are the most interesting, comprehensive, and important, which could be embraced by any public establishment; and their accomplishment is absolutely requisite for the good government and stability of this empire, and for the maintenance of the interests and honour of the Company and of the nation in India.

138. Many of these objects have already been accomplished by the effects of the institution under the eyes of this government, and all of them promise to be secured by the continuance and stability of the same system of discipline and study.

139. With such experience, and with such prospects, I cannot abandon the auspicious hope, that the representation submitted to you in this letter, may prove the means of inducing the honourable Court to restore to their civil service in India, the inestimable advantages which must be destroyed by the destruction of the college of Fort William, and to suffer the establishment of the college of Fort William to remain unaltered, until I shall have the honour of reporting in person to the Court, the condition and effects of the institution, and of submitting to you such details as may enable the honourable Court to exercise its final judgment on the whole plan.

140. The expense of the institution is greatly overbalanced by the importance and magnitude of its beneficial consequences. I should be guilty of disrespect, as well as of injustice towards the East India Company, if I could suggest, that the Court of Directors, with a full knowledge of the objects and principles of this institution, and with ample proofs of its actual success, could *now* admit an opinion, that the sum of money *now*

requisite to defray its charges, might be applied to any purposes more beneficial to the interests of the Company in India.

141. I, therefore, close this letter with a perfect confidence, that the honourable Court will issue without delay, a positive command for the continuance of the college of Fort William until further orders; and, although my resignation of the office of Governor-General, precludes the hope of my being employed as the instrument for restoring this important benefit to these valuable dominions; I shall embark from India with a firm reliance, that my successor will execute the salutary orders of the honourable Court for the restoration of the college of Fort William, with the same sentiments of *zeal* for the public service, and of attachment to the public interests and honour, which induced me to found that institution.

I have honour to be,

With the greatest respect and esteem, Sir,

Your most obedient and faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.

No. CLXXIX.

Extract of a Letter from the Hon. Henry Wellesley to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY LORD,

Bareilly, August 5th, 1802.

1. I have already had the honour to address your Lordship respecting the conduct of General Perron's agents in the Punjab, and although my information upon this subject is extremely confined and imperfect, I think it my duty to continue to communicate to your Lordship any reports which may reach me upon a question in which our interests are so materially concerned.

2. Such is the distracted state of the Seik country, that Mr. Lewis (one of General Perron's officers) appears to have obtained possession of a considerable tract of country without the least resistance having been opposed to him. There can be no doubt of General Perron's intention to assume as large a portion of the Punjab as he may think himself able to manage, or it may be convenient to him to retain, and it is equally certain that the actual state of that country will render it an easy conquest to any thing like a regular force.

3. One of the greatest dangers to be apprehended from the establishment of a French force in the Punjab is, the means it would afford the French of extending their conquests down the Indus, and of securing a communication with the sea, by means of that river. This would remove every obstacle to their receiving supplies of men and stores

from Europe, for there is no British force on that side of India, nor are there any native powers situated at the mouths of the Indus capable of opposing a regular force with any prospect of success.

4. It does not appear that General Perron's designs upon the Punjab are sanctioned by Scindiah, or that they are in any way connected with the interests of that Chief.

5. Whenever it can be avoided with safety to ourselves, and a due regard to the obligations attached to the possession of an extensive Empire, it is extremely desirable not to interfere in the disputes between the native powers, but the policy which dictated a forbearance in this respect is certainly weakened by the immense increase of territory, wealth, and power, which we have acquired within these few years. From the important stake which we now possess in the country, it is hardly possible that our interference should not be solicited by the native powers in any cases of emergency, and I am in daily expectation of receiving letters from Rajah Sahib Sing of Puttealeh and from the Rajah of Amrutsir, both of whom are ready and willing to oppose General Perron, provided their exertions could be directed to any good end. These letters shall be forwarded to your Lordship as soon as they reach me.

6. I understand it to be General Perron's intention to enter the Punjab as soon as the rains shall have subsided. I am likewise informed that he is making every effort to raise troops.

I have the honour to be,
 your Lordship's most obedient and
 humble servant,
 HENRY WELLESLEY.

No. CLXXX.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Chairman of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

SIR,

Fort William, August 12th, 1802.

1. I have the honour to enclose a copy of the Gazette Extraordinary of yesterday, containing the intelligence of the dreadful misfortune which has happened with regard to the

Persian embassy at Bombay. It is not possible to describe the horror and affliction with which this disaster has filled my mind.

2. I trust, however, that I shall be able to succeed in convincing the Court of Persia that this calamity has arisen from circumstances which the British Government could neither have foreseen nor prevented.

3. For this purpose, I have ordered Major John Malcolm, so much distinguished for his successful embassy to Persia, to proceed to Bombay, under such instructions as will enable him to apply his knowledge of the temper and manners of the Court of Persia, and his influence with the individuals of that nation, to the actual state of affairs, on his arrival at Bombay. I also propose to despatch immediately to Bushire Mr. Lovett, a young gentleman of considerable talents, and intimately acquainted with the Persian language, for the purpose of forwarding the necessary communications to his Persian Majesty, and eventually to proceed to the Court of Persia.

4. I request you to communicate the contents of this letter to the Court of Directors, to whom I shall hereafter address a letter on the subject of this melancholy event.

I have the honour to be, Sir, &c.

WELLESLEY.

(Enclosure.)

August 11th, 1802.

On the 9th instant, his Majesty's frigate *La Chiffonne*, Captain Stuart, arrived in the river from Bombay, with despatches from that Presidency to his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council, containing the afflicting intelligence of the death of his Excellency Haujee Khuleel Khaun, Ambassador to the British Government on the part of his Majesty the King of Persia.

In the afternoon of the 20th ultimo, a dispute unfortunately arose between the Persian servants of the Ambassador and the sepoys of the corps of Bengal volunteers composing his Excellency's honorary guard, at the house assigned for his residence near Massagong. An affray ensued, and both parties resorted to arms.

At the commencement of the disturbance, his Excellency the Ambassador, with his nephew Aga Hoossain, and his attendants, descended into

the Court for the purpose of quelling the tumult, and while his Excellency was exerting his endeavours with the utmost degree of humanity and firmness for that purpose, he received a wound from a musket which instantly proved mortal. His Excellency's nephew was severely wounded in several places. Four of the Ambassador's servants were killed, and five more wounded. Tranquillity, however, was speedily restored, and medical assistance was immediately procured for the relief of the surviving sufferers.

The most active and judicious exertions were successfully employed by the Acting President at Bombay, J. H. Cherry, Esq. and by the civil and military officers under his authority, for the purpose of restoring order, and of tranquillizing the minds of the attendants and followers of the deceased Ambassador, as well as of securing the means of bringing to justice the perpetrators of this atrocious act.

A Court of Enquiry has accordingly been instituted at Bombay, for the purpose of investigating, with due deliberation and solemnity, all the circumstances of the case.

The Governor-General in Council has adopted measures for affording to the relations and followers of the late Ambassador all the relief and consolation which can be administered to them under the pressure of this severe calamity.

As a testimony of the public regret for the death of the late Ambassador, and of a deep sense of sorrow for the calamitous event which occasioned it, and as a mark of public respect for the high station of the deceased Ambassador, and for the Sovereign whom he represented, his Excellency the Governor-General in Council has been pleased to direct, that minute guns be fired on this melancholy occasion, at five o'clock this afternoon, from the ramparts of Fort William.

By command of his Excellency the most noble
the Governor-General in Council,
N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Sec. to Government.

[The following Declaration was issued by the Marquess Wellesley on this melancholy occasion.]

Declaration of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General, &c. &c. addressed to the surviving Relations and Attendants of the deceased Haujee Khulleel Khaun, late Ambassador from his Persian Majesty to the Governor-General in Council.

The solicitude of the British Government of India to strengthen and improve the relations of amity and honourable alliance with his Majesty the King of Persia, has been manifested by the most signal acts of systematic policy, and has been publicly acknowledged by all the States of Asia.

The peculiar splendour of the Embassy which conveyed the testimonies of my respect and attachment to his Majesty's presence ; the extraordinary honours with which his Majesty's Ambassador was received, under my express orders, on his Excellency's arrival in the British territories ; the zeal and assiduity displayed by the Government of Bombay, and by all ranks of British subjects at that settlement, to conciliate the good will of the Persian Ambassador ; and the public preparations, conducted under my immediate and personal direction, for his Excellency's reception with the most distinguished solemnity and honour at the seat of the Supreme British authority in India, have afforded sufficient demonstrations to the world of my high consideration for the dignity of the Persian Monarch, and of my uniform intention to evince that unalterable sentiment towards the accredited representative of his Royal person.

Reviewing these incontrovertible testimonies of my anxiety to establish a friendly and honourable alliance with the power of Persia on the most solid foundations, his Majesty and all the States of Asia will anticipate the deep affliction and anguish of mind with which I have witnessed the sudden interruption of our bright and happy prospects by a disaster, which as far eluded the scope of human prudence and foresight, as it surpassed the ordinary extent of human calamity, and the common vicissitudes of fortune. To this awful dispensation of Providence, I submit with resignation, but not without hope.

In the most painful moments of my disappointment and grief, I have derived consolation from the reflection, that as I have hitherto assiduously employed every possible effort to cultivate a lasting friendship and harmony of interests between his Persian Majesty and the British Government, my amicable sentiments have been uniformly returned with equal cordiality by the auspicious disposition of that illustrious Sovereign.

A dreadful, unforeseen, and uncontrollable calamity has intervened to afflict both States with mutual sorrow and consternation, and to retard the completion of their reciprocal wishes ; but not to suspend their established friendship by groundless jealousy and unjust suspicion ; not to frustrate the natural and propitious result of their united counsels ; not to destroy the fruits of their mature wisdom and justice ; nor to dissolve those sacred engagements, by which they had cemented the foundations of durable concord, secured the channels of free intercourse and beneficial communication, and enlarged the sources of their common safety, prosperity, and glory.

Entertaining a due sense of the value and importance of those engagements to both States, I shall pursue, with unabated confidence and perseverance, the policy on which the subsisting treaties are founded, and the amicable and earnest exertions, by which they were obtained. The pursuit of this course cannot ultimately fail to attain success. The calamity which we have suffered is a just subject of lamentation ; but its consequences are not irretrievable. From the reciprocal condolence of the two States may arise new motives of combined interest and additional securities of amity and alliance. A zealous interchange of the offices of humanity, a concurrent sense of common sorrow, and the conscious cer-

tainty of mutual sincerity and good faith may lead to a more intimate union of sentiments and views: and the temporary suspension of this important Embassy may tend to ensure and improve the benefits of our actual connection.

Supported by these hopes, and relying on the justice and integrity of the principles and motives which have actuated the British Government, I trust that the progress of our renewed intercourse with your illustrious Sovereign will gradually obliterate the remembrance of this fatal and unparalleled disaster, and will amply compensate to my mind for its actual distress by the final accomplishment of the same salutary plans of policy which had rendered a personal interview with your lamented master the object of my most cordial wishes, and of my most anxious expectation.

To repair the severe loss sustained by his untimely decease; to demonstrate my sincere respect for his memory, and my unfeigned regret that he should have fallen by a violent death, within the British dominions, and in the immediate exercise of functions, which the laws and usages of all civilized nations have rendered sacred, it is my primary duty to administer to his surviving relations and attendants every office of humanity and friendly compassion, every attainable comfort and alleviation of their just grief, and every possible compensation for the injuries which they have suffered.

In endeavouring to discharge this duty, I have selected an officer, who was recently vested with the honourable character of Envoy from this Government to the Court of Persia, and who now occupies the most confidential station in my family.

That officer is directed to proceed immediately to Bombay, and to afford to you, in my name, such effectual aid and assistance, and such testimonies of affectionate commiseration, as may tend to mitigate your sufferings, and to console your affliction.

With the same views, I have provided the most speedy means of offering to your Royal Sovereign the respectful expressions of my sincere condolence on this disastrous event, and of concerting with his Majesty such measures as may conduct the Embassy to its original purpose, accelerate the favourable issue of every depending question, and confirm the subsisting relations between the two States, in the conciliatory spirit of the recent negotiations, and on the basis of the treaties already concluded.

WELLESLEY.

Fort William, August 17, 1802.

By command of his Excellency the most Noble the Governor-General,
&c. &c. &c.

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Secretary to the Government.

No. CLXXXI.

Minute by the Governor-General.

August 16th, 1802.

I deem it proper to communicate to the Board the substance of my negotiations with his Excellency the Vizier during the period of my residence at Lucknow, and to record on the proceedings of Government the several documents connected with those negotiations.

Although his Excellency met me on the 19th of January at Cawnpore, considerations of policy induced me to postpone the discussion of any points of public business with his Excellency until my arrival at Lucknow.

After the long and arduous discussions which had terminated in the treaty of Lucknow, I was anxious, in the first instance, to conciliate his Excellency's confidence in my friendship and good-will, and by the interchange of personal civilities, to establish a degree of cordial intercourse with his Excellency, which might facilitate our future arrangements.

With this view, I endeavoured to gratify his Excellency by every possible demonstration of respect and attention, and I have reason to be satisfied that my conduct towards his Excellency produced the most favourable impression on his mind, and materially contributed to the successful issue of my negotiations.

Soon after my arrival at Lucknow I desired a private conference with his Excellency, and on that occasion I proceeded to state to him the various points arising out of the treaty of the 10th of November, 1801, which remained to be adjusted. The points which I then stated to his Excellency are detailed in a paper annexed to this minute,* they were substantially—

* *Memorandum of Points stated by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General to the Nawaub Vizier.*

The points stated by Lord Wellesley to the Nawaub Vizier are as follows :

First. The payment of the arrear of subsidy, amounting to 21 lacs. The Governor-General proposes that his Excellency the Vizier should

1stly. The immediate discharge of the arrear of the augmented subsidy amounting to 21 lacs of rupees.

2ndly. The immediate reduction of his military establishment to the scale described in the Treaty of Lucknow.

3rdly. An exchange of the district of Handeah, and any other districts south of Allahabad, which interrupted the line of the Company's frontier.

4thly. The future regular payment of the pensions assigned for the support of his Excellency's relations, and other dependants, to be subsequently detailed.

discharge this sum between the present time and the last day of the month of June, in the following proportions :

One half, or 10 lacs, immediately. The remainder to be paid in the following proportions :—3 lacs in March, 3 lacs in April, 3 lacs in May, and 2 lacs in June,

The Governor-General is particularly desirous that his Excellency should discharge the first kist of 10 lacs immediately ; the whole of this money has already been advanced by the Company, who now actually pay interest for it.

Second. The Governor-General earnestly requests that his Excellency will proceed without delay to reduce the military establishment according to the treaty. This point is of the greatest importance, being intimately connected with the improvement of his Excellency's finances, and with the tranquillity and good order of his dominions.

Third. The Governor-General, through Mr. Wellesley, or Lieut.-Colonel Scott, will propose to his Excellency an exchange of the district of Handeah, and any other districts south of Allahabad, which now interrupt the line of the Company's frontier. The territories to be re-ccded to his Excellency will be such as to form an equivalent for Handeah and the above districts.

Fourth. The Governor-General most earnestly recommends to his Excellency a strict attention to the letter written by Mr. Wellesley on the subject of the pensions. On this point his Lordship will hereafter, through Colonel Scott, furnish the details.

Fifth. The Governor-General strongly urges to his Excellency the necessity of paying immediate attention to the introduction of an improved system of government in the dominions remaining subject to his own authority. The general outlines of a plan for this purpose are stated in the accompanying paper, and will hereafter be more fully explained by the Governor-General.

Sixth. The Governor-General recommends that the British force employed within his Excellency's reserved dominions, should be concentered at a cantonment in the vicinity of Lucknow.

(Signed)

N. B. EDMONSTONE,

Persian Secretary.

5thly. The introduction of an improved system of administration within his Excellency's reserved dominions with the advice and assistance of the British Government.

6thly. The concentration of the British military force to be employed within his Excellency's reserved dominions at a cantonment in the vicinity of Lucknow.

With regard to the 1st point, the payment of arrears of subsidy, his Excellency promised to discharge the amount of arrears actually due at the earliest possible period of time, but expressed a hope that some abatement would be made in the amount which had been stated, leaving that question, however, entirely to my decision.

With respect to the 2nd point, his Excellency readily professed his intention to proceed to the prescribed reduction of his military establishment.

His Excellency also signified his ready acquiescence in the exchange of territory proposed under the 3rd head.

With regard to the 4th point, the regular payment of the pensions, his Excellency denied that any irregularity had occurred in this respect, but expressed his disposition to conform to my wishes, when he should be furnished with the promised details.

With respect to the 5th point, the introduction of an improved system of administration within his Excellency's dominions, his Excellency professed the utmost readiness to proceed to the accomplishment of that important object, and requested me to furnish him with a plan for that purpose.

His Excellency made no material objection to the arrangement proposed under the 6th head, although he did not fully concur in the necessity or utility of concentrating the British force, appointed to remain within his reserved territories, at a cantonment in the vicinity of Lucknow.

My discussions with his Excellency were principally founded on the basis of the foregoing propositions, and my attention was particularly directed to obtain from his Excellency the immediate payment of a considerable portion of the arrear of subsidy, and to induce the Vizier to make an arrangement for the liquidation of the whole, within a specified period of time; anxious, however, that my discussions with his Excellency should be conducted with mutual cordiality and good will, and that his Excellency's mind should

be reconciled to the important arrangement which had been effected by the Treaty of Lucknow, I determined to regulate my communications with his Excellency by a spirit of liberal accommodation, to promote his Excellency's wishes in every mode consistent with the preservation of the rights and interests of the British Government, and to manifest a disposition to conciliate his confidence and regard, to assist in the arrangement of his affairs, and to secure the stability of his Government.

At a subsequent conference I communicated to the Vizier, at his Excellency's express desire, the outline of a plan for the future administration of his dominions. For this purpose I distinctly stated to his Excellency the evils and abuses which prevailed in the existing system of his government under the several branches of military establishment, judicial administration, and revenue, and pointed out to him the only means by which those evils and abuses could be remedied. For the information of the Board I annex to this minute a memorandum, containing the substance of my representations to his Excellency on that subject.* His Excellency admitted

* *Memorandum of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General's verbal Propositions to the Nawaub Vizier, for the improvement of his administration.*

With a view to explain the Governor-General's outline of a plan for the introduction of a just and efficient system of administration within the Nawaub Vizier's reserved dominions, the Governor-General deems it to be expedient to state the principal causes to which the prevailing abuses in his Excellency's dominions are to be ascribed, and the means by which those causes may be removed, and those abuses may be remedied.

First. The undisciplined state and licentious disposition of the military, and the power possessed by the Aumils of employing the military force of the state for the purposes of oppression, and of resisting the authority of government.

The remedy for this evil has been partly carried into effect by the dismission of a considerable portion of his Excellency's refractory troops; it remains to complete the reduction of his Excellency's military establishment to the scale prescribed by the treaty of November 1801, and to substitute sebundies in the several districts, limited to the number absolutely necessary for the collections of the revenues.

Second. The want of a system of judicial administration for the protection of the lives and property of the subjects, for the detection and punishment of crimes, for the redress of grievances, and for the adjustment of disputed claims.

the existence of those evils and abuses, and acknowledged the expediency of the measures which I proposed for their reform, but complained of the want of sufficient authority within his own dominions, for the purpose of giving effect to the measures which I had suggested. I gave his Excellency

To remedy this evil, regular courts of justice should be established in all the districts under his Excellency's authority. These courts should be subject to the controul and superintendence of a general court of justice, to be established at the capital, similar to the Suddur Dewanny and Nizamut Adawlut, at Fort William.

The provincial courts should not be subject to the authority and controul of the Aumils ; on the contrary, the Aumils themselves, as well as every other description of persons residing within the several districts, should be amenable to the court of justice established in those districts respectively. The judges of the provincial courts should be amenable for all acts done in their official capacity or otherwise, either to the superior court at the capital, or to intermediate courts constituted upon principles similar to those of the Courts of Appeal and Circuit in the honourable Company's dominions.

This arrangement should be combined with an efficient system of police throughout the country, calculated to secure the apprehension of offenders for the purpose of bringing them to justice.

It is not, however, the intention of the Governor-General, in recommending the establishment of this system of judicial administration, to propose to his Excellency the Vizier the adoption of the same code of laws which regulates the administration of justice in the Company's dominions.

The details of the system which his Lordship recommends must necessarily be regulated by local circumstances, and adapted to the constitution of the government, and the actual condition of the people. The Resident will be prepared to offer his sentiments and opinion upon the subject of those details, and to assist his Excellency in carrying the proposed system of judicial administration into complete effect.

Third. The abuses prevailing in the administration of the revenues, arising principally from the destructive practice of anticipating the revenues, of assigning the charge of the collections to persons who offer the highest terms, or the largest amount of nuzzerana,* from the uncertain tenure by which the Aumils hold the charge of their respective districts, the violation of the engagements contracted between the Aumils, Zemindars, under Renters and Ryots, the arbitrary and oppressive exactions which pervade the whole system of the revenue, through every gradation from the Aumil to the Ryot, the defective and injudicious constitution of the whole system of revenue, and the injurious mode of making the collections.

* Pecuniary offering from an inferior to a superior, on the occasion of the latter conferring a government or an office on the former.

every assurance of support, on the part of the British Government, in the exercise of his just authority; and I encouraged him to explain to me, in the most confidential and unreserved manner, the nature of those restraints which impeded the due exertion of his legitimate power, for the reform of the acknowledged evils and abuses of his administration.

To remedy these abuses, a complete reform in the system of revenue is indispensably requisite.

The assessment of the lands throughout the country should be regulated by the real assets of the several districts, to be ascertained by actual investigation, and that assessment should be increased only in proportion to the augmentation of resources in the several districts, which may be expected to arise from an improved system of administration in all its branches.

The practice of anticipating the revenue; of assigning the districts to the charge of persons who propose to pay the largest amount of revenue, or who offer the largest nuzzera, without regard to the character and qualifications of those persons, or to the actual resources of the lands, combined with the limited and uncertain period of the Aumil's tenure, impairs the sources of production, and encourages injustice, violence, and oppression. The Aumil, solicitous to derive the greatest possible profit from his temporary situation, and possessing no interest in the prosperity of the country, plunders and oppresses without restraint.

The districts should be given in charge to persons of established and respectable character, and of undoubted qualifications. Their tenure should be extended and secured to them while their conduct should continue to merit the confidence of their sovereign.

Salaries should be assigned to them; and their further profits should depend upon the augmentation of the resources in their respective districts.

Above all, every Aumil should be compelled to adhere to the engagements which he may contract with the Zemindars, Renters, and Ryots, and the inferior landholders and farmers of every description should be equally compelled to a strict fulfilment of their engagements with others. The executive power should be the guarantee of those engagements, and should exercise that guarantee through the channel of the public courts of judicature established in the several districts, where all complaints of undue exactions, of injustice and oppression in the realization of the revenue, and of violated engagements should be investigated and redressed.

The rights of property of all descriptions of landholders should be defined, and the definition of those rights should form a basis for the adjudication of disputed tenures.

(A true Copy.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE,

Persian Secretary.

My endeavours to obtain from his Excellency a verbal explanation upon this subject were unsuccessful; his Excellency, however, stated his intention of committing his sentiments to writing in a paper of requests, which he proposed to prepare on various points connected with this subject of discussion.

Accordingly, on the 15th of February, his Excellency transmitted to me a paper of propositions, a translation of which is annexed.*

* *Translation of a Paper delivered by his Excellency the Nawab Vizier, on the 15th of February 1802.*

Several points which have occurred to my mind I now commit to writing without ceremony, for the information of his Excellency the most noble Marquis Wellesley, in order that those points may be satisfactorily accomplished. Whereas, unless the authority of the Sovereign be so established that all persons, considering him the source of authority, may be led by the impulses of hope and fear to yield him due obedience, a proper arrangement of the affairs of his government cannot be expected; therefore, I have committed to paper the detail of this general position, in order that it may be carried into effect, and that my government may be duly and permanently regulated.

First. That whoever may be the Resident at this place, he will openly and inwardly act cordially and in concert and union with me. Although, out of my friendship and regard, I am disposed to conduct the important concerns of my government with the advice and counsel of the Company's officers, yet it is indispensably requisite that the consultations should be conducted with perfect cordiality and friendship. The mode in which such consultations should be conducted is this: I will consult the Resident upon every measure which I propose to adopt; until we shall have consulted together upon the proposed measure, let it not be communicated to any one else; after we shall have decided in concert what is advisable to be done, orders shall be issued accordingly by me, and, if it should be necessary, those orders shall be carried into effect with the aid of the Resident. On whatever point the Resident wishes to give me advice, let him not, in the first instance, make any communication whatever upon such point to any other person. Let the Resident state to me personally, without the presence of any other person, what he has to propose; let us discuss the subject together, and whatever course may be decided by mutual consent, the necessary measures for its adoption shall be carried into effect by me. By these means it will be made apparent to the world that mutual confidence subsists between us, and my authority will not be subverted.

[First. This arrangement is unobjectionable, and shall be adopted in future, provided it be understood that the Nawab will not act in

From this document it evidently appeared that the restraints of which the Vizier complained originated in the exercise, on the part of the Resident, of that degree of inter-

any important matter without the previous advice of the Resident, and that in the event of a difference of opinion, the Nawaub will abide by the Resident's advice. This case includes the supposition that, if the Resident should deem his aid, or the assistance of the British power necessary in any case, the Nawaub will resort to it without delay.]

Second. The people of this place, without the least occasion, are constantly waiting upon the Resident, and carry on a correspondence with whomever and about whatever they choose.

Their thus frequenting the Resident's is subversive of all regularity, for they have now (by those means) rendered themselves independent of me, and are wholly regardless of my authority. A person shall be appointed by me to attend the Resident. Let the Resident, when he requires the attendance of any one, send for him through that person. Let not the Resident receive letters from the people of this place upon any subject, nor answer them without my intervention.

[Second. It appears to be indispensably necessary, for the Resident's correct information, as well as for the maintenance of his authority, that he should maintain the most free and unrestrained intercourse and correspondence with all ranks and descriptions of people. Nor can this practice affect the Nawaub's authority, or alienate the affections or respect of his subjects, provided the Resident shall be careful to avoid any step which can tend to impair his Excellency's dignity, or to contract the due limits of his power. It would be highly useful that the Nawaub should appoint, with my advice, some person properly qualified to conduct, in the quality of Prime Minister, the ordinary details of public affairs; and this person might constantly confer on all points of business with the Resident. No difficulty or vexation can hereafter occur, if a cordial union be maintained between the Resident and the Nawaub, and if their mutual deportment be regulated by principles of reciprocal confidence and respect, and by the uniform observance of a decorous personal conduct by both parties.]

Third. Let no one, as has hitherto been the practice, afford countenance and support to any person to impede the recovery of just balances from Aumils and others. But, on the contrary, let him (meaning the Resident) afford assistance to the Sircar in the recovery of those balances.

If the Resident is desirous of withholding me from the prosecution of any particular measure, let him state his sentiments to me in private; in which case (as I am far from being disposed to act unjustly) either I will prove to the Resident the equity of the proceedings, or the Resident will set me right; and in the latter event, I will, in conformity to his desire, abandon such proposed measure, and no one will be apprized of any disagreement subsisting between us.

ference and controul which is indispensably necessary for the support of the British influence in Oude, and in the want of cordiality between his Excellency and the Resident.

[Third. Unobjectionable. This proposal shall be observed, provided the Resident be considered to be at liberty in all such cases to obtain such information as may be necessary to satisfy him of the justice of the proceeding.]

Fourth. Regular tribunals, in which I do not desire to possess any exclusive interest, shall be established for the sole purpose of giving effect to the Mahomedan law, of fulfilling just claims, and of securing the lives and properties of the people. It is necessary that all persons should subject themselves to the jurisdiction of those tribunals; and if any person should refuse to acknowledge the jurisdiction, or oppose the authority of those tribunals, let the Company's officers assist me in enforcing obedience to them.

[Fourth. This is perfectly wise and proper.]

Fifth. I consider her Highness the Begum as my superior, and I am extremely desirous of supporting her dignity, and of promoting her ease. I have no concern with the produce and revenues of her Jaggeer, nor of any of the Jaggeerdars; but the authority of the courts of justice, the adjustment of disputes, the redress of grievances, the observance of the civil and criminal punishments, and all other points connected with the administration of justice, must be conducted under my orders in the cities of Lucknow and Fyzabad, and in all the Jaggeers, in the same manner as in the rest of my dominions; for these things appertain to the Sovereign, whose duty it is to prevent every species of oppression. Her Highness's servants must not, in any manner, interfere in them; for a partnership in government is inadmissible. It is for her Highness's own credit that she should state to me whatever may be her desire in points of the nature above described, in order that what she desires may be accomplished through the medium of the officers of my government. The state of affairs hitherto prevailing has been this: that frequent tumults and blood-shed have occurred in Fyzabad, and in her Highness's Jaggeer, and not the slightest attention has been paid by her Highness to any thing that I have said or written. In the time of my late brother, the settlement of disputes in the Jaggeers was left to the Sircar. These points will give efficacy to my government.

I request that his Lordship will have the goodness to send for Daraub Ali Khaun, and desire, that exclusively of the Jaggeer, such property, lands, bazars, gardens, &c. to a considerable extent belonging to the Sircar, as the officers of her Highness have unjustly, and without the requisite voucher (Sunnud) appropriated since four years (a fact which Mr. Lumsden, Molavy Golaum, Kauder Khaun, his Moonshee, and other creditable persons, such as Almas Ali Khaun, Daraub Ali Khaun, and their respective Vakeels can substantiate, and are fully acquainted with, which her Highness herself formerly acknowledged, which all the most

It was manifestly his Excellency's object to impose, on the authority of the Resident, such limitations as would secure to his Excellency a power absolutely independent of all con-

creditable officers of the Sircar, such as Jye Sookh Roy, &c. know, and a statement of which property is to be found upon their records, and the appropriation of which property occasions a considerable loss to me, at a time when I am not in a condition to sustain any loss) may be restored to me, and the profits which may have been collected from such property made over to me, so that my losses therein may be compensated. This will be in conformity to her Highness's engagements.

Let his Lordship further have the goodness to transmit orders to the honourable Henry Wellesley, upon the following several points :

[Fifth. The administration of justice in the Begum's Jaggeer must be under the Nawaub's authority, and the Begum's servants must be subject to it. The authority of the Nawaub's courts will be enforced by the British power.]

The Governor-General proposes to take all the matters depending between the Nawaub and the Begum into full consideration, and to effect a settlement between the Begum and the Nawaub on just, equitable, and permanent principles.]

First. Not to afford protection to fugitives from my country, but to surrender such when demanded by me, or else to expel them from him.

[First. All criminals will be reciprocally surrendered, but the subjects of both states, who shall not be accused of capital crimes, should be at liberty to pass freely from one country to the other, and be established reciprocally in either.]

Second. In the event of any of the dependants of my Sircar applying for farms within the ceded districts, to require such person to execute a writing, binding himself to take such farm only, on condition that he is not in balance to the Sircar. There are several of my Aumils retaining lands in the ceded districts, who are in balance to the Sircar. To give me credit in his accounts for the sums due by such Aumils, or else to deliver up those Aumils to me, that I may recover from them what is justly due, and then let them go. When they have settled their accounts with the Sircar, Mr. Wellesley will of course enter into such engagements with them as he may think proper.

[Second. All balances now or hereafter due to the Sircar, to be adjusted within a reasonable time, and engagements to be taken to this effect from all persons in balance; none of the Nawaub's Aumils are now employed in the ceded provinces.]

Third. There are many gardens and other property belonging to the Sircar, in the country ceded for the charges of the troops, which are quite distinct from the revenue of the country, in the same manner, for instance, as at this moment at Benares there is property belonging to me, and still in my occupation. Let his Lordship have the goodness to direct that any property of that description in the ceded districts may be given into the possession of my people.

troul on the part of the British Government, and would render nugatory that stipulation of the treaty which provides for the security of the British influence over the measures of his Excellency's administration.

In the course of the conferences which I subsequently held with the Vizier, his Excellency became more explicit and unreserved in the expression of his sentiments with respect to the conduct of the Resident, and I learned, with extreme regret, that those sentiments were of the most unfavourable nature, and that one of the principal objects of his Excellency's wishes was to obtain the removal of Lieut.-Colonel Scott from the situation of Resident at his Excellency's court.

I considered that a compliance with his Excellency's wishes

A statement of the particulars of such property, gardens, &c. within the ceded districts, shall be given by me.

[Third. Any property of this description, which the Nawab shall satisfy the Lieut.-Governor to belong to his Excellency, will, of course, be delivered over to his servants.]

Fourth. I have been induced to cede the districts for the charges of the British troops merely to gratify his Lordship, deeming it necessary so to do, in consequence of Mr. Wellesley's arrival, and resolving to conform to his Lordship's wishes, and to obey his Lordship's commands. Let strict orders be issued that no one may be permitted to injure or destroy any mosques, tombs of Imaum Baurahs, which now exist within those districts.

[Fourth. Orders will be issued accordingly.]

Fifth. An engagement was contracted for paying to the Sircar the monies collected at the Gauts at Allahabad; four years have now elapsed since that time, and though I have repeatedly made application to the Resident upon this subject, nothing has hitherto been paid on that account, which occasions a considerable loss to me. Let orders be issued for the payment of those monies agreeably to engagement.

[Fifth. Orders will be issued for the settlement of this account.]

A promise was made to send the treaty. It has not, however, yet been received.

Let his Lordship (or Mr. W.) be reminded, and the treaty be sent.

What further disagreeable circumstance I have suffered, and continue to suffer, I will specifically explain whenever his Lordship shall personally require me.

It will be a great satisfaction to me to receive an answer to all these points to-morrow.

(A true translation.)

(Signed.) N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Secretary.

on this occasion would not only be an act of injustice towards Lieut.-Colonel Scott, whose measures and exertions during the whole course of his service in the station of Resident, claimed my entire approbation, and whose distinguished talents, knowledge, and integrity qualified him in a peculiar degree for that important station, but would have been a concession on my part subversive of the future influence of the British Government in the state of the Nabob Vizier. I, therefore, discouraged any expectation on the part of his Excellency of my compliance with those wishes; I observed to him that the unfortunate disagreement between his Excellency and the Resident must principally be ascribed to the unpleasant nature of those discussions which his Excellency's continued opposition to the just demands and representations of the British Government had occasioned. I remarked, that no points of discussion now remained of a nature to occasion any unpleasant altercation, and that a mutual disposition, on the part of his Excellency and the Resident, to observe the forms of respect and attention, must have the effect of producing cordiality and concert in all their transactions.

In my replies to the several propositions of his Excellency I endeavoured to combine the means of securing to the Vizier the exercise of his just rights, with the preservation of that degree of authority in the hands of the Resident, which is indispensably requisite for the security of the British interests in the Vizier's dominions, and to prescribe that line of conduct which his Excellency and the Resident should mutually observe for the purpose of producing concert and harmony in their intercourse with each other. Those replies which were delivered to his Excellency on the 20th of February are inserted in the margin of the document last mentioned opposite to the articles to which they respectively relate.

At an early period of my intercourse with his Excellency at Lucknow, I had been led to expect from him a declaration of the intention which he had some time before communicated to the Resident, of proceeding on a pilgrimage; it was not, however, until the 18th of February, a fortnight after my arrival at Lucknow, that his Excellency formally declared that intention to me, and solicited my concurrence, requesting at the same time that I would assist him in making an

arrangement for the administration of the government during his absence. On that occasion I deemed it proper to state to his Excellency the various considerations connected with the welfare and prosperity of his dominions, and with his Excellency's individual comfort, which, in my judgment, rendered the prosecution of his declared intention highly inexpedient; at the same time I explicitly and repeatedly assured his Excellency that I had no intention to oppose any obstacle to his departure, if, after full deliberation upon the considerations which my regard for his Excellency and my solicitude for the welfare and prosperity of his dominions, had induced me to state to him, his resolution should remain unchanged.

His Excellency appeared to be perfectly satisfied by these assurances, and deliberately, in my presence, took notes of the several arguments which I had adduced, with a declared intention of communicating to me his sentiments upon them in writing.

From the commencement of my discussions with his Excellency I had never ceased either in person, or by message, to urge him on the subject of the immediate discharge of a large portion of the arrears of subsidy. In reply to my applications, his Excellency always assured me that the state of his Treasury did not admit of the immediate payment from it of any considerable sum, but that he was endeavouring to provide cash for that purpose from other resources. At the conference last mentioned, his Excellency informed me that he had provided to the extent of eight lacs of rupees in part of the arrears of subsidy, and that he had not even deposited that sum in his Treasury, but had set it aside for the express purpose of applying it to the discharge of a portion of his debt, and this fact was confirmed by collateral intelligence. This information naturally led me to expect that his Excellency would immediately pay that sum into the Resident's Treasury; in this expectation, however, I was disappointed, I therefore, directed the Persian Secretary to wait on his Excellency, and to express to him my earnest request that no further delay might occur in the payment of a sum which he had expressly provided for that purpose, and which had been withheld without any reasonable cause. From the reply which his Excellency returned to this requisition, I learned, with the utmost degree of surprize and indignation, that his

Excellency had resolved to render the payment of that sum dependent on the conclusion of an arrangement for his Excellency's departure on his projected pilgrimage.

After the solemn assurances which I had given to his Excellency of my disposition to conform to his wishes on the subject of that arrangement, the conclusion of which had been suspended solely in consequence of his Excellency's declared intention to communicate to me in writing his sentiments on the observations which I had stated to him in person, his Excellency could not be justified in entertaining a doubt of my acquiescence in his determination as soon as that determination should be finally signified to me, nor could his Excellency be justified under any circumstances, in connecting transactions so distinct in their origin and nature, as his Excellency's discharge of an acknowledged debt, and my concurrence in an arrangement for his Excellency's temporary absence from his dominions.

I could not be insensible to the disrespect manifested by his Excellency towards my public character by his implied doubt of my veracity, and by the unworthy spirit of stratagem which dictated this undignified and suspicious conduct. I, therefore, addressed to his Excellency the letter of which a copy is annexed to this minute,* and to preclude the delay

To the Nawab Vizier.

Written 20th February 1802.

* At the conference which I had the honour to hold with your Excellency the day before yesterday, your Excellency informed me that you had already provided to the extent of lacs of rupees, in part of the arrears due for the additional troops. This information induced me to expect that your Excellency would immediately pay that sum into the Resident's treasury. Disappointed, however, in that expectation, I yesterday directed Mr. Edmonstone to express to your Excellency my earnest request, that no further delay might occur in the payment of a sum which has been withheld without a reasonable cause, since your Excellency expressly informed me that it had been actually provided for the express purpose of liquidating a part of the demand which your Excellency has consented to pay.

From the reply which your Excellency returned to this requisition, I am led to suppose that your Excellency has resolved to render the payment of that sum dependent on the adjustment of a request from you wholly unconnected with the question, a request which I have manifested a sincere disposition to gratify. The final arrangement of your wishes

of rendering it into the Persian language, I directed the Persian Secretary to wait upon his Excellency and translate

having been suspended solely in consequence of your Excellency's declared intention to communicate to me your sentiments in writing, on the observations which I had the honour to state to your Excellency, when on Thursday last the question of your Excellency's departure from Lucknow was agitated in person between your Excellency and me.

On that occasion I explicitly stated to your Excellency that I had no intention to oppose any obstacle to your departure, if, after full deliberation upon the considerations which my regard for your Excellency, and my solicitude for the welfare and prosperity of your dominions, induced me to state to your Excellency, your resolution should remain unchanged.

Your Excellency, therefore, could not be justified in entertaining a doubt of my immediate acquiescence in your Excellency's determination as soon as that determination should be finally signified to me.

Since I have had the honour of a personal intercourse with your Excellency, you have experienced the most unequivocal proofs of my disposition to promote your Excellency's wishes in every practicable mode, to conciliate your confidence and regard, to support your dignity, to assist in the arrangement of your affairs, to strengthen your authority, and to secure the stability of your government. Your Excellency has been pleased to acknowledge your satisfaction at my personal conduct towards you, and your sense of the friendly motives which have regulated my advice and communications to your Excellency; in return, I had reason to expect, on the part of your Excellency, an equally sincere disposition to conform to the just requisitions which I have made on the part of the Company. My concern and disappointment are, therefore, considerable, when I find that, on the eve of my departure, your Excellency has resorted to the unfriendly measure of exacting unreasonable conditions from me, as necessary preliminaries to the discharge of your own solemn obligations, and to the satisfaction of the just rights of the British Government.

Your Excellency is already apprized, and it is superfluous to repeat, that if your resolution to depart from your dominions be fixed, I am prepared instantly to enter into the consideration of providing for the government of your dominions during your absence, and of vesting the exercise of the government in one of your sons.

But I cannot consent to the admission of any delay which shall connect this transaction with the payment of the Company's additional subsidy.

The impression which your Excellency's conduct has made upon my mind can only be removed by the instant payment of the sum which your Excellency has provided, in part of the whole amount of arrears, and by a settlement of the future kists. I, therefore, renew my request that your Excellency will immediately issue orders for that purpose, and that you

it to him verbally. A translation of the letter from his Excellency to the Persian Secretary referred to in my address to his Excellency also accompanies.* That letter affords a singular instance of his Excellency's insincerity, and of his unwarrantable distrust of my declarations and assurances.

will unite with me in bringing to a speedy termination all other points of business depending between us; your Excellency's perseverance in your present measures will certainly accelerate my departure, and will even compel me to alter the channel and mode of communicating with you.

If advantage is to be taken of my personal disposition, for the purpose of frustrating the public service, I must request your Excellency to receive this final expression of my good wishes, as announcing my immediate departure, and my determination to communicate with your Excellency hereafter through the ordinary official channels.

Mr. Edmonstone has communicated to me your Excellency's letter of this day, the reply to it is anticipated in this note.

(A true Copy.)

(Signed)

N. B. EDMONSTONE.

Persian Secretary.

* *From his Excellency the Nawaub Vizier to the Persian Secretary to Government.*

Received 20th February, 1802.

It was to-day my intention to have the pleasure of attending the most noble Marquess Wellesley, Governor-General, at dinner; but, being indisposed, I shall be prevented from doing so.

I have received the papers which you sent by Gocul Chund Chobey, but it will be necessary that you should come to me for an hour, to explain some parts of them in person.

I am anxious for an answer to what I stated to his Lordship the other day after breakfast, at General Martin's house. I request that you will obtain an answer.

My desire to conform to his Lordship's wishes induced me to agree to what his Lordship proposed. It is now incumbent on his Lordship to fulfil the object of mine. My wish and desire is, that one of my sons should be invested with the regency (Neabut) here, in his Lordship's presence; that whoever may be appointed Resident here may be instructed to carry into effect, in concert with me, whatever arrangement may be concerted between his Lordship and me with respect to this country, and that I may be enabled to make preparations for my intended journey. The more immediate his Lordship's promotion of these objects, the more satisfactory will it be to me. Delay will occasion me much vexation and embarrassent.

(A true translation.)

(Signed.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE.

Persian Secretary.

My address to his Excellency produced the effect of obtaining a solemn promise from him to pay the sum in question on the following morning, and that promise was punctually performed. His Excellency also engaged to complete the payment of the whole arrear of subsidy by the ensuing month of September, but declined pledging himself to discharge the amount by fixed instalments.

On the 22nd of February I held another conference with his Excellency. On that occasion, his Excellency declared that his determination to proceed on the intended pilgrimage was unalterable, and that he, therefore, had not thought it necessary to commit to writing his sentiments on the observations which I had stated to him on that subject, as he originally intended. His Excellency then expressed his wish to appoint his second son Mirza Ahmud Ali Khaun to be Regent during his absence, and communicated to me a request that I would be present at his son's investiture as Regent. His Excellency's selection of his second in preference to his eldest son, originated in a disagreement which had long subsisted between the latter and his Excellency; and as the proposed arrangement did not appear to me to affect the question of the succession to the musnud on the death or abdication of the Vizier, or to impose any obligation on the Company to concur in the future elevation of his second son to the musnud of Oude, if it should be his Excellency's wish to change the regular order of succession, I signified to his Excellency my compliance with his request, and the ceremony of the investiture of Mirza Ahmud Ali Khaun as eventual Regent, was accordingly performed in my presence at his Excellency's palace on the following day.

On the 22nd of February his Excellency delivered a paper*

* *Modification, proposed by the Nawaub Vizier, of the Answers of the Governor-General to the Vizier's Papers of Propositions, delivered on the 15th February 1802.*

Answer to the 1st Article.

This arrangement is unobjectionable, and shall be adopted in future. Let the Nawaub and the Resident consult with each other with perfect cordiality in all important concerns, and let them use their utmost endeavours in consulting upon and discussing such concerns.

(a translation of which is annexed to this minute) containing several proposed modifications of the replies which I had returned to his Excellency's paper of propositions delivered on the 15th.

On the 24th I held my last conference on public business with his Excellency, and on that occasion his Excellency's original propositions, together with my replies, and his Excellency's proposed modifications of them were fully discussed. At the same conference his Excellency the Vizier advertizing to the suggestion contained in my reply to the second article of his original propositions, that the Vizier should appoint some person to conduct, in the quality of minister, the ordinary details of public affairs, was induced to waive the objection to that measure which he had declared in his paper of the 22nd of February, and proposed to appoint his second son Mirza Ahmed Ali Khaun to act in the

In the event of any difference of opinion, let them bring their discussions pro and con to such a point, that they may finally coincide in one course of measures, and, being agreed, let them unite in carrying the result of their deliberations into effect; and let their mutual deportment be so regulated by principles of reciprocal confidence and respect, that no difficulty or vexation may occur.

Answer to the 2nd Article.

The answer to the 2nd Article is replete with evil, which will totally subvert my authority.

I before wrote fully upon this point; either let a favourable answer be given to this Article, or let it be wholly omitted.

While I remain, it is unnecessary to appoint a minister. On my departure, let a confidential person, properly qualified, and not disposed to excite trouble, be appointed on the part of the Sircar, as the channel of communication between my son and the Resident, and let such person be removed and appointed at the option of the Sircar, and let him act according to the wishes and orders of the Sircar.

Answer to the 3rd Article.

Unobjectionable: and this proposal shall be observed.

capacity of minister, an arrangement to which I readily gave my consent.

I further deemed it expedient, on that occasion, to declare explicitly to his Excellency the general principles which in my judgment should regulate the connexion and intercourse between the two States, as resulting from the treaty concluded at Lucknow between the Honourable Company and his Excellency the Vizier on the 10th of November, 1801.

The Resident shall be furnished from the Hazoor* with all the information necessary to establish the justice of the proceeding, by vouchers and proofs.

Answer to the 5th Article.

Do.

Do. the next Article.
Do. to the 1st of the separate Articles.

Do.

Do. to the 2d Article.
Do. the 3rd do.
Do. the 4th do.
Do. the 5th do.
Do. the 6th do.

Do.

Do.

Do.

Do.

Do.

Both formerly and now I have done what has been required of me by his Lordship.

It is a subject of deep regret to me, that these points, and the point which I personally represented to his Lordship, have not been finally settled and concluded during his Lordship's presence. I am, however, confident that, agreeably to his Lordship's promise, his Lordship will hereafter adjust all points in conformity to my wishes. I hope, from his Lordship's kindness, that his Lordship will, in my presence, explain all the foregoing points with the Resident, and direct him to act in conformity to them ; and that his Lordship will also enjoin the Resident, after his Lordship's departure, to occasion no delay or impediment in my departure, whenever I may choose to set out, and to assist me in the preparations for my journey.

(A true translation.)

(Signed.) N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Secretary.

* Hazoor signifies "The Presence."

With a view to obviate all future doubts on the subject and result of the several communications and conferences which passed between his Excellency and me, the final determination of the several points discussed between his Excellency and me was committed to writing, and the paper was transmitted to his Excellency, under my seal and signature, soon after my departure from Lucknow.

A copy of that paper is annexed to this minute.*

At the conference last mentioned, in conformity to the desire expressed by his Excellency in the last paragraph of his

* No. 57.—*Memorandum of the final Result of the Discussions between his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General and the Nawaub Vizier.*

On the 15th of February 1802, his Excellency the Nabob Vizier transmitted to the Governor-General a paper of propositions, to which his Excellency required the Governor-General's assent, and the Governor-General, after full deliberation on the contents of the said paper, returned a distinct answer to each of the articles therein detailed. His Excellency the Vizier, in a paper delivered on the 22nd of the same month, proposed certain modifications of the Governor-General's answers, and the original propositions, together with the Governor-General's answer, and the Vizier's proposed modifications thereof were fully discussed at a conference holden between the Governor-General and his Excellency the Vizier on the 24th of the same month. In consequence of this conference, it was mutually agreed, that certain of the articles of the original paper of propositions should be altogether omitted, and that the Governor-General's reply to the 3rd article should be modified in conformity to the suggestion of his Excellency the Vizier. At the same conference his Excellency the Vizier, adverting to the Governor-General's suggestion in his reply to the 2nd article, that the Vizier should appoint some person to conduct, in the quality of minister, the ordinary details of public affairs, proposed to constitute and appoint his second son Mirza Ahmed Ali Khaun to act in that capacity. The Governor-General at the same conference deemed it to be expedient to declare to his Excellency the Vizier, the general principles which, in his Lordship's judgment, should regulate the connexion and intercourse between the two states, as resulting from the treaty concluded between the honorable Company and his Excellency the Vizier, on the 10th of November 1801. With a view to obviate all future doubts on the subject and result of these communications and conferences, the Governor-General now commits to writing the final determination of the several points discussed between his Lordship and the Vizier, and affixes his seal and signature to this paper, and directs the Secretary in the political department,* who was present at every conference, and who interpreted between the Governor-General and the Vizier, to countersign this paper.

paper of the 22nd, the proposed explanations and injunctions were stated to the Resident by me in his Excellency's presence.

Since my departure from Lucknow his Excellency has made several payments on account of the arrear of subsidy,

Answers.

Unobjectionable, and this proposition shall be observed. The Resident shall be furnished by his Excellency the Nabob Vizier with all the information necessary to establish the justice of the proceedings, by vouchers and proofs.

This is perfectly wise and proper.

The administration of justice in the Begum's Jaggier must be under the Nabob's authority, and the Begum's servants must be subject to it. The authority of the Nabob's Courts will be enforced by the British power.

The Governor-General proposes to take all the matters depending between the Nabob and Begum into full consideration, and to effect a settlement between the Begum and the Nabob on just, equitable, and permanent principles.

All criminals will be reciprocally surrendered, but the subjects of both states, who shall not be accused of capital crimes, should be at liberty to pass freely from one country to the other, and to be established reciprocally in either.

All balances now or hereafter due to the Sir-car to be adjusted within a reasonable time, and engagements to be taken to this effect from all persons in balance.

None of the Nabob's Aumils are now employed in the ceded provinces.

Any property of this description which the Nawaub shall satisfy the Lieut.-Governor to belong to his Excellency, will of course be delivered over to his servants.

Propositions.

Insert 3rd Article.

Insert the 4th Article.

Insert the 5th Article.

Insert the 6th Article.

Let his Lordship have the goodness to transmit orders to the honourable Henry Wellesley upon the following points,

Insert the 1st of the separate Articles.

Insert the 2nd of separate Articles.

Insert the 3rd of the separate Articles.

and I entertain a confident expectation that the whole arrear will be completely discharged within the period specified by his Excellency.

In compliance with my repeated request, the Vizier proceeded to the reduction of his military establishment in con-

Orders shall be issued accordingly.

Insert the 4th of the separate Articles.

Orders will be issued for the settlement of this account.

Insert the 5th of the separate Articles.

The treaty has been sent.

Insert the 6th of the separate Articles, and omit the rest.

The Governor-General concurs in this proposition, and considers Mirza Ahmed Ali Khaun to have been appointed accordingly.

The Nabob Vizier proposes that his son Mirza Ahmed Ali Khaun be appointed to the situation of minister for the affairs of his government.

In conformity to his Excellency's desire, the proposed explanation and injunctions were stated to the Resident by the Governor-General, in his Excellency's presence, on the 24th of February.

I hope from his Lordship's kindness, that his Lordship will, in my presence, explain all the foregoing points to the Resident, and direct him to act in conformity to them; and that his Lordship will also enjoin the Resident, after his Lordship's departure to occasion no delay or impediment in my departure whenever I may choose to set out, and to assist me in the preparations for my journey.

The Governor-General now proceeds to state the general principles by which the connexion and intercourse between the two states are to be regulated henceforth.

By the terms of the treaty concluded between the British Government and his Excellency the Vizier, on the 10th of November 1801, his Excellency the Nabob's authority is to be completely established within

formity to the treaty, before my departure from Lucknow, and I have the satisfaction to learn that the prescribed reductions are now nearly completed.

It is my intention, as soon as the state of public affairs may admit, to prepare a detailed plan for the administration of the Vizier's dominions, founded on that which shall be established within the ceded provinces.

In pursuance of the intention which I expressed to his Excellency of entering on the consideration of all matters depending between his Excellency and the Bhow Begum his Excellency's grandmother, and of effecting a settlement be-

his reserved dominions and to be exercised through his Excellency's own officers and servants, the British Government having engaged to guarantee the establishment and exercise of his Excellency's authority within his reserved dominions, and the Governor-General will never depart from this engagement. His Excellency has engaged to establish, within his reserved dominions, such a system of administration as shall be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and be calculated to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants.

This system of administration is to be carried into effect by his Excellency's own officers and servants, and by his own authority.

His Excellency has also engaged always to advise with, and to act in conformity to, the counsel of the officers of the honourable Company.

In the establishment therefore of an improved system of administration within the reserved dominions, and also in all affairs connected with the ordinary government of those dominions, and with the usual exercise of his Excellency's established authority, the Vizier has engaged to advise with the British Government, and to conform to its counsels.

Those counsels will always be offered to his Excellency in the form of friendly advice, and in the spirit of reciprocal confidence, and of mutual regard and respect.

The Governor-General, when the importance of the subject shall require, and the nature of the occasion shall admit his immediate intercourse with the Vizier, will offer the advice of the British Government to his Excellency, by a direct communication either in person or by letter.

The British Resident at Lucknow, however, is the constituted local representative of the British Government, and the ordinary and established channel of communication in all cases whatever.

The Resident will therefore, in the common course of business, offer to the Vizier the advice of the British Government, in the name of the Governor-General; and in every case which may require the Resident to state such advice, it is to be received as proceeding immediately from the Governor-General.

Such advice will be offered by the Resident in all practicable cases, under the general or specific orders of the Governor-General.

tween the Begum and his Excellency on just, equitable, and permanent principles, I directed her Highness's confidential agent, Daraub Ali Khaun, whom the Begum deputed to meet me at Lucknow, to accompany me on my return to Benares, with the view to enter into a discussion of the several points of difference at issue between the Begum and the Vizier. The pressure of other urgent business, however, precluded the practicability of this discussion. I, therefore, merely received from Daraub Ali Khaun an explanation and statement of the Begum's demands and expectations from the Vizier and the British Government, with the design of entering into the consideration of them at some more favourable opportunity. I shall communicate to the Board hereafter the details of this subject, and the measures which I propose to adopt for the adjustment of all questions depending between the Vizier and the Begum.

It is my intention to prepare, at the earliest practicable

The Resident must advise the Nabob with perfect cordiality, and must employ every endeavour to coincide with his Excellency in an uniform course of measures, and to unite sincerely with his Excellency in carrying into effect exclusively, under his Excellency's authority, and through his Excellency's officers, those measures which shall be determined upon in conformity to the counsels of the British Government. In cases requiring the aid of the British Government, or the assistance of the British troops, they shall be employed according to the exigency of the occasion.

The Resident must conduct himself towards the Nabob Vizier, on all occasions, with the utmost degree of respect, conciliation, and attention, and must maintain cordial union and harmony in all transactions, and must endeavour to impart strength and stability to his Excellency's authority.

The Resident must never proceed to act in the affairs of the reserved dominions without previous consultation with his Excellency, or with his minister; and the Resident must, in the first instance, observe strict secrecy with regard to the subject of such consultations, until the measures to be adopted shall be finally determined.

Under these regulations the Governor-General expects that the Nabob Vizier will act in conformity to the advice and representations of the Resident; and as no question of difficulty remains between the British Government and his Excellency, the Governor-General entertains a confident hope, that no future vexation can occur in the transaction of affairs.

WELLESLEY.

(A true copy.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Secretary.

period of time, a representation to his Excellency the Vizier on the subject of the regular payment of pensions, in conformity to the declaration which I made to his Excellency at the opening of my conferences with him at Lucknow.

WELLESLEY.

No. CLXXXII.

The Earl of Macartney to the Marquess Wellesley.

Lissanoure, near Ballymoney, March 23, 1802.

MY DEAR LORD,

[Received Sept. 5th, 1802.]

It would be natural for you to expect some news in a letter that comes to you from such a distance, but I am almost incapable of sending you any, for I have been retired to this place upwards of nine months past, and have never stirred a dozen miles from it during the whole time. If I had not been a little wiser than some people thought me, this letter might be dated from the India control office, but thank God, I was allowed to let that cup pass from me. You may easily imagine how bitter a draft it would have been to me, though I hear my Lord Dartmouth does not dislike it.

Sir William Temple says, that a man should quit gallantry at forty, and public business at fifty. I added ten years to the latter term and extended it to sixty, at the end of which, (after six-and-thirty years service in a greater variety of employments than has often fallen to any man's share,) it was surely not too soon to claim the privilege of an *Emeritus*; but indeed, had I been younger and abler, I could not with any pleasure have born a part in the political drama that has been lately acted. Not that I would be understood to venture passing any censure upon it; I have been too distant from the scene, and too imperfectly informed to be guilty of so much presumption. They who signed the preliminaries must have known, what I did not; they must have known our own affairs to be worse, and those of the enemy to be much better than I had any idea of; they must have been sure, (which I could not be) that the time and the terms were too good and too favourable for them to hesitate upon, and they must have had reasons, (to which I was a stranger,) for their

singular confidence in Buonaparte. Otherwise, when I recollect that we had annihilated the French, Spanish, and Dutch marines, that we had taken from the enemy every thing we wished to take, (Egypt the last,) and that in the course of an eight years war, we had not lost an inch of our own territory, I scarcely conceived that we should be compelled to part with Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, and Tobago. Malta would have secured our Mediterranean importance, and been a barrier against future Egyptian projects. Your Lordship knows the value of the Cape as well as any man, and I know that Trinidad will be a very precarious possession to us, whilst we have an enemy behind us in Tobago.

But enough upon a subject, which you must already be perfectly master of, as I believe you have the best correspondents in the world, and living almost entirely out of it, as I do, I have none that go much beyond the intelligence, or speculations of a common newspaper. I have not indeed, much cultivated my political acquaintance of late, for I know not how it is, but I find so many objects to amuse and endear my retirement here, that I every day grow less inquisitive, and feel less interested in what is passing abroad. The event that has been of all others the most gratifying to me, is the union of Great Britain and Ireland, which I have had the happiness of seeing recently accomplished, and which I trust, not only secures the salvation of both, but will render them more flourishing and powerful than ever.

I shall be obliged to return to England in two or three months, on account of some business which imperiously calls me there, otherwise I should not think of leaving this place for a great while. Though the country around me is wild, and the inhabitants consimilar, yet this place in itself is very beautiful, and every day becoming more so. I have placed an inscription over my gateway, which, if you will allow the authority of Ausonius for the quantity of one adverb,* I will venture to submit to the rigour of your prosody.

Sub Libertate Quieti,
Hos avitos agros, has ædes auctas et ornatas,
D.D.D.

Georgius Comes de Macartney in patriam redux, Anno salutis, 1800.

* Ferè.

Erin nos genuit, vidit nos Africa, Gangem
 Hausimus, Europæque plagas ferè visimus omnes,
 Nec latuit regio primùm patefacta Columbo.
 Sinarum licuit dextram tetigisse Tyranni,
 Tartaricos montes, murum et transcendere magnum,
 Turbidaque impavidi tentavimus alta Pechelæ.
 Casibus et variis acti terrâque marique
 Sistimus hic tandem, atque Lares veneramur Avorum.

Adieu, my dear Lord, I think when we parted at the Cape you talked of five years as being the term proposed for your residence in India; if your mind continues the same in that respect, we may flatter ourselves with the hopes of seeing you in the course of next year.

Nothing could give greater pleasure to him, who is with every sentiment of respect, esteem and regard,

My dear Lord,

Most sincerely yours,

MACARTNEY.

No. CLXXXIII.

Lord Clive to the Marquess Wellesley.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort St. George, 14th September, 1802.

At the time the *Britannia* sailed from England, the belief of my being upon my passage home was so complete, that I am not only without information from my political friends, but have not even received a line from any of my family. And as I cannot expect an answer in less than two months to my despatch of February last, announcing the suspension of my departure in consequence of your Lordship's sentiments made known to me by Major Malcolm, I must necessarily remain in a state of doubt and anxiety with respect to the nomination of my successor, and the period of my being relieved, unless your Lordship's communications from home shall enable you to supply my want of information. I need not say how much I shall feel indebted for any intelligence respecting these points, or the situation of the government of Fort St. George, which, during the temporary cessation of

my correspondence, your Lordship may have the kindness to honour me with, and under these circumstances, I am at a loss whether I ought to continue to avail myself of your lordship's permission to detain the *Swallow*, and as I am unwilling to keep her without a pressing necessity from any service your Lordship may wish to employ her upon, I submit her future destination to your consideration, requesting your Lordship to determine that point, according to your judgment, upon the probable contingency of the speedy arrival of my successor in India.

I have great satisfaction in being able to inform your Lordship, that I have just received a private communication of the arrangement for the commutation of the military service of the western Polygars, for a money payment, having been brought to a satisfactory conclusion with those chieftains, by Mr. Stratton, the collector of western Peiswah. The increase of revenue is one lac seventy-eight thousand pagodas.

I remain always with the greatest regard and esteem,

My dear Lord,

Most faithfully your's,

CLIVE.

No. CLXXXIV.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lord Clive.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort William, September 14, 1802.

Your Lordship's kind indulgence, and your knowledge of the multiplied, complex, and vexatious affairs, which have required my personal attention for some time past, will have induced you to forgive the omissions, which have occurred in my private correspondence with you. I have endeavoured to supply the defect as far as might be possible by means of Major Malcolm's letters; but I am still aware that I must rely much on your Lordship's accustomed candour, and consideration of the extreme difficulty and labour of my situation, in the present strange crisis.

I desired Major Malcolm to apprise you of my cheerful acquiescence in your Lordship's desire to detain the *Swallow Packet*, for your eventual conveyance to Europe, in case the

Court of Directors should be pleased to send out a successor to your Lordship previously to the proposed time of your return to Europe. In detaining the *Swallow* at your desire, I felt that I made but a trivial acknowledgement of respect to your Lordship's eminent public services under my administration. I trust that your Lordship will repose implicit confidence in my resolution to discharge towards you (in every situation, and under every possible state of circumstances and events) the duty which I owe to your high personal claims, and the respect due to your father's memory.

The time is not distant when the nation and the crown will feel their obligations to your Lordship, and will acknowledge the strength of those securities, which you have added to the empire acquired by your illustrious father.

Ever, my dear Lord,

With the greatest regard,

Your faithful and affectionate servant,

WELLESLEY.

No. CLXXXV.

The Right Hon. Lord Hobart to the Marquess Wellesley.

Downing Street, 5th May, 1802.

MY LORD,

[Received at Fort William, 18th Sept. 1802.]

Your Lordship will already have received the intelligence which I had the honour to transmit to you, in my letter of the 28th ultimo, of the favourable termination of the negotiation at Amiens, by the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace between his Majesty and the Governments of France, Spain and Holland, the ratifications of which treaty have been finally exchanged.

In congratulating your Lordship upon an event which has so effectually strengthened our power in India, by the annexation of the island of Ceylon to the British crown; and in adverting to the occurrences which have principally contributed to produce it, the brilliant services of our army in Egypt, and the entire expulsion of the French from that country, claim the first consideration; and I feel a peculiar

gratification in having to convey to your Lordship his Majesty's most gracious approbation of your conduct in applying the whole of the troops that you had caused to be assembled at Ceylon and Bombay, to an united effort in co-operation with his Majesty's forces and those of the Ottoman porte, for the attainment of that important object.

The ability and energy manifested by your Lordship in the essential aid which you administered to the efforts made in Europe to frustrate the designs of the French are marked with the same character that so eminently distinguished the memorable and triumphant operations of the Mysore war, and the alacrity and dispatch with which you executed the plans of co-operation you had so wisely concerted, and the very judicious arrangements made by your Lordship for that purpose, have accordingly received his Majesty's most gracious approbation.

His Majesty's pleasure relative to the return of the Indian army from Egypt, having been already communicated to your Lordship, I have nothing further to add upon that subject.

In the papers transmitted by your Lordship to the President of the Board of Control, I have adverted particularly to your correspondence with Admiral Rainier upon the subject of your proposed attack upon the Mauritius, and although from the cordiality and zeal in the prosecution of the public service, which has distinguished the Admiral's conduct upon all occasions, no doubt can be entertained that his dissent to co-operate with your Lordship in that expedition, proceeded from a sense of duty on his part, I am to express his Majesty's entire approbation of the general principles laid down by your Lordship in your letter of the 5th of February, 1801,* with respect to the conduct of the naval and military services. It being of the utmost importance that it should be explicitly understood that in the distant possessions of the British empire during the existence of war, the want of the regular authority should not preclude an attack upon the enemy in

* The letters here adverted to by Lord Hobart are given in the Appendix, as illustrative of an important principle in Colonial government; the Governor-General's letter to Admiral Rainier of the 20th of February, 1802, is also appended, as shewing the cause of the change in the projected expedition.—[ED.]

any case that may appear calculated to promote the public interests.

I have the honour to be, &c.

HOBART.

No. CLXXXVI.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Lord Hobart, Secretary of State for the War Department.

MY LORD,

Fort William, October 2, 1802.

1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter under date the 5th of May, 1802, which reached Fort William on the 18th ultimo, and I request your Lordship to accept my congratulations on the conclusion of peace between his Majesty and the Governments of France and Holland.

2. I have derived peculiar satisfaction from reflecting on the effect of those stipulations in the definitive treaty, by which the island of Ceylon is annexed to the British Crown; and I concur entirely in your Lordship's sentiments with regard to the important accession of strength which has been secured to the British power in India, by the final annexation of that valuable possession to this empire.

3. I request your Lordship to submit to his Majesty, my most dutiful and grateful acknowledgements for the distinguished honour which his Majesty has been pleased to confer upon me in signifying to me through your Lordship, his most gracious and particular approbation of my endeavours to apply in the most effectual manner the forces under my command, to the important object of co-operating with his Majesty's forces from Europe, and with those of the Ottoman Porte, in the expulsion of the French from Egypt.

4. The terms in which your Lordship has conveyed his Majesty's royal pleasure to me demand the warmest return of my gratitude and satisfaction; and I assure your Lordship that the favourable opinion which you are pleased to express of my services in the conduct of the several operations of the army, entrusted to my government and command during the late arduous contest, has furnished a most grateful addition

to the honour which I have received from his Majesty on this occasion.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CLXXXVII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Lord Hobart, &c.

MY LORD,

Fort William, October 2, 1802.

1. I have the honour to enclose for your Lordship's information, an extract of a letter from Mr. Stratton, his Majesty's Chargé D'Affaires at the Ottoman Porte, with a copy of the translation of a letter to my address, from the Kauyim Mokam received at Fort William, on the 19th September.

2. Your Lordship will observe by these documents, that the Grand Seignior has been pleased to confer on me, the order of the Crescent of the first rank, as a mark of his Highness's approbation and favourable opinion, and of his sense of the services rendered by the Indian army in Egypt.

3. I request that your Lordship will be pleased to submit these documents to his Majesty, and to communicate to me the notification of his royal pleasure with regard to my final acceptance of the honour conferred on me by the Ottoman Porte.

4. Having already received his Majesty's most gracious approbation of the same services, which the Porte has noticed by this mark of distinction, and having understood that his Majesty had been pleased to permit British subjects to accept similar honours from the Grand Seignior, I have deemed myself to be at liberty to accept, and to wear the insignia of the order until I can receive the notification of his Majesty's pleasure, and I have also directed Major-General Baird, and other officers, who had received similar honours in Egypt to wear them in India, until further orders may be signified by his Majesty.

5. My object in pursuing this course was to avail myself of the advantage to be derived in the consideration of the numerous class of British subjects in India professing the

Mussulman faith, by a public manifestation of the amity and alliance subsisting between his Majesty, and the supreme head of the Mahomedan church, and of the estimation and honour in which the British Government and army of India are held by the Ottoman Porte.

6. The policy of endeavouring to unite our subjects of the Mussulman faith in sentiments of respect for the British Government, and to mitigate their prejudices by every practicable means of conciliation, must be obvious to your Lordship's experience in the affairs of India. Adverting to these considerations, I trust that the course which I have pursued in consequence of the honour conferred on me by the Porte, will meet his Majesty's gracious approbation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

APPENDIX.

A.

*Treaty for cementing the friendship and alliance between the Honourable Company and his Excellency the Rajah of Tanjore, and for establishing the Government of Tanjore on a permanent foundation.**

Nov. 26, 1799.

Whereas the stipulations and conditions of the treaty of 1792, concluded between the Honourable Sir Charles Oakeley, Baronet, Governor in Council at Fort St. George, and his Excellency Ameer Sing, late Rajah of Tanjore, have been found inadequate to the intentions of the contracting parties; and whereas his Excellency Maha Rajah Serfojee, Rajah of Tanjore, has, by a certain instrument under his signature, previous to his elevation to the Musnud of his ancestors, engaged to consent to such arrangements as may be deemed expedient for the better management of the country of Tanjore, particularly for the due administration of justice, and also for securing to the Honourable English East India Company, a regular discharge of their existing and future demands on Tanjore; wherefore the present treaty is concluded between his Excellency Serfojee, Rajah of Tanjore, on his own part, and Benjamin Torin, Esq., Resident at Tanjore, on behalf of the Company, being invested with full powers by the Right Honourable the Earl of Mornington Behauder, Governor-General of Bengal, according to the following Articles:—

ART. 1. Such parts of all former treaties with the former Rajahs of Tanjore, as are intended to establish the friendship and alliance between the Honourable Company and His Excellency the Rajah of Tanjore, are hereby strengthened and confirmed, and the contracting parties mutually agree that the friends and enemies of either shall be considered to be the friends and enemies of both.

ART. 2. The several provisions heretofore established, for enabling the contracting parties to carry the spirit and intention of the preceding article into execution, having proved defective, and the result of an enquiry instituted by the authority of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, with the previous written consent of his Excellency Maha Rajah Serfojee, for the purpose of ascertaining the actual state and condition of the country of Tanjore, having proved that it is become indispensably necessary to establish a regular and permanent system, for the better administration of the revenue of the said country, it is stipulated and agreed, that all former provisions for securing a partial or temporary interference, on the part of the Honourable Company, in the government, or in the administration of the revenues of the country of Tanjore, shall be entirely annulled, and that in lieu thereof, a permanent system for the collection of the revenue, and for the administration of justice, shall be established in the manner hereafter described.

ART. 3. The Honourable Company shall be at liberty, as soon as possible, to ascertain, determine, and establish rights of property, and to fix a reasonable as-

* Referred to at pages 120, 130, 154, and 196.

essment upon the several Soubahs, Peigunrals, and villages of the country of Tanjore, and to secure a fixed and permanent revenue, and the said assessments so ascertained and fixed, shall not be liable to change, but shall be collected according to fixed rent rolls, by such officers as shall be appointed for that purpose

ART. 4. A court, or courts, shall be established for the due administration of civil and criminal justice, under the sole authority of the English East India Company. The said courts shall be composed of officers to be appointed by the Governor in Council of Fort St. George for the time being, and shall in no instance whatever, be subjected to the controul, authority, or interference of the said Rajah, but shall be conducted according to such ordinances and regulations (framed with a due regard to the existing laws and usages of the country,) as shall from time to time be enacted and published by the said Governor in Council.

ART. 5. The revenues shall be collected according to the rates of assessment to be established by the third article, by the officers to be appointed by the said Governor in Council for that purpose, and the said Rajah shall exercise no controul whatever, nor in any manner interfere in the administration of the said revenues.

ART. 6. Whereas it is stipulated and agreed by the fifth article of the treaty of 1792, that the payments to be made to the Honourable Company by his Excellency the Rajah, shall amount to five lacks seventy-four thousand two hundred and eighty-five pagodas per annum, under the different denominations of subsidy, Peish-cush, public and private debts, it is now stipulated and agreed, that these distinctions shall for ever cease, and that the whole revenue shall be collected and accounted for by the said Company, in the manner hereafter provided, the said Company charging themselves with the payment of that part of the registered private debt which has not already been transferred to their account.

ART. 7. In lieu of the said stipulations in the fifth article of the treaty of 1792, it is hereby stipulated and agreed, that his Excellency the Rajah shall in all cases receive annually one lack of Star Pagodas, which shall be considered to be the first charge payable from the net revenues of Tanjore. In addition to the said sum of one lack of Star Pagodas, his Excellency shall receive a proportion of one fifth, to be calculated on the remainder of the net revenue, after deducting all charges of collection of whatever description, and the charge specified in the following Article.

ART. 8. It is stipulated and agreed that the sum of twenty-five thousand Star Pagodas shall in all cases be appropriated to the support of the late Rajah Amer Singh, and shall be considered as a charge on the revenue, to be deducted previous to the calculation of the proportion of one-fifth above mentioned. The residue of the revenues, after the foregoing deductions, shall be at the disposal of the said Company.

ART. 9. It is stipulated and agreed, that the Rajah shall be treated on all occasions, in his own territories, as well as in those of the Company, with all the attention, respect, and honour, which is due to a friend and ally of the British nation.

ART. 10. Whereas his Excellency the Rajah has had occasion to complain of inconvenience to his Excellency and his servants, from the present mode of garrisoning his Excellency's hereditary fort of Tanjore by a part of the Honourable Company's troops, it is stipulated and agreed, with a view to the accommodation and satisfaction of his Excellency, that the said fort of Tanjore shall be evacuated by the Company's troops entirely, and that his Excellency shall be at full liberty to garrison the said fort in such manner as to him shall seem fit. Provided always, that in the event of an invasion of the territories of the Company, or of their allies, or in the event of any failure in the due performance of the engagements contracted by his Excellency the Rajah, the said Company shall again have power to occupy the said fort as a military post for the protection and mutual interests of the contracting parties; the said Company binding themselves to evacuate the said fort as soon as the reasons for re-occupying it shall no longer exist.

ART. 11. His Excellency the Rajah stipulates and agrees, that the said fort shall in no case whatever become an asylum for public offenders, or for persons desirous of escaping from the jurisdiction of the courts of civil or criminal justice, or from

the authority of the revenue officers, or of any other branch of the authority of the Honourable Company; and His Excellency the Rajah further agrees to deliver up all such persons without delay, on application from such officer or officers as the Governor in Council of Fort St George shall appoint for the purpose.

ART. 12. In complaints brought before any of the courts of justice, in which it shall appear, either by the application of the Rajah, or the representation of the defendant, at or before the time of giving in his or her answer, or by the petition of the complainant, that both parties are relations, or servants, or dependants of his Excellency, or inhabitants usually resident within the fort of Tanjore, it is stipulated and agreed, that such parties shall, in the first instance, be referred for justice to the Rajah, or to any person he may appoint to dispense it; any complaint against the Rajah's relations, immediate servants, or others, residing in the fort of Tanjore, by persons of a different description, shall in the first instance be made to the Company's representative at Tanjore, who shall prefer it to his Excellency; the Rajah hereby engages to order an immediate investigation to be made in his court of justice, or in case the parties should desire it, to order the dispute to be referred to a proper arbitration, His Excellency engaging to bring it to a direct issue, and to carry the sentence or award, if unfavourable to his relation or servant, into immediate execution.

ART. 13. In order that his Excellency the Rajah may have full satisfaction in respect to the revenues of the territory hereby subjected to the management of the Company, his Excellency shall be at liberty to inspect the accounts of the head Cutcherry, or collector's treasury, from time to time, or to station a Vakeel, or accountant, at his own expense, for the purpose of taking and transmitting to his Excellency, copies of any, or of all the accounts which shall be recorded in the head Cutcherry, or treasury of the collector.

ART. 14. Whereas a certain annual Peishcush, amounting to two thousand Chukrums, is payable by the Danish Government of Tranquebar, for lands held of the Rajah of Tanjore, in the vicinity of that place, it is stipulated and agreed, that the said Peishcush shall continue to be received by his Excellency the Rajah, without any deduction from His Excellency's proportion of the revenue, as herein before stipulated.

ART. 15. And whereas it is necessary to the convenience and comfort of his Excellency the Rajah, that certain supplies of rice, gram, and other grain, should be supplied for the use of his Excellency, the Company bind themselves to furnish the said supplies, as often as the Rajah shall find it necessary to apply for this purpose, his Excellency binding himself to pay for the said grain, with the charge of transportation, at the rate of the current prices for the time being.

This Treaty, consisting of fifteen Articles, being settled this day, the 25th of October, 1799, corresponding to the 12th of Alpeshy, in the year Sedhartey, by Benjamin Torin, Esq., on the part of, and in the name of, the Right Honourable Richard, Earl of Mornington, Governor General aforesaid, and by his Excellency Maha Rajah Serfojee Rajah, on his own part, the said Benjamin Torin, Esq has delivered to his Excellency Maha Rajah Serfojee Rajah, one copy of the same, signed and sealed by himself; and his Excellency Maha Rajah Serfojee Rajah has delivered to Benjamin Torin, Esq. another copy of the same, sealed and signed by himself. And Benjamin Torin, Esq. engages that the said Treaty shall be ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor General, under his seal and signature, within forty-five days from the date hereof.

BENJAMIN TORIN, Resident.

Ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, at Fort William, on the 26th day of November, A.D. 1799.

APPENDIX B.

Articles of Agreement between the Honourable East India Company and their successors and the Nabob Nasur-ud-Deen Khan, &c. &c. and his heirs and successors, for the better Administration of the Government of the City of Surat and its dependencies.

Whereas the honourable English East India Company have been subjected to a heavy expense for the protection of the city of Surat, and whereas the existing system of internal government in the said city has been found inadequate to the protection of the persons and property of the inhabitants; and whereas the Right Honourable the Earl of Mornington, Governor-General of the British Possessions in India, and the Nabob Nasur-ud-Deen, &c. are mutually desirous of providing more effectually for the external defence of the city of Surat, and for the security, case, and happiness of the inhabitants, the following articles of agreement are concluded on behalf of the honourable English India Company and their successors, by the honourable Jonathan Duncan, Governor of Bombay, vested with full powers for that purpose by the said Governor-General on the one part, and by the Nabob Nasur ud-Deen, and his heirs and successors, on the other part.

ART. 1. The friendship subsisting between the honourable English Company and the Nabob Nasur-ud-Deen Khan, &c. &c. &c. is hereby strengthened and confirmed, and the friends and the enemies of one shall be considered to be the friends and enemies of the other.

ART. 2. The Nabob Nasur-ud-Deen agrees, that the management and collection of the revenues of the city of Surat, and of the territories, places, and other dependencies thereof, the administration of civil and criminal justice, and, generally, the whole civil and military government of the said city and its dependencies, shall be vested, for ever, entirely and exclusively in the honourable English Company.

ART. 3. It is agreed, that the Nabob shall be treated, on all occasions, with the same respect and distinction as his predecessors.

ART. 4. The English Company agree to pay to the Nabob Nasur-ud-Deen and his heirs, out of the revenues of Surat and its dependencies, in four equal quarterly payments, one lac of rupees annually, which shall be considered to be the first charge payable from the said revenues. The Company also engage to pay to the said Nabob and his heirs, in addition to the above-mentioned lac of rupees, a proportion of one-fifth part of the annual revenues now arising, or which may hereafter arise, from the said city, and its dependencies, after deducting the said lac of rupees, the sum payable to the Mahrattas and the charges of collection. The residue of the revenues, after the foregoing deductions, shall be at the disposal of the said Company.

ART. 5. In order that the Nabob may, at all times, have full satisfaction, in respect to the revenues of Surat and its dependencies, he the said Nabob shall be at liberty to inspect all the accounts thereof, from time to time, or to station a Vakeel, or accountant, at his own expense, in all or any of the offices of collection, for the purpose of taking and transmitting to his Excellency copies of all or any of the accounts of the said revenues.

ART. 6. Courts shall be established for the due administration of civil and criminal justice; which courts, agreeably to the stipulations in the second article, shall be under the sole authority of the English East India Company. The said Court shall be composed of officers to be appointed by the Governor in council of Bombay for the time being, and shall be conducted according to such ordinances and regulations (framed with a due regard to the existing laws and usages of the country) as shall, from time to time, be published by the said Governor in council.

ART. 7. In complaints brought before the courts of justice, in which it shall appear, either by the application of the Nabob, or the representation of the defendant, at or before the time of giving in his or her answer, or by the petition of the complainant, that both parties are relations or servants of the Nabob, it is agreed, that such parties shall, in the first instance, be referred for justice to the Nabob, or to any person he may appoint to dispense it. Any complaint against the relations or immediate servants of the Nabob by persons of a different description,

shall, in the first instance, be made to the chief civil servant at Surat, who shall refer it to the Nabob, who hereby engages to order an immediate investigation to be made, or in case the parties should desire it, to order the disputes to be referred to a proper arbitration, the Nabob engaging to bring it to a direct issue, and to carry the sentence or award, if unfavourable to his relation or servant, into immediate execution.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in council,
(Signed) G H. BARLOW,

Chief Secretary to the Government.

N. B. The above is the copy of the treaty as transmitted from the Governor-General in council of Bengal to the Governor in council of Bombay, on the 10th of March, 1800, and was ultimately agreed to, without any alteration, by the Nabob of Surat, on the 13th May, 1800.

APPENDIX C.

*Treaty of perpetual and general defensive alliance, between the Honourable the English East India Company and his Highness the Nabob Nizam ul Mulk Asoph Jah Behauder, Soubahdar of the Deccan, his children, heirs, and successors; settled by Captain James Achilles Kirkpatrick, Resident at the Court of his Highness, by virtue of the powers delegated to him by the most noble Richard Marquess Wellesley, &c. &c. &c.**

Whereas, by the blessing of God, an intimate friendship and union have firmly subsisted for a length of time, between the Honourable Company and his Highness the Nabob Nizam ul Mulk Asoph Jah Behauder, and have been cemented and strengthened by several treaties of alliance, to the mutual and manifest advantage of both powers, who with uninterrupted harmony and concord, having equally shared the fatigues and dangers of war and the blessings of peace, are, in fact, become one and the same in interest, policy, friendship, and honour. These powers, adverting to the complexion of the times, have determined, on principles of precaution and foresight, and with a view to the effectual preservation of constant peace and tranquillity, to enter into a defensive alliance, for the complete and reciprocal protection of their respective territories, together with those of their several allies and dependants, against the unprovoked aggressions, or unjust incroachments, of all or of any enemies whatever.

ART. 1. The peace, union, and friendship, so long subsisting between the two states, shall be perpetual; the friends and enemies of either shall be the friends and enemies of both; and the contracting parties agree, that all the former treaties and agreements between the two states, now in force, and not contrary to the tenor of this agreement, shall be confirmed by it.

ART. 2. If any power or state whatever shall commit any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against either of the contracting parties, or against their respective dependants or allies, and, after due representation, shall refuse to enter into amicable explanation, or shall deny the just satisfaction or indemnity which the contracting parties shall have required, then the contracting parties will proceed to concert and prosecute such further measures as the case shall appear to demand.

ART. 3. For the more distinct explanation of the intent and effect of this agreement, the Governor-General in council, on behalf of the honourable Company, hereby declares, that the British Government will never permit any power or state, whatever, to commit with impunity, any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against the rights or territories of his Highness the Nizam, but will, at all times, maintain the same, in the same manner as the rights and territories of the honourable Company are now maintained.

ART. 3.* With a view to fulfil this treaty of general defence and protection, his highness the Nabob Asoph Jah agrees, that two battalions of Sepoys and one

* Referred to at p. 275.

† Sic orig.

regiment of cavalry, with a due proportion of guns and artillerymen, shall be added, in perpetuity, to the present permanent subsidiary force of six battalions of Sepoys, of one thousand firelocks each, and one regiment of cavalry, five hundred strong (with their proportion of guns and artillerymen), so that the whole subsidiary force furnished by the Honourable East India Company to his Highness shall henceforward consist of eight battalions of Sepoys (or eight thousand firelocks) and two regiments of cavalry (or one thousand horse) with their requisite complement of guns, European artillerymen, Lascars, and pionneers, fully equipped with warlike stores, and ammunition; which force is to be stationed in perpetuity, in his Highness's territories.

ART. 4. The pay of the above-mentioned additional force shall be calculated at the rate of the pay of the existing subsidiary force, and shall commence from the day of the entrance of the said additional force into his Highness's territories.

ART. 5. For the regular payment of the whole expense of the said augmented subsidiary force (consisting of eight thousand infantry, one thousand cavalry, and their usual proportion of artillery) his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah hereby assigns and cedes to the honourable East India Company, in perpetuity, all the territories acquired by his Highness, under the treaty of Seringapatam, on the 18th March, 1792, and also all the territories acquired by his Highness, under the treaty of Mysore, on the 22nd June, 1799, according to the schedule annexed to this treaty.

ART. 6. Certain of the territories, ceded by the foregoing article to the honourable Company, being inconvenient, from their situation to the northward of the river Toombuddrah, his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah, for the purpose of rendering the boundary line of the honourable Company's possessions a good and well defined one, agrees to retain the districts in question, namely, Copul, Gujinderghur, and others (as marked in the annexed schedule) in his own possession; and, in lieu thereof, assigns and cedes, in full and in perpetuity, to the honourable Company, the district of Adoni, together with whatever other territory his Highness may be possessed of, or is dependant on his Highness's Government, to the south of the Toombuddrah, or to the south of the Kistnah, below the junction of those two rivers.

ART. 7. The territories to be assigned and ceded to the honourable Company by the fifth article, or in consequence of the change stipulated in the sixth article, shall be subject to the exclusive management and authority of the said Company and of their officers.

ART. 8. Whereas the actual produce of a considerable portion of the districts ceded to the honourable Company by article sixth, is ascertained and acknowledged to be greatly inferior to their nominal value, as specified in the schedule annexed to this treaty, and the said districts cannot be expected, for a long course of years, to reach their said nominal value; and whereas differences might hereafter arise between the contracting parties, with respect to the real value of the same, and the friendship and harmony, happily subsisting between the contracting parties, be disturbed, by discussions relating to the adjustment of accounts of the produce and value of the said districts; in order to preclude all causes of any such future difference or discussion between the two states, the said East India Company agrees to accept the said districts (with the reservation stated in the sixth article) as a full and complete satisfaction for all demands, on account of the pay and charges of the said subsidiary force, and therefore to whatever extent, or for whatever length of time, the actual produce of the said districts shall prove inadequate to the amount of the subsidy payable by his Highness, on account of the said subsidiary force, no demands shall ever be made by the honourable Company upon the treasury of his Highness, on account of any such deficiency, or on account of any failure in the revenues of the said districts, arising from unfavourable seasons, from the calamity of war, or any other cause. His Highness the Nizam, on his part, with the same friendly views, hereby renounces all claim to any arrears of balances which may be due to him from the said districts, at the period of their cession to the honourable Company, and also to any eventual excess in the produce of the said districts beyond the amount of the subsidy payable by his Highness, on account of the said subsidiary force, the true intention and meaning of this article being, that the cession of the said districts, and the exchanges stipulated in the sixth article, shall be considered as a final close and termination of accounts

between the contracting parties, with respect to the charges of the said subsidiary force.

ART. 9. After the conclusion of this treaty, and as soon as the British resident shall signify to his Highness Asoph Jah, that the honourable Company's officers are prepared to take charge of the districts ceded by the fifth article, his Highness will immediately issue the necessary Perwannahs, or orders, to his officers, to deliver over charge of the same to the officers of the Company; and it is hereby stipulated and agreed, that all collections made by his Highness's officers, subsequent to the date of the said Perwannahs, or orders, and before the officers of the Company shall have taken charge of the said districts, shall be carried to the account of the honourable Company.

ART. 10. All forts situated within the districts to be ceded as aforesaid, shall be delivered to the officers of the honourable Company with the said districts; and his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah engages, that the said forts shall be delivered to the honourable Company, as nearly as possible in the same state as that in which his Highness received them.

ART. 11. His Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah will continue to pay the subsidy of the former subsidiary force, and also that of the additional troops, from his treasury, in the same manner as hitherto observed, until the honourable East India Company's officers shall have obtained complete possession from his Highness's officers of the country ceded to the said Company by the fifth article. The Company will not claim any payments of subsidy from his Highness's treasury, after their officers shall have obtained possession of the said districts from the officers of his Highness.

ART. 12. The contracting parties will employ all practicable means of conciliation to prevent the calamity of war; and, for that purpose, will, at all times, be ready to enter into amicable explanations with other states, and to cultivate and improve the general relations of peace and amity with all the powers of India, according to the true spirit and tenor of this defensive treaty. But if a war should unfortunately break out between the contracting parties and any other power whatever, then his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah engages, that, with the reserve of two battalions of Sepoys, which are to remain near his Highness's person, the residue of the British subsidiary force (consisting of six battalions of Sepoys, and two regiments of cavalry, with artillery) joined by six thousand infantry and nine thousand horse of his Highness's own troops, and making together an army of twelve thousand infantry, and ten thousand cavalry, with their requisite train of artillery, and warlike stores of every kind, shall be immediately put in motion, for the purpose of opposing the enemy; and his Highness further engages to employ every further effort in his power, for the purpose of bringing into the field, as speedily as possible, the whole force which he may be able to supply from his dominions, with a view to the effectual prosecution and speedy termination of the said war, the honourable Company, in the same manner, engaging on their part, in this case, to employ in active operations against the enemy, the largest force which they may be able to furnish, over and above the said subsidiary force.

ART. 13. Whenever war shall appear probable, his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah engages to collect as many Benjairies as possible, and to store as much grain as may be practicable in his frontier garrisons.

ART. 14. Grain, and all other articles of consumption and provisions, and all sorts of materials for wearing apparel, together with the necessary quantity of cattle, horses, and camels, required for the use of the subsidiary force, shall, in proportion to its present augmentation, be as heretofore, entirely exempted from duties.

ART. 15. As by the present treaty the union and friendship of the two states are so firmly cemented, as that they may be considered as one and the same, his Highness the Nizam engages neither to commence nor to pursue, in future, any negotiations with any other power whatever, without giving previous notice, and entering into mutual consultation with the honourable East India Company's Government; and the honourable Company's Government, on their part, hereby declare, that they have no manner of concern with any of his Highness's children, relations, subjects, or servants, with respect to whom his Highness is absolute.

ART. 16. As, by the present treaty of general defensive alliance, mutual defence, and defence against all enemies, are established, his Highness the Nabob Asoph

Jah consequently engages, never to commit any act of hostility or aggression against any power whatever; and in the event of differences arising, whatever adjustment of them the Company's Government, weighing matters in the scale of truth and justice, may determine, shall meet with full approbation and acquiescence.

ART. 17. By the present treaty of general defensive alliance, the ties of union, by the blessing of God, are drawn so close, that the friends of one party will be henceforward considered as the friends of the other, and the enemies of the one party as the enemies of the other; it is therefore hereby agreed, that if, in future, the Shorapoor or Gudwall Zemindars, or any other subjects or dependants of his Highness's Government, should withhold the payment of the Sircar's just claims upon them, or excite rebellion or disturbance, the subsidiary force, or such proportion thereof as may be requisite, after the reality of the fact shall be duly ascertained, shall be ready, in concert with his Highness's own troops, to reduce all such offenders to obedience. And the particular interests of the two states being now, in every respect, identified, it is further mutually agreed, that if disturbances shall, at any time, break out in the districts, ceded to the honorable Company by this treaty, his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah shall permit such a portion of the subsidiary force as may be requisite, to be employed in quelling the same, within the said districts. If disturbances shall, at any time, break out in any part of his Highness's dominions, contiguous to the Company's frontier, to which it might be inconvenient to detach any proportion of the subsidiary troops, the British Government, in like manner, if required by his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah, shall direct such proportion of the troops of the Company, as may be most conveniently stationed for the purpose, to assist in quelling the said disturbances within his Highness's dominions.

ART. 18. Whereas, by the favour of Providence, a perfect union, harmony, and concord, have long and firmly subsisted between the Honourable East India Company, his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah, his Highness the Peshwah Rao Pundit Purdhaun, and Rajah Rhagojee Bhoosillah, therefore should his Highness, Rao Pundit Purdhaun, and Rajah Rhagojee Bhoosillah, or either of them, express a desire to participate in the benefits of the present defensive alliance, which is calculated to strengthen and perpetuate the foundations of general tranquillity the contracting parties will readily admit both, or either of the said powers, to be members of the present alliance, on such terms and conditions as shall appear just and expedient to the contracting parties.

ART. 19. The contracting parties being actuated by a sincere desire to promote and maintain general tranquillity, will admit Dowlut Rao Scindiah to be a party to the present treaty, whenever he shall satisfy the contracting parties of his disposition to cultivate the relations of peace and amity with both states, and shall give such securities for the maintenance of tranquillity, as shall appear to the contracting parties to be sufficient.

ART. 20. This treaty, consisting of twenty articles, being this day settled by Captain James Achilles Kirkpatrick with the Nabob Asoph Jah Behauder, Captain Kirkpatrick has delivered one copy thereof, in English and Persian, signed and sealed by himself, to the said Nabob, who, on his part, has also delivered one copy of the same, duly executed by himself; and Captain Kirkpatrick, by virtue of especial authority given to him on that behalf by the most noble the Governor-General in council, hereby declares the said treaty to be in full force from the date hereof, and engages to procure and deliver to his Highness, in the space of thirty days, a copy of the same from the Governor-General in council, in every respect the counterpart of that executed by himself; and on the delivery of such copy, the treaty executed by Captain Kirkpatrick shall be returned, but the additional subsidiary force, specified in the third article, shall be immediately required by his Highness the Nizam, and furnished by the honourable Company, and all the other articles shall be in full force from this time.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged, at Hydrabad, on the 12th October, Anno Domini 1800, or 22nd Jemmadee ul Awul, Anno Higeræ 1215.

(Signed)

J. A. KIRKPATRICK,
Resident.

(A true copy.) THOMAS SYDENHAM,
Secretary to the Residency.

Schedule of his Highness the Nizam's territorial acquisitions by the treaty of Seringapatam, dated the 18th May, 1792, and by the treaty of Mysore, dated the 22nd June 1799, and which in conformity to the fifth and sixth Articles of the annexed treaty, are now, together with the Talook of Adoni, and all other Talooks situated to the South of the Rivers Toombuddrah and Kistnah, ceded in full and in perpetuity to the honourable East India Company.

List of Talooks acquired by the treaty of Seringapatam — Sidhout, 6 talooks, 81,885 C. pagodas, Chinnoor, 6 do 65,427; Kumlapoor, 4 do. 50,729, Vo-oor, 6 do. 70,684; Budwail, 3 do. 54,883; Jumonul Murrow, 7 do 90,643, Kummum, 7 do. 1,30,148; Kunnuckgherry, 3 do. 30,952; Chit-koontah, 1 do. 11,298, Gudtoor, 1 do. 17,846; Coelkonetah, 1 do. 10,224; Opulpaho, 1 do. 10,098; Nursapoar, 1 do. 8,397; Bisspul, 1 do. 11,074; Dony pahr Wurdwaium, 1 do. 12,402; Poodtoor, 2 do 22,979; Chutwail or Muttlaur, 8 do. 130,769; Monyarel paht, 1 do 6,000; Nussum, 1 do. 17,802; Bungumpully and Chunchunmuttah, 2 do. 41,804; Ouak, 1 do 20,000, In Goody, 4 do. 51,782; Bulhary and Kurkoor, 1 do 23,000; Weonlahwempelly, 1 do. 12,565; Kopul, 8 do 106,137; Gajjinderghun, 8 do. 101,977; Kunnuckgherry 1 do. 79,100; Singaputtum oopal warrah, 1 do. 20,000; Hunmunteond, 1 do. 15,000; Busswahpoor, 1 do. 5,000; Mokah, 12,162; In the Talook of Koorkoor, 370 — Total, 13,16,666.

List of Talooks acquired by the Treaty of Mysore.—Gooty (remainder of) — Fye Nissar (the fort and dependencies) 15,568; Kundundlah, 7,500; Paumiy, 11,000; Wurkur kunoor, 8,998; Yarutty Muriacheiroo, 5,902; Beem Rajah, 4,800; Nuttoor, 2,700; Bialy Mutty Murgh, 9,426; Chintumpully, 8,951; Mutyhurah Huttoor, 22,251; Koodunty, 8,800; Yarghy, 22,673; Pencoondah, 60,000; Minigh-serrah, 8,000; Hundy Ununtpoor, 16,000; Koorkoor, (remainder of) 11,629; Kunchungoondy, 10,000; Gurrumcondah, 1,85,810; Ruttungherry, 10,000; Raydroog, 6 talooks, 1,02,856; Kinnool Paishcush, 66,666, Junymullah, 1 do. 7,800; Umrahpoor Noomaatty, 10,000; Annagoondy, 60,100; Kurpunkully, 6 talooks, 1,10,030; Wurtnahpoor, and sundry other villages in the Chittledroog district, 5,840.—Total, 7,93,300.—Grand total, 21,09,968.

Districts situated north of the Toombuddrah, which, conformably to the sixth article of the annexed treaty, remain with his Highness the Nizam, to be deducted from the above, as follows: Koopul, 8 talooks, 106,137; Gajjirdughur, 8 do. 101,977; Kunnuackgherry, 1 do. 79,100, Villages of the Anagoondy district, situated to the north of the Toombuddrah, 8,710; Villages of the Tukkulcotah district, situated likewise north of the Toombuddrah, 855.—Retained by his Highness the Nizam, 2,96,780.—Remains to the honourable Company, 18,13,188.—Add the Adoni country, which together with all his Highness's remaining possessions, south of the Toombuddrah, is, by the sixth article of the annexed treaty, ceded in exchange for the above districts to the honourable Company, 8,34,718 rupees.

(A true copy) J. A. KIRKPATRICK,
Resident.

Separate and Secret Articles appertaining to the Treaty of perpetual and general defensive alliance, concluded between the honourable English East India Company, and his Highness the Nawab Asoph Juh Buhauder, on the 12th October, Anno Domini 1800, or 22nd Jemmadee ul Awul, Anno Higeræ 1215.

ART. 1. The Peshwa, Rao Pundit Purdaun, shall be admitted to the benefits of this general defensive alliance on the following conditions:

First. Rao Pundit Purdaun shall accept the mediation of the honourable Company's Government, for the amicable adjustment on the basis of the treaty of Mah, of all claims or demands of Choute, and of all other claims or demands whatever, on the territories or government of his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah.

The British Government will also take into consideration the claims of his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah to a total exemption from Choute, and will arbitrate, on the principles of justice and equity, any question now existing, or which shall hereafter arise, relative to the same, between Rao Pundit Purdhaun and the Nabob Asoph Jah, provided Rao Pundit Purdhaun shall agree to accept the said arbitration, and Rao Pundit Purdhaun shall not be admitted to the benefit of this general defensive alliance, until he shall have agreed to accept the arbitration of the British Government, with respect to the said claims of the Nabob Asoph Jah to a total exemption from Choute.

Secondly. Rao Pundit Purdhaun shall give full satisfaction to the honourable East India Company, on the various points depending between him and the British Government in India.

Thirdly. If Rao Pundit Purdhaun shall agree to the foregoing conditions, the honourable East India Company and his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah will assist him in the restoration of his just authority in the Mahratta empire.

Fourthly. For this purpose, Rao Pundit Purdhaun shall agree to subsidize, in perpetuity, such a body of the said Company's troops, as shall hereafter be judged necessary for the restoration and maintenance of his authority.

ART. 2. Rajah Rhagojee Bhooslah shall be admitted to the benefit of this general alliance on the following conditions :

First. Rajah Rhagojee Bhooslah shall accept the Honourable Company's arbitration of all unadjusted points between his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah and the said Rajah, according to the tenor of subsisting treaties.

Secondly. Rajah Rhagojee Booslah shall agree to such equitable interchanges of territory with the honourable East India Company, as shall be judged necessary to complete or improve their respective frontiers, or to such cessions of territory (in consideration of a just pecuniary equivalent) as shall be judged necessary to the same purpose.

ART. 3. If contrary to the spirit and object of this defensive treaty, war should hereafter appear unavoidable (which God avert!) the contracting parties will proceed to adjust the rule of partition of all such advantages and acquisitions as may eventually result from the success of their united arms.

The contracting parties entertain no views of conquest or extension of their respective dominions, nor any intention of proceeding to hostilities, unless in the case of unjustified or unprovoked aggression, and after the failure of their joint endeavours to obtain reasonable satisfaction, through the channel of pacific negotiation, according to the tenor of the preceding treaty. It is however declared, that in the event of war, and of a consequent partition of conquests between the contracting parties, his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah shall be entitled to participate equally with the other contracting parties, in the division of every territory which may be acquired by the successful exertion of their united arms, provided his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah shall have faithfully fulfilled all the stipulations of the preceding treaty, especially those contained in the twelfth and thirteenth articles thereof.

Signed, sealed and exchanged, at Hydiabad, on the 12th October, Anno Domini 1800, or 22d Jemmadee ul Awul, Anno Higeræ 1215.

J. A. KIRKPATRICK,
Resident.

APPENDIX D.

POLITICAL TREATY WITH THE KING OF PERSIA.*

Translation of a Firman from Futtah Ali Shauh, King of Persia, and of an annexed Treaty concluded by Haujy Ibrahim Khaun, Prime Minister, on the part of the King of Persia, by whom he was fully empowered, and by Captain John Malcolm, on the part of the English Government, by virtue of powers delegated to him for that purpose, by the Most Noble the Marquess Wellesley, K.P. Governor General of India, &c. &c. &c.

FIRMAUN.

In the name of the Beloved and Great God !

The earth is the Lord's. Our august commands are issued, that the high in rank, the exalted in station, the great rulers, officers, and writers, of the ports, sea coasts, and islands of the provinces of Fais and Khoozistaun, do consider themselves as particularly honoured and advanced by the royal favour; and whereas at this period the foundations of union and friendship have been cemented, and the habits of amity and intercourse have been increased between the Ministers of the Persian State, of eternal duration, and the Ministers of the High Government of the Refulgent Sun of the Sky of Royalty, Greatness, and Eminence, the Sovereign of the countries of England, and India, and as various engagements and treaties, calculated for duration and permanence, and for mutual good understanding have been contracted, therefore this command from the Palace of Glory, requiring obedience, has been proclaimed, that you, high in rank, do cheerfully comply, and execute the clear sense and meaning of what has been established, and should ever any person of the French nation attempt to pass your posts or boundaries, or desire to establish themselves either on the shores or frontiers, you are to take means to expel and extirpate them, and never to allow them to obtain a footing in any place, and you are at full liberty, and authorized to disgrace and slay them. You are to look upon it as your duty to aid and act in a friendly manner to all traders, merchants, and men of rank of the English nation, all such you are to consider as possessing the favour of the King, and you must act in conformity to the conditions of the annexed treaty that has been concluded between the trustworthy of the high State, the bracelet of the graceful Government, Haujy Ibrahim Khaun, and the high in rank, Captain John Malcolm, view this as an obligation.

Dated the 12th of Shaubaun, in the year of the Higera, 1215, corresponding with the of January, A.D. 1801.

Sealed in the usual form on the back of the Firmaun, by the following Ministers :—

(Sealed)

Haujy Ibrahim Khaun.

Meerza Shuffee.

Meerza Reza Kouli.

Meerza Assud Oollah.

Meerza Ahmud.

Meerza Mortiza Kouli.

Meerza Rezy.

Meerza Fuzullah.

Meerza Yoosuf.

TREATY ANNEXED.

PREAMBLE.

Praise be unto God, who said, "Oh, you who believe, perform your contracts, perform your covenant with God when you enter into covenant with him, and violate not your engagements after the ratification thereof." After the voice is raised to the praise and glory of the God of the world, and the brain is perfumed with the scent of the saints and the prophets, to whom be health and glory !

whose rare perfections are perpetually chaunted by birds * of melodious notes, furnished with two, three, and four pair of wings, and to the highest seated in the heavens, for whom good has been predestinated, and the perfume mixed with musk, which scenteth the celestial mansions of those that sing hymns in the ethereal sphere, and to the light of the flame of the most high, which gives irradiated splendour to the collected view of those who dwell in the heavenly regions, the clear meaning of (the Treaty) which has been established on a solid basis, is fully explained in this page, and it is fixed as a prescription of law, that in this world of existence and trouble, and in this universe of creation and concord, there is no action among those of mankind that tends more to the perfection of the human race, or to answer the end of their being and existence, than that of cementing friendship, and of establishing intercourse, communication, and connexion between each other.

The image reflected from the mirror of accomplishment is a tree fruitful and abundant, and one that produces good both now and hereafter. To illustrate the illusions that it has been proper to make, and to explain these metaphors, worthy of exposition at this happy period of auspicious aspect, a treaty has been concluded between the high in dignity, the exalted in station, attended by fortune of great and splendid power, the greatest among the high viziers, in whom confidence is placed, the faithful of the powerful Government, the adorned with greatness, power, glory, splendour, and fortune, Haujy Ibrahim Khan, on being granted leave, and vested with authority from the Port of the high King, whose court is like that of Solomon, the asylum of the world, the sign of the power of God, the jewel in the ring of kings, the ornament in the cheek of eternal empire, the grace of the beauty of sovereignty and royalty, the king of the universe, like Caherman, the mansion of mercy and justice, the phoenix of good fortune, the eminence of never-fading prosperity, the king powerful as Alexander, who has no equal among the princes exalted to majesty by the heavens in this globe, a shade from the shade of the most high! A Khoosroo, whose saddle is the moon, and whose stirrup is the new moon, a prince of great rank, before whom the sun is concealed,

[Arabic Verse.]

Thy benevolence is universally dispensed: every where drops are scattered. Thy kindness shadows cities, may God fix firm the basis of thy dominion, and may God fix and extend thy power over the servants of the Almighty!

and the high in dignity, the great and able in power, the adorer of those acquainted with manners, Captain John Malcolm, delegated from the sublime quarter of the high in power, (seated on a throne, the asylum of the world, the chief jewel in the crown of royalty and sovereignty, the anchor of the vessel of victory and fortune, the ship on the sea of glory and empire, the blazing sun in the sky of greatness and glory, lord of the countries of England and India, may God strengthen his territories, and establish his glory and commands upon the seas!) in the manner explained in his credentials, which are sealed with the seal of the most powerful and most glorious, possessing fortune, the origin of rank, splendour, and nobility, the ornament of the world, the completer of the works of mankind, the Governor General of India.

This Treaty between these two great States shall be binding on race after race, and the two Governments must ever, while the world exists, act in conformity to what is now settled.

ART. 1. As long as the sun illuminating the circle of the two great contracting powers shines on their sovereign dominions, and bestows light on the whole world, the beautiful image of excellent union shall remain fixed on the mirror of duration and perpetuity. The thread of shameful enmity and distance shall be cut, conditions of mutual aid and assistance between the two states shall be instituted, and all causes of hatred and hostility shall be banished.

ART. 2. If the King of the Afghans should ever show a resolution to invade India, which is subject to the government of the monarch (above mentioned), the prince of high rank, the King of England, an army overthrowing mountains furnished with all warlike stores, shall be appointed from the state of the conspicuous

* Metaphorically angels.

and exalted, high and fixed in power, (the King of Persia), to lay waste and desolate the Afghaun dominions, and every exertion shall be employed to ruin and humble the abovementioned nation.

ART 3. Should it happen that the King of the Afghaun nation ever becomes desirous of opening the gates of peace and friendship with the Government of the King (of Persia), who is in rank like Solomon, in dignity like Jumsheed, the shade of God who has bestowed his mercy and kindness on the earth, when negotiations are opened for an amicable adjustment, it shall be stipulated, in the peace concluded, that the King of the Afghauns or his armies shall abandon all design of attack on the territories subject to the government of the King abovementioned, who is worthy of royalty, the King of England.

ART 4 Should ever any king of the Afghauns, or any person of the French nation commence war and hostilities with the powerful King of the ever enduring state (the King of Persia), the rulers of the government of the King (of England), whose court is like heaven, and who has been before mentioned, shall (on such event) send as many cannon and warlike stores as possible, with necessary apparatus, attendants, and inspectors, and such supply shall be delivered over at one of the ports of Persia, whose boundaries are conspicuous, to the officers of the high in dignity, the King of Persia.

ART 5. Should it ever occur that an army of the French nation, actuated by design and deceit, attempts to settle, with a view of establishing themselves on any of the islands or shores of Persia, a conjunct force shall be appointed by the two high contracting states, to act in co-operation for their expulsion and extirpation, and to destroy and put an end to the foundations of their treason. It is a condition, if such event happens, and the conquering troops (of Persia) march, that the officers of the Government of the King (of England), who is powerful as the heavens, and as before mentioned, shall load, transport, and deliver (for their service), as great a quantity of necessaries, stores, and provisions, as they possibly can. And if ever any of the great men of the French nation express a wish or desire to obtain a place of residence or dwelling on any of the islands or shores of the kingdom of Persia, that they may there raise the standard of abode or settlement, such request or representation shall not be consented unto by the high in rank of the state encompassed with justice, (the Government of Persia), and leave for them residing in such place shall not be granted.

While time endures, and while the world exists, the contents of this exalted treaty shall remain an admired picture in the mirror of duration and perpetuity, and submission to the fair image on this conspicuous page shall be everlasting.

HAUJY IBRAHIM KHAN,
JOHN MALCOLM, Envoy.

COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH THE KING OF PERSIA.*

Translation of a Firmaun from Futtah Ali Shauh, King of Persia, and of an annexed Treaty concluded by Haujy Ibrahim Khaun, Prime Minister, on the part of the King of Persia, by whom he was fully empowered, and by Captain John Mulcolm, on the part of the English Government, by virtue of powers delegated to him for that purpose, by the Most Noble the Marquess Wellesley, K.P. Governor General of India, &c. &c. &c.

FIRMAUN.

In the name of the Beloved and Great God !

The earth is the Lord's. Our august commands are issued, that the high in dignity, the exalted in station, the refuge of power and glory, the noble and great in authority, the chiefs of high nobles, the Beglerbegs, the Haukims, the Naibs, and Mootasuddies of the kingdom under our protection (who are raised by our royal favour) become acquainted, that at this period, the dignified, and eminent in station, the prudent, able, and penetrating, the greatest of the exalted followers of

* Referred to at p. 578.

the Messiah, Captain John Malcolm, deputed from a glorious quarter, (from the Government of the King of England, whose court resembles the firmament, an emperor in dignity like Alexander, possessing the power of the globe, and from the repository of glory, greatness, and ability, endowed with nobility, power, and justice, the Governor General of the kingdom of Hindoostan) for the purpose of establishing union and friendship between the two great states, has arrived at our threshold founded on justice, and has been honoured by admission to our royal presence of conspicuous splendour, and has expressed a desire that the foundations of amity and union should be laid between the two states, that they should be connected together in the bonds of friendship and harmony, and that a constant union and reciprocal good understanding should exist, we, from our august selves, have given our consent, and have granted the requests and desires of the high in rank abovementioned, and a treaty sealed with the seal of the minister^{*} of our ever enduring Government, has been given to him, and you, exalted in station, are positively enjoined of the necessity (after you become informed of our royal and august order) for all of you acting in strict conformity with the conditions of the treaty concluded and exchanged between the high in rank, the exalted in station, the great and glorious in power, near to the throne, in whom the royal confidence is placed, Haujy Ibrahim Khaun, and the high in rank the Envoy (Captain John Malcolm), whose titles have been before enumerated. Let no one act contrary to this high command, or to the contents of the annexed treaty; and should it ever be represented to us that any of the great nobles conduct themselves in opposition to the stipulations of this treaty, or are in this respect either guilty or negligent, such will incur our displeasure and punishment, and be exposed to our royal anger, which is like fire, and let them view this as an obligation.

Dated in the month of Shaubaun, in the year of the Hijera 1215, corresponding with the month of January, A.D. 1801.

Scaled, in the usual form, on the back of the Firmaun, by the following Ministers :—

(Sealed)

Haujy Ibrahim Khaun.

Meerza Keza Kouli.

Meerza Ahmud.

Meerza Rezy.

Meerza Yoosuf.

Meerza Shuffee.

Meerza Assud Oollah.

Meerza Mortiza Kouli.

Meerza Fuzullah.

TREATY ANNEXED.

PREAMBLE.

Praise be to God, who has said, "perform your covenant, for the performance of your covenant shall be enquired into hereafter."

As establishing the obligations of friendship between all mankind, is a charge from the Almighty, and is a most laudable and excellent institution, and as the Creator is pleased, and the happiness and tranquillity of his creatures consulted by it, therefore, at this happy period of auspicious aspect, a treaty has been concluded between the high in dignity, the exalted in station, attended by fortune of great and splendid power, the greatest among the high viziers, in whom confidence is placed, the faithful of the powerful Government, the adorned with greatness, power, glory, splendour, and fortune, Haujy Ibrahim Khaun, on being granted leave, and vested with authority from the port of the high King, whose court is like that of Solomon, the asylum of the world, the sign of the power of God, the jewel in the ring of kings, the ornament in the cheek of eternal empire, the grace of the beauty of sovereignty and royalty, the king of the universe, like Caherman, the mansion of mercy and justice, the phoenix of good fortune, the eminence of never fading prosperity, the king powerful as Alexander, who has no equal among the princes exalted to majesty by the Heavens in this globe, a shade from the shade of the Most High, a Khoosroo, whose saddle is the moon, and whose stirrup is the new moon, a prince of great rank, before whom the sun is concealed,

* Literally one in whom confidence is placed.

[*Arabic Verse.*]

Thy benevolence is universally acknowledged, every where drops are scattered. Thy kindness shadows cities; may God fix firm the basis of thy dominion,

and the high in dignity, the great and able in power, the adorer of those acquainted with manners, Captain John Malcolm, delegated from the sublime quarter of the high in power, (seated on a throne, the asylum of the world, the chief jewel in the crown of royalty and sovereignty, the anchor of the vessel of victory and fortune, the ship on the sea of glory and empire, the blazing sun in the sky of greatness and glory, lord of the countries of England and India, may God strengthen his territories, and establish his glory and commands upon the seas!) in the manner explained in his credentials, which are sealed with the seal of the most powerful, and most glorious possessing fortune, the origin of rank, splendour, and nobility, the ornament of the world, the completer of the works of mankind, the Governor General of India.

This Treaty between these two great States shall be binding on race after race, and the two Governments must ever, while the world exists, act in conformity to what is now settled.

ART 1. The merchants of the high contracting states are to travel and carry on their affairs in the territories of both nations, in full security and confidence, and the rulers and governors of all cities are to consider it their duty to protect from injury their cattle and goods.

ART. 2. The traders and merchants of the kingdom of England or Hindoo-staun, that are in the service of the English Goverment, shall be permitted to settle in any of the sea ports or cities of the boundless empire of Persia, (which may God preserve from calamity) that they prefer, and no Government duties, taxes, or requisitions, shall ever be collected on any goods that are the actual property of either of the Governments, the usual duties on such to be taken from purchasers.

ART. 3. Should it happen that either the persons or property (of merchants) are injured, or lost, by thieves or robbers, the utmost exertions shall be made to punish the delinquents, and recover the property. And if any merchant or trader of Persia evades or delays the payment of a debt to the English Government, the latter are authorized to use every possible mode for the recovery of their demands, taking care to do so in communication, and with the knowledge of the ruler or governor of the place, who is to consider it as his duty to grant, on such occasion, every aid in his power. And should any merchants of Persia be in India, attending to their mercantile concerns, the officers of the English Government are not to prevent them carrying on their affairs, but to aid and favour them, and the above mentioned merchants are to recover their debts and demands in the mode prescribed by the customs and laws of the English Government.

ART. 4. If any person in the empire of Persia die indebted to the English Government, the ruler of the place must exert his power to have such demand satisfied before those of any other creditors whatsoever. The servants of the English Government resident in Persia are permitted to hire as many domestics, natives of that country, as are necessary for the transaction of their affairs, and they are authorized to punish such in cases of misconduct in the manner they judge most expedient, provided such punishment does not extend to life or limb In such cases, the punishment to be inflicted by the ruler or governor of the place.

ART. 5. The English are at liberty to build houses and mansions in any of the ports or cities of Persia that they choose, and they may sell or rent all such houses or mansions at pleasure. And should ever a ship belonging to the English Government be in a damaged state in any of the ports of Persia, or one of Persia be in that condition in an English harbour, the chiefs and rulers of the ports and harbours of the respective nations are to consider it as their duty to give every aid to refit and repair vessels so situated; and if it happens that any of the vessels of either nation are sunk or shipwrecked in or near the ports or shores of either country, on such occasions, whatever part of the property is recovered shall be restored to their owners or their heirs, and a just hire is to be allowed by the owners to those who recover it.

FINAL ARTICLE. Whenever any native of England or India, in the service of the English Government, resident in Persia, wishes to leave that country, he is to

suffer obstruction from no person, but to be at full liberty to do so, and to carry with him his property.

These articles of the treaty between the two states are fixed and determined. That person who turns from God, turns from his own soul

HAUJY IBRAHIM KHAUN.

JOHN MALCOLM, Envoy.

ADDITIONAL ARTICLE. It is further written in sincerity, that on iron, lead, steel, broad cloth, and perpets, that are exclusively the property of the English Government, no duties whatever shall be taken from the sellers, a duty not exceeding one per cent. to be levied upon the purchases. And the duties, imports, and customs, which are at this period established in Persia and India (on other goods) are to remain fixed, and not to be increased.

The high in rank, Haujy Khulleci Khaun, Malik u Tijar, is charged and entrusted with the arrangement and settlement of the remaining points relative to commerce.

HAUJY IBRAHIM KHAUN.

JOHN MALCOLM, Envoy.

APPENDIX E.

*Treaty for settling the succession to the Soubahdarry of the territories of Arcot, and for vesting the administration of the civil and military Government of the Carnatic Puyen Ghaut in the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies.**

Whereas the several treaties which have been concluded between the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies, and their Highnesses heretofore Nabobs of the Carnatic, have been intended to cement and identify the interests of the contracting parties; and whereas, in conformity to the spirit of the alliance, the said Company did, by the treaty concluded on the 12th July, 1792, with the late Nabob Walajah, relinquish extensive pecuniary advantages, acquired by the previous treaty of 1787, with the view, and on the consideration of establishing a more adequate security for the interests of the British Government in the Carnatic; and whereas subsequent experience has proved, that the intention of the contracting parties has not been fulfilled by the provisions of any of the treaties heretofore concluded between them, and whereas the musnud of the Soubahdarry of Arcot having become vacant, the Prince Azeem ul Doulah Behauder has been established by the English East India Company in the rank, property, and possessions of his ancestors, heretofore Nabobs of the Carnatic; and whereas the said Company and his Highness the said Prince Azeem ul Dowlah Behauder have judged it expedient, that additional provision should, at this time, be made, for the purpose of supplying the defects of all former engagements, and of establishing the connection between the said contracting parties on a permanent basis of security, in all times to come; wherefore the following treaty is now established and concluded, by the Right Honourable Edward Lord Clive, Governor in council of Fort St. George, by and with the sanction and authority of his Excellency the Most Noble the Marquess Wellesley, K.P., Governor-General in council of all the British possessions in the East Indies, on behalf of the said united Company, on the one part, and by his Highness the Nabob Walajah Ameer ul Dowlah Modaur ool Mulk Ameer ool Hind Azeem ul Dowlah Behauder Shokut Jung Sepah Salaur Nabob Soubahdar of the Carnatic, on his own behalf, on the other part, for settling the succession to the Soubahdarry of the territories of Arcot, and for vesting the administration of the civil and military government of the Carnatic in the united Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies.

ART. 1. The Nabob Azeem ul Dowlah Behauder is hereby formally established in the state and rank, with the dignities dependent thereon, of his ancestors, heretofore Nabobs of the Carnatic, and the possession thereof is hereby guaranteed by the honourable East India Company to his said Highness Azeem ul Dowlah Behauder, who has accordingly succeeded to the Soubahdarry of the territories of Arcot.

ART. 2. Such parts of the treaties heretofore concluded between the said East

* Referred to at p. 552.

India Company and their Highnesses, heretofore Nabobs of the Carnatic, as are calculated to strengthen the alliance, to cement the friendship, and to identify the interests of the contracting parties, are hereby renewed and confirmed, and accordingly the friends or enemies of either are the friends and enemies of both parties.

ART. 3. The honourable Company hereby charges itself with the maintenance and support of the military force necessary for the defence of the Carnatic, and for the protection of the rights, person, and property of the said Nabob Azeem ul Dowlah Behauder; and with the view of reviving the fundamental principles of the alliance between his ancestors and the English nation, the said Nabob Azeem ul Dowlah stipulates and agrees, that he will not enter upon any negotiation or correspondence with any European or Native Power, without the knowledge and consent of the said English Company.

ART. 4. It is hereby stipulated and agreed, that the sole and exclusive administration of the civil and military governments of all the territories and dependencies of the Carnatic Payen Ghaut, together with the full and exclusive right to the revenues thereof (with the exception of such portion of the said revenues as shall be appropriated for the maintenance of the said Nabob and for the support of his dignity) shall be for ever vested in the said English Company; and the said Company shall accordingly possess the sole power and authority of constituting and appointing, without any interference on the part of the said Nabob, all officers for the collection of their revenues, and of establishing courts for the administration of civil and criminal judicature.

ART. 5. It is hereby stipulated and agreed, that one-fifth part of the net revenues of the Carnatic shall be annually allotted for the maintenance and support of the said Nabob and of his own immediate family, including the Mahal* of his late Highness the Ameer ul Omrah. The said fifth part shall be paid by the Company, in monthly instalments of twelve thousand star pagodas; and whatever circumstance may occur, affecting the net revenues of the Carnatic, the said instalments shall not be less than twelve thousand star pagodas. Whatever balance of the said fifth part may remain due at the expiration of each year, shall be liquidated upon the settlement of the accounts, and the said fifth part shall be at the free disposal of the said Nobob, consistently with the principles of the said alliance.

ART. 6. The fifth part of the revenues, as stated in the preceding article, shall be calculated and determined in the following manner, viz. all charges, of every description, incurred in the collection of the revenues, the amount of the Jaghire lands, stated in the ninth article in the treaty of 1787 at star pagodas 2,13,421, and the sum of pagodas 6,21,105, appropriate to the liquidation of the debts of the late Mahammed Ali, shall, in the first instance, be deducted from the revenues of the Carnatic; and after the deduction of those three items shall have been made, one-fifth part of the remaining net revenue (including the Polygar Peshcush, which shall always be calculated at the sum of 2,64,704 star pagodas 20 fanams 26 cash, according to the treaty of 1792) shall be allotted for the maintenance of the said Nabob, and for the support of his Highness's dignity.

ART. 7. Whereas it was stipulated by the fourth article of the treaty of 1792, that the sum of six lacs twenty-one thousand one hundred and five star pagodas should annually be applied to the discharge of certain registered debts, due by the late Nabob Mahomed Ali to his private creditors, under agreements concluded between his Highness and the honourable Company, and guaranteed by the Parliament of Great Britain, until the said registered debt should be liquidated, the honourable English Company, accordingly, hereby, charges itself with the annual payment of 6,21,105 pagodas from the revenues of the Carnatic, until the remainder of the said registered debt shall be liquidated.

ART. 8. Whereas certain debts are due to the said Company by the ancestors of the said Nabob, and whereas it is expedient, in order that the present treaty may include a complete arrangement of all affairs depending between the said Company and the said Nabob, that an adjustment should be made of the aforementioned debts, wherefore the said Nabob formally and explicitly acknowledges the debt, commonly called the cavalry loan, amounting, with its interest, to 13,24,342 star pagodas 6 fanams 47 cash, and also the portion of the registered debt heretofore paid by the said Company to the creditors of the late Nabob Walajah (according to the annexed schedule) to be just debts; and whereas, exclu-

* Female establishment.

sively of the above-mentioned debts, other unadjusted debts also remain, which were referred to the adjustment and decision of the Governor-General in council of Bengal; and whereas the said unadjusted debts have not been determined according to that intention, the said Nabob hereby engages, that whenever the said determination shall be made, his Highness will acknowledge to be a just debt the amount of the balance which shall be so declared to be due to the said Company. It is not, however, the intention of this article, to cause any diminution from the fifth part payable to the said Nabob, but, on the contrary, it is specified, that no deduction shall be made from the revenue, on any account whatever, excepting the three items stated in the sixth article, previously to the determination of his Highness's proportion.

ART. 9. The English Company engages to take into consideration the actual situation of the families of their Highnesses the late Nabobs Walajah and Omdut ul Omrah Behauder, as well as the situation of the principal officers of his late Highness's Government; and the British Government shall charge itself with the expense (chargeable on the revenues of the Carnatic) of a suitable provision for their respective maintenance. The amount of the above mentioned expenses, to be defrayed by the Company, shall be distributed, with the knowledge of the said Nabob, in such manner as shall be judged proper.

ART. 10. The said Nabob Azeem ul Dowlah Behauder shall, in all places, on all occasions, and at all times, be treated with the respect and attention due to his Highness's rank and situation, as an ally to the British Government, and a suitable guard shall be appointed from the Company's troops for the protection of his said Highness's person and palace.

ART. 11. The entire defence of the Carnatic against foreign enemies, and the maintenance of the internal tranquillity and police of the country, having been hereby transferred to the British Government, his said Highness engages not to entertain or employ in his service any armed men, without the consent of the British Government, who will fix, in concert with his Highness, the number of armed men necessary to be retained for purposes of state. Such armed men as his Highness may, in consequence of this article, engage in his service, shall be paid at the exclusive cost and charge of the said Nabob.

ART. 12. The honourable East India Company shall, in conformity to the stipulations of this treaty, enter upon the exclusive administration of the civil and military government of the Carnatic, on the 31st day of July, 1801, and his said Highness the Nabob shall issue orders to all his civil and military officers, to transfer the district or districts, under their respective charge, to such persons as shall be appointed by the said Company to manage the said districts, and also to deliver to the persons appointed all records, accounts, and official papers, belonging to their respective cutcherries or offices.

This treaty, bearing date the 31st day of July, Anno Domini 1801, and consisting of twelve articles, having been executed by Edward Lord Clive, Governor in council aforesaid, on the one part, and his Highness Azeem ul Dowlah Behauder on the other part, is hereby mutually interchanged, the said Edward Lord Clive engaging that a copy of the said treaty shall be transmitted to Fort William, for the purpose of being ratified by his Excellency the most noble the Marquess Wellesley, K.P., Governor-General in council, and that, as soon as the ratified treaty shall be received from Bengal, it shall be delivered to his said Highness, who will then return to his Lordship the copy which he now receives.

CLIVE,
J. STUART,
W. PETRIE,
E. W. FALLOFIELD.

By the Right Honourable the Governor in council.
J. WEBBE,
Chief Secretary to Government

Schedule of the Account referred to in the eighth article of this Treaty.

Amount paid by the Company to his Highness the Nabob's creditors, on account of his consolidated debt of 1777, 26,47,381 star pagodas; deduct—receipts of

revenue from the Carnatic surplus to the fixed military subsidy, in the Fusly years 1200 and 1201, 8,29,481; interest at six per cent. for four years and a half, 2,23,960; balance due by the Nabob, 15,93,940; add—interest for four years and eleven months, at six per cent., 4,70,211: actual balance, 20,64,151 star pagodas.

CLIVE,
J. STUART,
W. PETRIE,
E. W. FALLOFIELD.

By the Right Honourable the Governor in council,
J. WEBBE,
Chief Secretary to Government.

Separate explanatory Articles annexed to the Treaty for settling the succession to the Soubahdarry of the territories of Arcot, and for vesting the administration of the civil and military Government of the Carnatic Payenghant in the united Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies.

ART. 1 Whereas it is stipulated by the fifth article of the treaty, that the sum to be appropriated to the support of the dignity of his Highness the Nabob Azeem ul Dowlah Behauder, shall be calculated at one-fifth part of the net revenues of the Carnatic, and whereas the improvement of the said revenues, which, under Providence, may be expected to arise from the effects of the present arrangement, may render the said fifth part greater than will be necessary to the purposes intended by the contracting parties, it is hereby explained, for the better understanding of the fifth article of the treaty, that whenever the whole net revenue of the Carnatic, including the sums to be deducted, according to the sixth article of the treaty, shall exceed the sum of twenty-five lacs of star pagodas, then and in that case, the fifth part of such surplus shall be applied to the repair of fortifications, to the establishment of a separate fund for the eventual exigencies of war, or to the military defence of the Carnatic, in such manner as may be determined by the Governor in council of Fort St. George, after the previous communication to his Highness the Nabob Azeem ul Dowlah.

ART. 2. Whereas it is stipulated in the sixth article of this treaty, that the sum of 2,13,421 pagodas on account of Jagheer, and the sum of 6,21,105 pagodas on account of the private debts of the Nabob Mahomed Alli, shall be deducted from the amount of the net revenue, previously to the determination of the proportion to be paid to his Highness the Nabob, it is nevertheless hereby explained, that it shall not be incumbent on the honourable Company to appropriate lands yielding a revenue to the said amount of 2,13,421 pagodas, but that the said Company shall be at liberty to exercise its discretion in the mode and on the extent of the provision to be made, according to the ninth article of the treaty, for the support of the family and principal officers of the Nabob Mahomed Alli, and of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah. And it is further explained, that notwithstanding the liquidation of the private debt of the Nabob Mahomed Alli, or of the debt due to the honourable Company, the said sum of 6,21,105 pagodas, shall always be deducted from the net revenue, and shall, in no case, be included in the net revenue, previously to the determination of the share to be allotted to his Highness the Nabob Azeem ul Dowlah Behauder, it being the intention of the contracting parties, that the said sum of 2,13,421 pagodas, and the said sum of 6,21,105 pagodas, shall be considered to be permanent deductions, in all times to come, from the revenue of the Carnatic.

CLIVE,
J. STUART,
W. PETRIE,
E. W. FALLOFIELD.

lands attached to it, excepting privileged lands and those appropriated to religious purposes and to Jaggeers, &c. which are specified separately in the account of collections shall be given up to Samee Jeo, for his expenses, as a present. The conditions, with respect to Samee Jeo,* are, that if he should remain at Benares, or at any other place within the Company's provinces, and should spontaneously farm his Jaggeer to the officers of Nepaul, in that event the amount of collections shall be punctually paid to him, agreeably to certain kists which may be hereafter settled; that he may appropriate the same to his necessary expenses, and that he may continue in religious abstraction, according to his agreement, which he had engraved on brass, at the time of his abdication of the Raj,^t and of his resigning it in my favor. Again, in the event of his establishing his residence in his Jaggeer, and of his realizing the collections through his own officers, it is proper, that he should not keep such a one and other disaffected persons in his service, and besides one hundred men and maid servants, &c. he must not entertain any persons as soldiers, with a view to the collection of the revenue of the Purgunnah; and to the protection of his person he may take two hundred soldiers of the forces of the Nepaul Government, the allowances of whom shall be paid by the Rajah of Nepaul. He must be cautious, also, of commencing altercation, either by speech or writing; neither must he give protection to the rebellious and fugitives of the Nepaul country, nor must he commit plunder and devastation upon the subjects of Nepaul. In the event of such delinquency being proved, to the satisfaction of the two governments, the aid and protection of the Company shall be withdrawn from him; and in that event, also, it shall be at the option of the Rajah of Nepaul, whether or not he will confiscate his Jaggeer.

The Maha Rajah also agrees on his part, that if Samee Jeo should take up his residence within the Company's provinces, and should farm out his land to the officers of Nepaul, and that the kists should not be paid according to agreement, or that he should fix his residence on his Jaggeer, and any of the inhabitants of Nepaul should give him or the Ryots of his Purgunnah any molestation, a requisition shall be made by the Governor-General and the Company, on this subject, to the Rajah. The Governor-General is security for the Rajah's performance of this condition, and the Maha Raja will immediately acquit himself of the requisition of the Governor-General, agreeably to what is above written. If any profits should arise in the collection of the said Purgunnah, in consequence of the activity of the officers, or any defalcation occurs from their inattention, in either case, the Rajah of Nepaul will be totally unconcerned.

ART. 10. With a view of carrying into effect the different objects contained in this treaty, and of promoting other verbal negotiation, the Governor-General and the Rajah of Nepaul, under the impulse of their will and pleasure, depute a confidential person to each other, as Vakeel, that remaining in attendance upon their respective governments, they may effect the objects above specified, and promote whatever may tend to the daily improvement of the friendship subsisting between the two states.

ART. 11. It is incumbent upon the principals and officers of the two states, that they should manifest the regard and respect to the Vakeel of each other's government, which is due to their rank, and is prescribed by the laws of nations; and that they should endeavour, to the utmost of their power, to advance any object which they may propose, and to promote their ease, comfort, and satisfaction, by extending protection to them, which circumstances are calculated to improve the friendship subsisting between the two governments, and to illustrate the good name of both states throughout the universe.

ART. 12. It is incumbent upon the Vakeels of both states, that they should hold no intercourse whatever with any of the subjects or inhabitants of the country, excepting with the officers of government, without the permission of those officers; neither should they carry on any correspondence with any of them: and if they should receive any letter or writing from any such people, they should not answer it, without the knowledge of the head of the state, and acquainting him of the particulars which will dispel all apprehension or doubt between us, and manifest the sincerity of our friendship.

ART. 13. It is incumbent upon the principals and officers mutually to abide by

the spirit of this treaty, which is now drawn out according to their faith and religion, and deeming it in force from generation to generation, that they should not deviate from it · and any person who may transgress against it, will be punished by Almighty God, both in this world and in a future state.

(A true translation)

C. RUSSELL,
Assistant Persian Translator.

Ratified by the Governor-General and council,
30th October, 1801.

APPENDIX G.

Treaty for the improvement and security of the Trade and Commerce between the Territories of the Honourable East India Company and of his Highness the Nabob Nizam'ool Mookh Asoph Jah, Soubahdar of the Dechun; settled by Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick, Resident at the Court of his Highness by virtue of the powers delegated to him by his Excellency the most noble Richard Marquess Wellesley, Knight of the most illustrious Order of Saint Patrick, one of his Britannic Majesty's Privy Council, Governor-General in Council, Captain General, and Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's and the Honourable Company's forces in India, appointed by the Honourable the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company to direct and controul all their affairs in the East Indies, and Governor-General in Council of all the British possessions in the East Indies.

Whereas a well regulated commerce is essential to the opulence and prosperity of the people, and to the wealth and power of the State, and whereas a free and secure commercial intercourse tends to maintain and improve the relations of amity, peace and concord, between contiguous nations;

Wherefore the honourable East India Company and his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah, anxious to improve, by every possible means, the close and intimate connection now happily established between the two States, and to extend the benefits of their union to their respective subjects, have agreed on the following articles of a treaty of commerce between the two States.

ART. 1. As the testimony of the firm friendship, union and attachment, subsisting between the Honourable Company and his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah, the Honourable Company hereby agree to grant to his Highness the free use of the sea port of Masulipatam, at which port his Highness shall be at liberty to establish a commercial factory and agents, under such regulations as the nature of the Company's Government shall require, and as shall be adjusted between the Governor-General in Council and his said Highness.

ART. 2. His Highness's ships bearing his flag shall be entitled, at all times, to the protection of his Britannic Majesty's and the Honourable Company's ships of war, and shall be admitted into all the ports belonging to the British Government in India, upon the footing of the most favoured nations.

ART. 3. There shall be a free transit between the territories of the contracting parties of all articles, being the growth, produce, or manufacture of each respectively; and also of all articles being the growth, produce, or manufacture of any part of his Britannic Majesty's dominions.

ART. 4. All Rahdarry duties, and all duties collected by individual renters or zemindars, or goods passing to and from the territories of the contracting parties, shall be abolished, and all zemindars, renters, &c. shall be strictly prohibited from committing any acts of extortion or violence on the merchants passing through the respective territories of the contracting parties.

ART. 5. A duty of five per cent. and no more shall be levied at Hyderabad indiscriminately on all articles of merchandize whatever, imported into his Highness's dominions from the Company's possessions. No articles shall pay duty

more than once; the duties payable shall be regulated by a just valuation of the article or commodity on which they shall be charged, and which shall be determined by an invoice authenticated by the seal and signature of the proper officer on each side; nor shall any arbitrary valuation of any article or commodity be admitted to enhance the amount of the duties payable thereon. And the said duties shall be fixed and immutable, except by the mutual consent of the contracting parties.

ART. 6. The honourable East India Company shall, on their part, adopt similar arrangements in every respect for the purpose of facilitating the transit through their dominions of all articles, the growth, produce or manufacture of his Highness's territories, and of guarding the same from all unjust exactions or vexatious imposts whatever.

ART. 7. The duties payable to the Honourable Company on all articles imported into their territories from his Highness's dominions, shall be collected in the mode prescribed by the 5th article at Masulipatam alone, or at one or more places, according to the convenience of the merchants belonging to his Highness's dominions, and the said place or places shall be fixed with the consent of his Highness the Nizam, it being understood that no article imported from his Highness's dominions shall in any case pay duty more than once, whether the said duty be collected at Masulipatam or elsewhere.

ART. 8. A duty of five per cent. and no more shall be levied at once by his Highness's Government, and be made payable at Hyderabad on the prime cost of all commodities purchased in his Highness's dominions for exportation.

ART. 9. No merchants or traders, under the Company's Government, shall be allowed to revend, in the dominions of the Nabob aforesaid, the productions or manufactures of his territories purchased by them therin. Neither shall any grain be exported from the territories of the Nabob aforesaid into those of the Honourable Company without a special license for the purpose, nor any more grain be purchased in his Highness's territories than what is necessary for the consumption of the subsidiary force. But it is at the same time hereby agreed, that in cases of necessity, permission shall be granted immediately on application for the transportation of grain, free from all duties whatever, into the respective territories of the two contracting powers in Hindostan and Deccan.

ART. 10. The traders under both Governments, namely, all such as shall traffic from the honourable East India Company's territories to the territories of his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah and vice versa, shall, upon the importation of their commodities into the respective territories, pay once a duty of five per cent. according to the terms prescribed in the foregoing articles. With respect to others, who do not come under the above description, such as traders from foreign parts, or inhabitants of Hyderabad, who have always paid the usual duties, the Kurrorah shall, as heretofore, levy duties from them according to custom.

ART. 11. The preceding regulations shall take effect, and be established in the respective territories of the contracting parties on the 1st day of September next, answering to the 2nd of Jemaudool Awul A. H. 1217, after which day no duties shall be levied in any other manner than in conformity to the stipulations of this treaty.

ART. 12. This treaty, consisting of twelve articles, being this day settled by Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick with the Nabob Asoph Jah Behadur, Major Kirkpatrick has delivered one copy thereof in English and Persian, signed and sealed by himself to the said Nabob, who on his part has also delivered one copy of the same duly executed by himself, and Major Kirkpatrick, by virtue of special authority, given to him in that behalf by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council hereby declares the said treaty to be in full force from the date hereof, and engages to procure and deliver to his Highness, in the space of fifty days, a copy of the same from the Governor-General in Council in every respect, the counterpart of that executed by himself; and on the delivery of such copy the treaty executed by Major Kirkpatrick shall be returned.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Hyderabad this 12th day of April, A. D. 1802, or 8th day of Zchidje, A. H. 1216.

J. A. KIRKPATRICK,
Resident.

APPENDIX H.

Articles of Agreement between the Honourable Jonathan Duncan, Esq., President and Governor of Bombay, for and in behalf of the Honourable East India Company, and Roujee Appajee, the Dewan, or Minister of Anund Row Guicowar Senah Khas Khel Shumshere Behauder, for and in behalf of the said Anund Row Guicowar, in virtue of the full powers vested in the said Roujee Appajee, to treat and settle for the affairs of the Guicowar Principality with the said Governor of Bombay, which powers bear date the 3rd of Zilkad, or 8th of March, in the year of our Lord 1802.

ART. 1. Whereas certain articles were, under date the 15th of March last, answering to the 10th Zilkad, entered into, under the abovementioned full powers, by the said contracting parties, in reference to the war then carrying on against Mulhar Row, and providing for the Guicowar Government's defraying the whole expense thereof, and for its subsidizing a permanent force from the Honourable Company, and ceding to them the Pergunnah of Chourassy and the Guicowar's share of the Choute of Surat; all these stipulations are herein declared to be in full force, and of equal strength and solidity, as if repeated in the present treaty.

ART. 2. Mulhar Row having commenced hostilities with the state of Anund Row Guicowar Senah Khas Khel Shumshere Behauder, and taking possession of Vessanagur, induced Anund Row to solicit the assistance of a British force, for the purpose of effectually reducing Mulhar Row, and taking his fort of Kurree, upon which the English sent a force to Cambay, with the view of bringing the said chieftain to reason, either by peaceable or hostile means; and the latter having, in consequence, been pursued, on account of Mulhar Row's not abiding by the advice of the English, the war has since terminated successfully for the state of Anund Row, who has, in consequence, entered on possession of the fort of Kurree and of its Pergunnahs, and of Mulhar Row's other territories, and made a provision for him in the Pergunnah of Meryad, ceding also to the English Company the Pergunnah of Chickly, situated in the district of the Surat Attaveesy, in full sovereignty for ever, as a spontaneous mark of his gratitude for their assistance in overcoming this opposition to his authority.

ART. 3. By the second article of the convention of the 15th of March last it is stipulated, that Jaydad, or landed funds, equal to the income of sixty-five thousand rupees per month, shall be assigned to the Honourable Company, to defray the expense of the subsidized force; but as, from the present incumbered and mortgaged state of the districts composing the Guicowar piincipality, these assignments cannot be effected, and the Honourable Company put into possession during the current year, beginning from the Mirgh of 1859, or June 1802, it is hereby agreed, that the payment of the subsidy for this term shall be secured, according to the condition of a separate bond executed for this purpose, under the present date, and that the assignment of land to the Honourable Company shall be effectively and fully accomplished by the Mirgh of 1860, beginning in June 1803. This subsidy to be chargeable to the Guicowar State from the period referred to in the convention of the 15th March.

ART. 4. The second article of the convention of the 15th March last, proposing to effect a reduction in the number of the Arab force under the Guicowar Government, the principal obstacle to which consists in want of ready money funds, for the liquidation of the arrears of such part of the said establishment as it is proposed to disband, and the Honourable Company meaning to extend, to this effect, some pecuniary assistance to the Guicowar State, the repayment of this amount is to take place and be secured in manner following:

The first payment of interest by the Mirgh of 1860, or June 1803; the second year's interest, and one-third of the principal, by the Mirgh of 1861, or June 1804; and all the remaining principal and interest by the Mirgh of 1862, or June 1805. But in the event of failing in the above stipulated payments, the revenue of the

Pergunnahs of Barodra, Coral, Senor, Pittad, and Ahmedabad, to the full amount of the Russud, which will be about 11,75,000 rupees per annum, shall be collected by the Company, in proportion to the advance that may be made by them; and when this debt is fully paid, the collection of that part of the revenue, from the above named Pergunnahs, shall revert again to the administration of the Government of Barodra.

ART. 5. There shall be a true friendship and good understanding between the Honourable English East India Company and the state of Anund Row Guicowar, in pursuance of which, the Company will grant the said chief its countenance and protection in all his public concerns, according to justice and as may appear to be for the good of the country, respecting which he is, also, to listen to advice. And the state of the Guicowar having represented sundry points to the Governor in which it is interested, he has assured Raoba of the general attention of the Honourable Company to protect the administration of Anund Row in all their rights, and to be aiding to its concerns with his Highness the Paishwa, or elsewhere, on all just occasions, where their assistance may prove requisite and useful.

ART. 6. For the cultivation and promoting the permanency of the good understanding between the two states, there shall be a constant good correspondence kept up between them, and agents reciprocally appointed to reside with each.

ART. 7. In future, the subjects of each state who may take refuge with either, shall be delivered up, if the state from which such party or parties shall have fled appear to have any demand of debt, or any just claim against him or them: but as a free intercourse between the countries and the two governments is also intended, frivolous claims against parties resorting from their own to the other jurisdiction are not to be preferred, and in all serious cases cordiality will be shewn.

ART. 8. This agreement to be binding and permanent, when ratified by the Supreme Government of Bengal, which, in all political concerns, controuls all the other Presidencies; but, in the mean time, to be in full force.

In witness whereof the parties to the foregoing articles of agreement have interchangeably put their hands and seals, in Cambay, this 6th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1802.

(Signed) JONATHAN DUNCAN.

Signed, sealed, and delivered, in the presence of

(Signed) A. WALKER,
KAMAULEDDEEN.

A true Copy,
(Signed) H. SHANK,
Acting Political Secretary.

A true Copy,
(Signed) J. A. GRANT,
Sub-Secretary to Government.

Translation of a Sunnud, or Grant, of Chickley, written in the form of a Letter to the Honourable Jonathan Duncan, Esq. Resident and Governor of Bombay, by Anund Row Guicowar Senah Khas Khel Shumshere Behauder.

Mulhar Row Guicowar Himmut Behauder being indebted to us for the arrears of our annual accounts, and having exchanged Bahanders, or securities, for the future good behaviour on both sides, a settlement had taken place. In the present year Mulhar Row unjustly raised a quarrel with us, and without paying any regard to the Bahanders, or securities, we sent to him, for the purpose of discussing the subject, the fort of Bissanagur was taken from us, and he occasioned much disturbance in our country. Babajee Appajee, in his proceeding with troops to Katia and Katiavod, was opposed by him, and there ensued a battle. In consequence of this we dispatched Kemauleeddeen Hoossien Khan Behader and Gopal Row Bapjee to you, and begged the assistance of the Company Behader, on condition that we shall defray the charges of their troops, for which a due provision has been separately made: but in testimony of our sense of the seasonable assistance afforded to us by the Honourable Company, we now make the Company a present of Chickley, within the province of Surat Attavissy, to be taken possession of by

the English, at the beginning of the approaching year, on Suvant 1859, and to enjoy the benefit of it for ever. In this Pergunnah, whatever are the gifts and donations, such as annuities, Enams of villages and grounds, charitable allowances, and the rights of the Zemindars, may be observed and allowed for, according to the usual rules, and the balance of the present year against that Peigunnah may be discharged, agreeable to its accounts.

Dated 2nd Suffer, or 4th June 1802.

A true Copy,

(Signed) H SHANK,

Acting Political Secretary.

True Copy,

(Signed) J. HALLETT, Assistant to the Secretary.

Malsa Kaunt, in the Rajah's own hand writing.

I, Anunt Row Guicowar Sena Khel Shumsere Bhader, do hereby confirm and ratify such compacts and agreements as my faithful Dewan, Rowjee Appajee, hath in my name, and on my behalf, made and concluded with the Honourable the Governor of Bombay.

Firstly. I hereby confirm and ratify such grants of lands as my said Dewan Rowjee Appajee has made to the Honourable Company either in Enam or Jaydad; and I also declare that I hold myself, my heirs and successors, bound to repay in money, or in such further landed assignments as may be sufficient for the purpose, all debts and expences which the English Government have been at or contracted in the course of their military operations in Guzerat, undertaken for the support of my Government.

Secondly. I entirely approve and highly commend the prudence of my Dewan in having obtained a body of English troops, to remain permanently in this country, as on their courage and fidelity I place an unlimited dependence.

I have determined that the payment of this subsidiary force shall commence from the 1st of this month, English style, or 1st of Assar 1859, Hindu æra.

Thirdly As I repose an entire confidence in the English, I depend on their friendship to shield me from misfortunes. I am sensible that there are many evil disposed persons amongst the Arabs, who, disregarding my legal authority, have plotted against my liberty, and even my life. By the favour of God they have been defeated, but should their wicked machinations at any time hereafter succeed, I shall expect the English to release me, and desire that all my acts and deeds, although executed by me in the usual form while in that state of restraint, may be considered as of no validity I desire, therefore, that my subjects will pay no attention to my orders in this situation, but hear what Major Walker has to say, strictly following his directions and assisting him in every measure that he shall devise or direct for restoring my person to freedom.

Whoever, in short, shall either bring Canoojee into the management of affairs, or shut me up in the Fort of Baroda or elsewhere, is a rebel, and I fully authorize the aforesaid Major Alexander Walker, or the person intrusted with the chief management of the Company's affairs in Guzerat, to chastise such disturbers of Government, and bring them to that punishment which is due to those who endanger the person of their sovereign in every part of the world.

Thus, therefore, I order all the faithful officers of Government, Silladars, Se-bundy and others, on any of the foregoing events occurring, to obey Major Walker's orders.

Fourthly. Whereas it is signified in certain articles of agreement between the Honourable Company and my Dewan Rowjee Appajee, that the English Government is disposed to assist in reducing the Arab force in my service, Major Walker, Resident on the part of the English Government at Baroda, consents to assist me with a pecuniary loan, to effect this reduction in the following terms.

Fifthly. As it seems impossible that I can retrieve myself or my country from its present embarrassments, without reforming and reducing the expense in every department, I do hereby promise and agree to make the necessary reductions by degrees. The objects of reduction are contained in the annexed account, and, if

possible, they shall be effected at the periods specified opposite to each of the articles.

Sixthly. Before any money is advanced, Major Walker must be satisfied that a real and effective reduction shall take place. For this purpose, an exhibition must be made of the accounts, and a muster taken of the troops in the presence of three persons, viz one on the part of the Company, one on the part of the Guicowar Government, and the third by such of the Jemedars, or Parcikhs, as may be the agents of the Sebundy. According to this muster the account shall be taken and discharged.

Seventhly. I do hereby further agree and promise, that I shall positively reduce the Arab and other force, within six or eight months after the present reduction is accomplished to the standard of Futtch Sing's time, but to enable me to perform this stipulation, it will be necessary for the English Government to assist me, as they have done on the present occasion.

Eighthly. Provision is already made in the 4th article of agreement executed and interchanged between the honourable the Governor of Bombay, and My Dewan Rowjee Appajee, bearing date the 6th June, or 5th Suffer last, for the payment of the principal and interest of the money to be advanced by the Company, but as it has since been proposed to pay the same off one year sooner than is thereby provided, by applying the entire Russud of the lands appropriated by that article to the amount of 11,75,000 rupees per annum, to the discharging in equal proportion, of the principal and interest of the money to be advanced by the Company, and by such other persons as may engage therein, Major Walker, accepts of the modification by which the Company's advance may be liquidated one year sooner than it would be by a strict adherence to the letter of treaty, it being however always understood that the provisions in the 4th article of the said treaty of the 6th of June, or 5th Suffer, are always in full force, the same as if this subsequent engagement had not been made in the event of the repayment of the honourable Company's loan as well of principal as of interest, failing to be made good in the more speedy mode now proposed. The amount of the above receipt or Russud, is to be collected every year from the Camavissdars of the Peigunnahs allotted for this purpose, in the treaty of the 6th of June, by such persons as the Government of Bombay may appoint.

Ninthly. Interest on that part of the pecuniary assistance and aid which the Company may give on this occasion, shall be reckoned and accounted for from the time the said Company may raise a loan for that purpose, and it shall be reckoned every six months at the rate of three quarters per cent. per month of thirty days, instead of every year, or every twelve months. All or any loss by exchange, or otherwise, which may arise by bringing the money from Bombay to this place, shall be on my account and made good by me and my successors.

Tenthly. Conformably to Major Walker's suggestions and wishes, the articles contained in this declaration were written, and to which I have given my assent; but in the event of evil-disposed persons attempting any thing unfair, or unreasonable, against any person, my dewan, Rawjee Appajee his son, his brother, nephew, or relations, and Madow Row Tatia Mazumdar, or even should I myself, or my successors, commit any thing improper, or unjust, the English Government shall interfere, and see in either case that it is settled according to equity and reason.

I have also required of Major Walker on the part of the Company to promise that my state and government shall be permanent, and descend to the lineal inheritors of the Musnud, and that the dewanship shall be preserved to Rowjee Appajee.

In the last place, I desire to form the most intimate connection with the Company, and that all business with the Poona Durbar, may be jointly managed by the English resident, and my Vakeel.

Such are my wishes and sentiments. So help me God.

Given at Baroda, 29th July, 1802.

Witness:

(Signed) GOPAUL Row BAPOOJEE,

Vakeel in behalf of Sena Kass Khel Shumshere Behader.

Witness:

(Signed) MIGUEL DE LIMA SOUZA.

The date of the Mahiatta version, in the hand-writing of the Dewan, as also the signature "Anund Row Guicowar Sena Kass Khel Shumshere Bahader." The following words are written in the Rajah's own hand: "the above writing is true."

APPENDIX I.

Statutes of the College of Fort William, in Bengal.*

I. Admission of Students.—Every student, previously to his admission, shall subscribe the following declaration, viz.:—

“I A. B. do hereby solemnly and faithfully promise and declare, that I will submit to the statutes and rules of the college of which I am about to be admitted a member; that I will ever maintain its honour, interests, and privileges; and that I will be obedient to the provost, to the vice-provost, and to all the superior officers of the college, in all lawful commands.

A. B.”

Which subscription being made, his admission shall be recorded in the college register; in which also shall be inserted his age, rank, degree in any university, his native country and district, the time of his appointment to the service, and of his arrival in India; together with his destination to the establishments of Bengal, Fort St. George, or Bombay.

II. Admission of the Superior Officers and Professors.—Inasmuch as the College of Fort William is founded on the principles of the Christian religion, and is intended not only to promote the knowledge of oriental literature, to instruct the students in the duties of the several stations to which they may be destined in the government of the British empire in India, and to strengthen and confirm, within these possessions, the attachment of the civil servants of the East India Company to the wise laws and happy constitution of Great Britain; but also to maintain and uphold the Christian religion in this quarter of the globe, it is declared, that no person shall hold any superior office in this institution, or be admitted as professor or lecturer in the same, until he shall have taken the oath of allegiance to the King's Majesty, and shall have subscribed the following declarations, viz.:—

“I A. B. do solemnly and faithfully promise and declare, that I will not teach or maintain publicly or privately any doctrines or opinions contrary to the Christian religion, or to the doctrine and discipline of the Church of England, as by law established.”

“I A. B. do solemnly and faithfully promise and declare, that I will not teach or maintain publicly or privately any doctrines or opinions contrary to the lawful constitution of Great Britain, either in church or state, or contrary to the duty which I owe, as a faithful and loyal subject, to the royal person, family, and government of his Majesty.”

“I A. B. do solemnly and faithfully promise and declare, that I will obey the statutes and rules of the college of which I am about to be admitted a member, and that I will endeavour, by precept and example, to maintain and promote order, discipline, and good morals in the same.

A. B.”

III. Of Terms.—Four terms shall be helden within each year.

The first term shall commence on the sixth day of February, and end on the last day of March.

The second term shall commence on the fourth day of May, and end on the last day of June.

The third term shall commence on the first day of August, and end on the last day of September.

The fourth term shall commence on the first day of November, and end on the last day of December.

IV. Of Lectures and Exercises.—During each term, the professors, lecturers, and teachers shall instruct the students in the manner to be prescribed by the council of the college.

Every student shall attend at least one class of study in the oriental languages during each term.

Into whatever class or classes a student shall enter, he shall continue in the same, attending to the prescribed studies, until the expiration of the term.

Permission to attend the different lectures shall be granted by the provost.

* The Statutes are here given in further illustration of the principles which guided the founder of the college of Fort William.

The council of the college shall prescribe the public exercises to be performed by the students during each term.

V. *Of Examinations.*—Two public examinations shall be holden annually.

The first examination shall be holden at the close of the second term.

The second examination shall be holden at the close of the fourth term.

At each of these examinations each student shall be publicly examined in one or more of the oriental languages, and shall be classed according to his respective proficiency.

The comparative proficiency of the students shall be determined in all possible cases, by exercises in writing, and by written answers to questions proposed in writing by the examiners.

The professor of the language or science in which the students shall be examined, shall attend the examination, and shall afford such assistance in the conduct of it, as may be required by the examiners, but he shall not have a vote in determining the respective proficiency of the students, or in adjudging the prizes or honorary rewards.

In order to encourage and to ascertain the proficiency of the students in general learning, and in languages not the immediate objects of this institution, any student, at the prescribed examinations, may be examined in any branch of useful knowledge, science, or literature.

The prizes and honorary rewards of each year shall be announced on the fourth day of May; they shall be awarded by the examiners at the second examination in each year, and shall be publicly distributed on the sixth day of February following, to such students as shall have obtained from the examiners certificates of peculiar merit.

The committees of examination in the different branches of study shall be appointed by the council of the college.

The examiners shall subscribe the following declaration, viz. :

"I A. B. do solemnly and faithfully promise and declare, that I will give an impartial judgment of the comparative merits of the students now to be examined."

"A. B."

VI. *Of Public Disputations and Declamations in the Oriental Languages.*—Whereas it is necessary that the students destined to exercise high and important functions in India, should be able to speak the oriental languages with fluency and propriety; it is therefore declared that public disputations and declamations shall be holden in the oriental languages, at stated times, to be prescribed by the council of the college.

VII. *Of Exercises in English Composition.*—Each student shall compose one essay or declamation in the English language, during the course of each term.

The subject of these essays or declamations shall be proposed by the council of the college, and such compositions as may appear to merit distinction shall be read in public.

VIII. *Of Certificates and Degrees.*—No student shall be considered to have finished his course of study in the college of Fort William, until he shall have completed twelve terms, or three years, in the manner required by the statutes, at the expiration of which period of time, every student shall receive from the council of the college a certificate, specifying the proficiency which he may have made in the prescribed studies of the college; and also the tenor of his general conduct during the period of his residence at the college.

Attested copies of all such certificates shall be submitted to the visitor, who will enter the same on the public records of the Government.

A degree of honour shall be conferred by the visitor on such persons as shall be distinguished for peculiar excellence in the knowledge of any of the oriental languages, of the Mahomedan or Hindu codes of law, or of oriental literature.

This degree shall not be conferred on any student who shall not have received a certificate from the council of the college in the manner prescribed by this statute.

IX. *Jurisdiction of the Provost.*—The professors, officers, students, teachers, and servants of the college, shall be under the immediate jurisdiction of the provost.

Divine service shall be performed in the college chapel at such times as the provost shall appoint, at which all the students shall attend.

It shall be the peculiar province and sacred duty of the provost governing the college at Fort William, to guard the moral and religious interests and character of the institution, and vigilantly to superintend the conduct and principles of all its members. This trust he shall especially discharge by admonishing such professors or officers of the college as shall neglect their duty, or shall fail to afford a proper example for the imitation of the students. And if his admonition shall prove ineffectual, he shall report the circumstances of the case to the visitor.

Students who shall be guilty of indecorous conduct, or who shall neglect, or wilfully disobey the statutes or rules of the college, shall be admonished by the provost privately, or by the council of the college, according to the nature and circumstances of the case.

When the gravity of the offence shall require such a proceeding, the name of any student offending against the statutes or rules of the college, or against the principles of order, morality, or religion, shall be reported by the council of the college to the visitor.

X. *Of the Council of the College.*—The council of the college shall consist of five members, of which the provost and vice provost for the time being shall be two. The three remaining members shall be appointed by the visitor.

Any four or three members shall constitute a council, provided the provost or vice-provost be actually present; no council shall be holden otherwise than in the presence of the provost or vice-provost.

The council of the college shall have power to propose to the visitor the enactment of any new statute, or the amendment or abrogation of any existing statute for the government of the college.

The council of the college shall have power to enact laws and private regulations for the internal government and discipline of the college. All such rules shall be submitted to the inspection of the visitor from time to time, and shall be revocable by his authority alone.

The council of the college shall meet once in every month at least, on a day to be appointed by the provost.

The council of the college shall investigate the general state of the institution, all disbursements and charges, and the establishments of the professors, lecturers, Moonshies, Molvies, and Pundits; and shall propose to the visitor such alterations in the same as circumstances may appear to require.

All questions in the council of the college shall be determined by the majority of voices.

In any case in which the voices shall be equally divided, the provost, or in his absence, the vice-provost, shall have the casting voice.

All proceedings of the council of the college shall be regularly submitted to the visitor.

XI. *Of Apartments and of the Public Table*—The students of the college of Fort William shall be provided with apartments at the expense of the college.

A public table for the students shall also be maintained at the expense of the college.

No student shall absent himself from the public table in the College Hall oftener than twice in a week during term.

XII. *Of Debts.*—Whereas every student attached to the college of Fort William will receive the monthly allowance of three hundred Sicca Rupees, and will also be provided with apartments, and with a common table at the expense of the college, it is declared, that if any student shall contract debt during the period of his residence at the college (to be computed from the time of his admission to the time of the last examination,) he shall not receive from the council of the college the certificate prescribed by Statute VIII. chap 1. until he shall have delivered to the council of the college a satisfactory statement of the amount of such debt, which statement shall be annexed to the said certificate.

WELLESLEY.

By command of the Patron and Visitor,
DAVID BROWN.

APPENDIX K.

*Officers and Professors.**

The Council of the College. The Rev. David Brown, Provost, the Rev. Claudius Buchanan, Vice-Provost; the Honourable Henry Wellesley, George Hilaro Barlow, Esq., Neil Benjamin Edmonstone, Esq.

Professors George Hilaro Barlow, Esq. (Professor of the laws and regulations of the British Government in India); Neil Benjamin Edmonstone, Esq. (Professor of the Persian language); Lieutenant John Baillie, (Professor of the Arabic language); John Gilchrist, Esq. (Professor of the Hindostance language); the Rev. Claudius Buchanan, (Professor of the Greek, Latin, and English classics.)

Teachers, &c.—Mr. William Caley, (Teacher of the Bengalee, and Sanscrit languages); James Dinwiddie, L.L.D. (Teacher of mathematics), Mr. Du Plessy, (Teacher of modern languages), Mr. Lumsden, (Assistant in the Persian department); Mr. Rothman, (Secretary to the council of the College.)

List of Students,† with the date of their arrival out.—Bengal.—John William Laing, February 26, 1796; Alexander Ross, February 26, 1796, George Dempster Guthrie, March 2, 1797; James Wemyss, March 6, 1797; *Bombay*—John Morrison, July 20, 1797; *Bengal*—Charles Lloyd, January 24, 1798, *Bombay*—Richard Thomas Goodwin, January 29, 1798; *Bengal*—William Pearson Elliott, February 18, 1798; William John Sands, February 18, 1798; John William Grant, March 12, 1798; Matthew Law, March 12, 1798; *Bombay*—George Smith, *Bengal*—William Scott, April 21, 1798; *Bombay*—T. H. King, September 29, 1798; *Bengal*—Richmond Thackray, October 27, 1798; Henry Hodgson, October 31, 1798, Robert Van Sittart, November 5, 1798; George Hartwell, November 6, 1798; Richard Owen Wynne, November 6, 1798; William Percival Potts, November 6, 1798; Francis Morgan, November 7, 1798; David Campbell, December 21, 1798; Richard Chicheley Plowden, August 2, 1799; James Hunter, August 29, 1799; William Toone Swettenham, August 29, 1799; W. M. Fleming, September 18, 1799; William Paton, September 18, 1799, William Rennell, October 21, 1799; William Byam Martin, October 21, 1799; David Morison, October 26, 1799; William Butterworth Bayley, November 6, 1799; Henry Dumbleton, November 6, 1799; Paul William Pechell, November 6, 1799; William Morton, November 6, 1799; *Bombay*—Samuel Bourchier, December 6, 1799; James Joseph Sparrow, December 6, 1799; *Bengal*—Charles Chisholme, December 15, 1799; *Fort St. George*—Thomas Newnham, March 15, 1800; *Bengal*—George French, March 16, 1800; *Fort St. George*—William Chaplin, July 13, 1800; Terick Hamilton, July 13, 1800; Charles Higginson, July 13, 1800; Edward Wood, July 13, 1800; Robert Charles Ross, July 17, 1800; *Bengal*—John Wauchope, August 1, 1800; Richard Joseph Powell, September 1, 1800; Anthony Blagrave, October 14, 1800; John Ewer, October 14, 1800, James Richard Barwell, October 15, 1800; *Fort St. George*—Alexander Hamilton Kelso, December 5, 1800, *Bengal*—George James Robarts, December 8, 1800; Alexander Bruere Tod, December 8, 1800; Robert Haldane Rattray, December 9, 1800; Thomas Perry, December 9, 1800; John Digby, December 9, 1800; Robert Mitford, December 9, 1800; Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, January 3, 1801; William Gorton, January 4, 1801; Thomas Liell, January 4, 1801; Joseph White Sage, January 4, 1801; Clotworthy Gowan, January 5, 1801; *Bombay*—Richard Jenkins, January 7, 1801; *Bengal*—Hastings Impey, January 12, 1801; *Bombay*—Byrom Rowles, January.

* This is given as an historical document in justice to those gentlemen who aided in establishing the first British college in India.

† Many of these Students preeminent distinguished themselves in the service of the Company.

APPENDIX L.

From the Mysore Commissioners to the Governor-General, the Earl of Mornington, &c. dated 30th June, 1799.

MY LORD,

1. We have the honour to inform your Lordship, that Purnea having reported to us, on the 25th instant, that the Brahmins had fixed on the 30th of June, as the most auspicious day for placing Kistna Rajah Oodiaver on the Musnud of Mysore, we resolved that the ceremony should accordingly be performed on that day.

2. We at the same time communicated to Lieut.-General Harris our wish, that he would, if possible, assist in person on this occasion.

3. His Excellency, in consequence, came hither from camp yesterday morning, attended by his suite, and an escort of European cavalry, for the occasion.

4. The Rajah and his family removed some days ago from Seringapatam to the old town of Mysore, where the best preparations were made for their accommodation which circumstances would admit.

5. This morning the members of the commissions, accompanied by Meer Allum, and his son Meer Dowran, and preceded by his Majesty's 12th regiment of foot, proceeded to the residence of the Rajah, who was placed on the Musnud about noon, under three volleys of musquetry from the troops on the spot, and a royal salute from the guns of Seringapatam.

6. The ceremony of placing the Rajah on the Musnud was performed by Lieut-General Harris, as senior member of the commission, and by Meer Allum, each of them taking a hand of his Highness on the occasion. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, some time after, delivered to the Rajah the seal and signet of the Rauje.

7. The deportment of the young Prince, during this ceremony, was remarkably decorous, considering the untoward circumstances which had preceded his elevation, and confirmed the opinion which we had formed of him at our first visit to him.

8. We have great pleasure in informing your Lordship, that Gholam Ali Khan, Ali Reza, Budruz Zemaun Khan, and Syed Mohammed Khan, spontaneously attended on this occasion. The Meer Sudoor was prevented, we understand, by indisposition.

9. After taking leave of the Rajah, we partook of an entertainment which had been provided for us in an adjoining Choultry.

10. The inauguration having taken place under an open Pandaul, the spectators were very numerous; and it would be difficult to describe the joy which was visible in the countenances of all the Hindoos present.

We have the honour to be, &c. &c.

GEO. HARRIS,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY,

HENRY WELLESLEY,

WM. KIRKPATRICK,

BY. CLOSE.

Seringapatam,
June 30th 1799.

APPENDIX M.

Notice of the Board of Trade of the 5th of October, 1798.

1. That the Board of Trade, in pursuance of authority from the Governor-General in council, purposes to hire on account of the Company, ships duly qualified according to law, to proceed with cargoes from Bengal to England in the present season 1798-9, and that the owners will be permitted (under the restrictions stated in the 11th and 12th articles) to occupy the tonnage of their respective ships with their own or other goods to be delivered at the port of London.

2. Tenders of ships will be received at the office of the Secretary to the Board of Trade, on or before the 31st of January, 1799; and they must contain the fol-

lowing particulars : name of the ship ; name of the owner, and their place of residence ; name of the commander ; by whom the ship was built ; ship's burthen by carpenter's measurement ; when the ship will be ready to recommence loading ; when ready to leave the river for the voyage.

3. Ships not at present in port, but expected, may be tendered.

4. The ships will be taken up on their measured tonnage.

5. Should any ship not be ready to commence loading at the time specified, or be ready to leave the river for the voyage at the time specified, the owners will be liable for failure in the former to have their ships rejected, notwithstanding the previous acceptance of her ; and for failure in the latter to a penalty (payable in Bengal) of twenty-five sicca rupees per ton of the ship's tonnage ; unless such cause for delay be assigned as the Governor-General in council or the Board of Trade may deem satisfactory.

6. The Board of Trade shall be at liberty, previous to the acceptance of any ship, to cause her to be surveyed.

7. The Board of Trade reserve to themselves the right of rejecting any tender without assigning any reason to the party.

8. Every ship after the delivery of her cargo in England, will be permitted to return to India, and to bring all such goods and merchandize as may legally be brought, ordnance and military stores excepted.

9. Each ship, if not already registered either in India or England must be registered in Bengal according to the mode practised with respect to the ships which were taken up in Bengal in the season of 1795-6. And no ship will be permitted to take in cargo until she shall be registered accordingly, or until the certificate of her former registry be produced to the Board of Trade, as the case may be.

10. The goods must be manifested at the Export Warehouse for passing on board of the ships, in the same manner as is done with private goods which go on ships taken up by the Company in England.

11. The undermentioned commodities are prohibited by the Court of Directors from being carried to Great Britain from India : China raw silk, tea, Nankeen cloths.

12. The Company shall, if they think fit (and not otherwise) occupy as far as one per cent. of the chartered tonnage of each ship with stores for St. Helena, allowing freight for the same, at the rate of £12 sterling per ton. The amount of the freight will be paid at St. Helena, on the delivery of the stores, and payment will be made either in cash, or by bills upon the Court of Directors payable sixty days after sight at the option of the Governor and council of St. Helena.

13. The Board of Trade do not mean to lade any goods upon any of the ships besides the stores mentioned in the preceding article.

14. Each ship shall carry free of charge, such packets as may be sent on board by the Governor-General in council for St. Helena, or for England, or by the Governor and council of St. Helena for England.

15. The ships must not carry any passengers from India to Europe, or from Europe to India, or from any place whatever to another without permission, under a penalty of five hundred pounds sterling for every passenger so carried without permission.

16. Two securities (not being owners of the ship, the partners of a mercantile or agency house to be considered but as one security) must be named for the performance of engagements ; and the assent of the security must accompany the tender.

17. For information of the further conditions intended to be stipulated, the public are referred to the draft of a charter party which is preparing, and, when ready (notice of which will be given) will be submitted for general inspection.

18. The owners of the ships must reimburse to the Company the under-mentioned expenses, and pay the subjoined fees to their officers :

Allowance customarily drawn by the agent and master attendant upon despatching the ships. Cost of the printed copies of the charter parties fees as follow — to the secretary of the Board of Trade on the signing of the charter party, 10 gold mohurs ; to the sub-export warehouse keeper on the manifests of the goods shipped being completed, and for preparing the documents necessary for despatching the ship, if under 500 tons, 6 gold mohurs ; if 500 tons, or upwards, 10 do. ; to the master attendant, his deputy, or his assistant, on mustering the crew upon

the final dispatch of the ship, if under 500 tons, 2 gold mohurs; if 500 tons, or upwards, 3 gold mohurs; to the master attendant, his deputy, or his assistant, on mustering the crew upon the ship's return to Bengal, if under 500 tons, 2 gold mohurs; if 500 tons, or upwards, 3 gold mohurs.

19. It is requested that the tenders be made out in the following form :

To W. A. Edmonstone, Esq. Secretary to the Board of Trade.

SIR,

1. In consequence of the advertisement bearing date the 5th of October, inviting traders of ships to carry cargoes from Bengal to England in the season 1798-9, I beg leave to tender the under-mentioned ship; and subjoin the several particulars required respecting her; viz. ship's name, [] sole owners, [] [] inhabitant of [] [] ditto [] commander [] built at [] in the year [] by [] burthen by carpenter's measurement, tons [] will be ready to commence loading by the [] will be ready to leave the river for the voyage by the []

2. I agree [on behalf of myself, and of the other owners] to abide by all the conditions contained in the advertisement, and in the draft of the charter party.

3. As securities for my performance of engagements, I beg leave to tender the under-mentioned persons, whose assent is hereunto annexed:

[]

Calcutta, the _____ of 179

I am, &c.

We agree to be securities.

[]

20. Persons tendering ships on behalf of constituents must, with their tenders, send, for the inspection of the Board of Trade, their authority for making the same.

Published by order of the Board of Trade,

W. A. EDMONSTONE, Secretary.

APPENDIX N.

*Extract from a public Letter from the Court of Directors of the East India Company to Bengal dated 25th May, 1798.**

70. Conceiving it a duty incumbent upon us to afford our civil and military servants, and all Christians living under our protection, professing the Protestant religion, the means of attending Divine service, in which we trust, those in superior station will set the example, we most cheerfully acquiesce in your proposal for erecting chapels in the progressive manner pointed out in the 63d paragraph of the letter to which we are now replying, such edifices to be as plain and simple as possible, that all unnecessary expense may be avoided.

71. Having thus, as far as depends upon us, provided for the due observance of public worship on the sabbath-day, we cannot avoid mentioning the information we have received, that at the military stations it is no uncommon thing for the solemnity of the day to be broke in upon by horse-racing, whilst Divine worship, (for which the sabbath is especially enjoined to be set apart) is never performed at any of those stations, though chaplains are allotted to them. And we have now before us a printed horse-racing account, by which it appears that not less than eight matches were run at Chinsurah in one day, and that on a Sunday. We are astonished and shocked at this wide deviation from one of the most distinguishing and universal institutions of Christianity. We must suppose it to have been so gradual, that transitions from one step to another have been little observed; but the stage at

* Referred to at p. 346, in the Governor-General's letter to the Chairman respecting Fort William College.

which it is now arrived, if our information be true, must appear to every reasonable man, highly discreditable to our government, and totally incompatible with the religion we profess.

72. To preserve the ascendancy which our national character has acquired over the minds of the natives of India, must ever be of importance to the maintenance of the political power we possess in the East, and we are well persuaded that this end is not to be served either by a disregard of the external observances of religion, or by any assimilation to Eastern manners and opinions, but rather by retaining all the distinctions of our national principles, character and usages. The events which have recently passed in Europe, point out that the present is least of all the time in which irreligion should be promoted or encouraged; for with an attachment to the religion which we profess, is found to be intimately connected an attachment to our laws and constitution; besides which, it is calculated to produce the most beneficial effects in society, to maintain in it the peace, the subordination, and all the principles and practices on which its stability and happiness depend.

73. We therefore enjoin that all such profanations of the sabbath, as have been mentioned, be forbidden and prevented, and that Divine service be regularly performed, as in England, every Sunday, at all the military stations; and all European officers and soldiers, unless hindered by sickness or actual duty, are to be required punctually to attend, for which such an hour is to be fixed as shall be most suitable to the climate. The chaplains are to be positively ordered to be regular and correct in the performance of their duty, and if any one of them neglect it, or by his conduct bring discredit on his profession, we direct that he be dismissed from our service.

74. We rely on the ready obedience of the commanding officers at the different stations, in carrying this necessary regulation into execution, and particularly depend on the attention of our Commander-in-Chief, and of our Governor-General for giving it full effect.

75. We are here naturally led to remark, exclusive of what relates to the public institutions of religion, that the general tenor of the Indian newspapers, and periodical publications which come under our inspection, as well as the private informations which reach this country, concur in exhibiting an increasing spirit of luxury and dissipation in our principal settlements, and even at some of the subordinate stations.

76. This suggests to us much matter of very serious concern and apprehension. It points to evils incalculable in their consequences. One inference immediately arising from it is, that either the general scale of allowances and emoluments in our service is too large, or that by an improvident use of them, a principle of new wants and new desires is kept in too much activity, and thus a tone given to the general manners most contrary to that regulated economy on which so much turns the welfare of governments, and the comfort, independance, and respectability of individuals.

77. It is on the qualities of our servants that the safety of the British possessions in India essentially depends; on their virtue, their intelligence, their laborious application, their vigilance and public spirit. We have seen, and do still with pleasure see, honourable examples of all these; we are anxious to preserve and increase such examples, and therefore cannot contemplate without alarm, the excessive growth of fashionable amusements and shew, the tendency of which is to enervate the mind, and impair its nobler qualities, to introduce a hurtful emulation in expense, to set up false standards of merit, to confound the different orders in society, and to beget an aversion to serious occupations.

78. This taste in a society which, with an exception of the article of commercial gains, a source by no means general, derives its whole income mediately or immediately from the State, is especially to be deprecated. The progressive wealth and prosperity of any country, do indeed too naturally increase luxury and its attendant evils; but where this order is inverted, and luxury increases, whilst the grand source that supplies it remains without proportionate augmentation, as is the case of the land revenue of Bengal, now unalterably fixed in its amount, the consequences must be eventually ruinous, unless a system so preposterous is effectually checked.

79. Believing that the enjoyment of avowed, honourable allowances, would tend to promote, among other beneficial effects, a due regulation of expense, the Com-

pany have, from such considerations, strained their own means to put their servants on the most liberal footing; but whilst they feel themselves weighed down by the civil and military charges of their establishments, they are still frequently assailed in one way or another, by new applications for pecuniary concessions; and yet at the same time that we hear of straits and hardships resulting from inadequate allowances, we not only discern evident marks of increasing dissipation in the general habits of European society in India, but in some of them a spirit of gaming publicly shewing itself in lotteries, and the keen pursuits of the turf.

80. We must here mention the information we have received, that some individuals at, and under your Presidency, have lately introduced the pernicious practice of gaming to a very considerable extent, which must be ultimately ruinous to many. As we consider such practices to be totally incompatible with the interest of the Company, we earnestly recommend it to our Governor-General, to endeavour to discover the names of those concerned therein; and if his admonitions should be unavailing in putting a stop thereto, we authorize him to make an example of the person or persons who may be the principal promoters of such licentiousness, by removing them from office, and sending them to Europe.

81. As in this general subject none of our Presidencies on the Continent of India is wholly unconcerned, it will behove our several governments there to bestow a very serious attention upon it, and to consider of the means of which, in the way of regulation, influence, or retrenchment, the growing taste for expensive living, amusements, and display may be repressed, especially we recommend this interesting subject to the care of our Governor-General, to whom we are persuaded it will appear in its just importance, and from whose judgment and example we shall confidently hope for a co-operation with our views.

82. Indeed we are disposed to believe, that many persons give into modes of expense less from inclination than the fear of being singular; and we think it will be worthy of our servants who are honourably distinguished by character, talents, or situation, to be distinguished also for moderation and frugality in their habits of living.

APPENDIX O.

*Report of Mr. Edmonstone, Persian Translator to the Government, on various Documents found in the Palace of Seringapatam, implicating the conduct of the Nabobs of the Carnatic, Waulah Jah, and Omdut ul Omrah, dated Fort William, 6th of April, 1800.**

Among the records of the late Tippoo Sultaun's Government discovered in the palace at Seringapatam, has been found a very voluminous correspondence between the Sultaun and his Vakeels, Ghoolaum Ali Khan, and Ali Rezza Khan, who accompanied the hostages delivered by Tippoo Sultaun at the termination of the war in 1792, to Madras. From this correspondence, a number of papers have been selected, of which the tendency is to fix a charge upon his late Highness the Nabob Waulah Jah of a breach of the alliance subsisting between his Highness and the Honourable Company, to implicate the present Nabob Omdut ul Omrah as a party therein, and to establish a similar charge against the latter after his accession to the musnud. From the contents of those papers the following facts may be collected—

First. That the late Nabob Waulah Jah maintained a secret intercourse and correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun through the medium of the Vakeels, Ghoolaum Ali Khan, and Ali Rezza Khan, above-mentioned, for the purpose of forming a connection with Tippoo Sultaun, subversive of the alliance subsisting between his Highness and the Honourable Company, and directly adverse to the British interests in India.

Secondly. That the Nabob established such connection, and proceeded to act under it by communicating certain articles of intelligence of a nature calculated to betray the interests of the Honourable Company, and to favor the sinister designs of Tippoo Sultaun against them.

* This Report refers to several documents, the voluminous nature of which, render their insertion impracticable—their spirit is, however, faithfully preserved in the Report.

Thirdly. That the present Nabob of the Carnatic, Omdut ul Omrah was a principal channel of communication between his father and the Vakeels, for maintaining the secret intercourse before-mentioned, that he cordially united both on his father's account and on his own, in promoting the objects of it.

Fourthly. That the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, after his accession to the musnud, continued to maintain a secret intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun in the same spirit which he manifested in his intercourse with the Vakeels of that prince, during the lifetime of his father.

The first indication of the Nabob Waulah Jah's disposition to connect himself with Tippoo Sultaun, by the ties of political interest appears in a letter dated in June, 1792, from the Vakeels Ghoolaum Ali Khan, and Ali Rezza Khan, to Tippoo Sultaun, in which they give an account of what passed between the Nabob, the princes, and themselves, at an interview which took place soon after their arrival at Madras. After the warmest expressions of attachment to Tippoo Sultaun, the Nabob is represented to have reprobated the preceding war as having been undertaken by the allied powers for the subversion of the Mahomedan religion. He is represented to have stated, that "he used, (pending the war) night and day to pray for the Sultaun's prosperity, because the confederacy of the three allies, was for the subversion of the Mahomedan religion." It is obvious from these expressions, that from the very commencement of the war between the allies, and Tippoo Sultaun, the Nabob Waulah Jah, wished success to the arms of Tippoo Sultaun against the power with which he was connected by the most solemn obligations of union and alliance, and that by entertaining sentiments so inimical to its interests, he violated the fundamental principles of that alliance.

This pre-established fact gives additional force to the open declarations which the Nabob subsequently made of his desire to establish an union of interests, and a close alliance with the Sultaun; and accordingly at the same interview above-mentioned, the Nabob is stated to have declared his wishes upon that subject in the most unqualified manner to the Vakeels. The sentiments above quoted are represented to have been expressed in the presence of Marquess Cornwallis, Sir C. Oakeley, &c. but it is easy to conceive the facility with which the Nabob might have held such discourse, without being overheard by the person who interpreted between him and his Lordship, nor can it be supposed that he would have uttered such sentiments in the hearing of any person who understood, and might communicate them to his Lordship,—the communication however, subsequently alluded to, was made in a more private manner, and for the express purpose of being communicated to Tippoo Sultaun, as appears by the report of the Vakeels, who state, that when the party 'was going away, the Nabob came up to them, and with a great deal of warmth desired them to stay, as he had something to say to them'; that he then expressed himself in the following terms, viz. "that his life was now drawing to a close, that for what had taken place hitherto between his Highness and the Sultaun there was no remedy, but now, merely out of a regard for the faith (of which the Sultaun was a pillar) he was desirous of establishing a cordial harmony with the Sultaun, and if they (the Vakeels) having in view the claims of both parties, upon their endeavours, would in the presence of God exert themselves for that purpose, the Almighty would reward them, and both parties would reap the benefits of that event which were great and numberless; that although his Highness wanted to prevent the war between the three allied states and the Sultaun, yet Nizam Ali Khaun at the latter period of his life was thus preparing for futurity, by exerting himself for the destruction of religion; that it was solely from a regard to the faith that his Highness did not encourage the measure, and that he now declared that in a thousand points of view it was advisable that perfect harmony should reign between the Sultaun and his Highness."

At a subsequent conference between the Nabob and the Princes accompanied by the Vakeels, (an account of which is given by the latter, in a report to the Sultaun, dated the beginning of August, 1792), the Nabob is stated to have expressed his attachment to the Sultaun, and his disposition to establish a union of interests with him in terms still stronger than before. His Highness is also represented upon that occasion to have expressed a solicitude to know in what manner the Sultaun had received the former communication of his sentiments. The substance of what passed at that conference is related by the Vakeels in the following terms:

"the Nabob Waulah Jah accompanied by Omdut ul Omrah, and Hoossain Newauz Khaun paid a visit to the princes, and taking them upon his knees, for about two hours, blessed them and said, may God long and permanently preserve the shadow of Tippoo Sultaun extended over you and me, since in this age, the preservation of religion depends upon him alone. I have arrived at my eightieth year, and in that time many are the things I have seen, and done, and experienced. What is past—is past; and God only knows what futurity may bring to light; at present, the maintenance of religion rests with Tippoo Sultaun, and may God preserve him and keep him victorious and triumphant; I do not say this merely in your presence, but I say it taking to witness him who knows all that is hidden; night and day, after the prayers of the day, and on Fridays after public devotion, I offer up my prayers, (meaning for Tippoo Sultaun) and require the people also to do the same. The Vakeels then procced to state, that 'as Waulah Jah had paid a visit to the princes, it became necessary that they should return it, and consequently, they waited upon him the next day, which was the Eed ool Zoah, (or festival of the Camel) The Nabob accompanied by Omdut ul Omrah, and the other sirdars, (persons of rank) came out to meet them as on the first day, and having assisted the Princes in alighting from their palankeens, took them within the house where he repeatedly carressed them and said, God preserve the Sultaun in safety, for through him alone, these rituals and observances of the faith, (alluding probably to the Eed) yet remain. He then observed to us, "In my first conversation with you, I spoke to you upon the subject of establishing friendship and harmony between me and Tippoo Sultaun; have you intimated it to him, and have you received a favourable answer." We replied, "that we had set forth to your Majesty word for word, the friendly sentiments his Highness had expressed, and that your Majesty had written in reply, that friendship, union, and brotherly regard had from the beginning been established among the profession of Islamism, as was evinced by the testimony of the holy book (the koraun) agreeably to the prescriptions of which your Majesty wished that cordial friendship and attachment should without prejudice or partiality, be established between the followers of the faith, as the means of supporting the religion of Mahomed, and that your Majesty added, God preserve the Nabob Waulah Jah, who is a prince, and one of the leaders of the faithful, and a pillar of the faith." At the term 'a pillar of the faith,' the Nabob could not suppress his tears, and said, "I am what I know myself to be; tell the Sultaun that *he* is the pillar of the faith, "and may God preserve him, and grant him long life, since I and all Mussulmen "derive support from him, for otherwise *the state of affairs here is evident*; that which "is evident, does not require explanation." We also in conformity to your Majesty's commands mentioned to his Highness in a becoming and suitable manner, whatever there was to state upon the subject of friendship and attachment, his Highness replied, "in consideration of the complexion of the times, the state of which is "manifest, and that the support of the religion of Mahomed in this country, entirely "depends upon the Sultaun; my nightly and daily prayer is offered up for his good; "may my prayers be acceptable in the sight of God!" He then said to the Princes, "Oh, my sons, if my life and property can be of any service to you, God is witness "that I will not refuse them to you." He then gave orders to the superintendant of the gardens to carry every day, fruits and flowers to the Princes, before his (the Nabob's) own children, and said to us, "you are not acquainted with the state "and order of affairs here; consider me from my heart your well wisher, and "sincere friend, and at all times be assured, that in whatever I may be able to effect "your benefit either by word or deed, I will not decline my exertions."

From the foregoing quotations it is manifest that the Nabob Waulah Jah formally proposed to Tippoo Sultaun through the medium of his Vakeels, to form an alliance with that prince, avowedly for the purpose of supporting the interests of the Mahomedan religion. Although the simple fact of his Highness's negotiating an alliance of friendship with the Sultaun, without the participation of the British power, would, (according to the tenth article of the treaty of 1792, by which it is stipulated that the Nabob shall not "enter into any negotiations or political correspondence with any European or native power without the consent of the Company,") be a breach of treaty with the latter, yet the views and objects so well understood by the phrase supporting the cause of a religion, of which one of the first duties is to wage eternal war against those of a different persuasion, warrant

a conclusion that the designs of his Highness in establishing this connection, were of a nature decidedly hostile to the British nation in India. When his Highness asserts that a war which the British Government was forced into by the unprovoked aggression of Tippoo Sultaun, was undertaken for the subversion of the Mahomedan religion, and when, by parity of reasoning, he must ascribe the same object to any future war against a Mussulman power, however just and necessary, no other construction can be put upon the solicitude he shows in support of the Mahomedan faith, than enmity against that power by which he considered it to be endangered; and when his Highness stigmatizes the co-operation of the Nizam, as an act that would hazard his hopes of happiness in a future state, it may justly be inferred that the Nabob Waulah Jah would not scruple to betray those interests which, as an ally of the Company, he might at a future period be called upon to support. It appears by a letter from Tippoo Sultaun to his Vakeels, dated the beginning of September, 1792, that he eagerly availed himself of the Nabob's favourable disposition towards him, and directed his Vakeels to encourage his Highness in it, and to express to him his confidence that "the Nabob would do whatever might tend to the support of the religion of Mahomed, and that he would give the necessary attention to that point. Tippoo Sultaun in the same letter directs his Vakeels to state to the Nabob, that "in conformity to the command of God and the prophet, the improvement of friendship among the professors of Islamism would be beneficial to various concerns, both spiritual and temporal, and that deeming him (Tippoo Sultaun) attached to their common religion and to his Highness's person, his Highness would no doubt direct his attention accordingly."

There is every reason, indeed, to believe that the Vakeels had secret instructions from Tippoo Sultaun to endeavour to establish this connection with the Nabob; and those instructions are probably alluded to in the following passage in the letter last referred to—" You will also state to the Nabob the other points of friendship which you have repeatedly heard from my mouth." That the Vakeels were charged by Tippoo Sultaun with some concealed commission at Madras, appears from several of the accompanying documents, particularly from two letters from the Vakeels to Tippoo Sultaun, dated in June, 1792, in which they promise and profess the most inviolable secrecy, and also from the mysterious expression so frequently made use of in the correspondence between the Vakeels and Tippoo Sultaun. "The affair you know of." But what the nature of it was, does not clearly appear. The Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, however, (it appears by a letter from the Vakeels to Tippoo Sultaun, of a date subsequent to July, 1793,) was made acquainted with it, and promised to exert himself to effect the object of it.

The expectations which Tippoo Sultaun was thus induced to entertain from the Nabob Waulah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah, are plainly expressed, and the views to which they were directed, are strongly implied in the terms of two letters, dated the end of November, 1792, from Tippoo Sultaun, respectively to the Nabobs Waulah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah, in reply to letters from them, which appear to have opened the epistolary correspondence between them. To the former he writes;—" My hope from Almighty God, and my confidence in the prophet, is that according to the command of God and of the prophet, which is well known to all Mussulmans, all the faithful will exert themselves with heart and soul in maintaining and rendering permanent the religion of Mahomed. Upon your Highness, who is one of the heads of the faith, this is an absolute duty, and I am confident that your Highness will, by all means, constantly employ your time in performing what is obligatory on you."

And in his letter to Omdut ul Omrah, Tippoo Sultaun writes:—" I am confident that you will direct your attention to the adjustment of affairs between me and the well-wisher of mankind, who is the chief and principal of the professors of Islamism."

These two documents are of particular importance, not only as they tend to establish the existence of a reciprocity of views between the Nabob and Tippoo Sultaun, but as carrying upon the face of them almost positive proof of a secret intercourse between those princes; and also as they throw considerable light upon another document, which is otherwise very mysterious and obscure.

Previous, however, to a further notice of that document, it is necessary to advert to another very important paper, the existence of which alone would almost suffice to establish the fact of a clandestine correspondence between the Nabob

and Tippoo Sultaun. This document is a key to a cypher for proper names and terms, at the bottom of which is a note in the handwriting of one of Tippoo Sultaun's moonshees, purporting that the paper is written by Omdut ul Omrah. After a close comparison between the handwriting of that paper and the hand in which the letters from the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah are invariably written, there cannot remain a doubt of their being the same. But the genuineness of this document does not rest upon that ground alone; for in the letters above referred to, from Tippoo Sultaun to Waulah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah, Waulah Jah is mentioned (with a slight variation, namely, well-wisher for friend), by the very name which is assigned to him in the cypher, namely, well-wisher of mankind; and in the letter from Tippoo Sultaun to Waulah Jah, the former mentions his sons by the fictitious term "hearts," which is assigned to the word "sons" in the cypher.

It is necessary to return to the document (No. 7) first adverted to. This is a letter from Ghoolaum Ali Khaun to Tippoo Sultaun, written on occasion of Alli Rezza's return to Seringapatam, for the purpose of making certain verbal communications to the Sultaun.

From the expressions used in letter No. 7, a doubt might be suggested whether the communications to be made by Alli Rezza to Tippoo Sultaun on the part of the Nabob be not connected with those on the part of the Marquis Cornwallis, and whether by the expressions "both sirdais" be not meant his Lordship and the Nabob; in other words, it may be asked whether Alli Rezza was charged with any secret communication from the Nabob to the Sultaun. This doubt appears to be obviated by the letters before mentioned, from Tippoo Sultaun to Waulah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah. In his letter to Waulah Jah, the Sultaun writes as follows: "Now by the receipt of your Highness's letter, and the account of your Highness's friendship and attachment which I have had from the verbal communications of the high in rank,* the distinguished in friendship, the trusty, I am certain that, (according to the words of the prophet, "The union of Mussulmans is as that of the soul with the body,") that warmth of attachment and that original affection implanted among Mussulmans, exists between us."

In his letter to Omdut ul Omrah, the Sultaun writes as follows: "When I learned also from the communication of the high in rank, the distinguished in friendship, the trusty of your great and noble qualities, and the sincere friendship and cordiality you entertain towards me, my happiness was greater than language can adequately express. May God realize this source of happiness, that is to say, that perfect attachment and union among the followers of Islamism, which is the greatest gift of the Almighty, and than which nothing is more essential to the temporary and eternal interests of mankind."

Two circumstances in those letters indicate that the person mentioned by the designation, "the high in rank, the distinguished in friendship," was Alli Rezza. One, that "the distinguished in friendship," is the term assigned to Alli Rezza's name in the cypher. The other, that Tippoo Sultaun in both letters refers the Nabobs for further particulars to one person only, from which it is to be inferred that one of the two Vakeels was absent from Madras. This point established, there can be little doubt, that by "both the sirdars" were meant Waulah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah, and that the "unlooked for good" was some proposition on their part favourable to Tippoo's views and interests, and probably of no slight importance, as Alli Rezza is stated to "attend the Presence especially for that purpose;" and that "the affair" which Choolaum Ali Khaun so earnestly recommends to Tippoo Sultaun's adoption, was the proposition with which Alli Rezza appears to have been charged.

No further trace of this proposition, whatever it might be, appears in the correspondence. In corroboration of the foregoing, it may be remarked, that the circumstances of Alli Rezza's departure to Seringapatam, and his return to Madras, before the hostages quitted that presidency, are conformable to fact.

By a letter from the Vakeels to Tippoo Sultaun, dated in July, 1793, subsequent to the return of Alli Rezza to Madras, and before the departure of the hostages, it appears that the Nabob Waulah Jah sent a message to the Vakeels by Kaudir New-aüz Khaun, purporting that "he had something of a secret nature" which he wished to communicate to us in private, adding, "that if the Vakeels would go under pretence of seeing a mosque which his Highness had built, he would send

* No name mentioned.

Omdut ul Omrah alone to meet them. Accordingly, when the Vakeels repaired to the appointed spot, they were met by Omdut ul Omrah, who led them into a neighbouring tomb, under pretence of offering up prayers for the deceased devotee to whom it was consecrated. Upon this occasion Omdut ul Omrah appears to have been very particular in ascertaining the extent of the powers vested by Tippoo Sultaun in his Vakeels, and when satisfied on that head, he disclosed his purpose to this effect "That for a very long time there had been, without cause, a veil (or want of cordiality) between his Highness and him (Tippoo Sultaun), which had been productive of injuries to both; but now that by the favour of God a system of harmony as was becoming among the professors of Islamism had taken place, his Highness confidently hoped from God, the Prime Cause of all, that the time past might be amply redeemed; that for his Highness's (Waulah Jah's) own part, considering from his heart himself, his country and his property to belong to your Majesty, he had made it a testamentary injunction to his children and family, taking God and his prophet to witness, to pray night and day for the pillar of the faith (meaning Tippoo Sultaun), and to consider their prosperity and welfare as inseparably connected with him (Tippoo Sultaun). That they (the Vakeels) must ascertain the Sultaun's wishes upon that head in a manner satisfactory to both, and if the Sultaun should be from his heart solicitous for this proposed cordial harmony, his Highness would, under the testimony of God and his prophet, detail to the Vakeels his sentiments fully at the time of their departure, which, please God, would soon take place."

It will be observed, that in the first part of the foregoing communication, the Nabob speaks of the "system of harmony" as having been already established with Tippoo Sultaun, which is in perfect consonance with the negotiations before adverted to, and in some measure an additional proof that those negotiations actually took place. The remainder of the communication conveys sentiments utterly repugnant to the faith of the Nabob's alliance with the Company. It further appears by another letter from the Vakeels, subsequent in date to that above quoted, that the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah held another secret conference with the Vakeels, by their appointment at a garden, to which they proposed to go, for the purpose of arranging their effects, preparatory to their departure. On that occasion Omdut ul Omrah is stated to have "discoursed in the most undisguised manner on the part of the Nabob Waulah Jah, as well as on his own, of the sincerity of their friendship, attachment, and regard." That he also made use of some particular expressions of his (the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah's) attachment, requiring the Vakeel, upon oath, not to commit them to writing, but to defer the communication of them until their (the Vakeels) return to Tippoo Sultaun. "I have expressed myself as I have done, (says Omdut ul Omrah, according to the report of the Vakeels) merely from my regard for the faith, and from my friendship and good will towards the defender (or protector) of the faith (the term by which Tippoo Sultaun is designated in the cypher). Please God, you will shortly be with his Majesty, when you will communicate them in person."

It has already been remarked, that the phrase of "supporting the cause of the faith," (and which is so frequently mentioned by and on the part of the Nabob) implies a determined hostility against those of another persuasion. That the Nabob considered it in a sense opposed to the British interests, is manifest from his denominating the defensive war in which the Company and their allies were engaged with Tippoo Sultaun, a war against religion; but neither can he be supposed ignorant of the doctrines which his own religion inculcates, and the hostile and aggressive measures which it sanctions under the term "supporting the cause of the faith." The views, however, which the Sultaun himself veiled under that plea, were in presence of the Nabob's sons, (as appears by a report of Alli Rezza's to Tippoo Sultaun, dated the end of August, 1793,) plainly and publicly avowed in a solemn convocation of the Mussulmans in the service of Tippoo Sultaun, (and at which it is to be supposed many other Mussulmans attended, as it was held on Friday, the sabbath of the Mussulmans) at a mosque at Madras, by the orders of Tippoo Sultaun, for the declared purpose of binding them by a solemn obligation to support the interests of the Mahomedan faith. In the course of the solemnity, the obligation imposed by the Mussulman religion "to wage holy war, not to take flight in combating with infidels, and to form a union among all the professors of the faith," were strongly insisted upon, and the persons who should

disregard these obligations were denounced as sinners in the sight of God; and as if he intended to point out more unequivocally the objects of this convocation, Alli Rezza represents himself to have remarked upon hearing that denunciation, that "it was very extraordinary that notwithstanding the notoriety of that, and the great plurality of Mussulmans, they should so depart from the obligations of the faith, as to take up their abode in such a place, and choose to render obedience to those of a different persuasion. God grant it may turn out well for the Mussulmans of this place!" This was preaching the language of rebellion in the very heart of the Company's dominions, and it affords no slight presumption of the truth of the allegations against the Nabob and Omdut ul Omrah, that Alli Rezza should have ventured to hold such language in presence of the latter, and that Omdut ul Omrah should have heard what passed on this occasion without communicating it to the British Government.

The merit of waging war with infidels was further inculcated by Alli Rezza's remark, that "the prayers which are offered up in the mosque in favour of a prince who fights for the faith, are accepted of God, but the prayers in favour of those who do not, are rejected." Alli Rezza proceeds to state that every individual present bound himself by the most solemn engagements, that "hereafter as long as he lived, his conduct should manifest nothing else than fidelity, devotion, zeal, and truth; that he would never be guilty of flight in the face of an enemy, of theft, of lying, of injuring, of wishing ill, or of enmity towards those who wished well to the Khoodadaud* (Tippoo Sultaun's) state," and "that he considered the power of all Mussulmans as an object of individual concern," Alli Rezza adds, that prayers were afterwards said "that the Khoodadaud Sirkar might be triumphant and victorious."

It appears that Tippoo Sultaun himself conceived that his Vakeels might entertain some apprehension at performing such a ceremony as this in the very heart of the British dominions, which implied a disposition on his part hostile to the British nation, as Alli Rezza quotes Tippoo Sultaun's commands to him and his colleague, not to suffer themselves to be deterred by any such apprehension, and Alli Rezza, in disclaiming all apprehension of that nature, defends the measure, and ascribes to it many great and prospective advantages to the interests of the Musulman cause.

It may be alleged in defence of the Nabob, that this ceremony was performed subsequently to the intercourse between him and the Sultaun. But besides that, there is every reason to believe that the Nabob and the Sultaun perfectly understood each other; the same attachment to the cause of religion and to Tippoo Sultaun is expressed in a letter to Ghoolam Ali Khaun, in the handwriting of Omdut ul Omrah, although under the fictitious name of Ghoolam Hoossain, which appears in written characters upon the cover in the place of the seal, and in which is a couplet of verses to the following effect:—

"In the preservation of thy person is the permanence of the faith.

"Let not him remain who wisheth not thy preservation."

This is an epitome of the terms in which the Nabob Waulah Jah is represented to have professed his solicitude to maintain the cause of the Mussulman religion, and to have declared his devotion and attachment to the interests of Tippoo Sultaun; and as Omdut ul Omrah appears to have been the principal channel for the negotiation between the Nabob and Tippoo Sultaun, these expressions must be considered as conveying the sentiments of both. They confirm the prior negotiations, and being subsequent in date to the ceremony above described (at which the sons of Waulah Jah were present,) it must be inferred that the Nabobs Waulah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah understood the phrase of supporting the cause "of the faith" in the same sense that Tippoo Sultaun himself intended to convey by it. Of the authenticity of the note (No. 17) there cannot be a doubt, as it is certainly written by the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah himself, whose hand writing cannot be mistaken, although signed (as well as superscribed) Ghoolam Hoossain. The use of this fictitious signature is a further corroboration of the secret and clandestine intercourse which subsisted between Tippoo Sultaun and the Nabobs Waulah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah, and will be more particularly noticed in a subsequent part of this report.

* Khooda daud, signifies "God-given," the epithet by which Tippoo usually designated his dominion.

It further appears that the Nabob Waulah Jah acted in conformity to his professions of devotion and attachment to the interests of Tippoo Sultaun, and under the connexion which he had formed with him, in two distinct instances—

1st. By communicating to Gholaum Alli Khaun, for the information of Tippoo Sultaun, an article of secret intelligence, which his Highness had received from certain emissaries in Bengal whom he employed for the purpose of collecting and transmitting secret intelligence, purporting that the Sultaun was suspected by the British Government of maintaining a sinister negotiation with the Mahrattas, and recommending him to suspend his views until a more favourable opportunity. The Nabob is stated to have sent Kaudir Newauz Khaun to Gholaum Alli Khaun (Alli Rezza being then absent on his mission to Seringapatam) for the purpose of communicating this article of intelligence which he prefaced by the strongest professions of attachment to the interests of Tippoo Sultaun, adding, that it is from the impulse of that attachment that he makes the communication. He then states that, from the report of certain persons whom he has stationed in Bengal for the purpose of collecting and transmitting secret intelligence, he learns that the Resident at Poonah had written to the Governor-General that from the frequent messengers passing between Seringapatam and Poonah, there was reason to believe that the Sultaun was endeavouring to form a close connection and alliance with the Poonah Government, and through that Government with the Nizam; that as this information had excited some suspicion in the Governor-General's mind, it was expedient for him (Tippoo Sultaun) to suspend his views until the Governor-General, Marquess Cornwallis's departure for Europe, which might soon be expected. The words are as follow—"In a short time his Lordship will go to Europe; the Princes, please God, will soon return, and the Kists are in a course of payment. After his Lordship's departure, the liquidation of the Kists and other points, whatever may be his Highness's (Tippoo Sultaun's) pleasure, will be right and proper, at present it is better to be silent upon every thing, because at this time his Highness's honour would at all events be called in question; when another shall arrive from Europe, the imputation will in every event, and in every measure, fall upon him."

This communication evidently manifests sentiments inimical to the British interests, and favourable to Tippoo Sultaun, in a point of view, opposed to those interests. Whatever may have been the fact as it respects Tippoo Sultaun, the Nabob himself was unquestionably culpable to the extent in which Tippoo Sultaun was suspected, whether those suspicions were well founded or not; for if the measure ascribed to the Sultaun of endeavouring, by clandestine negotiation, to detach the Company's alliances be deemed hostile to the British interests, what construction must be put upon the conduct of an ally who, with the view to place the Sultaun on his guard, informs him that he is suspected of adopting that measure, and presuming that the suspicion is well founded, far from endeavouring to dissuade him from the prosecution of his supposed views, manifests a participation in them by advising the Sultaun to suspend his operations until a more favourable opportunity, and cautions him against shewing any indication of hostility towards the British power, while there was upon the spot a person like Marquess Cornwallis, who possessed vigilance, activity and ability, to defeat his projects, and whose character stood so high in the general estimation, that in a question of good faith, the universal suffrage would be in his favour! This communication appears to have been made in the month of December, 1792.

2nd. By communicating to the Vakeels, for Tippoo Sultaun's information, (as appears by the report of the former, under date May, 1793), intelligence of the intended march of the British troops against Pondicherry, in consequence of the rupture between England and France, and recommending him to be cautious in his future intercourse with the French—to avoid epistolary correspondence, and to maintain his communication with them by emissaries. After noticing the rupture between England and France, the intended march of the troops against Pondicherry, and the probability of its falling in consequence of internal dissensions, the Nabob is represented to state, by the mouth of Kaudir Newauz Khaun, as follows:—"The Vakeel of the Ahmedy* Sirkar, who was at Pondicherry, has lately

* This is another epithet by which Tippoo sometimes designated his kingdom. It is a derivative of the Arabic root from which the Prophet's name is also derived, and signifies "glorified."

(it seems) returned to the prescrver (Tippoo Sultaun.) Please God, there is no doubt that the Sultaun keeps in view all the ups and downs of the time At this time no kind of assistance will be afforded, but out of the warmth of that friendship which I feel towards the Sultaun, I recommend that the Vakeel remain a short time at the presence, and also that epistolary correspondence be discontinued for a short time. Although a friendly connection has long subsisted with the French on the part of the Ahmedy Sirkar, yet considering the circumstances of the time, it is not advisable : (i. e. to maintain epistolary correspondence with the French,) should there be any point of urgency to communicate, there is no objection to do it verbally." Further—" I am actuated solely by my good wishes in making this communication. Since the day that a cordial union took place between us, let me be no longer a Mussulman, nor a servant of God, if I have not always first offered up my prayers for the Sultaun's good, and afterwards for my own. May the Almighty preserve firm and uninjured the Mahomedan church and the safety of the Sultaun."

The conduct of the Nabob Waulah Jah in communicating to Tippoo Sultaun the rupture between England and France, and the projected expedition against Pondicherry with the view to recommend caution to him in his future intercourse with the French; his pointing out the mode by which the Sultaun might maintain his correspondence with the enemies of the British power with the greatest security; and his assigning as the motive for these communications, his solicitude for the welfare of Tippoo Sultaun, was evidently inconsistent with the faith of his engagements and alliance with the Company. But why it may be asked should the Nabob think it necessary to caution the Sultaun with respect to his intercourse and correspondence with the French, unless he was aware that the nature of Tippoo Sultaun's intercourse with them either was, or was likely to be adverse to the British interests, since Tippoo Sultaun was not bound by the provisions of treaty to abstain from all intercourse with foreign powers? A suspicion hence arises, and is supported by all that previously passed between the Nabob and the Sultaun, that his Highness was not ignorant of the views which we now know Tippoo Sultaun at that very time entertained against the British power, and of the assistance which he hoped to derive in the prosecution of them, from his connection with the French. Considering this transaction in its most favourable point of view, it is still a confirmation of the close connection supposed to have been previously established between his Highness and Tippoo Sultaun, and a direct breach of the 10th article of the treaty of 1792 between his Highness and the Company.

From the whole of the foregoing, the following facts appear to result:—

1stly. That so early as pending the war of 1792, the Nabob Waulah Jah entertained sentiments inconsistent with the faith of his alliance with the British nation by deeming the defensive war in which the British power and its allies were engaged, a war against the Mussulman religion, and wishing success to the arms of their enemy.

2ndly. That subsequently to the war, the Nabob Waulah Jah, in the same spirit proposed to Tippoo Sultaun, to form an intimate connection with him, for the avowed purpose of supporting the cause of the Mahomedan religion, and utterly incompatible with the engagements subsisting between his Highness and the Company.

3rdly. That during the whole period of the residence of Tippoo Sultaun's Vakeels at Madras, the Nabob Waulah Jah maintained a secret intercourse and correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun for the purpose mentioned in the foregoing article.

4thly. That the objects of the proposed connection were of a nature subversive of the alliance between the Nabob and the Company, and directly hostile to the British interests in India.

5thly. That Tippoo Sultaun eagerly met and encouraged the Nabob's disposition to establish an intimate connection with him for the purposes above mentioned, and that the Nabob Waulah Jah did accordingly enter into that connection, and did thereby violate his faith, and virtually abandon his alliance with the British nation.

6thly. That the Nabob Waulah Jah, by certain overt acts, founded upon his recent connection with Tippoo Sultaun, manifested a participation of views and designs with that Prince, hostile to the British interests in India.

7thly. That the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah was a principal channel of communication, and a most active and zealous agent between his father the Nabob Waulah Jah and the Vakeels, for establishing the connection before mentioned, with Tippoo Sultaun, that he was a party in it, and cordially united in promoting the objects of it.

It may be proper in this place to enquire more particularly what degree of credit is due to the evidence from which the foregoing conclusions are deduced.

It may be suggested that the Vakeels, to gratify their master, exaggerated the friendly expressions used by the Nabob Waulah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah, and that the latter in their solicitude to show attentions and civilities to the sons of Tippoo Sultaun, and to manifest, in imitation of the British Government, a desire to be upon terms of perfect amity with Tippoo Sultaun, may have expressed sentiments of attachment which they never felt, and the language of compliment may have been converted by the report of the Vakeels into expressions of devotion and attachment, and a desire to form a connection with the Sultaun, upon the basis of mutual interest and their common religion. The accuracy of reports from agents, natives of India, to their principals, cannot, under any circumstances, be implicitly relied on; and in one of the reports of the Vakeels, which contains the substance of a conference between themselves, the princes and the Nabob, at which Colonel Doveton was present, a speech is ascribed to that gentleman, which is evidently fabricated, a circumstance which tends to weaken the validity of all their reports; and if the evidence of the Nabob's conduct rested solely upon them, the proofs might be considered as extremely defective and problematical.

But several of the other documents are of an unquestionable nature, and tend to establish the general credit of the reports of the Vakeels. Of these the most decisive, is the key to the cypher, which (as has been already remarked) is undoubtedly transcribed in the handwriting in which the present Nabob's letters are, (and the late Nabob Waulah Jah's used to be,) invariably written. The mere existence of this cypher would afford strong presumption of an intercourse between the Nabob and Tippoo Sultaun, that could not safely be avowed, and when its existence is combined with all that is related by the Vakeels, as well as with other circumstances, amounts almost as nearly to positive proof as the nature of such cases generally admits. But it appears that several of the ciphered names were actually adopted by Tippoo Sultaun in writing to the Nabob Waulah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah, (as has been before remarked,) a circumstance which establishes the use of the cypher between the parties.

It will also be observed, that the terms selected to designate the Nizam and the Marhattas, are in perfect consonance with the opprobrious terms in which the Nabob is represented to have spoken of the co-operation of the former in the war, and with the sentiments which, upon the same principle, he must have entertained with respect to the Marhattas, and those which his Highness is stated to have expressed generally with regard to the Triple Alliance. The terms are, for the Marhattas, *Pooch*, (or mean, despicable,) and for the Nizam, *Heech*, (nothing, or non-entity). It is also to be observed, that the English are designated by the significant term of "*new-comers*."

It is impossible, with any degree of consistency, to suppose that a cypher composed of terms so pointedly allusive to characters and circumstances, should have been invented but for purposes adverse to the British interests, and hence, while the cypher confirms in a great degree the truth of the reports of the Vakeels, its mere existence is a proof of a disposition on the part of the Nabob hostile to his alliance with the Company.

Another document of even less disputable authenticity than the former, and which corroborates the charge against the Nabob, is the note written by Omdut ul Omrah himself, with a pencil. The language it contains is in strict conformity to that which is so repeatedly ascribed to his father and himself, in the reports of the Vakeels; indeed, the mere circumstance of his writing to Ghoolam Ali Khaun in the terms he has written, would suggest and warrant the conclusion, that something to the effect of those expressions had before passed between them, added to which, the fictitious signature of Ghoolam Hoossain, gives to the whole an air of mystery in itself very suspicious, and when combined with other considerations affords as conclusive evidence as can be expected in such transactions.

The letters from Tippoo Sultaun to the Nabob Waulah Jah, and Omdut ul

Omrah, also come strongly in aid of the general body of evidence. Thus supported, there is every reason to give credit to the general substance of the reports of the Vakeels, (Ghoolaum Ali Khaun, and Alli Rezza Khaun.) The fact of their holding a secret conference with Omdut ul Omrah, at the mosque, or tomb, and in the garden, can hardly be supposed a fabricated story, and would probably be thought worthy of credit, though no other circumstances appeared to support it. The circumstance also, as related by the Vakeels of the Nabob's communicating to them, the secret intelligence which he had received from Bengal, and the intimation relating to Pondicherry, and to the French, bear intrinsic marks of authenticity

It has been shown, that the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah was a principal channel, and a most active and zealous agent for the secret negotiation between the Nabob Waulah Jah, his father, and Tippoo Sultaun, and that he rendered himself a party in it, both by his instrumentality in promoting it, and by uniting his individual sentiments with those of his father; but it may be proper to collect into one point of view the several passages in the correspondence, from which it appears that Omdut ul Omrah maintained a secret intercourse with the Vakeels on his own part, with the same view as on the part of his father, and pledged his individual attachment to the interests of Tippoo Sultaun.

In another report from the Vakeels, not yet noticed, and dated in May, 1793, the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah is stated to have professed his devotion to Tippoo Sultaun in warm terms, and to have desired the Vakeels to assure their master, that "at a proper season, his fidelity towards him should be made manifest." Farther, at a secret meeting which took place at a garden between Omdut ul Omrah, and the Vakeels, by the appointment of the latter, (vide No 15) Omdut ul Omrah is described to have "discoursed in the most undisguised manner on the part of the Nabob Waulah Jah, as well as on his own, of the sincerity of their friendship, attachment, and regard, and also to have made use of some particular expressions of his attachment, requiring them (the Vakeels) upon oath, not to commit them to writing, but to defer the communication of them until their (the Vakeels) return to Tippoo Sultaun, and that he added, 'I have expressed myself as I have done, merely from my regard for the faith, and goodwill towards the defender of the faith. Please God, you will shortly be with his Majesty, when you will communicate them in person.'

Again in the same paper, "Concerning the affair with which your Majesty is acquainted, we have under suitable pleas, and by proper introduction prevailed upon Omdut ul Omrah to lay the foundation of it, and he is exerting himself with zeal in this business."

Lastly, the note written with his own hand before quoted, affords the strongest testimony of his particular and individual attachment to the combined cause of the Mahomedan religion, and the interests of Tippoo Sultaun. It remains to examine what has been the conduct of Omdut ul Omrah, since his accession to the musnud, as far as it is exposed by the documents under discussion.

It appears by two reports from Mahomed Ghyauss, and Mahomed Ghous Khaun, the two ambassadors deputed by Tippoo Sultaun, the latter end of the year, 1795, with khelauts* and letters of condolence to Omdut ul Omrah, for the death of his father, and of congratulation upon his accession to the Musnud, that the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah expressed a desire to hold, and did actually hold a private conference with them upon the subject of his attachment to the Sultaun. The direct proof of it is confined to the two following passages in their reports above adverted to.

"His Highness, with the greatest degree of kindness, placed us close to himself, and launched out into great praises of your Majesty, and appeared delighted with the subject, telling us that it was his intention to send for us, and say what he had to say, in private, adding, that our arrival at this time was extremely proper, (or as it may be interpreted extremely opportune.)"

The second passage is as follows : "after many salams (obeisances) his Highness with the appearance of great satisfaction, rose, and taking our hands said, now am I extremely happy ; we then sat down in a private place, when his Highness expatiated during two hours, (near an hour English) with great warmth upon the subject of union and friendship."

* Honorary dresses.

From the summary terms in which the purport of the Nabob's discourse is described, it may perhaps be inferred that it consisted of little more than empty compliment, since it may be supposed from the minuteness of their other descriptions, that the ambassadors would have been more particular in reporting a conversation of any importance, and the circumstance of "sitting down in a private place," is so common an occurrence, and so often takes place, without adequate occasion, that perhaps little could be founded on this simple fact. On the other hand, the secret intercourse which Omdut ul Omrah maintained with Tippoo Sultaun through the medium of his Vakeels, in the lifetime of Nabob Waulah Jah, the disposition so strongly manifested by him to form a close alliance with the Sultaun, together with all the other circumstances of his conduct as before detailed, the vexation which at that particular time he openly declared himself to feel at the measures pursued by the Government of Madras to effect a modification of the treaty of 1792, the extraordinary attention which his Highness appears to have shewn towards Tippoo Sultaun's ambassadors, and in particular the two documents hereafter noticed, leave no doubt of the continuance of the Nabob's favourable disposition towards Tippoo Sultaun, and of his disaffection towards the British nation, and consequently warrant a well founded belief of his having availed himself of the presence of the ambassadors, to convey and confirm his sentiments in that spirit to the Sultaun.

The first of the two documents above alluded to is, a letter written in the handwriting in which the Nabob's letters are invariably transcribed, as were those of his father, and the same in which the key to the cypher before noticed is written, addressed to Ghoolaum Ali, without seal or signature; but in the place of the former upon the cover, appears in written characters, the name Ghoolaum Hoossain, the fictitious name under which his Highness before wrote (as has been particularly noticed) to Ghoolaum Ali with his own hand, in August, 1794. The letter is indorsed by one of Tippoo Sultaun's Moonshees, as having been received on the 8th of January, 1797, its contents are as follows :

" After a lapse of time, at the moment my heart was desirous of learning the account of your welfare, I had the pleasure to receive your very friendly letter, and I was gratified by the news of your health; I have fully comprehended the several points contained in that letter. You will become acquainted with the circumstances alluded to, from the communications of Mohummud Ghyauss and Mahommud Ghouss Khaun. Deeming me desirous of receiving the pleasing accounts of your health, you will gratify me by communicating them."

There is no address whatever inside the letter, the cover is superscribed to Ghoolaum Ali without any other form. This unusual dereliction of the established forms of address, which is only admissible in letters to persons standing in a very inferior relation to the writer, the hand-writing of the letter, the nature of its contents, and in particular the name of Ghoolaum Hoossain in the place of the seal, denoting that it came from a person of that name, when it is recollect that a former letter to Ghoolaum Ali, unquestionably from the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah himself, was signed and superscribed by that name, prove beyond a doubt that the letter in question was from the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah. The reference to the verbal communications of Mohammed Ghyauss, and Mohammed Ghouss Khaun, for the knowledge of certain circumstances alluded to in the letter which the Nabob acknowledges from Ghoolaum Ali, shews that Omdut ul Omrah had held some secret communication with those ambassadors. That those circumstances related to affairs in which Tippoo Sultaun was concerned, is to be inferred from the circumstances of the letter being indorsed by one of the Sultaun's Moonshees, and preserved among his records. The terms in which the Nabob refers to the verbal communication of the persons above-mentioned seem to warrant a conclusion, that the circumstances which they were to detail, were communicated to them by the Nabob in person, but the lapse of time between their mission to Madras, and the date of the receipt of the letter tends to weaken that conjecture, unless it be supposed (what may probably have been the case) that they made a second visit to the Nabob at Madras. It does not however, affect the question of a secret intercourse with those ambassadors, and this latter fact corroborates the circumstance before detailed, of the Nabob's having held a private conference with those ambassadors at Madras, and combined with the Nabob's prior intrigues and avowed disposition to connect himself in alliance with Tippoo Sultaun, affords a strong

ground of belief, that the object of this intercourse was the same as that which he and his father before held with the Sultaun's Vakeels. It will be remarked, that the letter acknowledges the receipt of one from Ghoolaum Ali. The circumstances of Ghoolaum Ali being the channel of correspondence upon this occasion, and of the Nabob's adoption of the fictitious name Ghoolaum Hoossain may be accounted for as a measure of precaution, as well as from the circumstance of Ghoolaum Ali's having been originally the channel of the secret intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun; the same arguments afford additional reason to believe, that the communications to be made by the ambassadors were upon the same subject as the former clandestine intercourse with the Vakeels.

That Ghoolaum Ali wrote to the Nabob by Tippoo Sultaun's express sanction is more than probable not only because he would scarcely have ventured to correspond with Omdut ul Omiah without such sanction, but from the strong corroborative fact of the letter in question, being indorsed by Tippoo Sultaun's Moon-shee, and placed among his records. If the letter did not refer to something that could not safely be avowed, where was the necessity for all this mystery; if it did not relate to the mutual concerns of Tippoo Sultaun, and the Nabob, why should it have been shewn to, and recorded by the Sultaun?

These proofs are still further corroborated by the second of the two documents before adverted to. It is a letter to Ghoolaum Ali, from Kaudir Newauz Khaun, a favourite and confidential servant, both of the late and present Nabob, and who, it has been shewn was a principal channel of negotiation between them and the Vakeels, in 1792-3, as well as between Omdut ul Omrah, and the ambassadors in 1795. It was received at Seringapatam on the 8th of January, 1797, and contains the following passages :

"What you write of the satisfaction of the Nawaub Tippoo Sultaun upon the intimation of my attachment, has called forth my highest thanks and endless praises. You will present my respectful acknowledgements for his kindness and favours towards me. I have from first to last been endeavouring, that through the favour of God, the degree of union between the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, and Tippoo Sultaun, which is calculated to produce the happiness of God's people, may daily be strengthened and cemented, and mutual friendship and attachment be confirmed and established; and thanks to the Almighty, that the system of harmony and union has acquired the requisite degree of stability and firmness."

The first part of this quotation tends to confirm the accuracy of the report of Tippoo Sultaun's Vakeels, respecting the instrumentality of Kaudir Newauz Khaun, in the intrigues between the Sultaun and the late Nabob. In the latter, the continuation of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah's attachment to the Sultaun, is explicitly avowed with the additional intimation that "the system of union and harmony between them has acquired the requisite degree of stability and firmness."

These documents shew, that secret intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun was carried on by the Nabob to so late a period as the latter end of 1796. Admitting that at the commencement of this intercourse in 1792-3, it was the policy of the British Government to conciliate the friendship and good-will of Tippoo Sultaun, to the utmost practicable degree, and even supposing for the sake of argument, that the Nabobs Waulah Jah, and Omdut ul Omrah, in professing their attachment towards Tippoo Sultaun, far from entertaining sentiments repugnant to the principles of this alliance with the Company, or injurious to the British interests, only pursued the line of policy adopted by the British Government, still that argument would not apply to the latter period of this clandestine intercourse. When the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun in assembling the army on his Highness the Nizam's frontier, rendered it necessary for the British Government to arm for the eventual defence of his Highness's dominions, and when there was every reason to believe, what has since been confirmed, that the Sultaun entertained the most hostile design against the British Empire in India; but in fact, the argument is equally untenable when applied to the first, as to the last mentioned period. If it had been the Nabob's design merely to pursue the line of policy adopted by the British Government; no motive could exist for secrecy. The existence and the use of a cypher between the Nabob and Tippoo Sultaun, so incontrovertibly established, and the designations respectively given in that cypher, to the three allied powers, and the information respecting Bengal and Pondicherry, are utterly inconsistent with the foregoing supposition; and had such only been the views of the Nabob Waulah

Jah, and Omdut ul Omrah, they would have sought to comprehend the Company in this projected league of anity, instead of negotiating a distinct and separate connexion with Tippoo Sultaun, of which the British Government had no knowledge, and from which the British power was pointedly excluded.

It yet remains to be observed, that while Tippoo Sultaun (as we have now discovered) was endcavouring by emissaries, by correspondence, by every means in his power to conciliate the alliance of every state in India for purposes hostile to the British nation in India, it is not probable that he would neglect any attempt to contract an alliance with a Mussulman prince, who, like the Nabob of the Carnatic might have it in his power to be of the most essential service to his views, in the event of hostilities between him and the Company, and it is not perhaps going too far to suppose, that when (as appears by the printed translations of documents found at Seringapatam,) Tippoo Sultaun proposed the landing of the French troops, which he expected, at Porto Novo, there to form a junction with his own army, he had reason to depend upon every assistance which the Nabob could afford towards the success of the expedition ; it is even not improbable that the Nabob was made acquainted with the plan.

If to all the circumstances, inferences, and arguments, herein detailed, be added the perverse (not to say hostile) conduct of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, towards the British Government during the late war, the whole constitutes a body of powerful proof that his Highness had connected himself for several years with Tippoo Sultaun, by ties of interest and community of views, subversive of the fundamental principles of alliance between him and the Company in the season of peace, and absolutely hostile to the British nation in that of war ; and that had the opportunity occurred, he would have openly supported the cause of Tippoo Sultaun, and the Mussulman interest against that of the Company.

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Persian Translator.

APPENDIX P.

*Extract of a Letter from the Mysore Commissioners, dated Seringapatam,
8th of June, 1799 **

"We feel great satisfaction in being able to assure your Lordship, that before the Zenana was searched for treasure, separate apartments were prepared for the ladies, and no precaution omitted to secure them from the possibility of being exposed to any inconvenience. No treasure was found in the Zenana, nor was any article whatever conveyed from thence."

APPENDIX Q.

The Marquess Wellesley to his Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier, &c. +

(PRIVATE AND SECRET.)

Fort William, Feb. 5th, 1801.

SIR.—1. I have the honour to reply to your Excellency's private and secret letter of the 20th of December, 1800.

2. In my most secret official letter (B) of this date, I have stated to your Excellency, my sentiments with respect to the opinion which you have delivered in your official most secret letter (B) of the 20th of December, on the subject of the proposed expedition to the Isle of France.

3. Your Excellency's desire that your opinion stated in that despatch, should be considered as constituting your principal objection against co-operating in the prosecution of the proposed expedition, rendered it more necessary for me to submit to you in an official form, my deliberate reflections on the consequences of your determination.

* This letter refutes the charge made at p. 21, of the troops having searched Tippoo Sultaun's Zenana, after the storming of Seringapatam.

+ Referred to at p. 701 in Lord Hobart's letter to the Marquess Wellesley.

4. Your Excellency will receive with indulgence, my dissent from your opinion, that the general objection of the impolicy of employing any considerable part of the land and sea forces, particularly of the European regiments, on distant objects of enterprize, operated at the period of time in which I had the honour to address your Excellency with equal force against both the proposed expeditions to Batavia, and to the Isle of France; still less can I perceive, that the general objection so justly applied to the projected enterprize against Manilla, in the year 1797, was, in any degree, applicable to the subject of my despatch of the 22d of October, 1800.

5. The expedition which I proposed against the Isle of France, was not intended to have been prosecuted, unless the general state of affairs, at the close of the month of December, or at the commencement of January, had been such as to render the attempt practicable without danger to our Indian possessions. On your Excellency's arrival at Trincomalé, (the intended place of rendezvous) you would have received from me, or from the Governments of Fort St. George, Bombay, or Ceylon, the fullest information on that important branch of the subject; and you would have been in a situation to have availed yourself of every event which might have arisen. Every practicable precaution had been taken to preclude the possibility of your departing for the Isle of France, under any circumstances which could expose our Indian interests to hazard.

6. Had you arrived at Trincomalé at the close of the month of December, your Excellency would have learnt, that the state of affairs in India admitted of the application of a considerable part of our European land forces, to the reduction of the enemy's remaining possessions in this part of the globe; that no prospect appeared of any demand from his Majesty's ministers for our co-operation in Egypt during the approaching season; and that the state of the war in Europe, strongly recommended an immediate attempt upon the Isle of France, while the operations and position of Sir Roger Curtis's ships afforded every reason to expect its complete success. You would also have found, that preparations had been made in Ceylon calculated equally to facilitate an immediate attempt against the Isle of France, or the resumption of the expedition against Batavia, at the most favourable season for the latter enterprize, if in your Excellency's judgment it should have appeared preferable to the former.

7. In the view which I have uniformly taken, and which I have already stated to your Excellency, of the resources and position of the Isles of France and Bourbon, of their importance to the enemy, I have always considered those possessions to constitute a powerful instrument for the attack of India. Under circumstances in which it might have been expected, that the early attention of the enemy would be directed to some effort against this empire, I considered the attack of the Isle of France not as an hazardous diversion of our European force, but as a measure of wise precaution and judicious defence, by which we might be enabled to pre-occupy a military station, and naval resources, essentially necessary to the enemy in the prosecution of any system of extensive operations against our possessions in India; nor could I overlook the important collateral benefits to be expected from the seasonable removal of an evil, under the pressure of which every part of the possessions entrusted to my charge, has for some time past experienced the most severe injury. During the past year, the enemy from the Isle of France has actually carried on the most active hostilities against our trade and commerce in India, with the most alarming degree of vigour and success. The success of this species of warfare had become equally injurious to our interests, and derogatory to the reputation of our power in the opinion of our native subjects, dependants, and allies; while it tended to revive the hopes of our native and European enemies in India. The entire destruction of the piratical power of the French islands, in my opinion, is absolutely essential not only to the security of the trade and commerce of India, but to our national character. Your Excellency will observe, that this view of the nature and objects of the proposed expedition against the Isle of France, and of the various contingencies on which its eventual prosecution was always intended to depend, entirely precludes the application of the argument stated by your Excellency, in the 2nd paragraph of the letter, to which I now have the honour to reply.

First. Because it never was my intention to undertake the expedition *bound* against the French Islands, without full previous knowledge that it could not subject the safety of India to exposure.

Secondly. Because the seasonable occupation of the French islands would afford the most effectual means of embarrassing any movement from France, either towards India, or the Red Sea.

Thirdly. Because a naval war of the most destructive nature is now actually waged by the enemy, against the commerce of India, by the aid of the French islands, and cannot be terminated without their reduction, and

Lastly. Because neither the local position, actual state, genius, and character of the people, or peculiar resources of either Batavia, or Manilla, admit the application of any of the stated considerations to either of those colonies, however valuable and important in a different point of view.

8. With regard to the station and condition of his Majesty's ships, as described in the 3d paragraph of your Excellency's letter, it would be presumption in me to offer any opinion.

9. With regard to the number and rate of the ships proposed by Mr. Stokes's plan, I lament extremely, that your Excellency did not think it necessary to enter into a particular discussion with that gentleman, as I think it more than probable that he would have satisfied your Excellency, of the facility of carrying his plan into execution, within the first period of time proposed, with the ships within your Excellency's reach at the date of the delivery of my despatches of the 22d and 29th of October, 1800.

10. On the latter part of the 4th paragraph of your Excellency's letter, I can only express my entire confidence in the zealous and active co-operation, both of Sir Roger Curtis, and of Sir George Yonge, as soon as they shall be apprized of my intentions.

11. The delay of my brother's arrival from England, renders it impossible for me to think of visiting the coast during the present season.

12. Lord Clive, and Mr. Webbe, General Baird, and Colonel Wellesley, are acquainted with the objects of the armament assembled at Ceylon. I have no reason to apprehend that those objects have yet transpired, although various conjectures have necessarily arisen in the public mind, on a subject of so much curiosity and speculation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

(Most Secret B.)

The Marquess Wellesley to His Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier, &c. &c. &c.

Feb. 5, 1801.

SIR,—1. This letter will contain my reply to your Excellency's despatch marked (most secret B.) of the 20th December, 1800.

2. My sincere personal respect for your Excellency concurs with my sense of public duty, to render that despatch a subject of the deepest regret, and of the most severe disappointment to my mind.

3. Your Excellency has signified to me in the first paragraph of that despatch, that your concurrence in the expedition which I had proposed against the Isle of France, is withholden, because in your decided opinion no such enterprize can with propriety be undertaken, unless by the express command of the King, signified in the usual official form to the British Government of India, and to the commanders of his Majesty's land and sea forces. Admitting, for the present, that your Excellency is required to apply this rule to your own conduct, I cannot admit the force of any such rule to be so great, as to impose on your Excellency the duty of frustrating or impairing the use of such separate means and resources as the British Government in India may possess for the seasonable annoyance of the enemy, without reference to your co-operation, or to the principles by which your discretion may be governed.

4. The principle which your Excellency has stated as the ground of your determination not to co-operate in the proposed expedition against the Isle of France, involved no question of detail, the reasons of your Excellency's dissent being founded simply on the want of his Majesty's express commands to authorize your co-operation in the intended enterprize. This reason admitted of the most brief

and prompt reply to my despatches, nor can I conceive any causes which could render a longer delay than that of a few hours, necessary in such a case. Under these circumstances, it is with the utmost concern that I find myself compelled to lament that the letter announcing your Excellency's dissent, should not have been delivered to Mr. Charles Stokes until the 24th of December, although your Excellency had received my despatches under date 22nd and 29th of October, from Mr. Charles Stokes's hands, on the 2nd of December; and although the Cornwallis kept company with your Excellency's flag-ship from the 2nd of December, until you reached Prince of Wales's Island, and afterwards remained in port with you, until the 24th of December. The necessary result of this delay has been to preclude me from resorting, in due time, to any effectual or seasonable means of supplying the defect of your Excellency's co-operation.

5 Had your Excellency signified to me, without delay, the reasons which induced you to withhold your co-operation in the proposed enterprize, I should have received the communication with pain and concern; but in that case, the resources of the port of Calcutta, and of the arsenal of Fort William, and the period of the season, would have enabled me to have made such an immediate effort, as in my conscientious judgment would have secured to Great Britain in the course of the month of February the possession of the Isle of France, and would have annihilated the nest of privateers, from which so much mischief has issued during the present war. And I should still have been prepared in the course of the approaching season to have resumed the expedition against Batavia.

6. The first of these important objects has been entirely frustrated for the present season by the delay of your Excellency's despatches, and the hazard of a reinforcement arriving at the Isle of France before the present armament can reach that island, exposes the whole plan to the possibility of failure, independently of any measures which your Excellency may now adopt to aid me in its prosecution.

7. But my regret on this painful occasion is infinitely aggravated by adverting to the nature and general operation of the principle which your Excellency has stated as the ground of withholding your concurrence in the proposed expedition. Your Excellency has anticipated the probability of my not acquiescing in that principle; and I trust, therefore, that you will receive with candour and indulgence the respectful representation which my sense of duty to his Majesty, and my regard for the interests of my country, now compel me to address to you.

8. My experience of your Excellency's uniform zeal and alacrity in the prosecution of the public service, since my arrival in India, precludes the possibility of my regarding your dissent from the proposed expedition in any other light than that in which you have stated it, as an intended act of duty towards his Majesty. And if your Excellency's objections had been founded on the difficulty of the proposed plan of attack, either in the present, or in any future season, I should have received with respect and consideration the decision of a person whose judgement on that branch of the subject must necessarily be entitled to the utmost degree of attention. But your Excellency, approving the general outlines of the plan of attack, as founded upon the respectable evidence and accurate information furnished by Mr. Stokes, has declared your decided opinion that no such enterprize can with propriety be undertaken, unless by the express command of the King, signified in the usual official manner to me, and to the commanders of his Majesty's land and sea forces.

9. Injurious to the public service as the operation of such a principle must be, even if limited to the present case, its general application appears to me to involve evils of much greater magnitude, and of more dangerous extent.

10. If the ground of your Excellency's dissent from the proposed expedition to the Isle of France, be admitted as a general rule to govern the conduct of the military and naval service in these distant possessions during the existence of war; I apprehend that the greatest advantage must result from thence to the cause of the enemy. It is an established maxim of state, as well as an unqualified principle of public duty, that, in time of war, all public officers should employ their utmost endeavours to reduce the power and resources of the common enemy of the state, and should avail themselves of every advantage which circumstances may present for the advancement of the interests of their country, by the vigorous prosecution of hostilities. In remote possessions the exigency of this duty increases in pro-

portion to the distance from the parent state, and to the consequent difficulty of obtaining from home express and precise orders, applicable to the various emergencies which must arise in the course of war. If no advantage can ever be taken of the temporary or accidental weakness of the enemy's possessions in India, without express orders from England, signified through the usual official channels, not only to the Government of India, but to the commanders of his Majesty's land and sea forces, it is evident that opportunities of reducing the enemy's power and resources must frequently be lost without the hope of recovery, by reference for formal commands to the source of sovereign authority at home. In the present instance, an extraordinary and fortunate accident had disclosed to me the weak and almost defenceless state of the most important possessions remaining to France in this quarter of the globe. In my judgment, I should have failed in my duty towards my King and country, if I had waited for his Majesty's express commands, or for his orders, signified through the official channels established by Parliament for the government of India, before I had proceeded to take the necessary steps for availing myself of the critical posture of the French interests within the reach of the force entrusted to my controul. The arduous powers vested in me by Parliament are sufficient to render my opinion in India a substitute for the occasional and unavoidable defect of precise and express commands from the sovereign authority of the British empire.

In the exercise of this discretion I am subject to a severe responsibility; but wherever it appears to me to be my duty to exercise my discretion, and to apply for the assistance of his Majesty's naval force in the prosecution of my endeavours against the common enemy, I conceive that his Majesty's naval commander is not only justified in complying with my application, but absolutely required to aid me, unless the condition of his ships shall preclude their co-operation, or unless, in his conscientious judgment, the attempt which I propose may appear to be impracticable, or dangerous to the public service. The want of his Majesty's express commands will never be received either by his Majesty, or by the public, as an admissible justification of the conduct of any public officer for declining to co-operate against the enemy in an attack which appears to be practicable, and which promises advantage to the general cause.

11. Of the rule which I assert, I have furnished an example in my own practice, and if the principle which your Excellency has adopted had governed my conduct, the conquest of Mysoor would not have been achieved.

12. Your Excellency supposes that the express command of his Majesty is necessary to justify your co-operation on the present occasion, because his Majesty's express command had been signified to the commanders of his naval forces on all similar occasions within the compass of your experience.

13. It is undoubtedly the duty of his Majesty's ministers, in time of war, to issue express commands in all cases which can be foreseen, and to which such orders may be justly applicable. This practice will be more diligently pursued in proportion to the activity and ability of the administration actually in power. But however general such a practice may have been under the administration of his Majesty's present ministers, during the course of this war, no argument of precedent can thence be derived to exempt public officers, stationed in distant possessions, from the indispensable duty of availing themselves, with promptitude and alacrity, of those invaluable occasions and opportunities of reducing the enemy, which remote wisdom cannot foresee, and for which remote authority cannot provide.

14. By issuing express commands for the annoyance of the enemy in India, in particular instances, the wisdom of his Majesty's councils never proposed to render the receipt of his express previous commands in time of war, a necessary preliminary of every important act of hostility, nor to forbid the commencement of any rational enterprize in this quarter of the globe, until the direct notification of his royal pleasure should arrive in an official form. In any case, such a limitation upon the genius and spirit of the public servants in India, could only tend to contract our sphere of action, and to impair the predominant strength of the British power. But in the present war, contending against an enemy of indefatigable activity, of inexhaustible resource, and of the most daring spirit of adventure, this confined policy would weaken all our means of meeting the characteristic advantages of our antagonist, and would leave to him the undisputed possession of the

most extensive field for the free exercise of his formidable powers of enterprize, promptitude, and boldness.

15. If this argument could require any additional illustration, it would be furnished by the extent of the injury which the trade and commerce of India have sustained from the activity and boldness with which the inhabitants of the isles of France and Bourbon have employed the limited resources of those islands in the prosecution of hostilities during the present war, under every disadvantage of internal discord, and even of the occasional neglect, if not of the positive enmity of France.

16. In the midst of all these difficulties and embarrassments, the naval force of the French islands has carried into Port Louis British property to the amount of above two millions of pounds sterling, since the commencement of the present war.

17. My intimate personal knowledge of the characters of his Majesty's present Ministers, as well as my experience of their public conduct, enable me to assure your Excellency, that they will never become the patrons of any system, which in any quarter of the globe shall be calculated to limit the energy of British talents, to discourage the ardour of British spirit, or to open new and secure channels to the enterprising character of French adventure.

18. Even in the instances in which express orders have been dispatched to India from home in time of war, great latitude has always been afforded to the discretion of the Government on the spot; and while I have had the honour to hold the arduous station in which I am now placed, I have uniformly claimed from his Majesty's Ministers that degree of confidence which, during time of war, should admit of my selecting, in concert with the commanders of the sea and land forces, the time and mode of attacking the possessions of the enemy in India. Without this extent of confidence, it would be impossible for any person in my station to be responsible for the safety of his important charge. On the other hand, I am persuaded that his Majesty's Ministers rely on me, that no practicable opportunity of reducing the enemy's power in India will be neglected, and it shall be my earnest endeavour to justify their confidence in this respect.

19. Having thus reviewed the fatal consequences which must ensue from the application of the principle alleged by your Excellency to the present case, and from its adoption as a general rule of public service in India, I have felt it to be my indispensable duty to address to you an earnest but respectful remonstrance against your Excellency's determination not to co-operate in any expedition against the Isle of France, without the express commands of the King, signified to your Excellency in the usual official form.

20. I flatter myself that a reconsideration of the subject will induce your Excellency to waive an objection, which cannot be admitted as a rule of public service in time of war without considerable advantage to the cause of the enemy, and without proportionate injury to the interests of Great Britain.

21. I have confined my observations in this despatch to the general principle of your Excellency's dissent, having submitted to you, in separate despatches, the statement of such suggestions as the actual circumstances of our situation appear to require with respect as well to Batavia as to the Isle of France.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) WELLESLEY.

The Marquess Wellesley to his Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier.

(Most secret (A)).

SIR,

Fort William, 10th February, 1801.

1. In the moment of closing my despatches to your Excellency of the 5th instant, which you will receive by the present opportunity, an overland packet brought me the despatches from the Right Honourable Mr. Secretary Dundas, of which I have the honour to enclose copies for your Excellency's information.

2. In consequence of the receipt of these despatches, I have issued instructions

of this date to Major-General Baird, which I have directed him to communicate to your Excellency.

3. Your Excellency has probably received similar orders from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. But whatever may be the state of your latest advices from Europe, I am confident that your Excellency will instantly co-operate with me, to the fullest extent of your power, in the execution of his Majesty's commands for the important object of expelling the French from Egypt.

4. Your Excellency will necessarily exercise your judgment respecting the number and description of his Majesty's vessels from your squadron, which it may be proper to employ on the present service. The deficiency of the tonnage now collected at the Island of Ceylon renders it highly desirable that your Excellency should receive a proportion of the troops on board his Majesty's ships, and convey them to their destination in the Red Sea, and it would be peculiarly useful that your Excellency should select for this service such officers as are acquainted with the navigation of the Red Sea, and also that you should supply the transports with persons conversant with that navigation, and that you should furnish the officers commanding the land forces with every degree of information relative to the coasts and harbours of the Red Sea. It will also be advisable that a certain number of frigates or other armed vessels should be employed at Bombay, Fort St. George, and at the mouth of the river Hooghly, for the purpose of affording protection to the store ships, which it will be necessary to send, in constant succession, to the Red Sea from those several ports, with provisions for the European and native troops employed in that quarter. It will, from the present time, be of the utmost importance to protect these store ships from the depredations of the enemy's cruisers; especially as the activity of these may be expected to increase in consequence of the unavoidable postponement of the expedition against the Isle of France.

5. It is possible that, before the arrival of the armament from India in the Red Sea, the French may have been compelled to evacuate Egypt. In this case, or if it should be found impracticable for the troops from India to act with effect on the coasts of the Red Sea, it is my wish that the armament should be employed as speedily as possible in the reduction of the Isles of France and Bourbon, or of Batavia, according as the condition of the armament, at the period of leaving the Red Sea, shall appear to recommend in the judgment of the naval and military officers in the chief command of the forces.

6. If the probable deficiency of provisions should appear to be so considerable towards the conclusion of the month of June, as that the troops can neither maintain their position in the Red Sea, nor proceed against the French Islands nor Batavia, it will perhaps be judged necessary by the officers commanding the military and naval forces to return to India. With this view, I have empowered Major-General Baird to exercise his discretion in conjunction with the naval commanding officer, in the manner stated in paragraphs 43rd, 44th, 45th and 46th of my instructions of this date to Major-General Baird. I have the honour to refer your Excellency to those instructions, for my sentiments on such parts of the details of this important expedition as I have found it necessary or possible to state in the present moment.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) WELLESLEY.

APPENDIX R.

BENARES ADDRESS.

To his Excellency the most noble Richard Marquess Wellesley, K. P., Captain-General and Governor-General of India, &c. &c.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

We, the European inhabitants of Benares, impelled no less by the highest respect and admiration of your Excellency's character than by an ardent love of our native country, cannot refrain from offering to your Excellency our sincerest congratulations upon the late glorious successes of the British arms in Egypt. While

we exult in the general effect of your Excellency's administration, which has, in the short space of three years, extended and consolidated the British empire in India in a degree which must ever be contemplated with astonishment, we cannot repress the emotions which are, on the present occasion, excited in our minds by a consideration of the prompt and vigorous manner in which resources, so recently acquired, were applied by your Excellency to the aid of the general cause of the British empire : and, when we rejoice as Britons at the glorious success, which has followed the animated exertions of our brave countrymen in Egypt, we feel indebted to your Excellency for the proud reflection, that a force from British India has co-operated in this important service ; and that a part of that army, which so lately entitled itself to the approbation of its Sovereign, and of its country, by the reduction of Seringapatam, is at this moment employed on the shores of the Mediterranean.

The casual, but to us fortunate, occurrence of your Excellency's having received the intelligence of the fall of Alexandria and total expulsion of the French from Egypt, at this place, has suggested the idea of the present address, which, we confidently hope, your Excellency will graciously accept as the honest and unpreserved effusion of sentiments, which we are conscious of only entertaining in common with the rest of our countrymen in India.

[Signed by all the European Inhabitants.—ED.]